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Introduction
Collective action among peersÐthat is, cooperation among individuals who are, or
tend to be, formally equal in powerÐis an important problem in social and eco-
nomic life. For example, an increasingly large number of organizations ®nd them-
selves involved in knowledge-intensive production. This means that they must
permanently try to adjust to technological changes, to encourage higher quality,
innovation, and participation. These changes and adaptations are often associated
with an apparent decline of Taylorian rationalization of work. In this old model,
competence, and regulatory and decision-making authority are concentrated at the
top; objectivation and routinization of tasks are for the bottom. As a consequence of
this decline, organizations involved in knowledge-intensive work try to reduce the
number of hierarchical levels in their formal structures. They try to involve many
more members and stakeholders in regulatory activity. In turn, organization the-
oristsÐafter a century of critique of Weberian bureaucracy as a basic principleÐ
focus on such contemporary ¯attening and decentralizing organizations.
In spite of this attention, collective action among peers remains a puzzle for the
social sciences. Contemporary sociology does have a tradition of thought about
egalitarian relationships in organizations and society. This tradition debates the
possibility of organization without hierarchy. In particular, since Robert Michels's
Political Parties (1911), many sociologists have pointed to the fact that ¯at organ-
izations are also highly structured, a theme underlying discussions of the `iron law
of oligarchy' (for a review, see Rothschild and Whitt 1986). However, there is little
empirically grounded work researching how organizations without permanent
bosses and followers, in which all members ultimately have a formally equal say in
running operations or exercising control, are able to operate.
In the history of sociology, two reasons at least may explain a relative lack of
progress in the study of speci®c social mechanisms that underlie cooperation among
peers. First, the debate between Max Weber and Michels was framed by Weber so as
to focus on the `illusion' of pure democracy and on a general bureaucratization
process (Scaff 1981). Since then, the idea of a relatively general collegial modelÐto
use Weber's own vocabularyÐwith its own characteristics and in¯uence within the
bureaucratic model, or as an alternative to this model, has attracted little attentionÐ
although there are clear indications in classics such as Union Democracy by Lipset,
Trow, and Coleman (1956) that it resurfaces periodically.
Secondly, Weber himself mainly discusses collegiality as a means for hierarchy to
control experts or as a way to restrain autocratic control. This has led to a reduction
of the issue of cooperation among peers to one of a con¯ict between two forms of
statusÐthat is, between professional expertise and hierarchical coordination.1 In
this perspective, professional settings have been of particular interest to the study of
this form of collective action. These include corporate law ®rms, engineering and
technology ®rms, architecture ®rms, advertising agencies, medical wards, consulting
®rms, investment banks, scienti®c laboratories, religious congregations, and many
other organizations bringing together recognized experts.2
More generally, however, complexity, concern for quality and innovation, and
high variability of tasks usually lead to the right to participate in decision making
and share economic returns (Woodward 1965; but see also Burns and Stalker 1966;
Parsons 1968; Stinchcombe 1959), even in non-professional settings. Work on
`plural' forms of organizations (see e.g. Bradach and Eccles 1989) shows that the
issue of cooperation among peers is also relevant in countless collegial pockets that
can be found in larger bureaucratic organizations. In matrix (Davis and Lawrence
1977) or project-based structures, for example, individual members have to function
with frequently changing task assignments and group attachments, to report to
more than one superior, and to rely on expertise of colleagues from other work
units. Whenever members deal together with complex decisions that cannot be
routinized, this issue reappears.
T H E C OL L EG I A L OR G A NI Z A TI ON A N D
IT S G EN ER IC SO CI A L M EC H A NI SM S
In order to understand cooperation among peers as an issue of interest to organ-
izations in general, saying that activities are governed by objectives and resultsÐno
longer by Taylorian standard procedures and pyramidsÐis not enough. A ®rst step
consists in de®ning the characteristics of an idealtypical collegial organization, as
distinguished from bureaucracy. A second, theory-guided step consists in identi-
fying and analysing generic social mechanisms that characterize this organizational
form and help it govern itself.
At the intersection of the sociological literatures on organizations and on the
professions, increased interest for a general principle of `collegiality' has recently
produced original neo-Weberian theories that have proposed a set of formal
characteristics differentiating `collegial' or `polycratic' organizations from bureau-
cratic or monocratic ones. Waters's work (1989, 1993) on the collegial or `polycratic'
model, for example, offers a fresh look at this old issue, and the present book builds
on his contribution. He de®nes collegial organizations as `those in which there is
dominant orientation to a consensus achieved between the members of a body of
experts who are theoretically equals in their levels of expertise but who are special-
ized by area of expertise' (1989: 956).
Here I argue that this neo-Weberian description of a collegial form is useful
but not suf®cient by itself to explain collective action among peers, because it is
based almost exclusively on the idea of voluntary contracts, formal structure, and
formal consensus.3 This approach is limited because there are many tensions in
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the collegium, and there are obvious con¯icts between the individual and the col-
lective interest, for which it does not account. What is missing in this approach is a
deeper understanding of the social processes that help collegial organizations
solve typical problems of collective action and cooperation. In my view, a
combined neo-Weberian and structural approach is needed for that purpose. This
approach provides a deeper view of how such collegial organizations operate, a more
realistic picture of the `collegial phenomenon'Ðan expression echoing Michel
Crozier's Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1963). It often questions pervasive discourse on
idealized collegiality among peers. As in model approaches such as Crozier's or Peter
Blau's (1964), our approach to this phenomenon is based primarily on under-
standing power in such collective actors. Power is de®ned as the ability of indivi-
duals or groups in the organization to impose their will on others as a result
of resource dependencies. In the case of collective action among peers, however,
such dependencies are often less permanent and more complex than in bureau-
cracies. Power is shared, then aggregated upwards to be exercised simultaneously
by several positions in a `polycratic' system. There are also norms concerning this
exercise, especially for legitimization of inequality and justi®cation of acceptance
of inequality.
In effect, what does a `structural' approach mean? The term structural refers
to regularities observed in multiple and informal relationships between membersÐ
for example, strongly personalized co-workers' ties, or advice ties, or even friend-
ship ties. Such ties provide access to key production-related resources such as
co-workers' goodwill or advice, or to resources that are not directly connected with
the production process, such as friendship. In an organization, stable and durable
relationships represent multilateral resource interdependencies. They aggregate
and combine into an informal pattern of ties that is called `structure' because it
captures many kinds of opportunities and constraints for members in their
attempts to manage such resources. It is important to note that, in the Weberian
tradition, these social and informal relationships have long been considered by the
bureaucratic model as particularistic obstacles to ef®cient collective action (Perrow
1986). In the collegial model, however, some of these durable relationships
become the basis of a social discipline that helps members cooperate and exchange,
monitor, pressure, and sanction each other, and negotiate precarious values.
Without such an approach of resource interdependencies and social relationships, it
is dif®cult to understand generic social mechanisms (HedstroÈm and Swedberg
1998a) that characterize any form of collective action, particularly among rival
partners (Bourricaud 1961).
For any sociological theory of collective action, such generic social mechanisms
necessarily include, ®rst, an exchange system of multiple social resources; secondly, a
control regime; and, thirdly, a process of (re)negotiation of rules and underlying
precarious values. They are part of what Crozier and Friedberg (1977) would call
the `concrete action system' of any type of organization.4 As shown by Granovetter
(1985), specifying such mechanisms goes beyond statements of `embeddedness'
seeking to prove the economic ef®ciency of social ties. The speci®c mechanisms that
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help ¯at or collegial organizations operate are not necessarily comparable to that of
more bureaucratic and pyramidal organizations, because they are based on the
speci®city of resource interdependencies that characterize complex relationships
between formally equal partners. Sketching this system for collegial organizations
(or for collegial pockets in bureaucratic organizations) will, therefore, require spe-
ci®c methods that are able to look into complex resource interdependencies.
Methods such as network analysis both strengthen sociologists in their theories and
allow them to look at economic activity from this original perspective.
Thanks to such generic social mechanisms, ¯at organizations can achieve results
that many economic theories did not think they could: for example, help members
participate in collective action when they are expected to free-ride; coordinate the
activities of interdependent entrepreneurs when they are expected to ignore each
other as competitors; monitor and sanction deviant peers back to good conduct;
stabilize policy making or change the rules of the game when promises from the past
are dif®cult or impossible to keep. Speci®cally, analyses will show that they are
highly functional in addressingÐamong othersÐsuch problems as enhancing
economic performance and quality control (Chapter 4); cultivating and mitigating
status competition (Chapter 5); and integrating the ®rm by preventing easy defec-
tion by teams (Chapter 6). It is by focusing on such mechanisms of social organ-
ization (sometimes called self-organization) and by approaching the issue of
collective action among peers from a structural perspective that this book adds value
in research on collective action among peers.
A B R O A DL Y C ON C EI VE D ST R U C TU R A L A P P R OA C H
What does the expression `combined neo-Weberian and structural approach to
cooperation among peers' mean? How exactly does it help in reasoning about
collegial organizations? This approach is broadly conceived as having the ®ve fol-
lowing characteristics.
The ®rst is that it combines an understanding of the interests of actors themselves
with that of their organization as a whole, thus bridging the levels of individual and
collective action. It does so both by looking at the organization as a small political
community and by using information on relationships between members as
information on their resource interdependencies and derived power relationships.
In effect, in organized settings, participation in collective actionÐfor example, team
production, regulatory activity, or enforcement of previous agreementsÐrequires
cooperation with others. This cooperation is expressed through routine interactions
that allow transfers or exchanges of various kinds of resources. Examples for such
resources include information, co-workers' goodwill, advice, sometimes moral or
emotional support, and many other means that serve individual and collective ends.
Particularly in collegial organizations, all members have some resources that are
important to others; therefore, they all have, although to various degrees, some
power. These interdependencies are the product of a formal division of work and of
informal exchanges and circulation of all sorts of production-related resources
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through social ties. Together with formal dimensions of structure, they aggregate to
form an opportunity structure that constrains members' choices in access to
resources. In that respect, structural analysis is compatible with what Crozier (1963;
Crozier and Friedberg 1977) calls `strategic' analysis. Indeed, the former presupposes
the latter and offers sophisticated measurements of resource interdependencies,
status, and power. This means that, along with the analysis of structural determin-
ants of action, one must draw on a perspective that allows for some individual
freedom of choice and provide behavioural assumptions that include some kind of
strategic rationality.
The second characteristic of this broadly conceived structural approach, one that
separates it from earlier and narrower forms of structuralism, is its capacity to look
jointly at economic and symbolic activities. Saying that actors use their resource
interdependencies as a source of power presupposes a form of rationality that
includes cost±bene®t calculations, but also symbolic activity such as appropriateness
judgements (based on previous investments in relationships, recognition of iden-
tities, identi®cations in reference groups, and the use of various forms of authority
arguments) allowing individuals to politicize their exchanges and controls. For
example, volatile, intangible, or immaterial resources, such as knowledge, cannot be
accumulated, bartered, and shared outside such identity politics and boundary
management (Blau 1964; Lazega 1992a, 1999b).5 Opportunity structures do not
explain behaviour mechanically: actors do not always perceive a course of action as
an opportunity. They often make choices of courses of action based on symbolic or
normative criteria, to meet others' expectations. They politicize exchanges not only
to reduce costs, but to maintain shared principles that they think will help them.
Note that, in this perspective, power is not purely formal and unidimensional.
It is not reduced to a phone call from the White House. If actors politicize their
exchanges and controls, they must be assumed to have a trained capacity to perceive
relationships among others (and underlying resource interdependencies) and to
manipulate these relationships. Social relations and the resources that they con-
centrate do matter for power among peers. This also means that collegial is not a
synonym for congenial and nice. Partners can manage their interdependencies in
informal but truly Machiavellian ways. Status competition among peers can be all
the more ferocious, as it is heavily personalized. Collegial committees can be as
brutal as autocrats when they vote like lynch mobs.
Actors' politicization has two combined but potentially con¯icting dimensions:
niche seeking and status competition, both based on selections of or investments in
relationships. A member's social niche can be de®ned as a relational context, or
subset of other members in the organization, with whom this member commits
him/herself to exchange many different types of resources at a relatively lower cost,
an advantage that can be called bounded solidarity6 (for the complete de®nition, see
Chapter 1). As seen above, in spite of professional ideologies picturing them as
independent entrepreneurs (`their own men/women'), individual professionals are
strategic and inter-dependent entrepreneurs who need access to production-related
resources. Politicization is manifest in the selection of these exchange partners. It is
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rational because members try to build or join such multifunctional production
contexts as if they were stable quasi-groups in which these resources are more easily
available to them than outside these quasi-groups.
Politicization of exchanges means that selection of partners is based on particu-
laristic identi®cation to others (intuitions about how one's long-term interests are
compatible with that of others within a group identi®ed by speci®c characteristics
and similarities, and therefore by a form of bounded solidarity). Niche building or
seeking is strategic, but, once built, niches have the advantage of allowing partial
suspension of calculating behaviour. Indeed, they are built for that purpose, and
thus allow multiplex barters of resources without general equivalent (Blau 1964).
The word `multiplex' quali®es a rich relationship between two persons. It refers to
the fact that the two persons have a relationship in which they can transfer and
exchange multiple types of resources (Wasserman and Faust 1994). For example,
two partners have a multiplex relationship because they are co-workers on many
cases, because they also seek each other for advice in dif®cult professional situations,
and ®nally because they also have social activities outside work together. Analyt-
ically, this means that speci®c local substructures compounding several types of
social ties must crystallize for members to be able to cooperate on an ongoing basis
in the context of wider collective actors such as organizations.
This solidarity is bounded by identity politics (We-versus-Them reasoning)
playing strategically with multiple memberships and hierarchies of allegiances. In
short, members must, therefore, be characterized by a strategic and symbolic
rationality, by a long-term view enabling them both to value the ideology of
autonomous action (Freidson 1975, 1999; Sciulli 1986; Waters 1989) and to create
various forms of bounded solidarity with potential competitors (thus conditionally
suspending their strategic behaviour). This politicization, however, can also lead to
any forms of social discrimination that come attached to barter.
As strategic and interdependent entrepreneurs, these individuals also compete for
statusÐthat is, they try to concentrate resources in their own individual hands so as
to bene®t from a position of strength when negotiating terms of exchange (that is,
bartering) within and outside their quasi-groups (Blau 1964). In sociological theory,
status summarizes members' contributions to the collective, their recognition, and a
speci®c form of authority derived from this recognition. However, formally and
informally, there are many forms of status, because there are many ways of con-
tributing to the collective. The of®cial member, the most competent, the most
popular, the most committedÐall these have some sort of status, and participate in
the coordination of collective action. One important aspect of status is that members
back it by concentrating resources accumulated within niches and beyond niches, in
the wider context of the organization. Without this concentration, status remains
purely formal; it does not mean a true power to in¯uence either decisions made in
the collegium, or terms of exchange with others.
These assumptions about members' strategic rationality lead to a third char-
acteristic of a broadly conceived structural approach. As mentioned above, it bridges
the individual and collective levels of action by thinking in terms of multilevel
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social mechanisms. Examples of such mechanisms provided in this book include
generalized exchange (a form of bounded solidarity based on the existence of cycles
of indirect reciprocity among selected colleagues), lateral control (a form of early
monitoring and sanctioning of deviant conduct that both spreads and concentrates
the costs of control), and regulatory change (a form of `constitutional' rede®nition
of the rules of the game that is driven by members with multiple forms of status).
Multilevel theoriesÐfor example, a combination of rational choice and structural
analysis (e.g. Blau 1964; Boudon 1981; Burt 1982; Coleman 1990; Crozier and
Friedberg 1977; Hechter 1987; HedstroÈm and Swedberg 1998b; Lindenberg 1995;
Wippler and Lindenberg 1987), have been available for a long time. For example,
purposeful individual action produces unexpected effects at the structural level.
However, this combination is rarely focused on explaining stable collective action,
or participation in cooperation, and actual empirical work bridging the levels of
analysis is scarce. Improving on early approaches, a broadly conceived structural
approach identi®es the social mechanisms that are derived from, and fuelled by,
members' strategic and symbolic rationality (that is, from relational investments,
niche building/seeking and status competition).
In effect, niche seeking and status competition represent two rational dimensions
of individual politicized behaviour that create some compatibility between the
interests of the individual and that of the ®rm as a whole, micro through macro. For
the individual partner, a social niche provides access to multiple resources at a lower
relative cost; status provides an advantage in the negotiations of terms of exchange
for these resources. As will be shown below, social niches are useful to the organ-
izationÐfor example, because they make a form of solidarity possible for individu-
alistic entrepreneurs; once this solidarity has been introduced, social niches
constrain their members into increased performance and contribution; they allow
knowledge sharing and thus an unobtrusive form of quality control; they also lower
the costs of pressuring deviant partners back to good order. Status competition is
also useful for the ®rm as a whole. It drives and controls brainstorming in the search
for innovative solutions to complex problems; it produces different forms of power
that can be divided among different partners so as to reach a form of balance of
powers; it creates an oligarchy that can be helpful in maintaining a form of nor-
mative order, preventing endless discussions of precarious values.
Niche seeking and status competition, however, also represent risks for the ®rm.
Niches can be perceived as factions. They represent an increased risk of the defection
of entire subgroups to other ®rms. This study shows that, nevertheless, the balance of
powers reached by status competition can contribute to the prevention of such
`teaming up and out', and thus to the integration of the organization in spite of many
centrifugal forces. Status competition also can get out of control and create a pro-
blem of `too many chefs'. In turn, niches help reduce this risk by providing incentives
for mitigation of con¯icts and methods for exercising restraint. Niche seeking thus
helps solve problems raised by status competition, and the other way around.
The fourth characteristic of a broadly conceived structural approach is its use of
network analysis as a method for looking at these social mechanisms, at their
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consequences, at the ways in which niche seeking and status competition are
combined. As suggested by the above de®nition of multiplexity, power among peers
and durable collegial cooperation are not understandable without complex social
relationships as components of such processes. Network analysis is particularly well
suited here, because it analyses systematically the ways in which members politicize
their exchanges and controlsÐthat is, the ways in which members select their
partners when they transfer and exchange many types of production-related
resources, and resulting interdependencies.
In particular, an accent on multiplexity of relationships between members
guarantees a more precise understanding of interdependencies and power among
economic actors participating in collective action, and therefore of the related social
mechanisms themselves. Analytically, this is equivalent to saying that speci®c,
recurrent, local (uniplex and multiplex) substructures of social ties must be iden-
ti®ed to understand how members can cooperate and exchange on an ongoing basis
in the context of wider and politicized collective actors such as organizations. As will
be shown in the case study, such substructural patterns of uniplex or multiplex ties
are the building blocks of social mechanisms solving problems of individual action
(for instance, by reducing individual transaction costs, thus improving chances of
getting ahead) and coordination (for example, by simultaneously cultivating and
mitigating status competition, thus solving a `too-many-chefs' problem).
In addition, the methods of network analysis are particularly well suited to
account for the existence of social niches and various forms of status at the level of
the organization. Niches are de®ned as dense subsets of members that combine
both cohesion and pro®le similarity (that is, approximated structural equivalence)
vis-aÁ-vis the other members of the organization. Various forms of centrality in
different networks can be used as indicators of status and power. Combined with
speci®c centrality and constraint measures, pro®le similarity sometimes helps to
detect much more competitiveÐif not opportunisticÐbehaviour. For example,
members of the ®rm who are not part of one's niche are considered to be colleagues
that can be played off against each other and exploited in the oligarchic status
competition process (Burt 1982, 1992).7
Finally, the ®fth characteristic of a broadly conceived structural theory is its
account of collective actors' built-in dependence on culturalÐthat is, normativeÐ
processes. Saying that status provides a position of strength to de®ne terms of
exchanges is equivalent to saying that it helps de®ne the values, norms, and rules
from which such terms are derived. In early structural sociology, the conceptual
relationship between relational structures, on the one hand, and norms and values,
on the other hand, has been elusive. In narrow structural approaches, resource
interdependencies, more than norms, are considered the only principle of social
order (Brint 1992; DiMaggio 1992). My approach, however, aligns itself with a more
institutional perspective.8 In particular, to explain social change or stability, it
emphasizes the interpenetration of the interactional and normative realms. For
example, contracts and politicized social mechanisms sustaining their enforcement
are not suf®cient to maintain cohesion and solidarity in a social group, especially
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when structural constraints are multiple and sometimes contradictory. Members
need to learn and interiorize, or at least to commit themselves to, a system of rules
and underlying norms and values that contribute to make these contracts mean-
ingful and enforceable. Even if constraints, opportunities, and resource dependen-
cies are viewed as having a more pronounced effect on human behaviour than do
cultural norms, the latter do not disappear as a necessary ingredient of collective
action. This is particularly the case in collegial organizations, where all partners have
regulatory interests and rights, and are confronted with issues that require prin-
cipled and long-term choices between policy options.
Institutional theories of action have long stressed organizational values, norms,
and rules as restraints on grabbing economic behaviour and brutal exercise of
power. Such values are debated, contested, and permanently rede®ned by members.
Organizations change in part because they can rede®ne their formal and informal
rules (Reynaud 1989). This institutional level of organization was explicitly for-
mulated by many sociologists (Merton 1957; Parsons 1956a) and by studies
of political or micro-political efforts to change the rules by competing interests.
Such efforts may or may not be successful, and social arrangements are often
stable enough to hide such underlying contests. Structural analysis can help to
identify them.
Here, two notions combine a structural and an institutional perspective:
Selznick's idea (1957) of precarious values and the notion of `multi-status oligarchs'.
In his institutional conception of the regulatory process, Selznick illustrates the
entanglement of structure and culture with the concept of precarious value. A value
is precarious because it is always in danger of losing its ¯ag carriers and repre-
sentativesÐthat is, the active support by organized interest groups and elites that
help preserve it as a candidate for top priority on the list of all competing values.
This connection between structure and culture is useful, because any regulatory
process is a form of change that involves broken promises in the redistribution of
resources (Reynaud and Reynaud 1996). When the rules of the game are changed,
some parties come out as losing resources and others as winning resources com-
pared to the previous distribution. This is why, in organizations, regulatory changes
need the support of members with both power and legitimacy to push for changes.
Speci®c members, those with multiple and loosely connected forms of status, are the
key in such changes, because they can use such dependencies and legitimacy in the
regulatory process.
Such an approach is also not incompatible with our earlier rational choice
assumptions. In effect, just as they build or join social niches, members manage
exchanges of resources using formal and informal rules. Classical institutional
approaches to coordination in production have also insisted on the close links
between instrumentally rational actions and normatively (or `axiologically') rational
actions (Boudon 1998; Frey 1997). Values count for economic actors, not simply
through moral virtue but through politicized negotiation of the terms of exchanges.
In our view, culture and structure are therefore related in two ways at least.
First, norms help create relationships that are necessary for generic social
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mechanisms. Others are often chosen as exchange partners, bystanders, or third
parties so as to conform to the rules. For example, convergent social expectations
create lateral control intervention at the triadic level; they also create the role of
multi-target lever (MTL) (see Chapter 7). Members may select exchange partners
precisely among others whom they perceive as respecting the same rules of the game,
as sharing the same values. Secondly, a relational structure matters in the changes
of rules; since any such change means broken promises, it positions members
whom I will call multi-status oligarchs in a favourable way to rede®ne priorities
between precarious values and derived policy options. Indeed, regulatory changes
need the support of members with several forms of status. These oligarchs must have
the capacity to promote regulatory changes and deal with the negative effects of
broken promises. When differences in power are not huge among members, this
capacity often rests on sacri®ce of resources by such multi-status oligarchs. As will
be shown in Chapter 8, those who can afford to sacri®ce resources while not
losing power are people who have several inconsistent forms of status. Thanks to
this inconsistency, or loose coupling, losing one form of status does not entail
losing another.
Neither does this approach con¯ict with symbolic rationality. Beneath every kind
of rule, there is a representation of the collective (a convention9), or strong reference
group for which this rule makes sense (Strong and Dingwall 1985). The latter thus
reaches a certain stability that helps economic actors coordinate production and
distribution. This de®nition has strong normative extensions: it helps identify what
to expect legitimately in terms of commitments and solidarity in exchanges of
resources. Conventions thus include rules to which members refer to select partners
for production-related exchanges.
This broadly conceived structural approach is necessary to understand durable
cooperation among autonomous professionals, or collective action among peers. It
should also make this enterprise of value to more general sociological theory.
OU TL I NE O F T H E BO OK
Chapter 1 offers the theoretical framework that combines the neo-Weberian and the
broadly conceived structural approaches to provide a better understanding of this
kind of rational actor and of social mechanisms driven by such behaviour. This
framework expands on the view of peers presented aboveÐthat is, niche-seeking
entrepreneurs carving out a place for themselves in the larger group by selecting
relationships and by getting involved in various forms of status competition.
Partnerships are a good example of such collegial organizations, especially those
in which social relationships and underlying resource interdependencies tend to be
durable. In this book, I present this theory and describe these mechanisms, using as
an example a network study of a speci®c collegial organization, a corporate law
partnership in which partnersÐrational and calculating actors if ever there were
anyÐlocked themselves in a cooperative and long-term situation without much
hierarchy and formal power differences to enforce their agreement. In such a
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context, peers are `interdependent entrepreneurs'. For centuries, partnership
agreements as legal contracts have embodied various types of solidarity and mutual
obligations among potentially rival business partners. However, very little has been
written about cooperation in such organizations and their typical problems of
collective action among peers. Partnerships in particular, and collegial, knowledge-
intensive organizations in general, are complex social systems that need to ®nd
solutions to these typical problems.
This professional services ®rm is used as a site for testing propositions about how
niche seeking and status competition combine to offer an original view of social
mechanisms maintaining and using collective responsibility. This makes their ®rm
interesting for someone asking fundamental questions raised by traditional sociol-
ogy and using a broadly conceived structural approach. How do such durable
relationships help maintain individual performance and quality output, deal with
opportunistic free-riding, balance the powers of rainmakers and schedulers, and
integrate a multi-city ®rm in spite of many centrifugal forces? This ®rm is examined
using combined methods such as network analysis, ethnography of task forces
performing legal work, and organizational analysis of internal politics in the ®rm.
The collegial form does not necessarily take the form of a partnership contract.
Yet the processes going on in this ®rm, and therefore the whole case examined here,
are paradigmatic for what happens in any collegial and knowledge-intensive
environment bringing together interdependent entrepreneurs. In Chapter 2, I pre-
sent the empirical research conducted to ground and test this approach to collegial
organizations, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. I present the ®rm,
called Spencer, Grace & Robbins (or SG&R, an alias) and a standard organizational
analysis of its operations.10 Like many experts, lawyers create, apply, or preserve
knowledge (Flood 1987; Mann 1985; Nelson 1988; Starbuck 1992). As for any type of
collective-action system, this ®rm is examined from the perspective of resource
interdependencies connected to the production process (Crozier and Friedberg
1977). In particular, partners have adopted a compensation system (an equal sharing
default rule) that helps (or forces) them to take a long-term view with regard to
cooperation and solidarity. For example, they can only expel one of their own if
there is near unanimity against him or her. These characteristics may be connected
to the fact that they belong to a profession that is usually favoured with monopoly
returns,11 thus loosening the relationship between ef®ciency, performance, and
survival in the market.
Chapter 3 uses the network data to present SG&R as an exchange system for
various forms of resources, and members as (broadly conceived rational) status
competitors managing and accumulating those resources needed to work and sur-
vive in this environment. The analysis of the ways in which these resources are
bartered leads to the identi®cation of social niches, informal entities that are
shaped by individuals selecting exchange partners under the formal structure of the
®rm. The effects of differences in members' choices of exchange partnersÐsuch
as level of hierarchical status (partner/associate), speciality (litigation/corporate),
of®ce membership, gender, and law school (Ivy League/non-Ivy League)Ðis
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examined to con®rm the emergence of these niches. The existence of these entities is
then used in the following chapters to provide insights into how collegial organ-
izations ®nd structural solutions to additional key problems: for example, moti-
vating tenured partners, quality control, opportunism in the form of free-riding,
and ®rm integration.
The existence of such niches is then con®rmed statistically as is the existence of a
generalized exchange system and bounded solidarity in the niches. Just as strong
interpersonal relations are the key to the functioning of combat units (Shils and
Janowitz 1948), so they are also the key to allowing task forces of peers to make
decisions (Festinger et al. 1950). A realistic view of how a collegial organization
operates is then derived from this structural analysis: the relational architecture of
the ®rm (its exchange system) is described to show how SG&R's labour contracts are
embedded in a multilevel social system without which the partnership agreement
would not be enforceable.
Chapter 4 explains members' economic performance by combining the analysis of
the co-workers' network and that of the ®rm's economic performance data to look
at what sustains partners' productivity in a system with such enormous incentives to
free-ride (that is, let others work). Using Burt's measurement (1992) of network
constraint, I show that members' economic performance is positively correlated
with the amount of pressure that their main co-workers (usually members of their
social niche) put on them to work longer hours.
Chapter 4 also accounts for members' professional performance. With regard to
quality control, I look at the problem of accumulation of knowledge and experience
in the ®rm. Since members try to work in niches, they combine status competition
(hierarchy) and knowledge management in various ways, depending on their
experience of exchanges with speci®c co-workers. The consequence of the exchange
system for the distribution of knowledge can be seen in the structure of the advice
network. The ®rm's main resourceÐits expertise and creativity with regard to
solving complex legal problems for corporationsÐis located not only in its main-
frame computer, but in the structure of this network (in speci®c niches) and in
speci®c members sought out for advice by many others. Main advisersÐwho have
acquired a form of status that brings great deference within the ®rmÐare identi®ed.
Rules related to the circulation of advice within the ®rm are extracted from the
analysis, among which the most important is the seniority rule: one does not seek
advice from people `below'. The niche system thus solves problems of quality control
in an unobtrusive way, while at the same time creating inequalities and favouritism.
The circulation of advice favours a few selected associates in their race towards
partnership: through short cuts in the network, it provides them with access to very
senior advisers. Overall, however, the social exchange system is again shown to be a
productive form of corporate social capital: it helps members manage knowledge.
But it is also shown to be a selection device because it allocates immaterial or
intangible resources in an unequal way.
The solidarity that is provided to members through the generalized exchange
system in social niches is fragile, and status competition is a threat to the existence of
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such a positive social mechanism. Chapter 5 addresses the coexistence of niche
seeking and status competition. It shows how multiplex social ties (co-work, advice,
and friendship) within niches are used in such a context both to cultivate and to
mitigate status competition among professional colleagues. As mentioned before,
status competition can get out of hand; but social ties interlock to mitigate it in a
process involving speci®c substructures of advice and friendship ties.
Beyond economic performance, quality control, and mitigation of status com-
petition, the exchange system is also useful in maintaining a balance of powers and,
consequently, ®rm integrationÐparticularly in dealing with many centrifugal forces
threatening the organization (for example, disputes about sharing pro®ts, secession
of rainmakers and their more or less permanent team to another ®rm, status
competition in the work process, and disputes between subgroups representing
different of®ces or specialities). Chapter 6 shows that members of this collegial
organization have an interest in maintaining a stable oligarchyÐthat is, a subset of
members with various forms of status. Oligarchs are often under pressure not to
®ght. They are all the more appreciated because they do not raise controversies, keep
a low pro®le, and present their agreements as renegotiable. Multidimensionality of
status is bound to come with processes that help the collegial organization maintain
a balance of powers between these oligarchs. This is the case at SG&R, where eco-
nomic and administrative powers are separate, informally but in a strong structural
way. This allows two forms of solidarity and integration to coexist, one based on a
`welfare system' of bureaucratic distribution of work, the other based on an informal
and `clientelistic' distribution. Each form of solidarity (welfare, clientelistic) is made
possible by members with different forms of status in the organizations (`minders',
partners who mind the shop, and `®nders', partners who ®nd new and lucrative
clients) who are kept dependent upon each other. In many ways a collegial organ-
ization replaces an autocrat with a set of oligarchs who prevent each other from
accumulating enough resources to be independent. Collegiality (thus called poly-
cracy) presupposes the interdependency of oligarchs. Cohesion in the oligarchy is
reached by a balance of powers and integration aÁ la Montesquieu. Maintaining
heterogeneity and interdependence of forms of status is often the condition under
which rivalry among oligarchs leads to equilibrium.
In Chapter 7, I look at SG&R as a control system (against opportunistic behaviour
such as shirking) in which issues of cost of control are as central, if not more so, as in
any form of collective action. A structural perspective also helps focus on the
relationship between interdependencies and control of enforcement of decisions
made by the collegium, as well as between status and control. This issue is of
particular importance in formally egalitarian bodies in which practitioners are all
nominal equals and interdependent. Free-rider problems quickly arise in such set-
tings, because even a member who did not contribute effectively to the ®rm's
revenues imposes a cost on the organization as a whole by reaping the bene®ts
of membership (Olson 1965). As a consequence, monitoring and policing, espe-
cially early graduated sanctions, are considered to be particularly important
for ensuring that members' individual commitment to contribute remains credible.
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A second-order free-rider problem arises as wellÐthe problem of who will bear the
costs of monitoring and enforcing previous agreements and collective responsibility
among the formally equal members (Heckathorn 1989; Oliver 1980; Yamagishi
1986).
In such contextsÐhierarchical control being relatively weakÐthere is reluctance,
at an early stage, to use formal procedures against colleagues to overcome free-riding
and maintain solidarity. Direct command or use of administrative hierarchy is
not considered an appropriate means for exercising control, because professionals
have many ways of neutralizing formal authority (Bosk 1979; Freidson 1975, 1986;
Gouldner 1954.) In fact, early monitoring and sanctioning in collegial organizations
also rely on speci®c forms of interdependencies in the exchanges of resources to
protect overall prosperity against individual opportunism or parochial interests. An
understanding of such relational constraints explains how members try to keep early
monitoring costs low, and themselves motivated to carry on monitoring and
sanctioning each other.
These constraints take the form of a lateral control regime that helps peers ®nd an
early solution to this second-order free-rider problem in formally egalitarian
interdependent groups. I use the word `lateral' to express two facts: ®rst, that this
way of exercising informal control is based on the use of third parties as sanc-
tionersÐthat is, members acting as envoys of the ®rm in charge of pressuring
deviant partners back to good conduct; and, secondly, that these third parties are not
hierarchical superiors, but formally equal peers. Consideration of costs narrows the
choices of sanctioners appointed by partners exercising early monitoring and
sanctioning unobtrusively. In this regime, control costs are reduced for most
members, because they play on each others' resource interdependencies. In effect,
interdependencies between two partners produce, in the rest of the partnership,
expectations that one of the two will intervene on behalf of the ®rm to curb
potentially opportunistic behaviour displayed by the other partner in this dyad.
These expectations are built and learned over time. They are also shown to converge
and thus to create a constraining pattern of expectations with structural effects.
The structure coming out of this convergence of expectations is thus both cultural
and structural.
In this structure, however, fear of collusion between the sanctioners and the
infractors are then shown to have an additional effect: they shift control costs to
uncontroversial partners with a speci®c form of statusÐthat of `protectors of the
common good'. This status helps them carry more weight with infractors and deal
with the danger of preferential treatment reserved to partners too close to punish.
Thanks to this social mechanism, individuals ®nd it advantageous, credible, and safe
to pursue contingent commitment to rule compliance and mutual control.
Finally, this structural approach also helps to clarify the regulatory processÐthat
is, the rede®nition of the rules of the game in such collective actorsÐby looking at
their members' negotiation of precarious values underlying policy options. Chapter 8
looks at the last social mechanism, one that helps members to control this regulatory
process in the ®rm. A broadly conceived structural approach to cooperation
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provides insights into the relationship between interests and values, thus improving
our understanding of the combined importance of relational structure and norms in
collective action, particularly among peers. A precarious value (Selznick 1957) is one
that is essential to the viability of the collectivity but in which most members may
have no direct stake. Examples of precarious values include, in collegial organiza-
tions, hierarchical authority and professional ethical principles. Subunits ®ght for
the particular values entrusted to them and may continually rede®ne them to assert
their priority over potentially competing values. Client satisfaction, internal coor-
dination, innovation and quality of professional knowledge, societal needs, and
employee interests would not be defended or promoted if not represented by
powerful subunits or members to which the values in question are paramount, and
the organization as a whole would be the poorer (Simpson 1971).
This social mechanism helps collegial organizations solve the problem of endless
deliberation about norms and values, and thus about ®rm management policies
regarding issues such as work intake and assignment, compensation, marketing, and
peer review. It makes use of the multidimensionality of status ahead of the delib-
erations themselves. Since members participate in regulatory activities as status
competitors, the process is based on renegotiation of rules among multi-status
members, or oligarchs. Oligarchs driving the regulatory process are shown to have
several inconsistent forms of status. This helps them defend precarious values in
ways that seem compatible with the common good, but also prevent certain legit-
imate values from being later defended forcefully by other members.
In effect, regulatory decisions are also made from within the organizational
exchange system. The de®nition of rules is based on a selection of bi- or multi-status
oligarchs who play a leadership role by de®ning priorities. Their selection brings into
the deliberation only oligarchs who, because they have several inconsistent forms of
status, are thus able to give priority to one of these forms without disqualifying the
others. The negotiation of precarious values, or the emergence of a priority value,
requires a cohesive core of multi-status oligarchs clearly identi®ed with such values
and in a position to defend their rank with their peers, if not to prescribe them to
each other. In short, the debate about precarious values uses in a constraining way
the heterogeneity of sources of status observed by the classics. Structure mediates
between interests and values because oligarchs can promote some norms while
downplaying the importance of others.
To sum up, ¯at organizations rely not only on an oligarchy but also on speci®c
social mechanisms that produce certain forms of public good (public within the
organization). Members' formal positions and property rights are not enough to
guarantee the functioning of such organizations. Among these goods, I include a
form of solidarity that comes across as a generalized exchange system, a lateral
control regime, and a system stabilizing the renegotiation of rules. These are con-
sistent with individual interests and management of resource interdependencies,
but they are also the result of a form of social discipline. Individual returns are
guaranteed in this system if returns are conceived of as of many types. Incentives
exist to undertake socially desirable activities. Members are compelled to bear their
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share of risk, their part of the costs of transactions within the organization, because
of the necessity to manage several resources at the same time, and the impossibility
of accumulating some of them forever. In effect, one can say that they are based on
these individual interests, provided that the latter are broadly conceived with regard
to many long-term goals and with different types of resources. This assumption
about how members behave is not unrealistic in the institutional context of collegial
organizations in which such mechanisms operate. The latter characterize an organ-
ization that is embedded in an institutional environment, without being reduced to
it. They operate under speci®c institutional arrangements but they are not identi®ed
with them. The organization works because both an institutional arrangement and
social mechanisms based on resource dependencies make it worthwhile for members
to undertake socially productive activities.
BE YO ND E M B EDD ED NE SS S T UD IE S OF
K NO W LE DG E - I NT EN SI VE F I R M S
One can also hypothesize that, on a day-to-day basis, local of®ces of even large
professional services ®rms operate thanks to social and informal `governance'
mechanisms such as that listed and combined above. At the global level, power
variance in such organizations is presumably too large to allow for these collegial
mechanisms to operate, but even that remains to be checked. The informal processes
that go on in such organizationsÐmainly those that combine niche seeking and
status competitionÐmust be taken into account when designing ¯atter structures.
They are based on social relationships among members. As acknowledged by
Maister (1993), managing ®rms in which social relationships and resource inter-
dependencies are so complex is not easy and requires much more understanding of
the social constraints under which such management is carried out. In my view,
additional insights into such constraints require the kind of analysis carried out in
this book.
Contemporary management theories of knowledge-intensive organizations and
professional services organizations address some of the issues with which this book
deals. They sometimes draw on economic literature on services and innovation (see
e.g. Baumol and Wolff 1983; Gadrey 1994, 1996; Gadrey and De Bandt 1994; Gallouj
2000) to focus on the variety of forms taken by such organizations. They are con-
cerned with the collegial form, even though that term is not used, and the pressures
under which it has to operate. A structural approach differs from such theories
precisely thanks to its systematic identi®cation of multilevel and often informal
social mechanisms.
Many of the ingredients of a structural approach can be found in the literature
on knowledge management and organizational design (Myers 1996). For example,
Moss Kanter (1988) or Baker (1994) stresses the importance of power, coali-
tions, network density, autonomy for innovation, and `idea realization'. But these
ingredients, in my view, are not combined so as to account for elements of informal
self-governance. Another example is Starbuck's idea (1992, 1993) of a law ®rm as
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a knowledge-intensive ®rm. Along with authors such as Brock et al. (1999),
Greenwood et al. (1990), or Hinings et al. (1991), Starbuck provides a broad def-
inition of this type of organization. In this account, much of the importance of social
relations has often been captured as a characteristic of their cultural embedded-
nessÐfor example in organizational and/or professional culture.12 Although such
cultures are important, focusing on them often tends to stress that partners must
learn social skills when dealing with each other, so as to protect a good ambiance.
This often ignores that management of social relationships is equivalent to man-
agement of interdependencies and power relationships, not simply a good am-
bience. It sets aside the fact that, as a consequence, social ties can be the very stuff of
coordination, of social mechanisms without which a collegial organization cannot
operate and survive in the long run.
These views are limited, because they promote a purely managerial understand-
ing of how knowledge-intensive organizations operate. For example, in this
approach, the micro-political processes by which information is elaborated into
appropriate knowledgeÐthat is, knowledge that can be used as a premiss for
complex decisionsÐare not taken into account. In Starbuck's view (1993),
knowledge-intensive ®rms learn almost mechanically, by hiring, training, and dis-
missing personnel. In the view offered here, a ®rm learns mostly thanks to its
collective capacity to stabilize its production of authoritative knowledge. This
capacity depends, among other patterns, on the existence of an informally hier-
archical advice network. A social process of elaboration and distribution of
knowledge can thus help members ®lter and sift out authoritative answers to speci®c
problems. Knowledge and learning cannot be jointly produced without the existence
of authorities that allow generalization and represent experience. Such authorities
are often quickly identi®ed in the advice network within the organizations. The
authority arguments on which their status games are based are at the heart of such
organizations, whether professional or not (Lazega 1992a).
This book is, therefore, different from the mainstream theorizing of the know-
ledge-intensive and professional ®rms by its emphasis on the pervasive in¯uence of
multilevel social mechanisms in these organizations, regardless of their size. The fact
that the case study is carried out on data collected in a relatively traditional cor-
porate law ®rm does not mean, in my view, that such mechanisms are necessarily
waning in more bureaucratized professional services ®rms. At the global level, larger
multi-city and multi-country professional services ®rms operating as a one-stop
shop for multinational companies are often managed in different, more bureaucratic
ways (Aharoni 1997; Brock et al. 1999). However, it would be highly questionable
for observers (and foolish for such ®rms) to ignore the gap between global and local
governance and politics. It makes sense to hypothesize that, at the local level, even in
large and more bureaucratized partnerships (or perhaps in incorporated ®rms),
such mechanisms also operate as a form of corporate social capital. In effect, they
characterize collective action among rival peers, and such local of®ces are comprised
of at least large pockets of such partners. This hypothesis, however, remains to be
tested empirically.
17Introduction
Failing to take into account social mechanisms when making comparisons
between global and local levels of collective action leads to technocratic management
that believes in easy manipulation of collective efforts among peers. It is not my
objective here to derive managerial know-how from this book's understanding of
knowledge-intensive organizations. The book's main contribution is to develop an
approach to social mechanisms that shows, in particular, how members' niche
seeking and status competition are needed to sustain this form of collective action,
and can be used to balance each other's negative effects in various social processes.
A broadly conceived structural approach is important for an understanding of
the collegial phenomenon or cooperation between interdependent entrepreneurs.
In the Conclusion, I raise the issue of the generalization of these resultsÐin
particular the question of the existence of these mechanisms in all collegial organ-
izations. I describe some of the implications of this approach for more general
theories of collective action, but also for the identi®cation of speci®c social
problems that arise in contemporary organizations and professions. In the work
needed to address such issues more generally and more systematically, much
remains to be done.
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1A Structural Theory of Collective
Action among Peers
Neo-Weberian theories (see especially Waters 1989) have proposed a set of formal
characteristics that differentiate collegial organizations from bureaucratic or
monocratic ones. In this chapter I argue that these theories are not suf®cient by
themselves to explain collective action among peers. A combined neo-Weberian and
broadly conceived structural approach is needed, one that looks at the individual
and organizational levels at the same time. Such an approach assumes that individ-
uals have a strategic rationality. It looks at members as niche seeking entrepreneurs
selecting exchange partners, carving out a place for themselves in the group and
getting involved in various forms of status competition. From this conception of
actors, it derives the existence of generic social mechanisms that are needed to
sustain this form of collective action, in particular that of exchange, control, and
negotiation of precarious values. It is rooted, ®rst, in the analysis of the production
process and task-related resource dependencies; and, secondly, in the analysis of
derived governance mechanisms. Looking at such mechanisms helps in under-
standing how a collegial organization provides structural solutions to problems of
collective action among peers: how it cultivates and mitigates status competition;
how it maintains performance, quality, and controls; and, ®nally, how it maintains a
form of status differentiation that helps with organizational integration and with the
negotiation of precarious professional values.
A CO N T R A C T U A L B A S I S : TH E E X A M P L E OF
P A R T N E R S H I P S A S A N I N S T I T U T I O N A L F O R M
Professional partnerships are good examples to begin with. True partnerships are
special types of collective (or `corporate') actors. Historically, they go back to the
earliest times. Their distinctive feature is the sharing of pro®ts and losses in a
common business undertaking, and they are held to be a complex entity (Rowley
and Rowley 1960).1 From a collective action perspective, a partnership is an insti-
tutional form based on a nexus of contracts between members (practitioners and
apprentices). As a legal form, it often assumes formal equality among partners, as
well as individual and collective liability. In such collegial organizations, pressure
towards consensus is strong. They bring together voluntarily members who want to
satisfy their economic, social, and cultural common aspirations through an enter-
prise that is collectively owned and in which power is exercised as democratically as
possible. It is thus a type of organization in which economic and social life are
intertwined in a particularly visible way.
This contractual and voluntary basis is crystallized in a partnership agreement, a
document in which partners put in writing the terms by which they govern their
business affairs and organization. It provides rules for the conduct of the ®rm and
guidelines for individual behaviour. It seeks to promote ef®ciency in many ways, and
is therefore a powerful organizational device. These general principles are then more
or less applied to speci®c ®rm situations. Partnership agreements apply to the
various aspects of a ®rm's life, the prevailing ®rm philosophy regarding its practice,
and how it should be undertaken. In doing so, they represent an attempt to bring an
element of predictability to ®rm operations and to minimize the room for disputes
regarding issues such as the work process, ®rm management, compensation deci-
sions, and withdrawal terms (for the case of law partnerships, see Eickemeyer 1988).
The agreement accomplishes this by setting ground rules as to each partner's rights
and responsibilities in connection with these issues, and for the operation of the ®rm
itself. In many ways, it is fundamental, because such rules and procedures help
members constrain each other and reach consensus without resorting to coercion.
Usually, the agreement also tries to enhance the image of the partnership as a closed
professional community in which all partners have rights to participate, especially
when they may not sell or transfer their partnership interest.
Agreements are usually comprehensive and dif®cult to modify. Three main issues
(and consequently sources of controversy) are of particular interest to members:
®rm governance, compensation determination, and con¯ict management, including
sanctions against members who do not abide by the rules. First, the agreement
usually imposes a regulatory structure in which the partnership, the `committee of
the whole', is the ultimate authority. It establishes the committees that govern the
partnership and a structure to run it on a day-to-day basis, thus delegating limited
authority with more or less speci®city. The partners establish policy and manage the
affairs of the partnership through the partnership meeting. The meeting can, for
example, vest an executive committee or a managing partner with the responsibility
and authority for overseeing the ®rm's day-to-day operations. Secondly, a com-
pensation committee is usually in charge of establishing each year a schedule for the
distribution of cash and additions or adjustments to individual partners' capital
accounts. This committee has to adhere to the agreed-upon principles in estab-
lishing partners' shares. An agreement can provide a formula or any other method
by which each partner's compensation is determined, and, in setting out this
method, it makes clear what weight the ®rm places on various factors (for example,
seniority and loyalty to the ®rm, ®nding new clients, billed hours, apprentice
training, and community activities that enhance the ®rm's prestige). Thirdly, con-
¯ict resolution mechanisms, including arbitration and mediation, are de®ned to
handle partners' disputes. Formal procedures are used against members who violate
the rules, but often as a last resort, especially since monitoring and sanctioning are
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undertaken not by external authorities but by the participants themselves. In such a
case, infractors are likely to be allocated graduated sanctions (depending on the
seriousness and context of the offence) by other members, by of®cials accountable to
these members, or by both. If an individual breaks the rules more systematically,
sanctions can escalate until members punish the offender (and sometimes them-
selves) by breaking previous agreements.
Beyond the embodiment of the ®rm's approach to governance, compensation,
and con¯ict resolutionÐwhich are the thorniest issues in most partnershipsÐthe
scope of such agreements is much wider. They also regulate admission to the
partnership and attempt to anticipate, and provide for, inevitable events such as
partner retirement, disability, withdrawal, and death, as well as issues such as the
dissolution of the partnership. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of a partner-
ship is the fact that exit is mutually controlled. Even where it results from death, the
other partners are usually able to control the repayment of capital to a partner's
estate or may have treated this as an insurable event. Even a partner who resigns
cannot take his capital out precipitately but must reach an accommodation with the
others. Production and collective action among partners are thus formally struc-
tured. In theory, ®rm's members know about such arrangements and order their
professional lives accordingly. If the constraint of rules disappears, so does the
collective interest and the capacity to work productively together. This legal contract
is a set of constraints to which partners voluntarily subscribe. The rules formulated
to produce quality work and to monitor this production are jointly de®ned.
However, in reality partnership agreements are limited: alone, they cannot
structure collective action. They cannot function without the commitment of the
members of the ®rm. Commitment to this contract requires more than a purely
utilitarian and individualistic explanation. In effect, collective action rests upon the
existence of a collective interest, which includes an individual interest in collective
action. In itself, this collective interest is not suf®cient to create collective action; it
needs to be defended by members who are willing to enforce these rules in concrete
situations. Sociological theory has traditionally argued that, in order to make
contracts meaningful and enforceable, members have to use constraints by man-
aging their interdependencies and internalize informal social norms. As Durkheim
once pointed out, economic contracts are fragile and always destabilized by com-
petition (see also Blau 1964; Macaulay 1963). One indication is that such organ-
izations often seem to resist strong pressures towards incorporation brought about
by market pressures and liability issues. Thus, we are entitled to assume that part-
nerships are characterized by economic but also social features ensuring the
maintenance and development of collective action.
The type of collective action speci®c to partnerships helps members work together
and stick to their commitments. Economic cooperation and returns, while serving
individual interest, are not entirely motivated by it. Social processes of exchange,
recognition, control, and socialization are also involved. What exists is thus a col-
lective interest that is supported by a collegial discipline constructed by these
members. As stressed by Reynaud (1989), economic calculation, which is the basis of
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commitment, incorporates a `project', a re¯ection that motivates members, or
at least a large majority, to cooperate, even if they have to reduce their bene®ts or
anticipate an uncertain future gain to give up certain present gains. Waters's
approach to collegial organizations takes up such a view; it is a renewed synthetic
contributionÐin the tradition of Weber and ParsonsÐto the description of col-
lective action among peers.
BE YO ND C O NT R A C TS : TH E N EO - W EB ER I A N A P P R O A C H T O
C OL LE G I A L OR G A N I ZA T I ONS
Waters's papers (1989, 1993) deal with issues relevant to partnerships by comparing
`collegial' (or `collegiate') organizations with monocratic and bureaucratic organ-
izations.2 This comparison is constructed around two dimensions. First, there is the
way the distribution of power is arranged: in collegial organizations, power is dis-
persed or divided among a number of persons ideally conceived to be equals. For
instance, colleagues can be both leaders and of®cials. Power is not vested in a single
individual and delegated therefrom, but vested in a collectivity as a whole, dis-
tributed on a formally egalitarian basis, and aggregated upwards. Secondly, there are
the bases for legitimate claims to share in this distribution of power: for both
bureaucracy and collegiality, the central organizing principle is specialized expertise.
Within the bureaucratic administrative staff, differences in specialized performance become
the basis for hierarchy. Theoretically superiors have greater knowledge than do subordinates.
In collegial organizations, knowledge is conceived of as so individually specialized that
individual practitioners cannot be ranked (except in their relationships with apprentices).
Thus specialized experts are understood to have the right to equal standing in a distribution of
power. (Waters 1993: 65)
Both rational-legal bureaucracy and collegiality are supposed to be organized
around specialized performances evaluated on the basis of universalistic criteria.
But, unlike in bureaucracies, the `owner' of the knowledge is not the manager or the
client, but the profession and its representatives.
As mentioned earlier to describe more systematically the formal structure of
collegial organizations, Waters (1989: 956) de®nes collegial structures as `those in
which there is dominant orientation to a consensus achieved between the members
of a body of experts who are theoretically equals in their levels of expertise but who
are specialized by area of expertise'. The main organizational characteristics implied
by this statement of the principle of collegiality are as follows.
1. Theoretical knowledge : collegiate organization is arranged in terms of the use
and application of theoretical knowledge.
2. Professional career : members of collegiate organizations are considered as
professionals; careers are differentiated in at least two stages (apprentice and
practitioner), and provide security of tenure.
3. Formal egalitarianism : collegiate organizations are performance-oriented
systems, but because professionals are specialists it is dif®cult to compare
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performances; for this reason, collegiate organizations are formally equal
systems.
4. Formal autonomy : collegiate organizations are self-controlling and self-
policing.
5. Scrutiny of product : the products of the work done by colleagues must be
available for peer review (consultation, second opinion, public dissemination
of written opinion).
6. Collective decision making : collegiate organization implies the constitution of
collective forums in which decisions are made; the committee is the proto-
typical collegial decision-making body (general committee, specialist commit-
tee, delegative committee); collegiate organizations have complex, frequently
hierarchical, committee systems.
These idealtypical characteristics differentiate collegial organizations from bureau-
cratic organizations, even though, in most circumstances, collegiality is not the sole
decision-making structure but coexists with bureaucracy. A collegial organization is
more or less bureaucratic depending on how it is managed.
Based on this approach, Waters (1993) constructs an analytic typology of collegial
organizations around two dimensions: `personnel processes' (selection for of®cial
positions, career, leadership claims, closure patterns) and `decision processes'
(rati®cation, normative arrangements, compliance relationships, control pattern).
In the collegial form of interest here, selection for of®cial positions is on the basis of
election among professional practitioners. Positions are not ®lled by appointment.
Once a person is selected, his or her career is supposed to be based on tenure and
autonomous work practice free of supervision. `The career advances under the
subjective judgment of peers in relation to a set of substantive theoretical standards
rather than in terms of a proven capacity to follow rules and commands' (Waters
1993: 73). Leadership claims are more diffuse and tenuous than in bureaucratic
organizations. They are supposed to be based on greater expertise. But, `given that
the basis of the claim is evaluated by peers, and that expertise is specialized, this
leaves a great deal of space for shifting patterns of leadership'. Closure patterns (that
is, how members exclude non-members, how of®cials exclude simple members, or
how leaders exclude ordinary of®cials) are not supposed to be based on seniority
(as in bureaucracies), but on credentialism: `Closure is maintained by having a
certi®ed and/or demonstrably higher level of attainment than others in relation to
professional theoretical knowledge' (Waters 1993: 73).
Rati®cation has to be performed by constituencies of members in order to be
authoritative. `In collegial organizations this rati®cation takes place on the basis of a
consensus between professional peers established in relation to knowledge' (Waters
1993: 75). Normative arrangements in¯uencing decisions are based on a set of
abstract procedural norms (Sciulli 1986) `established to protect the rights of col-
leagues to autonomous action, and not merely the rights of vulnerable clients to
equality of treatment' (Waters 1993: 75). The compliance relationship is essentially
based on status: `Colleagues comply with collegial decisions because they would
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otherwise lose status in the professional pecking order, and clients comply because
of®cials have expert status' (Waters 1993: 76).3 Control pattern is based on peer
evaluation of colleagues' expertise: `Colleagues have a conventional or legal
monopoly of expertise in their areas of practice. Their mode of control is therefore
one of self-regulation based on peer judgment exercised within the boundaries of a
precise set of procedural norms' (Waters 1993: 76). Clearly, only specialized
expertise (that is, theoretical knowledge) is ultimately a basis for a legitimate claim
to one's share of status, power, and leadership in Waters's framework.
Although extremely stimulating, Waters's synthesis remains very formal. In his
approach, for example, production-related resource dependencies, as well as several
forms of status, remain untheorizedÐor rather, attributed to other forms of col-
lective action, not to the collegial one. Formal structure, as described by his refor-
mulation of Weber's and Parsons's ideas, is unlikely to guarantee by itself collective
action. If peers are `theoretically equals' but have to deal with `tenuous and diffuse'
leadership claims and `shifting patterns of leadership', how does such a system
actually work? If rati®cation `takes place on the basis of consensus', how is consensus
reached? And if there are different forms of status, why would colleagues ever
comply with decisions made by someone with a different form of status? If one
partner is responsible for a speciality and another for an of®ce, it is often formally
unclear whose responsibility decisions are on a given matter; how are these decisions
made? To answer such questions, I argue that the broadly conceived structural
approach sketched in the introduction is needed, an approach that is able to describe
social mechanisms characterizing such an organization. This view assumes a con-
ception of actors' rationality that takes into account their contextualization of their
own behaviour: their calculations, but also their politicization of their exchanges and
controls through the use of identi®cations, status, and norms.
B EH A VI OU R A L AS SU M P TI ON S A ND R ES UL TI N G
SO CI A L M E C H A NI SM S
This means that understanding durable cooperation among autonomous profes-
sionals is of value to more general sociological theory because it shows that
mechanisms such as those de®ned by HedstroÈm and Swedberg (1998a), and
Stinchcombe (1991) can be explained only when broadly conceived structural and
rational choice approaches are combined. Weber knew that neither individual nor
common interests create collective action on their own. Rather, social processes
support individual commitment to previous agreements, thus helping members deal
with each other and develop ties of cooperation. Such processes and the ways in
which they bridge levels of analysis need to be further explored. In the sociological
rational choice traditions, theories for such a micro through macro combination
were provided by many authors (Blossfeld and Prein 1998; Esser 1998; Lindenberg
1995). For example, individual action produces (intentional or unexpected) effects
at the structural level that are important to group solidarity because they help
members maintain integration processes based on their interdependencies.
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To combine these approaches, individuals in organizations must ®rst be seen as
interdependent members who need to get access to production-related resources
(Blau 1964).4 A broadly conceived structural theory can make the following
behavioural assumptions about members of collegial organizations and their
strategies to get access to production-related resources. Actors' rationality is
assumed to be `strategic' (Crozier and Friedberg 1977)Ðthat is, to include a
politicized view of action. As such, it includes calculations, but also symbolic
activity such as selection of, or investments in, relationships guided by appro-
priateness judgements (based on recognition of identities in the selection of part-
ners) and value judgements (negotiation of precarious values and norms) that allow
individuals to handle their exchanges and controls in ways that seem advantageous
to them and to their own collective. In this theory, niche seeking and status
competition are components of actors' strategic rationality. Individuals can thus be
represented as strategic and interdependent entrepreneurs who politicize their
behaviour by using boundary management to seek relatively closed contexts (Feld
1981) in which they can ®nd and exchange these resources at a low cost. Once in
such contexts, they seek various forms of concentration of these resources so as to
be in a position to de®ne the terms of their exchanges. A multilevel dimension is
built into this theory thanks to the notions of niche and multidimensional status.
Their importance comes from the fact that they are both structurally combined and
assumed to be indispensable for individual peers' commitment to a partnership
agreement. Together they are basic components of both members' strategic
rationality and of a series of generic mechanisms that characterize and drive col-
legial organizations. In the following sections I propose a de®nition of these notions
and mechanisms.
Actors seeking bounded solidarity in social niches
Interdependent members of organizations must have access to various production-
related resources (for example, clients, co-workers' goodwill, advice). To get access
to such resources, members do not entirely rely on formal organization and rules.
They are selective in their relational choices and manage their interdependence in
their own ways. The social niche of an actor can be broadly de®ned as a subset of
members of the organization selected by this actor, and with whom he or she
establishes especially durable exchange relations, whether directly or indirectly, in
order to get such an access.5 Niche building is a form of investment in relationships
(Blau 1964; Homans 1961). Actors contextualizing their behaviour in organizations
are able and trained to detect the existence of niches based on the criterion of a
certain social homogeneity: they use similarities (for example, in terms of of®ce
membership, or speciality, or hierarchical status; but also in terms of gender or
classÐthat is, more exogenous attributes) between exchange partners to identify the
boundaries of the niche in which they assume that dense exchanges do or will take
place. Since a social niche is a pool of colleagues with whom exchanges are char-
acterized by a certain density and multiplexity, sociologists can also check the
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realism of such a behavioural assumption by detecting a niche through a strong
relational cohesion among subsets of actors with similar attributes.
In theory, a social niche is not necessarily a group, because it is not necessarily
recognized as a group by its members, even if withdrawal of investments in it could
be very costly, and because it does not necessarily have the legitimacy that would be
granted to an independent entity by an outside authority. The organization can
recognize the importance of social niches for ef®cient circulation of resources, but it
does not favour the emergence of detachable subunits ready for easy defection. Just
as a social niche can be either a shelter or a hell for an individual member, it can be
an advantage or a threat for the organization that encompasses it. Rather, a social
niche can be considered to be a stable quasi-group.
Members operate within microstructures such as niches, which are themselves
part of the wider organization. It is rational for members to be niche seeking, because
it is rational for them to look for multifunctional contexts that provide them with
the resources needed to work productively, and with relative protection from rivalry
and competition for these resources. The multifunctional character of niches means
that several resources can be exchanged by members, who can thus decrease the costs
of interaction as well as those of the resources themselves. Indeed, such niches are
also built for that very purposeÐthat is, to allow multiplex barters6 of resources
without `general equivalent'. Niche building is strategic, but, once built, niches
have the advantage of allowing partial suspension of purely calculating behaviour
(Boorman and Levitt 1980; Bowles and Gintis 1998; Ekeh 1976). They help members
identify partners with similar long-term interests and combine, through identity
criteria, these long-term interests and the management of multiple resources. Niches
and identities come together because they introduce long-term stability in members'
choices and de®nitions of interests,7 thus bending fairness judgements (Homans
1961; Kellerhals et al. 1988).
This stability is based on the intuition that common characteristics make long-
term common interests more likely, and therefore the existence of indirect reci-
procity that is necessary for collective action. There is no barter without identities
and a very important symbolic dimension.8 An important individual-level concept
accounting for this stability and this process is that of identi®cation. Identity is
usually a relatively stable and multidimensional set of attributes that members use to
make judgements of appropriateness, de®ne themselves, and get recognition as
sources of their actions (for credit and accountability) on an ongoing basis. In a
politicized world, an actor is always `loyal' to some allegiance (represented by an
attribute) while `betraying' another (represented by another attribute). Symbolic
interactionist thought has theorized the dif®culty of compartmentalizing social life
so as not to be caught on the `wrong' side. Identity is what introduces time in action
by de®ning long-term individual and collective interests, whether material or ideal.
Politicizing exchanges means using such identi®cations as bearings for selection of
exchange partners. To some extent, members use identity criteria to choose
exchange partners who will presumably share values leading to some degree of
solidarity. The idea here is that identity is introduced in transfers and exchanges of
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resources to avoid measuring the value of the heterogeneous resources in multiplex
exchanges. The use of identities in multiplex exchanges creates a form of bounded
solidarity.
This bounded solidarity can be connected to a form of limited rationality, but in
the sense that members do not always use the same criteria to evaluate the fairness of
their multiplex barters. Since they establish an exchange system in which multiple
resources are often incommensurable, they do not always use the same criteria to
evaluate what is a fair multiplex exchange. Analytically, bounded solidarity can be
measured in several ways: for example, by the stability of members' choices of
exchange partners, a stability that can limit individual autonomy (Blau 1964; Ekeh
1976); or by the existence of generalized exchange cyclesÐthat is, of indirect reci-
procityÐamong them; or by the presence of informal rules imposing multiplexity or
preventing members from grabbing all the credit for successful actions.
To get access to such resources, members do not entirely rely on formal organ-
ization and rules. They are selective in their relational choices, and this selectivityÐ
together with institutional constraintsÐproduces patterns that make it possible to
understand exchanges in the organization. Members manage their interdependence
in their own ways, which are both economic, social, and politicized. As seen above,
to get access to such resources, they enter exchanges that are multilateral and
multiplex.9 The strategic rationality that is at work in such exchanges plays with
attributes and ties.10 It intervenes in the process of resource allocation by using
formal attributes in `politicized' ways or by introducing other particularistic attri-
butes and preoccupations (for example, gender or law school attended). The latter
are more informal and ad hoc ; they are not necessarily of®cially recognized by the
®rm as characteristics that should be used to promote cooperation and allocate
resources.
In sum, a social niche offers its members resources at a low cost, a sense of identity
and of common long-term interests, and the stimulation that is needed to work
productively together. Its multiplex exchange system sustains cohesive and durable
work relationships in contexts often dominated by ¯exibility and short-term cal-
culations. It constitutes a bounded solidarity bloc. A collegial organization can be
decomposed into small, ¯exible, homogeneous, and temporary task forces that must
be able to cooperate quickly and ef®ciently, to react to complex non-standardizable
problems. These work groups are nested within more stable niches, where members
can barter for the resources they need. Such resources can also be found outside
niches, but the likelihood of members reaching outside their immediate context
for access to such resources is weak when the resources are available without this
effort. Recall, however, that social niches can also become a dif®cult and very con-
straining environment, especially when peers lose control of the status competition
process.
Analytically, detection of niches requires combining attributes and ties as in the
empirical evidence (for the realism of this assumption) that is provided in Chapter 3.
Attributes that become identity criteria (in multiplex exchange of production-
related resources) can be formal and endogenousÐthat is, de®ned and recognized
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from within the organization as in¯uencing the work process: this is the case for
of®ce membership, status (for example, partner or associate), and speciality (for
example, corporate or litigation). Through such in¯uences on choices of exchange
partners, formal structures constrain actors' abilities to form exchange relationships,
and therefore de®ne the extent to which members can choose partners so as to
`optimize' their individual returns (Burt 1992; Flap and de Graaf 1989; Lin and
Dumin 1986). Other attributes are informal, or more particularistic and exogenous:
for instance, gender and school attended11 may be used selectively by speci®c
members to get access to resources, and consequently have an effect, at the collective
level, on the circulation of such resources. This does not mean that members are
necessarily moved to kinship by the simple knowledge of shared characteristics.
Nevertheless, the stability that a niche offers in terms of access and exchange of
resources comes from introducing timeÐthat is, a long-term perspectiveÐinto the
exchanges.
Finally, a useful distinction here is between the reason for the existence of social
mechanisms and the triggers for such mechanisms. At every stage of collective
action, the reason for their existence is the provision of solutions to organizational
problems. But their triggers are investment in and of social relationships, estab-
lishing them or enriching them, or cutting them or making them poorer. As will be
shown in this study, for generalized exchange, the trigger is the selection of exchange
partners who contribute to niche building. For social control, it is the use of
exchange partners for exercising one's share of individual and collective responsi-
bility. For regulation, it is again the `sacri®ce' of some of one's ties in order to
maintain a status quo or to promote regulatory change in the rules.
Relational investments and commitments are often made under speci®c condi-
tions characterizing social exchange. They appear to be dyadic in nature (that is, to
be `gifts'), but they actually presuppose the existence of collectives in which dyads
are embedded. Commitments and management of relationships have multilevel and
politicized dimensions. They are made to individuals (exchange partners) in social
niches because actors often try to shape as much as possible their opportunity
structure. In effect, as shown by social scientists from Mauss (1923), Blau (1964),
and Homans (1961) to Flap (1999), social investmentsÐthat is, investments of
resources that are speci®c to particular relationshipÐrequire follow-up efforts by
members of a society. They must try to prevent such investments from becoming
sunk costs, from being lost to opportunistic behaviour. Reliability is often assumed
to come from investing in relationships that are themselves embedded in a social
niche in which multiplex relationship lower the prices of resources.
Actors as status competitors: Power among peers
As well as building niches, members need to manage exchanges that take place in
them. The notion of multidimensionality of status helps to clarify how such man-
agement is carried out. Exchanges are always politicized, because members try to
de®ne the terms of those exchanges that are most favourable to them.12 One way of
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in¯uencing, and bene®ting from, intra- and inter-niche exchanges is to accumulate
a resource needed to work productively and thus achieve a form of status. This form
of status is equivalent to a source of power among peers, because a member who
controls access to large amounts of resources needed by others can also use such
resource dependencies to impose favourable terms of exchange.
Among peers, brutal and public demonstrations of raw clout are rare. This is
precisely what makes knowledge-intensive collegial organizations interesting from
our perspective. By de®nition, power variance is usually lower than in more stand-
ard bureaucratic organizations. This is not to say that inequalities do not exist. Even
among equals, some are more equal than others. But collegial organizations need
various types of resources to operate, including expertise, and distribution of such
diverse resources is rarely as unequal among peers as it is between superiors and
subordinates in hierarchies. Weaker peers often vote; they are rarely easy to ®re or
exclude. Therefore they have views that cannot be ignored altogether in deliber-
ations about policies. Rather, peers learn to be more cautiously mild-mannered
and Machiavellian, as will become more obvious in subsequent chapters.13 Power
is thus exercised through resource dependencies, coalition building, and various
forms of status. A unidimensional de®nition of hierarchical power does not
capture the different ways in which peers can be powerful and represent a form of
authority, and the kind of coordination that they can achieve informally (Chazel
1983; Weber 1920). I therefore assume that the notion of status, because it is
multidimensional, is central to the study of power among peers from a structural
perspective.
This understanding of power among peers echoes the literature on the dynamics
of personalization and depersonalization of power (Bourricaud 1964). Among
peers, power has an element of `now you see it, now you don't'; for example,
responsibilities in a committee are diluted. Reaching decisions depends on proced-
ural rules governing committee meetings, such as partnership meetings, and then
enforced by individual members in their practice. This view, however, is too
`legalistic', or too `formal'. After being depersonalized, power is repersonalized.14
In effect, players usually want to understand the game played by others, and espe-
cially by their representatives in decision-making committees. This repersonaliza-
tion of power strengthens accountability of leaders, who are personally held
responsible for their acts and asked to live up to their status. It also simpli®es a
complex situation in which `important people' are identi®ed as representatives of
various interests (Berelson et al. 1954). Once `important people' come to personalize
it, power becomes more easily symbolized and localized. In partnerships, and more
generally in collegial organizations, power is even personalized twice. In effect,
partners' personal liability and damage potential are wider than in incorporated
companies. Partners are personally accountable for the consequences of their acts
before the whole partnership, because each partner is liable for the rest of his or her
partners before the outside world. Individual partners' own actions and plans
necessarily interfere with those of their colleagues, upon whom they have little
power themselves.
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Members can seek many forms of individual status, within and outside such
niches, by accumulating different types of resources exchanged for working pro-
ductively. This role of multidimensional status in mechanisms sustaining collegial
organizations is complex. Before moving on to describing these mechanisms, it is
useful to summarize in a focused way the sociological perspective on status
understood from a structural perspective as the existence of various concentrations
of resources helping members solve individual and collective problems.
In general sociological theory, status refers to a member's relative position in the
group, both in the formal hierarchy and in the networks of exchanges in the group
(Blau 1964; Homans 1961; Hughes 1945; Lenski 1954; Linton 1958; Merton 1957;
Parson 1951). Members' status can be understood as a translation of their present
and past contributions to the cooperative system of the group into a right to actively
participate, and sometimes to lead. Members with status are members whose con-
tributions to the life of the group more than balance their returns, even when the
calculus of this balance is dif®cult. Sociological classics have long stressed the
importance and the many dimensions of social status and social approval. Max
Weber used to distinguish economic (based on revenue), social (honour, prestige,
not only from birth, but from human capital (education)), and political dimensions,
which can overlap in stable economic conditions. From a more endogenous per-
spective, status can be achieved in many waysÐfor example, based on strong
competence, administrative responsibilities, popularity, or even endorsement by
other members with status. As stressed by Parsons, then by Bourricaud, the func-
tions of leadership are always exercised by several persons: `the multiplicity of lead-
ers and the collegial character of their power come from the role differentiation [in
groups] and from the dif®culty of combining under one head the plurality of roles'
(Bourricaud 1961: 109). In Parsons's words, the role of the leader is `diffuse', not
specialized. Therefore, assessing who has status and power, or identifying a hierarchy
of statuses in a group, is not an easy task.
In organizations, and particularly among professionals, status means that the
individual is considered worthy of being granted an extensive mandate, regarding
both personal responsibility and corporate responsibility to regulate community,
professional, or internal ®rm affairs (Bosk 1979). This mandate is derived fromÐand
made measurable byÐthe concentration of production-related resources, or by the
privileges that are granted to members who control such resources. These may include
®nancial compensation, decision-making priorities, more collegial and respectful
treatment by peers, and symbolic and moral licensing, as well as escaping pressure
for accountability, tests of commitment, and blame for many errors. In addition to
making an individual less vulnerable to criticism from colleagues, and insulating
him or her from cross-pressures, status has functional prerogatives, including more
freedom to select interesting matters and cases on which to work, or the authority
to decide how such cases will be handled and dividing the work among others. It is
not surprising, therefore, that members of a group compete for status.
Members with status, as individuals, concentrate one or several types of resources;
they are also granted a licence (Hughes 1958) to participate in the speci®c form of
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leadership that characterizes collegial organizations. Status becomes the capacity to
gain favourable reactions from others for one's initiatives and decisions or to have
access to an authority argument in deliberations. This licence can become a con-
straining mandate to participate actively in coordinating collective action: members
with status also become the focus of other members' convergent expectations with
regard to providing solutions to problems of such collective action. Members with
status are under pressure to live up to their status, or they may lose some of it.15 Such
expectations play an important role in the structuring of collective action among
peers. They have a strong normative dimension in dense networks from which, more
generally, investments cannot be easily withdrawn. Collegial organizations tend to
have less stable elites than bureaucracies. Although authority relationships among
peers can be clear at times, it is dif®cult to locate power in them more permanently.
Analytically, each speci®c form of status can be measured by a corresponding
form of centrality in a speci®c network of ties. As mentioned in the Introduction, in
structural explanations in sociology, individuals are portrayed as being subject to
particular sets of constraints and opportunities de®ned by their social context, such
as speci®c social networks through which many resources can circulate (Nadel 1957;
White et al. 1976). Centrality measures the concentration of a speci®c type of
resource accumulated within niches and beyond niches, in the wider context of the
organization. It can thus be used as a measure of status as `expendable capital' (Blau
1964). Beyond a general understanding of status and status competition, this helps
theorize collegial organizations from a broadly conceived structural perspective,
using the notion of multidimensionality of status.
Multidimensionality of status, polycracy, and oligarchy
An illustration of multidimensionality of status in partnerships can be found in
Nelson's study of corporate law partnerships (1988), which shows that, in spite of a
set of rules that tries to smooth the hierarchical nature of their business, law part-
nerships are very much strati®ed organizations. Their authority system is based on a
distinction between ®nders, minders, and grinders, a distinction that will be recurrent
in this book. With a few exceptions, the ®nders, or `rainmakers', are partners who
®nd new and lucrative clients, and bear the greatest responsibility for them. They
pass on clients and work for others to handle. Their governing authority is not as
formal as that of their corporate analogues. Directives are reached by a form of
gentleman's agreement. The minders are partners with managerial roles and
responsibility for long-established clients. They typically sit on administrative
committees, while still trying to stay professionally credible and billable.16 The
managerial role in medium-sized and large ®rms arises from the necessity of
coordinating diverse practice areas, promoting an ef®cient organization of work,
discussing strategies, and decentralizing control over a large professional staff,
especially associates, working on highly specialized matters. In Maister's words
(1993), they not only manage the practice, in¯uencing the cost of the work, its
quality, and the timeliness of its delivery; they also play a motivational roleÐfor
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example, by providing clear goals, giving prompt feedback, involving others in
decision making, seeking members' opinion, tolerating impatience, and keeping
others aware of upcoming and challenging roles. The grinders are hard-working
back-room lawyers, either partners who function as little more than salaried staff, or
associates who are subject to the demands of partners and perform the actual legal
work. Status comes from many sources: contributions to the ®rm, history of
achievements (successful cases), establishing competence, credentials (Bosk 1979;
Bourricaud 1961; Bucher 1970; Freidson 1975; Freidson and Rhea 1963).
Since all forms of status are theoretically open to many members of collegial
organizations, it is often dif®cult, as already mentioned, to locate power clearly in
them. For example, status derived from knowledge and experience is fragile; it may
quickly become obsolete, so members need to keep up with ongoing changes in their
discipline; failure to do so means loss of professional status to challengers. But, on
the other hand, organizations such as partnerships, like any group based on strong
consensus, are interested in the stability and cohesion of a coalition of leaders. An
oligarchy is identi®able across the various types of statusÐincluding hierarchical
statusÐof its members. The reason for this interest in a stable oligarchy is that going
from division to unity with confused unstable coalitions is dif®cult, especially
reaching a tacit solidarity combining diverging interests. An in¯uential `elite' of
members with status is `respected'17 (as opposed to `feared') if it does not ®ght, and
even more if it plays down its status, or presents its agreements as renegotiable soon.
For example, when a hierarchical superior is not the most competent and competes
with the most competent for in¯uence on the direction to be taken by collective
action, they are both, as members of an in¯uential `elite', under strong pressure not
to ®ght in a way that paralyses collective action.
Finally, since competition for resources and for leadership among peers takes
many forms, since status has many dimensions, status in one dimension may be
tightly or loosely connected with status in another. This raises issues of status
consistency that will be shown to be important in collegial organizations, particu-
larly in the regulatory, or `constitutional' process. In government by committee,
where norms and rules are being promulgated for regulation of exchanges, much of
the deliberation combines different forms of status, different constituencies, and
different values (such as excellence or loyalty). Analytically, in speci®c social settings,
distribution of members across dimensions of status shows the extent to which, even
in a democratic group, an oligarchy of members with consistent forms of status
comes out of the requirements of collective action.
In sum, reaching and enforcing decisions, including a formal partnership
agreement, are processes that depend heavily on several leaders and multi-
dimensionality of status. Complex status games need to be disentangled in order to
understand collegial organizations. But, looking directly at the functioning of coali-
tions of leaders may not always provide a clear picture of the ways in which collegial
organizations operate. A broad structural approach to collegial organizations needs
to take social niches and multidimensionality of status into account. In order to
understand the role of niche seeking and status competition in such organizations, it
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is more useful to look ®rst at how they matter in more task-oriented decision-
making processes, in the enforcement of decisions made, and in the de®nition of
values orienting decision making. This is why, in the rest of this chapter, I specify
the social mechanisms that drive such collegial organizations, especially mechanisms
involving exchanges of resources, control of commitment, and defence of precarious
values.
The mechanisms providing solutions to problems of collective action among
peers do presuppose an institutional context such as that described by Waters, but
also processes of management of multiple resources, niche seeking/building, and
status competition grounded in the production process itself as much as in open
contests for ®rm leadership. Such processes matter for the cultivation and mitiga-
tion of status competition in knowledge-intensive task forces, the extraction of
economic performance through relational constraints, quality control, the enfor-
cement of previous agreements, ®rm integration through status differentiation
and the establishment of a balance of powers, and ®nally the de®nition of
professionalism.
C O LL E G IA L OR G A N IZ A T IO NS A S P R OD UC T IO N A ND
EX C H A NG E S YS TE M S
Empirical evidence for the existence of social niches tests for the realism of such
behavioural assumptions. But niche seeking is also conceived here as a component
of a generic social mechanism that produces partial suspension of purely calculating
behaviourÐthat is, bounded solidarity. A test for this ef®ciency of niches is the
detection of the presence of such a solidarity among niche membersÐfor example,
through generalized exchange. Generalized exchange involves indirect reciprocityÐ
which, in network analytical terms, can be identi®ed through cycles of transfers of
resources between at least three actors. Such cycles indicate the existence of this form
of social discipline between niche members, which lowers the cost of access to
resources and fosters the development of a `rudimentary group structure' (Blau
1964). Chapter 3 also provides such a test by detecting a form of generalized
exchange among strong co-workers in the case study. Members accept the need to
cooperate with others without expecting immediate and direct reciprocity; they
count on the fact that it will eventually come back to them indirectly. This estab-
lishes a minimal form of task-related solidarity that can be expected by a structural
theory of collegial organizations.
However, bounded solidarity among interdependent entrepreneurs is fragile by
de®nition, particularly because its positive effects must be protected from the
negative effects of status competition. A structural approach, unlike that of
Waters, can expect the organization's exchange system to provide this protection
of bounded solidarity. To understand this positive effect of a generic social
mechanism, it is useful to focus on the fact that collegial organizations are also
deliberative bodies in their production processes. As already mentioned, they can be
broken down into small, ¯exible, multifunctional, and sometimes multidisciplinary
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work groups (Eccles and Crane 1988) that react to complex non-standardized
problems to produce quality knowledge-intensive service. In these ¯exible and
multifunctional partner±associate task forces that process complex problems sub-
mitted by clients, work is very intense and interdependence among the members is
strong for as long as the case is not closed. Then the task force is dissolved, and the
members form different task forces with other colleagues to work on other cases.18
Partners have to divide the work among the members of their task force and lead this
work group through to the client's satisfaction. Activity is thus conducted in tem-
porary work groups in which colleagues canÐand often are expected toÐshare
knowledge. In effect, partner±associate task forces constitute the core of temporary
task forces that operate through brainstorming and `status auctions' (Sutton and
Hargadon 1996). Professional status competition is thus clearly encouraged among
members, across rank differences (practitioner±apprentice, partner±associate), and
within ranks.
Cultivating and mitigating status competition among peers
To account for the protection or reinforcement of bounded solidarity, it is useful to
look at multiplexity in this exchange system. Since niches are multifunctional, a
broadly conceived structural approach can expect multiplexity of ties in the
exchange system to help prevent a breakdown of bounded solidarity when status
competition gets out of hand. Multiplexity allows for a form of mitigation of status
competition among colleagues, thus solving a `too-many-chefs' problem.19 The
organization can be seen as a `locally multiplex' or niche-level exchange systemÐ
that is, a pattern of ties among members that helps them exchange various resources
directly and indirectly, and that allows circulation of production-related resources
while mitigating status competition. In order to understand this multiplex exchange
system as simply as possible in the context of this book, Chapter 5 illustrates this
process by reducing it to the idealtypical interplay of three types of resources that
members tend to ®nd in their niche. The ®rst type of resource is commitment to
work, or goodwill related to cooperation. The second type of resource is advice.20
The third type of resource is `friendship', or role distance, a form of out-of-of®ce
socialization and personal support not related to the tasks themselves.
Based on this approach to the functioning of work groups in collegial organ-
izations, the role of interdependence of relationships in the mitigation of status
competition can be precisely identi®ed. The logic of the blending of relationships in
a multiplex exchange system can be illustrated by an idealtypical process. When
deliberating about a case, practitioners and apprentices temporarily play a collegial
and egalitarian game in which all arguments have equal weight. Brainstorming based
on `status auctions' puts participants under strong pressure to reach a consensus
about a solution to the problem at hand. It is considered useful for ®nding creative
solutions to complex professional problems, but it also creates dif®culties that are
speci®c to collegial organizations. In effect, at some point, there is a need for
someone, usually the partner in charge, to step in and stop the deliberation.
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Practitioners' statusÐbased on greater experience, greater skill and judgement,
higher seniority, or responsibility to the clientÐbecomes a ground to justify stop-
ping the exchanges of ideas, and making a decision about how the case will be
handled and efforts allocated.
Knowledge-intensive work is thus inextricably mixed with status `games'.
Such status games are easily accepted as long as the group succeeds in ®nding a
consensus on collectively designed solutions. However, stopping the deliberation
without consensus, as is also often the case, is tricky. Members may withdraw
and not be willing to participate fully again. The form of task-related commitment
and solidarity established above may quickly disappear. Professional status compe-
tition can be stimulating, but can also lead to destructive gridlock.21 Status con¯icts
(dissenting partners puf®ng themselves up) can in turn have negative effects on
learning and the circulation of knowledge and experience. Of course, there are moral
exhortations to create consensus or defer to the partner in charge, but these can
remain arti®cial and rhetorical. Competition can easily get in the way of cooperation,
and professionals know that they can lose control of this process. Status competition
is thus a double-edged sword. It is encouraged, but it needs to be contained.
Understanding this process of mitigation is made possible by highlighting a
speci®c form of multiplexity among peersÐthat is, the structural relationship
between choices of three important sources of resources in a collegial organization.
Two steps characterize (analytically speaking) the mitigation process. A ®rst step
witnesses members who work together turning for advice to someone usually within
their niche. Con®gurations in which a co-worker tie and an advice tie appear
together (called `Blau ties' below) should be frequent: such con®gurations represent
status competition and the ®rst step of its mitigation by seeking advice from higher
status partners. The system of interdependence of ties con®rms the existence of a
®rst step in the dynamics of mitigation of status competition.
A second step consists in ensuring that the status competition is not simply
transferred higher up, thus creating a domino effect if members of the task force turn
to several third parties for advice. The solution is either to bring in only one adviser
or to turn to advisers who are themselves strongly connected and able to reach
consensus or defer to each other more easily than the brainstorming work group
itself. Con®gurations in which an advice tie and a friendship tie appear together
should also be frequent: they represent the use of friendship ties to prevent status
competition from continuing among advisers. Note that, in this idealtypical process,
work and friendship ties are not combined directly. A speci®c kind of multiplexity
should thus help partners control status competition by facilitating the combined
circulation of blended resources. Just as power is depersonalized and then reperson-
alized in collegial organizations (Bourricaud 1964), local exchanges of resources in
task forces play a role in mitigating status competition because they are personalized
in a very selective way.
Chapter 5 looks at how resources are blended and bartered in the case study to
con®rm the existence of this idealtypical process of protection of bounded solidarity
from the potentially negative effects of status competition. This is done by stressing
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the positive effect of speci®c multiplex exchanges (an analysis of the interlocking
of the three production-related relationships) for solving the `too-many-chefs'
problem arising especially from brainstorming. This shows the value of looking at
any collegial organization as a multiplex exchange system among interdependent
members. Resources transferred and/or exchanged concern the production activity,
both directly and indirectly although what brings the members together goes beyond
just functional interdependence (Lindenberg 1997).
For a broadly conceived structural theory of collective action, it is important to
pursue the demonstration of the bene®ts of this exchange system to the ®rm as a
whole, particularly to its economic performance and its quality control. After they
make a form of solidarity possible for individualistic entrepreneurs, social niches are
useful to the organization by constraining members into increased performance and
contribution; they also allow knowledge sharing and thus unobtrusive quality
improvements that are often dif®cult to track in knowledge-intensive work. In many
ways, such a system provides structural solutions to structural problems.
Relational constraint and economic performance
Indeed, collegial organizations also rely on niches to pressure members into being
productive. A multilevel and multiplex exchange system, inside and outside niches,
should be important to various forms of performance.22 In effect, depending on rules
for pooling and distributing resources, it is usually in partners' collective economic
interest to produce as much as possible (thus pursuing their individual self-interest
indirectly), but it can also be in their individual interest to let others do the work. For
quasi-tenured partners, for example, there are often enormous incentives to free-ride.
Getting associates to work well is also a problem: although they may be well paid, there
is little chance for them to become partners. If partners can free-ride and associates
threaten the quality of work, members' commitment to their labour contract (the
partnership agreement for partners and the employment contract for associates) is
dif®cult to sustain on a purely economic and legalistic basis.23 Because, as Durkheim
(1893) pointed out, a contract is always incomplete, members need the expectation
that it will be ful®lled. In other words, the contract must be combined with social ties,
such as strong collaboration, advice, and friendship, both at the dyadic level and at the
structural level. To show that, in such a situation, an exchange system has an effect on
his or her commitment, each member's combination of ties (with all the other
members) and position in the ®rm's relational structure must be examined and
related to his or her economic performance.
Niche-level relational pressure is one process by which this opportunistic behav-
iour is also mitigated. In effect, as already seen, niches provide members with work-
related resources, a sense of identity and of their long-term interest, but there is also
an element of self-entrapment in them. This brings us back to a classical idea that
organizational ef®ciency depends on the quality and con®guration of interpersonal
relationships between members (see e.g. Lewin 1952). It is not only that people who
have more relationships are more assimilated into the organization that makes them
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perform more on an economic basis. It is also that the structure of these relation-
ships constrains them to do so. At the work-group level, pressure corresponds to
high density and cohesion in strong work relationships. As already seen, the gen-
eralized exchange system supports cohesive work ties and maintains a speci®c form
of solidarity. Chapter 4 shows that this system also constrains some of its mem-
bersÐthose with speci®c relational patterns and work-group membershipÐinto
reaching higher economic performance. Analytically, this is measured using Burt's
constraint scores (1992),24 which are particularly sensitive to the fact that colleagues
do not discipline each other equally strongly.
Status and quality control in knowledge-intensive organizations
Through status competition and its mitigation, the multiplex exchange system ful®ls
an additional function in collegial organizationsÐthat of quality control. In such
organizations, problems to be solved are often too complex for one person, and
decisions to make too uncertain (Waters 1989). Usually, complexity has its source in
the necessity of a division of work (Durkheim 1893). But collegial organizations
have added problems of complexity to solve in order to satisfy their clients. What is
highly interesting in these organizations is the institutional production of certainty
and simplicity. This is why these organizations are particularly common in pro-
fessional work, where the core task of the worker is to achieve this certainty in a
practical way (Dingwall 1976; Dingwall and Fenn 1987). There are many reasonsÐ
in any knowledge-intensive organization handling complex and non-routine
problems, relying on innovation, and operating in a competitive environmentÐto
try to enhance the quality of work. Knowledge-based services are evaluated by their
level of quality, which is also dif®cult to measure. Maintaining such a level is thus a
problem for such ®rms. There is something about certainty-work that makes it
dif®cult to pin down into an organization, although it may depend upon organi-
zational resources for its accomplishment.25 Formal ex-post methods, such as
of®cial peer-review committees, are considered costly, dif®cult to implement, often
inef®cient, and too strongly politicized. A structural approach argues that the ®rm
relies on its exchange system to provide an informal, structural, and preventive
solution to this problem of quality control.
Collegial organizations count on a more proactive form of quality controlÐfor
example, the fact that its members seek each other's second opinions and share their
experiences before they make decisions or send opinions out to clients. In the status
competition process, members observe and evaluate (mostly informally) each
other's production: they praise big successes, and indirectly sanction (that is, criti-
cize and gossip about) blunders and mistakes (Bosk 1979; Wittek and Wielers 1998).
When they seek third parties for advice during the mitigation process, they do
so ®rst within their own niche. Thus, collegial organizations also rely on social
niches to facilitate quality control when formal peer-review systems fail to produce
results. Knowledge construction depends on these social relationships. Reasoning
exclusively in terms of human capital, as economists and management theories have
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done for a long time, presupposes that, once in business, members freely share their
knowledge and experience with one another. Rather, a structural theory views
quality control as depending on status auctions and competition. It is in members'
collective economic interest to share information and experience as much as pos-
sible, but it is also in their individual interestÐgiven the status competition
processÐto do so while increasing as much as possible their individual credit by
stressing the value of their own knowledge and experience. Therefore, the niche is
certainly where status competition and knowledge management happen at the same
time. But members also compete by expanding out of the local task force and niche
boundaries to reach and use sources of advice with ®rm-wide status. This leads to
the hypothesis of a very centralized and hierarchical pattern in advice networks, in
which a few members are the key to quality control because they accumulate and
distribute knowledge and experience in the ®rm.
These members are sought out for advice by their peers regardless of niche
boundaries because they have professional status. The issue here is not so much who
knows what, but who has the authority to know, and how is this authority nego-
tiated, constructed, and maintained. In effect, advisers often do not have more
technical information to solve a problem; rather they are in a position to take
responsibility for decisions regarding quality. Attention to one aspect of a case
rather than to another may be the object of a debate. Authority to know helps
members impose a certain focus of attention during and after a deliberation. In the
selection of relevant and appropriate information, actors need the authority to make
an issue salient: peers with status can impose that. Knowledge cannot be shared
without authority arguments allowing selected members to assert their authority
to know.
Since members tend to work together in temporary task forces nested in more
stable niches, it is likely that they will ®nd advisers with this authority to know
within this niche. But it is also likely that they will ®nd them outside the niche, thus
using resources provided by the ®rm as a whole (®rm-wide status of speci®c part-
ners) to manage local problems raised by the work process. It allows such members
to impose their standards and criteria of quality26 and to perform much of the ®rm's
proactive quality control. Indeed, Chapter 4 provides evidence for the existence of
this solution in the case study by showing that one of the informal rules related to
the circulation of advice within the ®rm is the seniority rule: one does not seek
advice from people `below'. This concentration of the authority to know may be
paradoxical in an organization where members are jealous of their formal profes-
sional discretion and individual authority to know. But this social process of
capitalization and sharing of knowledge works only because it is informal.
A Montesquieu structure for ®rm integration
However, from the organization's perspective, the exchange system does not have
only virtuous effects. One obvious problem facing collegial organizations that rely
on such a system of niches is to ensure that the organization remains integrated in
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spite of many centrifugal forces. Niches are ef®cient at creating cohesion at the local
level, just as interpersonal relations are the key to the functioning of combat units
(Shils and Janowitz 1948). But, when multiplex exchanges and bounded solidarity
come to be based on a sense of identity, niches may become ®rms within the ®rm.
Well-knitted teamsÐthat is, subsets of members who recurrently belong to the same
task forcesÐbecome a threat to the organization because they can defect and take
away with them valued members and clients. A structural theory of collective action
among peers can use its assumption about status competition and the fact of
multidimensionality of status to offer a theory of ®rm integration that keeps in
check the damage that niches could do to overall ®rm integration.
Speci®cally, collegial organizations solve this problem by making it dif®cult for
niche members to defect together. This can be achieved by allowing some niche
members to reach ®rm-wide status through accumulation of one type of resource,
and the establishment of a balance of power between these members with different
forms of ®rm-wide status. The structural solution consists in systematizing the
division of leadership workÐthat is, status inconsistency. Partners are encouraged
to accumulate one type of resource, while prevented from accumulating resources
providing other forms of status, particularly through a process of destabilization of
task forces and circulation of associates (a resource particularly useful to potential
defectors). In effect, encouraging specialization of status makes sense from the point
of view of the collegial organization, particularly when it tries to undermine the
dangerous ability of such niches to secede.
Following Kuty (1998), this balance of powers can be called a Montesquieu
equilibrium. In this case, the formal structure of the ®rm actively establishes this
informal balance. This contributes to creation or reproduction of invisible
inequalities (an informal `oligarchy') within the ®rm, while still maintaining inte-
gration by making one form of status dependent on the other. In effect, system-
atizing the division of leadership work, especially by shaping access to important
sources of resources such as workforce or client relationships, establishes a relational
structure that counters patronage with `welfare' solidarity. This creates a form of
informal political power sharing. Collegial organizations try to prevent some
partners from becoming too important, particularly by destabilizing `their' teams
and circulating `their' associates.
Chapter 6 deals with an example of such a Montesquieu structure in the case
study. To survive in collegial organizations, interdependent members of a ®rm
need access to resources such as work for clients, and goodwill from cooperative co-
workers. In this context, solidary behaviour means that a member is prepared to
help out another member, particularly within his or her social niche, who ®nds him
or herself in a dif®cult situation with regard to such needs (Lindenberg 1997). For
example, this includes changing one's priorities for a while because Alter faces an
urgent deadline for a client. Or systematically selecting Alter (as opposed to others)
as a co-worker on an interesting and visible case brought into the ®rm. Or exercising
restraint by not trying to grab all the credit in a successful case conducted in con-
junction with Alter.
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The organization helps members get access to such resources and solidary
behaviour. It conducts its affairs based on formal rules, which express choices
among policy options, and allocate, directly and indirectly, these resources to
members (Rowley and Rowley 1960). Authority to handle new ®les or clients
(intake) or to allocate this new work among colleagues (assignment) is distributed
more or less formally. For many members (partners and associates), access to work
opportunities depends on these intake and assignment policies. A basic `welfare
system' is establishedÐthat is, a committee that allocates such resources across
professional members of the ®rm and helps organize cooperation. In spite of their
boring aspect, procedures of intake (mainly, whether or not to take in a case) and
assignment (mainly, who will do the work) are thus good indicators of solidary
behaviour.
In theory, members of a ®rm know about such formal arrangements and
order their professional lives accordingly. But in reality many often behave differ-
ently. For reasons that will be described, they do not necessarily trust or count on
the of®cial welfare system to get cooperation from one another and to provide
solidarity. They can have strong interests in not doing so. For instance, partners
have strong incentives to keep control of the ®les for clients that they bring into
the ®rm, and to use the best possible peers and associates to do the work.
Associates are required to bill a minimum number of hours in the year, and have
personal incentives to work with in¯uential partners who will carry weight on the
day of the decision about their promotion to partnership. Thus, ®les are not
all allocated by the formal channels; members cooperate through other channels.
Clientelistic ties and more selective solidarities can be established between, on the
one hand, patrons with control of access to the market and, on the other hand, more
dependent colleagues. The welfare system is thus intertwined with an informal
patronage system. Members thus have a choice between getting access to coopera-
tion through welfare or through patronage. Each can respond to his or her interests
and solve his or her problems differently, although the clientelistic match-making
process is not formally allowed.
Each type of solidarity is organized by partners with a different form of status. The
®rst is organized by `minders', the second by `®nders' or `rainmakers' who establish
clientelistic ties with `grinders' (junior partners, sometimes called `baby partners', or
associates). A social process helps minders maintain ®rm integration when facing
threats of defection by ®nders. In effect, this situation creates a threat to a ®rm's
integration, because patronage tends to build up teams of specialized members that
are in a position to defect. In such professional partnerships, the existence of
patronage often represents a danger of disintegration for the ®rm. Clientelistic
solidarity among partners or between partners and associates can create stable work
groups that may leave, taking lucrative clients away with them. Thus, in such a
situation, members' choice of either welfare or patronage to get cooperation raises a
typical problem of collective action.
Actors' niche seeking logic in their choices of co-workers is then shown to have an
effect on the coexistence of the two solidarity systems (welfare and patronage),
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because it creates a structure in which minders occupy a position that helps them
prevent ®nders from mustering the specialized workforce necessary for easy defec-
tion. Niche seeking structures the organization in a way that is likely to help minders
in their efforts to control ®nders and their threat of opportunistic behaviour. This
structure is called a `Montesquieu structure', precisely because it re¯ects the
existence of a partial political order. Retrospectively, one of the goals of intake and
assignments procedures appears to be to prevent the creation of `ready-for-easy-
defection' work groups within such niches. Thus, status competition at the indi-
vidual level can have positive effects at the collective levels, particularly when it
prevents ®rm disintegration by imposing a balance of power between two forms
of status (or two kinds of oligarchs).
C OL L EG I A L O R G A NI Z A TI ON S A S L A TER A L
C ON TR O L R E G IM ES
As already seen with the example of the constraining structure of a members'
co-workers' network, one of the central problems of collegial organizations is
dealing with behaviour perceived to be opportunistic. The issue of conformity is of
particular importance in formally egalitarian bodies in which free-rider problems
quickly arise. As mentioned in the Introduction, direct command or the use of
administrative hierarchy are not considered appropriate means for exercising con-
trol, because professionals have many ways of neutralizing formal authority
(Freidson 1975, 1986; Gouldner 1954). Therefore, a second-order free-rider pro-
blem arises as wellÐthe problem of who will bear the costs of monitoring and
enforcement among the formally equal members (Cartwright 1965; Hechter 1984;
Heckathorn 1989, 1990; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Oliver 1980; Yamagishi 1986).
Collegial organizations, even when they do not shy away from monitoring collective
economic ef®ciency, need ways of controlling and pressuring members or task forces
other than hierarchy. Unable to pull rank on peers, members of collegial organi-
zations need decentralized controls. How do such controls operate and deal with the
costs of control?
Here the existence of multiplex and personalized ties in social niches, as well as
status competition, are again essential to providing an answer. Theories of collective
action have already shown that conformity of members to the rules governing the
management of common resources requires social control and informal con¯ict
resolution mechanisms (Black 1984; Coleman 1990; Ellickson 1991; Fortado 1994;
Hechter 1984, 1987; Heckathorn 1990; Lazega 1995b, 2000a; Lindenberg 1993;
Morrill 1995; Ostrom 1990; Reynaud 1989; Taylor 1987; Wittek 1999). Compliance
to the rules is contingent on the compliance by others, and therefore members spend
time and energy monitoring each other. Infractors are likely to be allocated grad-
uated sanctions by other members, by of®cials accountable to these members, or by
both.27 Such sanctions range from economic losses to social marginalization, then
®nally to expulsion.
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However, beyond general understanding of early monitoring and sanctioning, the
way in which a formally egalitarian organization gains `quasi-voluntary compliance'
(Levi 1988) with its rules and agreements must be explained by looking at how costly
the graduated and unobtrusive ways (through which such pressures are exercised)
are considered to be. Enforcement through negative sanctions can be costly for the
sanctioner, particularly when control is mobilized for the protection of the common
good in a formally egalitarian body. Attempting to put pressure on other members
on behalf of the ®rm can be costly in relational terms: infractors may accumulate
resentment, partners may blame the sanctionerÐespecially if he or she has personal
ties to the deviant partyÐfor failing to achieve results. The issue thus becomes: how
then does the organization keep costs of enforcement low? As noted by Bourricaud
(1961: 385), Reynaud (1989), and Ostrom (1990), sanctions are not usually auto-
matic. They are not independent of the person who applies them, of the person to
whom they are applied, and of the characteristics and relationships of both. Any
process of early monitoring and sanctioning must therefore help select sanctioners
and build access to infractors. In Chapter 7, I argue that informal processes con-
tribute to maintaining low costs, in particular the politicized use of social resources
or relationships between members, as well as a speci®c form of status called `pro-
tector of the common good'. Practitioners are reluctant to invest systematically their
own personal ties for the protection of the common good when the target is not part
of their own social niche and relational capital. They also do not have enough such
personal ties to cover the entire partnership. They are thus forced to make choices
outside their niche and personal networkÐhence the pressure exercised on some
members to become such protectors.
In effect, a structural approach asserts that, the more I need to control
others whose job is important to me so that I can do my own job, and the more
important are the relationships with these others, the more likely it is that I will
have an informal and personalized way of monitoring and sanctioning them that
signals that I am interested in these relationships. As part of what Freidson calls
`the rule of the collegium', members tend to avoid open face-to-face con¯icts, as
well as direct and coercive exercises of power. Therefore, graduated sanctions start
with convergent expressions of normative expectations, unobtrusive and unsolicited
advice and the spread of gossip. In Freidson and Rhea's words (1963), colleagues
informally `talk to' infractors in order to curb behaviour perceived to be unpro-
fessional or opportunistic. In effect, social ties provide access to infractors and focus
their attention, because they represent the existence of underlying resource
dependencies. In Mintzberg's words (1979), there is `mutual adjustment' among
peers working in `adhocracies'. Others refer to this process as gaining `quasi-
voluntary compliance' (Levi 1988), or as achieving autonomous regulation (Rey-
naud 1989), concertive control (Barker 1993), or compliant control (Heckathorn
1990). Colleagues show infractors that lack of conformity has been detected, must be
discussed, and may involve external social costs, such as marginalization or stopping
exchanges at various levels. Because interdependent partners need social resources to
perform effectively, they are also more exposed to pressures from partners who
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control these resources. These processes do not necessarily guarantee by themselves
that peers will be able to maintain an enduring institution, but a structural theory
asserts that any complex system of rules needs them to survive over time.
Little is known about the selection of early sanctioners and monitors among
peersÐamong whom applying rules is never unambiguous because monitors,
infractors, and sanctioners are all formally equals. Many views of in¯uence assume
that it is based on solidary relations, such as friendship (Breiger 1990; Friedkin 1998;
Granovetter 1985; Marsden and Friedkin 1993). It can be argued that such relations
provide channels through which disputes can be mediated before they escalate
(Lazega and Vari 1992; Morrill 1995).28 In Chapter 7, I attempt to enhance under-
standing of quasi-voluntary compliance by highlighting the relationship between
cost of control and choices of suitable sanctioners in the collegial organization.
According to the structural approach, this selection and underlying expectations
should be in¯uenced by factors such as formal dimensions of structure, and by
relative status of the protagonists of the control drama (interdependence and
control over resources). It should be driven by the convergence of colleagues'
expectations, which together exercise a constraint on levers to intervene.
Analytically, three-way data on the selection of sanctioners for a given infractor by
each respondent are used to provide evidence, in the case study, of the existence of a
social mechanism called `lateral control regime', which uses members' inter-
dependencies and ties to each other within such niches to put pressure on deviant
partners. As mentioned in the Introduction, I use the word `lateral' to express two
facts: ®rst, that this way of exercising informal control is based on the use of third
parties as sanctionersÐthat is, envoys of the ®rm in charge of pressuring `deviant'
partners back to good conduct;29 and, secondly, that these third parties are not
hierarchical superiors, but peers who are all formally equals. Structural constraints
have the effect of narrowing the choices made by partners when they exercise early
monitoring and sanctioning more or less unobtrusively by selecting who is going to
do the `talking to'. Again, this mechanism also involves a small number of members
with a speci®c form of ®rm-wide status, who are expected by their peers to exercise
more lateral control than others, regardless of niche boundaries. The informal
delegation of responsibility to a few `multi-target levers', which is at the core of this
lateral control regime among equals, tends to make sense from the perspective of
individual partners' management of social resources. This control mechanism is
thus both horizontally and vertically informal.
In effect, sanctioning costs are lowered when sanctioners are chosen because they
are structurally close to the infractor. I de®ne this structural closeness, or proximity,
in terms of geography (same of®ce and market), in terms of knowledge background
(common speciality), and in terms of social relationships (the existence of a tie
between them or membership in the same cohesive subgroups). This proximity
reduces the costs of control by spreading them among members of the same niche
with easy access to each other. However, it also raises problems with regard to the
effectiveness of such controls. If social ties are needed between the sanctioner and the
infractor so that the former can access effectively the latter, the organization may not
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trust the sanctioner if he or she is too close to the infractor. Strong ties between the
two could induce the sanctioners to reserve special treatment for close infractors, to
cover up some of the infractors' behaviour, and to side with them against the
collective interest of the ®rm (Katz 1977). I have argued that this problem is solved
by shifting some of the costs to members with a speci®c form of good-citizen status
within the ®rm. Such protectors of the common good are particularly trusted for
these enforcement tasks because they have speci®c characteristics. These char-
acteristics include, in particular, seniority and a formal responsibility in the ®rm
(which increases their capacity to monitor the infractor but also helps them speak on
behalf of the common good without raising additional controversies), and a form
of business performance that is not threatening to the infractorÐthat is, that does
not open confrontations that could be related (by the infractor) to individual
interests of the sanctioner. These results are consistent with previous work on
control processes.30
I also use the word regime to stress that selection of sanctioners (and the
whole social mechanism) is politicized in a normative way. The type of relational
in¯uence examined here among peers is based on two dimensions of collective
action: on the one hand, common interests and resource dependencies; on the other
hand, normative prescriptions regarding, for example, avoidance of con¯ict escal-
ation. In a collegial context, important sanctioners should also be less controversial
than others: they should be able to speak on behalf of the ®rm without raising
controversies, and without triggering additional con¯icts, or being suspected of
representing speci®c coalitions, or individually bene®ting from exercising pressure.
In¯uence stems from members' utilitarian logicÐfrom their considerations of
potential losses in social resources or costs incurred when exercising (or being
subject to) early monitoring and sanctioningÐbut also from an informal con-
sensus31 that emerges from a trained capacity of all partners to choose lateral
sanctioners. Members do use their relationships, or `spend' their own relational
capital for the purpose of enforcing collective decisions. However, they use it to
protect their own relational capital. In order to make lateral control function beyond
their social niche, they also build up collective and convergent expectations that
designate, for the same purpose, a limited number of members with a protector-of-
the-common-good status to enforce their previous agreements.
Such a social construction of the status of protectors is inseparable from nor-
mative considerations. Chapter 7 also describes the role and characteristics of these
main sanctioners, the social `territory' in which each of them is perceived to exercise
control, and how they are expected to control each other and solve the issue of `who
will guard the guardians'. Especially in heterogeneous or polarized systems, part of
their authority and capacity to inspire deference may be due to their assumed ability
to use the good connections that they have on both sides. But they draw much of
their authority from a normative consensus on their capacity to represent in a
credible and uncontroversial way the interests of the ®rm as a whole. Again, this
authority, or the right to speak on behalf of the common good, is supported either
by their willingness to serve in administrative positions, or by their importance to
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®rm revenues (but in an unthreatening wayÐthat is, they are not locked in any
constituency). They are prepared to act as universal sanctioners, not only because
partners on whom they depend for all sorts of resources expect them to interveneÐ
because there is a strong pressure on them to complyÐbut also because it is one
possible way to compete for status. Living up to this speci®c form of status may not
always be pleasant, but it has its own rewards including easy access to, or identi®-
cation with, other oligarchs. Their ®rm-speci®c status is the cornerstone of a wider
pattern, the lateral control regime, which helps maintain a cooperative institution.
In sum, when the total cost of control can constitute a severe constraint on any
group's ability to attain solidarity and reproduce itself, knowledge of this lateral
control regime helps to understand how members keep monitoring costs low, and
therefore keep themselves motivated to carry on monitoring each other. The
structural approach contributes to a theory of collective action among peers, par-
ticularly by identifying a pattern that is both structural and normative in peers'
mutual monitoring of conformity to a set of their own rules.
C OL L EG I A L OR G A NI Z A TI ON S A ND T H E
R EG UL A TO R Y M E C H A NI SM
As emphasized above, solidarity and compliance require social norms. The status of
protector has a built-in normative dimension. This points to the third generic
mechanism for which a broadly conceived structural perspective needs to account:
the rede®nition of the rules of the game by the members. In addition to building
niches as appropriate contexts for part of their exchanges, members compete for
status and the power to de®ne the terms of these exchanges. Here, my approach
emphasizes the interpenetration of the interactional and cultural realms, of inter-
dependencies and values, and contends that contracts and resource dependencies are
not suf®cient by themselves to maintain cohesion and solidarity in a social group.
Members need to commit themselves to priorities in a system of norms and values
that contribute to make these contracts meaningful and enforceable. This is parti-
cularly the case in organizations where members have regulatory interests and rights,
and are confronted with issues that require principled and long-term choices
between policy options.
More speci®cally, this relationship between interdependencies and values can be
approached by questions such as how the resource dependencies among members of
an organizationÐas an indication of power relationships among themÐeventually
affect the capacity of their social group to change its own rules, including important
rules such as that related to the distribution of resources among themselves. The
Parsonian approach (Parsons 1951) to culture is useful here to look at some aspects
of the interplay between structure and norms, if only at the regulatory stage of this
interplay. In effect, rules are expressed in policy options and they also represent
underlying values. They can thus be considered to be cultural characteristics of the
organization. This is consistent with traditional sociological thinking: a system of
interpersonal relations and exchanges driving a system of production, on the one
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hand, and a system of norms, values, or symbols, on the other hand, are inseparable.
Through the latter, individuals orient themselves reciprocally in a stable and con-
sistent frame of anticipation (Bourricaud 1961: 77). Members try to promote their
own personal interests in their exchanges. But they have to do this by defending
values that help them rede®ne the terms of these exchanges. In turn, however, this
assertion and defence of values is itself a structurally constrained process that
maintains a form of regulatory stability in the organization.32 Consequently, it often
favours the status quo.
The negotiation of precarious values
Building on Weber's and on Merton's work (1957), Selznick (1957) combines
structure and norms by using the notion of precarious values. As mentioned in the
Introduction, a precarious value is one that is essential to the viability of the col-
lectivity but in which most members may have no direct stake. It is always in danger
of losing its ¯ag carriers and representativesÐthat is, active support from organized
interest groups and elites (at the societal level) that helps preserve it as a candidate
for top priority on the list of all competing values. Values are preserved, within
organizations, by subunits entrusted with that preservation. Client satisfaction,
internal coordination, innovation and quality of professional knowledge, societal
needs, and employee interests would not be defended if not represented by powerful
subunits or members for which the values in question are paramount (Simpson
1971).33
Like any organization, collegial ones have many goals, and hence a chronic lack of
normative integration. Members of an organization, especially a collegial one, do
not have rigid overarching `common values' (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). Nor-
mative integration, sociologists have long argued, is achieved by an ongoing debate
over rules, norms, and values fuelled by incompatibility between different interests
and different forms of status (Kellerhals et al. 1988). As shown by many authors
(Dingwall 1999; Freidson 1999; Hazard 1980; Hughes 1958), professional rules and
values, in addition to the law, are the key to the structuring of collective action
among professional colleagues. Actors, if they want to win, sometimes have to
rede®ne their priorities in terms of values (Friedberg 1993). For example, partners
feel free to develop and change their own conception of professionalism. They
calculate their interests, but they also `negotiate' their values (Kuty 1998). They fuel
debates concerning professionalism, especially when members with superior eco-
nomic power (for example, controlling access to large and lucrative clients) try to
impose their own hierarchy of values, their own rules of the game, and their own
terms for multiplex exchanges. For example, in decisions of recruitment through co-
optation, peers often reach a con¯ict between loyalty (typically clientelistic criter-
ion) and excellence (ideally bureaucratic and professional criterion).
In particular, a debate about norms is restarted when policies have to be adjusted.
Managerial, professional, and entrepreneurial ideologies can con¯ict in the de®ni-
tion of organizational policies. The `regulatory' debate among members focuses on
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the rules that they de®ne for their collective action, the `rules of the game' (Reynaud
1989). Negotiating precarious values is the ultimate way for members to politicize
their exchanges and indirectly seek favourable terms for them. The context of this
debate, the conditions under which it is pre-structured, is a basic micro-political
issue that raises the question of participation in change.34
This points to a process of upstream pre-structuring of the negotiation of pre-
carious values that is central to collective action among peers. In collegial organ-
izations, a variety of subunits and constituencies try to exercise power and defend
precarious values through con¯icts with other subunits that support other values.
Members with status who interpret the partnership agreement and `read' its
underlying norms belong to such subgroups representing a precarious value. Their
status is a temporary claim to interpret or rede®ne a norm in an attempt to convince
oneself and others to comply `voluntarily' to the current rules of the game. They
in¯uence policy making and debates about professional behaviour more than other
members. For example, administratorsÐor mindersÐcan step in to arbitrate when
con¯icts threaten to get out of hand. But their hierarchical status can be challenged,
especially on behalf of various conceptions of professionalism.
Note that, up to now, characteristics of the collegial organization were derived
from the work process itself. It could be argued that the process of task-related
mitigation of status competition works also for reaching regulatory decisionsÐthat
is, choices concerned with organizational policy making. But regulatory decisions
involve formally all peers, and therefore it is important here to come back to the
more commonly accepted context of government by committee (Waters 1989;
Wheare 1955) in order to look at the main mechanism used by collegial organiza-
tions to manage potential tensions between different values and norms underlying
policy options. Contrary to Waters's assessment, however, there are several
essential features of debates on professionalism that differ from simple orientation
to the best specialized knowledge. In particular, no member can have the last word,
once and for all, in such formal discussions. Moreover, a single member can drama-
tize lack of consensus on various issues and prevent consensus building. A modus
vivendi is, therefore, usually established among peers. In formal committees
and deliberations, such as partnership meetings, debates would be endless if not
structured by a mechanism that selects members who will carry more weight than
others in regulatory work. A structural approach can help understand, in part, this
modus vivendi and its construction. The latter is in fact an oligarchic process even in
a one-person-one-vote organization (Dahl 1985). In effect, peers' participation in
the regulatory debate is informally restricted. I argue that only multi-status members
are in a position to help their peers in reaching a temporary form of consensus about
priorities in such values.
Multi-status oligarchs and broken promises
Multidimensionality of status in the collegial organization is an important char-
acteristic of the regulatory mechanism. In effect, it allows members with different
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forms of status to be part of the oligarchy. A ®rst oligarchic process was identi®ed
above with the Montesquieu structure. It is a mechanism that requires a balance of
powers between minders and ®nders. In such a mechanism, since no part of these
elites can eliminate all its counterparts or opponents, rivalry leads to equilibrium
and ®rm integration. The regulatory mechanism is different in nature: it requires
not only a coexistence between members with status (oligarchs), but at least tem-
porary consensus among them and a capacity to convince their peers to accept this
consensus. Surprisingly though, studies of committee decision-making processes
focusing on the role of multidimensionality of status are not very well developed. A
broadly conceived structural approach provides speci®c insights into this social
mechanism. It shows that members with different forms of status de®ne the terms
under which exchanges take place. They defend norms from which rules governing
the organization are derived. However, this regulatory role of oligarchs can be real
only if a social process helps them convince their peers, at least temporarily, about
their selection of values to be considered a priority. This raises the question of the
nature of this social mechanism.
As already noticed, in collegial organizations, problems to be solved are often too
complex for one person, and decisions to be made too uncertain. Indeed certainty-
work is a de®ning characteristic of knowledge-intensive organizations. This is why
(even in bureaucracies) leaders can depend upon colleagues and subordinates with
valuable expertise. However, complexity is also due to the fact that decision-makers
are often `representatives of representatives' (Bourricaud 1961: 414). As Crozier, and
many others, have established, a decision is never simply reduced to a problem-
solving technique. It is also a strategy involving various constituencies and com-
promises. In our politicized situation, organizational constituencies with different
interests may con¯ict, and the reality of these con¯icts leads to an enlargement of the
circle of responsible leaders into a heterogeneous committee. Interests are defended
through a discussion of precarious values by multi-status membersÐthat is,
members of an oligarchy of peers.
Therefore, constitutional deliberations take place under the following structural
constraints. First, they require that members get involved in status competition and
try to reach a form of personalized status that will allow them to speak legitimately on
behalf of the ®rm before all its members. Indeed claims to leadership are based on
both capitalized status and assertion of speci®c policy options (and derived exchange
criteria). Without status, one is not much listened to by one's peers.35 Without policy
orientations, status as a concentration of resources is not a suf®cient ground to claim
leadership among peers: members making such claim need to get involved in con-
sensus building. Secondly, they require members with status to discuss policy
orientations and precarious values in a way that has its own logic. Ef®cient pro-
motion of policy options depends on the shape of this oligarchyÐthat is, the type of
heterogeneity of sources of status existing within the organization. This is where
insights from a broadly conceived structural approach and an institutional (that is,
normative) perspective need to be combined. They make it possible to understand
the negotiation of precarious values and the rede®nition of rules in this context.
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This negotiation is a social mechanism that helps collegial organizations solve the
problem of endless formal deliberation about values by using the multi-
dimensionality of status ahead of the deliberations themselves. It consists in
authorizing only members with multiple and inconsistent forms of status to
intervene so as to prevent legitimate and competing values from being defended
later in a forceful way by other members. This selection brings into the deliberation
only those oligarchs who have accumulated several forms of status and who
represent several precarious values, and are thus able to give priority to one of the
latter without disqualifying the others. In other words, values that are not repre-
sented by an oligarch accumulating at least two inconsistent forms of status still have
the right to exist but are unlikely to become a priority. This selection pre-quali®es
for regulatory deliberations only representatives of values ensuring an equilibrium
of powers among oligarchs. Control of negotiation of values thus happens before the
deliberations themselves. This social mechanism is thus based on a selection of bi-
or multi-status oligarchs who play a leadership role by de®ning priorities.36
This is a very useful connection between structure and culture. In effect, any
regulatory process is a form of change that involves broken promises and a redis-
tribution of resources. In any changes of the rules of the game, some parties will
come out as losing resources and others as winning resources compared to the
distribution of these resources before the changesÐthat is, under previous rules
(Reynaud and Reynaud 1996). This is why regulatory changes need the support of
members with several forms of statusÐmulti-status oligarchs. These oligarchs must
have the capacity to promote regulatory changes and deal with the negative effects of
broken promises. When differences in power are not huge among members, this
capacity often rests on sacri®ce of resources by such multi-status oligarchs, a form of
investment at some risk that yields more power (Blau 1964). Rising above their own
individual interests when favouring one policy option and siding with the `losing'
form of status is not a pure sacri®ce that in itself would carry the day. As a matter of
fact, in the long run, it is no sacri®ce at all. But it can be perceived to be one in the
short term, which helps multi-status oligarchs legitimize the changes and reach a
position where they can ask for similar sacri®ces from others as well. Those who can
afford to sacri®ce resources for consensus and for the common good while not
losing power are partners who have several inconsistent forms of status. Thanks to
this inconsistency, or loose coupling, losing one form of status does not entail losing
another. The ongoing debate over values is both fuelled and made manageable by
incompatibility between different forms of status. This high road, however, may not
be ef®cient in itself, which is why multi-status oligarchs are also in a position to force
these changes on their peers by using their control of resource dependencies. Both
power and legitimacy go hand in hand in the management of social change.
Looking jointly at multi-status oligarchy and at forms of status inconsistency in
the organization is a helpful way of extending our knowledge about the relationship
between culture and structure. The relationships between the various dimensions of
status are a key determinant of the ways in which regulatory debates take place, and
consequently of the ways in which speci®c rules and underlying values become
49A Structural Theory
priorities for a given collective actor.37 Chapter 8 provides exploratory analysis of
inconsistent forms of status and their in¯uence in the regulatory process in the case
study. In this partnership, uni-status members (for example, a highly productive
partner who champions one single valueÐthat is, `merit' in the distribution of
compensation) are not much listened to by their peers in debates about policy. Bi- or
multi-status members, who are central in several networks and highly productive,
attract much more attention. They are in a position to arbitrate in the negotiation of
precarious values, because they stand to lose something in any compromise reached
by the collegium. Almost only oligarchs who are senior, productive, have a good
reputation, and are in management can hope to muster enough credibility to
impress their colleagues in the deliberation about precarious values. They can
decrease the salience of a value that cannot create consensus without ignoring it
entirely, thus de®ning what conformity to the rules and orthodoxy will be. Peers will
converge towards positions defended by such oligarchs, whether or not the latter are
conformists or anti-conformists relative to one of their forms of status.
The social mechanism authorizing speci®c forms of status inconsistency
between multi-status oligarchs thus allows for a control of negotiation of values
that happens before the deliberations themselves. In summary, the negotiation of
precarious values, or the emergence of a priority value, requires a cohesive core of
pluri-status oligarchs in a position to defend their rank with their peers, if not to
prescribe these values to each other.38 But one of the dif®culties is that these multi-
status oligarchs are not always clearly identi®ed with such values. The debate
about precarious values uses in a constraining way the heterogeneity of sources of
status observed by the classics. Structure mediates between interests and values,
because oligarchs can promote some norms while downplaying the importance of
others. Thus, identifying this mechanism does not bring us back to narrow structuro-
functionalism and its search for the universal key to the integration of eternally
transcendent values. On the contrary, the relationship between the heterogeneity of
sources of status (which guarantees a form of balance of powers) and the consistency
of multiple forms of status (allowing for the creation, by oligarchs, of a hierarchy of
values) remains a variable one. It depends on the kind of social discipline that exists
among oligarchs. Thus a structural approach also helps in describing a social
mechanism through which an oligarchy of members is able to de®ne and maintain
the rules of the game in collegial organizations. This structural mechanism keeps in
check the discussion of values among peers by allowing some, and not others, to
participate in a credible way in the debate on the appropriate policy choices of the
moment.
The relationships between interests, values, and policies are not direct and
straightforward. A social mechanism characterizing the regulatory deliberation
among peers introduces complex status games that weigh on policy decisions. As a
social mechanism, this form of regulatory deliberation invoking precarious values
has a structural basis. It is particularly important in an organization with many goals
and not much normative integration. In spite of strong pressure towards consensus
in many types of collegial organizations, this political process maintains an
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underlying turbulence of critical debates. Recall that such debates are important to
prevent standardization and bureaucratization of any ®rm.
A broadly conceived structural approach provides a theory of collective action
among peers. This theory takes into account three generic social mechanisms that
help to solve the most important problems facing collegial organizations. It uses
behavioural assumptions about members' strategic rationality (their niche seeking
and their involvement in competition for status) as driving forces for exchanges,
controls, and regulation. These mechanisms have a strong informal dimension but
nevertheless contribute to the governance of the organization. They provide
structural solutions to problems familiar to interdependent entrepreneurs, such as
how to cultivate and mitigate status competition; how to maintain performance,
quality, and controls; and ®nally how to maintain organizational integration and
help with the negotiation of precarious professional values. In sum, this theory
explains the ways in which legally constraining economic contracts and informal
social mechanisms are combined to sustain cooperation among rival partners.
The next chapters in this book present a case study, that of a traditional law
partnership. This ®rm is of particular interest because it is built on durable rela-
tionships among partners, which make it easier to observe or reconstitute these
paradigmatic mechanisms. The case both illustrates this theory and tests analytical
approaches that are needed to replicate this work in other settingsÐwhether in small
partnerships, multinational professional services ®rms, or collegial pockets in ¯at-
tening bureaucracies.
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In this chapter, I present the ®rm that is used as a case study, a north-eastern US
corporate law partnership, in which ®eldwork, as presented in Appendix A, was
conducted to examine the generic social mechanisms that help coordinate activities
of interdependent entrepreneurs. In this ®rm, formal organizational structure such
as the partnership agreement (according to which partners are personally liable for
the actions of the others) and the committee system are not suf®cient by themselves
to account for collective action. Therefore the ®rm, a successful one in spite of
economic dif®culties in the north-east at the time of the research, offers a good
setting for this examination.
C O R P O R A T E L A W F I R M S : A N I N S T I T U T I O N A L FO R M
Much is known about the organizational form of US corporate law ®rms, their
history, and the changes made during the twentieth century (see e.g. Flood 1987;
Galanter and Palay 1991; Heinz and Laumann 1982; Laumann and Heinz 1977;
Mann 1985; Nelson 1988; Smigel 1969; Starbuck 1992; Tolbert 1988; and many
others). These ®rms provide minimal ef®ciency gains from sharing common pro-
duction facilities. As indicated above by Waters's de®nition, their formal structure
is based ®rst on a distinction between administrative staff and professionals, and,
secondly, on a distinction among the professionals, between the partners (the owners
of the ®rm) and the associates (salaried and usually younger attorneys who are
expected to bill around 1,800 to 2,000 hours of work per year). Partners are at the top
of the hierarchy; the partnership as a whole makes most of the important decisions.
They manage the ®rm through a management structure and a system of committees
(which do not meet very often). This organizational form is perceived to create
dif®culties in mobilization and decision making. This is why ®rms have developed
more centralized structures, both formally and informally, run by partners who are
either elected of®cials or more central partners (such as rainmakers who control
access to the largest clients). The hierarchical relationship between partners and
associates is consistently very clear. Associates must work hard for partners but also
exhibit some deference towards them, especially in public or in front of clients.
These ®rms justify high fees by presenting themselves as the elite of the legal
profession, capable of quickly mobilizing large task forces of imaginative attorneys
and of handling complex cases requiring sophisticated and constantly updated legal
knowledge. To recruit the best possible associates (that is, those coming out of the
most prestigious law schools), these ®rms must be able to give them a hope of
becoming partners after six to ten years as associates. If after that period the associate
is not co-opted as a partner, he or she must leave the ®rm. This is the up-or-out rule.
The most important resource of a law ®rm is its human, relational, and social capital
(experience, level of sophistication, reputation, good relations with clients and
among partners, and existence of social mechanisms facilitating collective action).
The traditional structure of these ®rms makes it possible to accumulate and share
this capital (Gilson and Mnookin 1985). Law ®rms are organized around promotion
to partnership as a means of protecting these forms of capital and as a means of
controlling associates. In so far as their business depends on an unpredictable
economy, and thus their growth on a mechanism with inherent risks, these ®rms
cannot have a simple growth policy, if any.
Until the end of the 1980s, this up-or-out ruleÐalong with a favourable economic
and political contextÐpushed the ®rms towards a growth that maintained their
short-term integration. It was easy to recruit associates and promise fast access to
partnership. But this growth was also a threat for their long-term integration. In
the 1990s most of these ®rms had to ®nd new ways of controlling their growth
and protecting their expertise. Integration through promotion to partnership was
threatened by the limitations of the market, the size of these ®rms, and the
competition among them. In reaction to this danger, they restructured and bureau-
cratized themselves much more. More rules were adopted, the number of
committees decreased, ®rms departmentalized, and important administrative and
commercial responsibilities were shared by a smaller number of partners. Criteria
for sharing pro®ts tended to diversify. Firms in which seniority had been the only
criterion gave more weight to performance and pragmatic ways of measuring it (for
example, number of hours billed, number of clients brought in, number of hours
spent on administrative responsibilities). This bureaucratization also consisted in
standardizing and routinizing as much as possible a maximum of tasks (for example,
examining entire boxes of memos to determine whether or not the other side should
have access to them, summarizing depositions, registering documents, and so on)
and assigning them to paralegal employees.1 It increased the administrative side of
the ®rm and transferred more authority to professional managers. Many ®rms
introduced formal peer and quality review processes for partners, in addition to
accounting controls. In some ®rms, partners were forced to switch specialities and
move into new and more lucrative areas of law. The creation of two-tiered part-
nerships with `salaried partners' and `permanent associates' was widely accepted.
Lateral recruitments (buying out specialists from another ®rm) were considered
pro®table (that is, they meant less investment in associate training), but they also
changed the relational fabric of the ®rm. Competition among partners and among
associates became tougher and cooperation took new forms.
Such changes, often presented as reducing the costs of collective decision making,
met with resistance, even though they were perceived to be a matter of survival.
Bureaucratization has its limits. The changes nevertheless represented a threat to the
way in which the legal profession conducted its business. With the relaxation of the
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up-or-out rule, human and social capital was also threatened. Fear of behaviour
perceived to be `opportunistic' (rejection of commingling clients, failure to share
competencies, partners leaving the ®rm with important clients, and so on) and
discourse on solidarity and loyalty were increasing. The problem of integration was
thus well known to members and managed in a way that represented a threat to the
organizational form. Even bureaucratized, such formal structures could not alone
guarantee the integration of the ®rm. Owing to changes both internal and external,
large law ®rms were looking for new organizational forms that were more attuned to
their environment and that allowed them to control growth more easily. As many
observers of the legal profession have shown, old world generalist partners were
trying to become lawyers as businessmen and entrepreneurs.
W H A T D O C O R P O R A TE L A W YE R S D O?
Descriptions of interesting, sophisticated, and challenging work are a staple of
corporate law ®rms' glossy recruiting devices. But detailed descriptions of
knowledge-intensive tasks performed by corporate lawyers, provided by Nelson,
Flood, Mann, and others, are very helpful for understanding how interdependent
attorneys are in this production context. Lawyering is an industry of information
management (Mann 1985). Lawyers' `knowledge-intensive' work entails much
interaction and talk about legal problems. `The businessman may know to some
degree what his problem is, but he will often lack the knowledge and expertise to
solve it within a legal context' (Mann 1985: 388). Changes in contexts require
rede®nition of the problems in which the lawyer holds the balance of power and
could strongly in¯uence the client. Corporate attorneys are portrayed as `highly
sophisticated technicians who construct complex transactions so that every con-
tingency is accounted for. It may be drafting a series of interlocking documents . . . or
manipulating procedural matters so as to confound the opposition . . . (Mann 1985:
28) They have to `receive constant ¯ows of information in order to make judgments.
This dependency on information streams forces the lawyer±client relationship out of
the ideal-typical mold of lawyer controlling client into a relationship where routine
matters have to be shared' (Mann 1985: 378±9). Even when they are not involved in
`frontier-type' projects (Maister 1993), lawyers deal with uncertainty and `construct
certainties' for clients (Abbott 1988; Dingwall and Lewis 1983). Flood (1987) has
analysed how lawyers make decisions in that context and how these decisions are
in¯uenced by their interactions with one another in the ®rm as much as by their
interactions with the clients and the opposition. `Problem solving for lawyers is a
constantly shifting activity, reactive more than proactive, subject to the unknown'
(Flood 1987: 42). He refers to Schon's idea (1983) of `knowing-in-action' instead of
technical rationality, a kind of knowing that does not stem from prior intellectual
operations, rules, or plans that we would entertain in the mind prior to action.
Lawyers essentially make forays in the dark; the application of legal knowledge (knowledge-in-
books) is virtually ineffective in such situations. Only knowledge-in-action works to guide
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lawyers through the unknown territory of problems and contingency. It is the contingent
nature of lawyers' work that is striking; a series of ad hoc steps in response to whatever action
has been taken by the other side. (Flood 1987: 396)
Associates are sometimes more versed in the law than partners because they have to
do the legal research, but they do not make the decisions concerning the clients. `The
practice of law is essentially based on experience as gained through a master-
apprentice craft system where knowledge-in-books is only of peripheral use' (Flood
1987: 397).
Flood compiled an index of practical tasks from lawyers' diaries or time records
where they record work schedules for billing purposes. Examples include compiling
(documents), conference and teleconference (with lawyers, or other persons),
drafting (agreements), meetings (depositions), of®ce administration (billing), prep-
aration (negotiations), research (cases), reviewing (draft contracts), revising (closing
documents), sending out (plans, opinions), writing complex contracts, often in
international business, large-scale negotiations or litigation (running large lawsuits
over a period of years), and recruiting (interviewing).2 These activities are carried
out by talking both on the phone and face to face with lawyers and persons from
outside the ®rm, and by writing. Partners' prerogative is the relationship with the
clients (for instance, lunches); associates do more research and actual legal work.
Tasks carried out for clients are broken down into two broad categories: litigation
and corporate (or transaction) work.
Corporate lawyers have a large range of tasks: putting together transactions,
arranging loan agreements with banks, engaging in international business, incorp-
orating companies, ¯oating securities issues, negotiating the purchase of real estate,
and so on. All these tasks can be boiled down to two: of®ce lawyers, especially
associates, essentially draft documents (for example, a letter of guarantee) and
negotiate them.3 Sometimes they advise their clients about issues outside their ®eld
(and sometimes competence), such as investment programmes (which is a broker's
job) and may have to hide errors and gaps of knowledge. The collective memory of
the ®rm is thus important in the process of document creation. For this type of
work, lawyers engage in complex processes of practical reasoning (Gar®nkel 1967:
11). `The process of formulating a document recognizably acceptable to all the
actors is an unfolding and contingent process' (Flood 1987: 271). Discussions are
often about who will have the authority to make a decision on such issues. It is
often a matter more of business than of law: lawyers as transaction costs engineers.
Not much legal knowledge and expertise are involved in putting these transac-
tions together. Of course, if needed, the lawyers could call upon the background
knowledge of the ®rm, but they actually do not apply many legal principles in
their work.
Litigation lawyers are ex-post, more combative ®xers. They do manage docu-
ments, but their work tends to be less routine and sometimes very intense. Their
activity includes discovery or fact investigation, legal research, settlement evaluation
and negotiation, and trial presentation if the case does not settle. Theirs is not a
smooth, muted, continuous activity, as most of®ce lawyering tends to be. `Litigation
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moves in ®ts and starts: a ¯urry of activity in writing and ®ling briefs, say, then
nothing for months' (Flood 1987: 316). Litigators are specialists in procedure; form
overrides substance. According to Mann (1985), their interesting moment is before
the ®ling of the lawsuit, when they are relatively unconstrained. The pre-legal
interplay of power and knowledge allows them to de®ne the terms in which the
con¯ict will play out. In large-scale litigation, work is conducted in task forces of
partners and associates supported by an infrastructure that can become quite
complex (satellite task forces working full time at the client's of®ces, and so on).
Their task is often to make their client's statements look `lawyerly'Ðthat is, to
exclude extraneous information and to make it more tightly argued. Litigators often
consider that litigation is real lawyers' work, that this is where lawyers are really in
charge, even with sophisticated clients, because this is where the real challenges and
satisfactions come from.4
D IV I SI ON O F W O R K A ND IN TE R DE P EN D ENC E
Interdependence among attorneys working together on a ®le may be strong for a few
weeks and then weak for months. Partners' work consists, in addition, of several
types of tasks associated, on the one hand, with establishing and maintaining a client
base, and, on the other, with monitoring and/or running task forces of at least two
attorneys to carry out legal work for the clients.5 The more senior the lawyer
becomes in the hierarchy of the ®rm, the more that lawyer's time is spent on direct
interaction with the clients and less with law books (Mann 1985: 397±8). Especially
for partners, `in the practice of law, one ®nds very little law. Instead, one sees
substantial amounts of face to face interaction or conversing on the telephone, but
legal research and writing, as such, constitute a minor portion of lawyers' work'
(Flood 1987: 67). In order to develop business, partners have networking strategies,
including lunching with clients, meeting prospects or contacts who will provide
access to new clients, switching from social talk to business talk, discussing business,
asking for business. Established ®rms with a strong reputation ®nd it easier to attract
clients. One ideal situation is to grow with the clients, establish a paternalistic
relationship with them (`protecting them'), anticipate their needs, and keep them
happy. Partners become `rainmakers' when they have many active corporate clients
providing regular work, and when they can cross-sell services to these clients, which
bene®ts other members of the ®rm. This brings in not only money, but also power to
in¯uence decisions within the ®rm, whether or not the partners sit on important
committees. In order to monitor and/or run a task force to perform the actual work,
partners design a strategy, divide the tasks among themselves and associates, manage
costs, and motivate the members to get the work out. When associates are young,
partners must supervise them to prevent gross and visible mistakes. Finally, partners
have to deal with one another: running a client-oriented, knowledge-intensive
organization means that partners try to protect the ®rm's human capital and
social resources, such as its network of clients, through policies of commingling
partners' assets (clients, experience, innovations) (Gilson and Mnookin 1985) and
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the maintenance of an ideology of collegiality. In that respect, informal networks of
collaboration, advice, and `friendship' (socializing outside) will be shown to be key
to the integration of the ®rm.
Associates' work also consists of several types of tasks. Under the `Cravath system',
young associates watch their seniors analyse and break a large problem involving
complicated facts down into its component parts. The associate is then given one of
the small parts and thoroughly and exhaustively does the part assigned to him or
her. An associate usually has to do the fact searching, prepare the questions for
witnesses, write the brief, and so on. Associates can be more versed in the law than
partners, especially because they have to do the research, but they are not the ones
who make the decisions concerning the clients. When projects are staffed parsi-
moniously (`running a lean out®t'), associates are frequently overworked and can
have a bad time coping with partners who can `pull rank'. Competition between
®rms is so great that the training component (of associates) has fallen away and the
extraction of pro®t has become paramount. Instead of observing how problems are
broken down into their components, associates are frequently assigned a piece of
a problem with no knowledge of how it ®ts into the general picture,6 and required
to specialize very quickly. They complain about not getting enough feedback on
their work, not receiving suf®cient training, being left to ¯ounder, not being given
complete instructions, and not having the means to reconstitute the overall scope
of a case. Tensions between different departments (litigation, corporate, and so on)
affect them profoundly; some are considered exciting, others dull. Departments are
greedy for associates, especially in the most pro®table ®elds. There are a few areas
of potential task-related con¯ict between partners and associates, such as typing
demands on secretaries (letters for partners, memoranda and briefs for associates
writing to deadlines).
Given that lawyering has become an industry of information management (Mann
1985: 40), support staff 's work is also of great importance. The practice of corporate
law has become heavily routinized:
Documents are drafted from standard forms ever-present on the word processor. Although
changes are made to ®t the speci®c situation, no document is drafted from point zero. Much
of the discovery process . . . entails examining boxes of intra-company memoranda to deter-
mine whether they should be seen by the other side, which requires no legal skills. Much of
this kind of work is now performed by paralegals who are considerably cheaper than asso-
ciates. (Flood 1987: 37±8)
The paralegals carry out routine matters, ®ling forms, checking court dockets,
summarizing depositions, ®ling documents with various clerks in the city and
county of®ce. Support staff generally includes secretaries, paralegals, messengers,
librarians, accountants, data processors, mailroom clerks, and telecommunications
people. An of®ce manager is in charge of these personnel. No real career opportunity
and often high turnover can make a paralegal job a frustrating one; it is also easy to
fob a paralegal off with an excuse. Particularly in this aspect of their work, lawyers
emphasize ef®ciency, marketing, and pro®ts.
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SP E NC E R , G R A C E & R OB BI N S
SG&R is a north-eastern US ®rm that belongs to this context and has the char-
acteristics of corporate law ®rms described by these organizational studies. In the
1960s and 1970s, the ®rm was a wealthy one.
The ®rm was very well known among Wall Street law ®rms. If you needed a local counsel
in our state for some particular reasonÐin those days there was a hell of a lot of
antitrust litigationÐwe would probably be the ®rm that was hired ®rst; they'd ®nd us
before they'd ®nd the competition. . . . Some people, especially among the senior
people, were, and still are, independently wealthy. Their parents owned manufacturing
companies and we handled their business. Money was rather irrelevant to them. Their
families had been important members of the community since the colonial days. That
meant that they would urge associates to do as much public-interest community-
oriented, charitable work as possible, the opposite of what other partners thought
should be done. . . . I come from a family of lawyers. But even as a junior partner my
wife and I couldn't believe the amount of money that we were making, even with the
lockstep compensation system. And I was at the bottom of the ladder, god knows
how much money the other guys were making. . . . At the time, to bill our services and
decide what the dollar amount should be, there was a conference at the end of the
case with all the lawyers who worked on it. Did we do a good job? Up. Did we do a poor
job? Down. Can the client really afford to pay? Up. They cannot afford to pay? Down.
Was it really hard work, a lot of weekends? Up. Not? Down. etc. This grand attitude
towards work changed as a result of our recruiting practices. We hired people who
came not from upper-middle-class families, but from working-class families. They
were the brightest at law school. And so they come, and for a couple of years they
work hard, and they see that they are doing well, and six years later they are made
partners. They look around and they see that there are all the other guys with large
houses in the country, horses, summer places in Maine, ¯ying off to do salmon ®shing
in Iceland, or spending three weeks a year in the South of France. All that stuff.
And they want it too. But they start off from a baseline of zero. They have nothing.
This is why things changed and status competition became an issue much more.
People began to pay attention to business and productivity, and became more
competitive. (Former Partner No. 1)
Fieldwork was conducted between 1988 and 1991, a period ending in an eco-
nomic downturn, later to be recognized as a recession. Although its market was not
limited to this geographical area, SG&R was in strong competition with other law
®rms for the same clients, mainly large and medium-sized companies in the region.
Practising law had become even more competitive when clients started routinely
spreading their legal work among several ®rms. The region had an ageing industrial
base, and demand for legal services was not increasing. Some specialities (bank-
ruptcy, environment, corporate litigation) were growing fast, others (real estate,
corporate) were declining. The large law ®rms of the 1980s are notorious for having
taken advantage of the spread of mergers and acquisitions in the world of business.
At the time of the study, SG&R was not seriously involved in this world of takeover
wars and proxy ®ghts.
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At the time of the network study, in 1991, SG&R comprised seventy-one lawyers
(thirty-six partners and thirty-®ve associates), in three of®ces (which will be iden-
ti®ed as Of®ce I (the largest), II, and III (the smallest)). It had doubled its size eight
years earlier through the merger of Spencer Grace with Robbins. It was formally
structured, based on the Cravath model, halfway between what Nelson (1988)
describes as the `traditional'Ðwithout formally de®ned departmentsÐand the
`bureaucratic' types.7 All the lawyers in the ®rm were interviewed.
SG&R was a general practice ®rm, a less than 20-million-dollar operation com-
peting with many other ®rms, its size and larger, in the region. By 1991 north-
eastern standards, SG&R was no longer among the very richest law ®rms and its
members were not the greediest in the profession. In this respect, it is interesting to
listen to former partners who left the ®rm and to the reasons they provide. One
example is provided by former Partner No. 1:
My problem was I didn't care about the client. I mean I didn't care. I could have been
just as well on the other side and gotten just as much out of it. I defended a lot of
malpractice cases for hospitals and doctors and what I really believed was that the other
side was right. We didn't do a lot of labour litigation, but when we did do that, I was in
charge. So here I was, a leftie, and I am negotiating labour contracts on the manage-
ment side. I was very uncomfortable. You put so much of yourself in it, and you care
about it from a craft perspective. So I felt sometimes that I was on the wrong side,
working for corporate America. . . . Plus my experience on the corporate side was
disappointing. For the most part, what I did was represent start-up electronics
companies. I cared about this, because the clients were my age, we used to party
together, make trips together, get drunk together, and chase women together, that
kind of thing. That was very exciting. But on the technical side, it was not very exciting.
I didn't really understand the electronics business, so all the dif®cult decisions they
would make. All I was doing was converting their decisions into standard contracts. That
was boring. For those two reasons, I left. (See also the story of former Partner No. 2 in
Chapter 7).
Nevertheless the ®rm put associates and partners under strong pressure to per-
form. Although not departmentalized, the ®rm broke down into the two general
areas of practice described above: the litigation area (half the lawyers of the ®rm) and
the corporate area (anything other than litigation, including tax, real estate, probate,
and so on). SG&R partners and associates were graduates from both Ivy League and
non-Ivy League law schools. Partner billing rates were pushed up to meet what the
market would bear. Partners were proud of the fact that no partner had ever left to
practise with another law ®rm. As in the other ®rms of the same size, ®rst-year
associates started with large salaries (compared to other entry-level professionals).
There was a minimum of 1,800 billed hours a year required from associates. Time to
partnership was increasing to an average of eight years, with the tendency being to
extend this. It took longer and longer for associates and young partners to become
independent pro®t centres. Like all the ®rms in its region, SG&R was still on the up-
or-out system. The ®rm was all white. It included three women among the thirty-six
partners, and ®fteen women among the thirty-®ve associates.
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The means by which economic prestige was derived in this ®rm, as in most ®rms,
changed as careers moved on. In the early years, billable hours were prestige (since
associates do not control the rate). The extent to which the fees were collected was an
indicator that associate and junior partners were given good work. As attorneys grew
in stature, they became more involved in non-chargeable marketing; their rates
increased as their time sheets grew in non-billable hours (that is, their work was
chargeable to a client code, but not billed to that client): senior partners gained
economic prestige from bringing in clients and from organizing work without
interference from anyone.
Although long-standing relationships with clients were increasingly a thing of the
past, the roster of clients in 1991 included regional banks and branches of worldwide
®nancial institutions and insurance companies, media and publishers, hospitals,
utilities, transit authorities, local and state authorities, universities, telecommuni-
cations, ®rms in the paper and automobile industry, as well as multinational
engineering, food, and distribution companies. Many of these companies had their
own legal staff or departments, doing routine work that used to be farmed out to
outside law ®rms. Therefore, SG&R thought of itself as doing non-routine sophis-
ticated legal work. Like its competitors, the ®rm tried to capitalize on opportunities,
but not with New York City aggressiveness. It was still learning to go after clients
with new marketing tools, and new attitudes towards competition.8 One practice
could feed another with business. But seeking new specialities or recasting a practice
area could create a very dif®cult problem. In this context, companies broke exclusive
ties that they had with their law ®rm and shopped for lawyers on an ad hoc basis,
while law ®rms competed for one-time jobs and still tried to retain their clients. Like
many other ®rms, SG&R took retainers from corporate clients in exchange for being
on call to represent them in case of legal trouble.
The ®rm was considered by its partners as `democratic'. It was a relatively
decentralized organization, which grew out of a merger, but without formal and
acknowledged distinctions between pro®t centres. Sharing work and cross-selling
among partners was done mostly on an informal basis. As will be detailed later, given
the classical strati®cation of such ®rms, work was supposed to be channelled to
associates through speci®c partners, but this rule was only partly respected. Partners'
compensation was based exclusively on a seniority lockstep system, where the only
variable was how long an individual had been a partner, without any direct link
between contribution and returns. Partners could argue informally about what
contribution might `fairly' match bene®ts, but the seniority system mechanically
distributed the bene®ts to each once a year.
The ®rm went to great lengths, when selecting associates to become partners, to
take as few risks as possible to ensure that they would, in terms of business, `pull
their weight'. Great managerial resources were devoted to measurement of each
partner's performance (time sheets, billing, collecting, expenses, and so on), and this
information was available to the whole partnership. A weak performance could not
be hidden for long, triggering concerns about relative standing. However, such ®rms
usually made considerable pro®ts, which helped partners overlook the fact that some
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voluntary contributions to shared bene®ts were not always consistent with the
successful pursuit of collective interest. In extreme cases, partners had the power to
`punish' each other seriously by preventing a partner from reaching the next
seniority level in the compensation system. As already mentioned, a partner could be
expelled only if there was near unanimity against him or her. Buying out a partner
was very dif®cult and costly. Therefore, despite the existence of direct ®nancial
controls, the ®rm did not have many formal ways of dealing with free-loading. The
harm that a single partner could in¯ict on others might become very substantial in
the long run. Conversely, partners could try to insulate one of their own informally
by, at the very least, not referring clients, not `lending' associates, and not providing
information and advice.
Given the informality of the organization, a weak administration (run by a cer-
ti®ed public accountant) provided information, but did not have many formal rules
to enforce. The ®rm had an executive committee consisting of a managing partner
and two deputy managing partners, who were elected each year, renewable once,
among partners prepared to perform administrative tasks and temporarily transfer
some of their clients to other partners. This structure was adopted during the 1980s
for more ef®cient day-to-day management and decision making. The managing
partner at the time of ®eldwork was not a `rainmaker' and did not concentrate
strong powers in his hands. He was a day-to-day manager who made recommen-
dations to functional standing and ad hoc committees (executive, ®nance, associate,
marketing, recruitment, ethics, paralegals, and so on) and to the partnership.
On the one hand, this managing partner had a reputation for caution, for
deferring decisions to consult with his partners, for trying to get to know all his
partners and build consensus. Partners were formally equals; they did not take
orders. On the other hand, some partners were more equal than others, and more
in¯uential in partnership meetings. If you wanted to secure a partnership for an
associate, you made sure that these partners were on your side, although you
never knew ahead of time how the partnership would vote. There were no real shot
callers in this ®rm: ambiguity about ®rm leadership is constitutive of this type of
organization.
This case is consistent with Nelson's observations (1988) of traditional law ®rms.
In this context, power, whether formal or informal, has to take into account this
dimension of equality and cannot assert itself systematically without relying on an
ideology of collegiality. Partners who attract large clients or manage the ®rm wield
more in¯uence when important decisions are made. But formal egalitarianism
among partners is maintained as a feature of their `professionalism' (Waters 1989),
and power retains a quality of `now you see it, now you don't' (Nelson 1988).
S G & R I N I TS CO NT EX T: T H E M A R K ET F O R LE G A L
S ER VI C ES I N T H E R EG I ON
SG&R's market was not exclusively limited to the region, but it was not large
enough to become truly multinational (to open branch of®ces abroad, for
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instance), although it got business from foreign and multinational companies. It
had its established client base, but the situation was perceived as very competitive,
especially since clients had started to spread work around systematically. Threat of
market exit was strong enough (with less than ten similarly sized corporate law
®rms competing in the state), however, to strengthen the social mechanisms
described in this book. Since the 1970s, market forces and built-in pressures had
encouraged a very rapid growth. Although it did not have unlimited possibilities
for diversi®cation, the ®rm had followed the two traditional paths to growth:
general service growth and growth by special representation, attempting to expand
in a specialized ®eld and then to consolidate the remainder of the client's legal
business; but also capitalizing on specialities developed for regular clients by
offering services in those specialities to other clients on a case-by-case basis. A shift
to this second form of growth seemed to be dominant at the time of the study, with
attempts to develop and promote interdisciplinary task forces that were expected
to make the ®rst form of growth possible again, bringing back a general service
relationship with newly established clients. Such a strategy, however, was often
limited by potential con¯icts of interest with existing clients.
The nature of the work had also slowly changed. Legal professionals in the early
1990s were required to do a type of work that they were not doing in the 1980s.
Especially in a period of recession, internal counsel had taken over more and more of
the routine aspect of corporate legal work, and a growing proportion of corporate
practice now involved either litigation, which often makes unpredictable and
intensive time demands, or rapidly changing and complex technical areas, which
require constant monitoring of new developments. Like all generalist law ®rms,
SG&R was thus moving away from predictable, more readily scheduled work
towards the more uncertain and unpredictable areas of practice.
The trend towards speciality representation was a general phenomenon that had
transformed the client base of even the most established general service ®rms. The
shift to special representation had profoundly affected the market for large law ®rm
services. The amount and complexity of legal regulation and litigation maintained a
generally high level of demand for legal services. However, economically, a rising
aggregate demand for such services did not guarantee the economic success of
individual ®rms. The shift in growth pattern to speciality ®rms and away from
general service ®rms, and the attendant rise in competition between large ®rms and
between internal counsel and ®rms had increased the level of economic uncertainty.
Law ®rms found it increasingly more dif®cult than before to maintain traditional
sources of work (big-ticket items). In-house counsels had become more aggressive
shoppers for legal services, were more price sensitive (information about the cost of
services was now been more actively monitored), and took their work to a greater
number of ®rms.
Even if the business volume grows, growth rates do not necessarily increase.9
SG&R and its competitors were not adding lawyers at the same rate as they had
done in the 1980s. They did not readily disclose business setbacks, but neither did
they expect to grow as quickly in the 1990s as they had done in the 1980s. As
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already mentioned, some areas of the market had been slowing down at the end of
the 1980s (corporate, real estate), and other areas were busier (environmental,
bankruptcy). Growing demand in those areas were at the partner level, which
meant more lateral hires. The ®rms that I observed between 1988 and 1991 had not
yet faced the acid test of seeing one area of practice dry up to the point that people
were sitting in their of®ces with nothing to do. Like its competitors, SG&R cut
back on new associate hiring, and had even ®red a small group of associates six
months before the study.
The shift towards special representation and the rise of internal counsel had led to
the commercialization of the relationships between corporate clients and the large
law ®rms, which stimulated ®rms' entrepreneurial behaviour. But the frame of mind
remained different from that found among lawyers interviewed in New York City.
The idea was that, for the time being, some specialities made more money than
others, but nobody knew where the economy would go, so they remained general
practice ®rms. `We have lots of people doing lots of different things, we stick
together as long as people do their hours and get their hourly rates' (the managing
partner at the time of the study). Also, despite the fact that legal services were often
consumed in conjunction with other services, SG&R had not adopted strategies of
hiring non-lawyer professionals (in investment advice, accounting, consulting on
business matters, and so on).
Some of the ef®ciency of the social mechanisms described in this study may be
explained by the perception of a risk of bankruptcy. The processes described may
have been signi®cantly in¯uenced by this economically pressured environment.
They may have taken on some urgency and necessityÐeven limitedÐbecause the
alternative was collective economic failure. This is partly where the energy comes
from to kick these processes into action and to sustain them. SG&R was thus par-
ticularly well suited for observation of social mechanisms characterizing the collegial
organizational form. In effect, among other characteristics, it was a private part-
nership, it allowed each partner one vote in important decisions, an equal share of
®rm pro®ts (weighted by seniority) regardless of contribution, and it had expulsion
rules that provided quasi-tenure to its partners, thus strongly emphasizing the
necessity of trying to reach consensus among them. Partners thus locked themselves
in a cooperative situation which helps identify basic mechanisms of this type of
cooperation.
SG &R 's P A R T NE R SH I P A G R E EM E NT
Production and collective action among attorneys were formally structured by a
partnership agreement. As seen above, this agreement represents an attempt to bring
an element of predictability to ®rm operations and to minimize room for disputes
regarding issues such as ®rm management, compensation decisions, and withdrawal
terms (Eickemeyer 1988). In the context described here, the processes of growth and
specialization had only recentlyÐthat is, in the 1970sÐintroduced pressures for
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®rms such as SG&R to put in writing the terms by which they governed their
business affairs and organization.
The agreement de®ned each partner's rights and responsibilities in connection
with these issues, and for the operation of the ®rm itself. It also tried to enhance the
image of the partnership as a closed10 professional community in which all partners
have rights to participation. After describing SG&R's philosophy, I will come back to
the limitations of such agreements. They establish collective responsibility but,
alone, they cannot structure collective action. Members need to apply these rules in
concrete situations. To make such a partnership agreement meaningful and
enforceable, members also have to manage their interdependencies, commit
themselves, and internalize social norms.
As the partnership agreement put it, each partner `con®rms, rati®es, and assumes
all prior business, assets and liabilities' existing since SG&R was established, without
limitation. All partners had equal access to the books, documents, and records of the
partnership. Each partner had one vote on all matters submitted to the partnership
meeting. Each of the partners of the partnership was bound to devote his full time
and attention to, and use his best efforts in the furtherance of, the affairs and
business of the partnership. Each partner had to obtain the prior approval of the
managing partner before he undertook any activity that might con¯ict with his full-
time commitment to his partnership duties, whether or not such activity involved
payment or remuneration. Examples of such activity included service on a board of
directors, service on municipal, state, or federal boards, committees, or associations,
and teaching positions.
Agreements are usually comprehensive and dif®cult to modify.11 They attempt to
anticipate, and provide for, inevitable events such as partner retirement, disability,
withdrawal, and death, as well as issues such as dissolution. Three main issues or
sources of controversy are of particular interest here: the formal governance
structure, the compensation system, and the admission to and expulsion from the
partnership.
Formal governance structure
The agreement imposed a regulatory structure. The partnership, the committee of
the whole, was the ultimate authority. It vested a managing partner with the
responsibility and authority for overseeing the ®rm's day-to-day operations. SG&R
grew by merger. A ®rst change came with the merger, as it produced a large executive
committee, whose members had ill-de®ned roles and authority, and whose gov-
ernance was loose. A second change created a managing partner elected every year,
renewable once, which in 1991 seemed to most partners to be a more workable
governing structure in control of the everyday management of the ®rm. The
managing partner could act as a policy-maker by making recommendations to the
partnership, but the ®rm was not structured in a way that concentrated much power
in his or her hands. There were committees for different functions and areas. As
already mentioned, an administrator helped the managing partner manage the ®rm
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on a day-to-day basis. The bounds of authority of the managing partner were not
very clearly de®ned.
The partners established policy and managed the affairs of the partnership
through the vehicle of the partnership meeting. Unless the partnership agreement
expressly required a speci®c percentage of the vote on a question, the decision of a
majority of the partners in attendance at such a meeting at which a quorum was
present was binding. A majority of all the partners constituted a quorum. Each
partner had one vote. The partnership meeting could delegate responsibility for its
duties to the various partners or groups of partners or to employees of the part-
nership. The partnership could also revoke the delegation of any responsibilities it
had previously delegated.
The affairs of the ®rm were thus managed by a managing partner and the part-
nership meeting. Speci®c authority was reserved to the partnership meeting and all
residual authority was vested in the managing partner. Those matters speci®cally
reserved to the partnership meeting included the following.
1. The setting of numerical and geographical guidelines for associate hiring, the
setting of associate salaries, and associate evaluations and terminations.
2. Choosing new members of the partnership.
3. Consideration and determination of major ®nancial questions, including
capital expenditures exceeding $100,000.
4. Non-economic policy questions regarding the production of quality legal work.
5. Any material change in the location and size of the ®rm's of®ces, in the
number of lawyers assigned thereto, and in the business conducted by the ®rm.
6. Election and removal of a managing partner and assistants to the managing
partner. The managing partner and the assistants were elected by secret ballot
to one-year terms. They could not succeed themselves after serving two
consecutive one-year terms. A vote of 75 per cent of the entire partnership
could remove a managing partner or assistant from of®ce before the end of
his term.
Monthly partnership meetings conducted the business of the ®rm. The partner-
ship meeting elected a managing partner from among the partners. Except for the
matters mentioned above, all of the residual authority to manage the ®rm was
granted to the managing partner, who also initiated action in areas reserved to the
partnership meeting. Among the responsibilities of the managing partner was
determination of which questions facing the ®rm came under the jurisdiction of the
partnership meeting. The partnership meeting also elected two assistants to the
managing partner from among the partners. The assistants were to be available to
serve as contact persons with the other partners and employees and to act for the
managing partner as directed by him in his absence.
A compensation committee, consisting of two partnersÐthe most senior partner
in each of the two largest of®cesÐestablished each year a schedule for the dis-
tribution of cash and additions or adjustments to capital accounts. This committee
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had to adhere to the following principles in establishing shares of partners in cash
distributions and capital accounts.
1. Each partner who had completed fourteen years of service as a partner of the
partnership received a share of cash distributions equal to that of each such
partner.
2. The capital account of each partner who had completed fourteen years of
service as a partner was equal to the capital account of each active partner who
had credited service of fourteen years or more as a partner.
3. From the ®rst through to the fourteenth year, partners who had equal years of
service as partners were assigned equal shares in cash distributions and the
capital of the partnership.
4. During the ®rst through to the fourteenth years of partnership, partners
proceeded in equitable annual increments from the shares of a newly admitted
partner to the shares of a fourteen-year partner. Partners with longer years of
service as partners had larger shares of the cash and capital of the partnership
than partners with lesser years of service as partners.
A recruiting committee appointed by the managing partner had as members at
least one resident member from each of the ®rm's of®ces. The committee was
responsible for hiring the ®rm's associate lawyers. It had authority, as assigned to it
from time to time by the partnership meeting, to make decisions about, for example,
the numbers and salaries of potential associate lawyers, and the nature and amount
of legal experience desired of the potential associate lawyers to be hired. An ethics
and con¯icts of interest committee, appointed by the managing partner, ruled on
such questions and reported its ®ndings to the managing partner.
The managing partner might from time to time establish and appoint members to
other committees of the partnership, such as a committee to evaluate and assign new
matters, a committee to supervise associate workloads and training, a committee to
supervise paralegal hiring, workloads, and training, a committee to evaluate and
recommend various insurance coverages for the partnership, a committee to review
needs for of®ce space, a committee to supervise the operations of corporate and
business matters, a committee to supervise litigation matters, and a committee to
supervise probate, trust, and estate matters. These committees were supposed to
report their doings to the managing partner.
We have a governing structure with one managing partner and two assistant managing
partners. The roles of the two assistant managing partners are not terribly well de®ned,
and tend to be more whatever the managing partner wants to give them to do. In the
role of managing partner, basically it's a question of what it is that they don't have
authority to do as opposed to spelling out what they can do. There are some gray areas
where I get to decide whether an issue falls in my jurisdiction or goes to the partnership.
The primary things that clearly aren't my decisions are making partners, certainly ter-
minating partners, termination of associates; actually associates' salaries, studying
partnership compensation, these are things that aren't mine, although certainly in some
of these areas, maybe almost all of them I have a fair amount of role to play. For
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example, we have a compensation committee, composed of the two most senior
partners in each of®ce who have reached 65 [years old], Partners 1 and 5. This com-
pensation committee has an extremely limited function, as we are on a pure lockstep
system. They would meet to set the percentage of a new partner, or preventÐwe call
it `whack down'Ðthat of a partner who does not pull his weight from reaching the next
level of compensation, which is an exceptional situation. Another example is associates'
salaries, which really I can't set myself. I make recommendations and I think since I have
been doing it there hasn't been any particular discussion about what I recommended.
I have limited the spending to $100,000 for any one thing. If one spends more than
that, one has to come to the ®rm for that. I can't close or open new of®ces. That's the
range of the things that are not in my role speci®cally. But other than that I can do most
things, which generally means the day-to-day operations, ultimately being responsible
for the non-lawyer staff, hirings and ®rings and salaries, budgetary work, ®nancial
planning. We have a ®rm administrator who is actually a certi®ed public accountant
who has been with the ®rm for longer than I have. He is the chief non-lawyer adminis-
trator; he does a lot of ®nancial work, but I ultimately work with him and set the
budgets. In fact, partnership compensation is pretty much worked out with him, subject
to approval by a compensation committee, and again a lot of the work that we do on
that is the bulk of what is ultimately decided. . . . We have relatively little, if anything,
in writing about committee duties. We have a number of committees that function in
very speci®c areas, but they do not meet very often. I would guess every partner in
the ®rm is at least on one of these committees, and they play an extremely important
role. I guess I am ex of®cio a member of all these committees; I work with them, I
understand what they are doing. But generally what these committees are would be
the hiring committee responsible for hiring associates and the associate coordinating
teams. There are two of those, one in the litigation area, one in the corporate area;
that's one of our general breakdowns here. Those three partners play a role in associ-
ates' work assignments, associate reviews, and associate training; those are very
important committees. We have an ethics and con¯icts of interest committee, which
never meets. It is more like two partners I draw upon when we have ethical issues,
con¯icts which are a little more confusing. We have two lawyers on the library com-
mittee, which works with the librarian for acquisitions the library should make. There is a
space committee which tends to be an ad hoc committee depending upon space
needs; we are adding some space in a couple of our of®ces, so several of those are
relatively active. We have an insurance committee, which deals with the whole range of
insurance, from malpractice to health insurance. We have a client development, new
business committee, which has been relatively active since last year; in fact we are doing
a fair amount in that area right now. Other than that we really have very little in the way
of a committee structure. In particular, we have no executive committee. The assistant
managing partners simply have whatever duties the managing partner wishes to assign
to them. (The managing partner at the time of the study)
Thus, power was not spun out to a tight web of powerful committees with the
managing partner in the middle. Apart from long-term decisions, what a mana-
ging partner might or might not do without going back to his or her partners was
not very explicitly de®ned. This vague approach was considered to be more in tune
with the style and preferences of SG&R partners. It had been adopted because
it was expected to be the path of least resistance. The managing partner was
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prevented from concentrating too much power (which made informal social
mechanisms even more indispensable). It was also sometimes disappointing to
some, who would have liked to see a strong leader at the helm, speeding things up.
In spite of its small size, the ®rm was too large to adapt its structure to the people
who were available for ful®lling certain jobs. It therefore limited the number of
management jobs. In some ®rms, the partnership does not create certain speci®c
functions without knowing whether it entails light or heavy duties, and who
commits him or herself to be in charge of it. But, at SG&R, discussion about the
structure was separate from the question of whether or not there would be can-
didates for the job. The structure looked good on paper, but the turnover rule
helped make it work.
The compensation system
Compensation determination was one of the most sensitive issues in this ®rm as
in any other. As indicated above, the compensation system followed by SG&R's
compensation committee established a system based exclusively on seniority, a
lockstep system of plateaux, where partners reached the share of full partner after
approximately fourteen years. A majority of partners wanted to hold onto this
traditional system as long as possible, as it was associated with `no bad feelings, no
mean grasping behaviour, no political problems' (Partner 1), although it did not
design ways of `dealing with people who are clearly unproductive' (Partner 13). This
compensation system did not reward successful business generation and rain-
making, billed hours, client servicing, ®rm administration, or unusual expertise
brought to deals. There were no merit raises nor bonuses of any type.
For most partners, a seniority-based compensation enhanced cooperation and
protected a cooperative environment. Introducing merit criteria or a bonus system
meant creating incentives for grabbing clients or associates (compensation-bred
competition among lawyers). Despite the fact that clients were unequivocally clients
of the ®rm, practically speaking the partners knew that the major clients were used
to dealing with certain people (their `primary lawyers'). Some acknowledged that
their minds could change about this system of compensation if a senior partner left
the ®rm for another ®rm, taking away a major client (to the extent that it was
actually feasible).
Partner 1 summarized the ®rm philosophy with regard to compensation:
Our compensation system is something that we want to preserve because it eliminates a
lot of back-stabbing. It makes it a much more relaxed, pleasant, uncompetitive place.
People aren't looking over their shoulders or trying to justify their existence every day.
The rather mean, personally grasping characteristics that you can get in a system that
rewards individuals for how many clients they bring in or how much work they control
or how many associates they keep busy, those are all things that can be unpleasant
because it discourages people from sharing work easily with others. With our system,
there is no hoarding of cases or associates. It takes out of that equation the sel®sh thing.
It promotes cooperation. But you have got to be successful to be able to afford it. If you
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are not successful, then people start looking around and saying, `Hey, he is taking out
more than I am and I'm working harder'. . . . Again, one of the factors is that our
cooperation system is keyed towards everyone doing what he can for the ®rm as a
whole, and shared equally. That is signi®cant. Contributions are going to vary. Most of
us are essentially self-driven, for me the stimulation coming from being in competition
with the other side. I want to win. There is mutual respect for other people's ability to
perform at the partnership level. Firm practice changes all the time, and you need
people with suf®cient ¯exibility and skills to move into new areas. That creates mutual
respect. By and large, one major criterion for partnership is to be able to deal with
diverse problems, and capacity to shift.
In this system, an age-graded pyramid easily shows that it was mostly the older
lawyers who got a larger share of the pro®ts. The client base changes only gradually,
so more senior lawyers were still likely to have greater client responsibility (and
therefore compensation) than younger lawyers. Each member's expectations were
clear, although the system was periodically challenged. As will be shown in Chapter
8, a fault line existed between the values of the ®rm's older partners and those of the
younger ones.
Partners had a capital account managed by the ®rm. A partner's capital account
was de®ned to include his or her share of undistributed income left in the part-
nership over the period of time he or she was a partner; plus his or her share of
unbilled time and accounts receivable, and of other assets and liabilities, as deter-
mined under the accrual method of accounting in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles. The amounts did not reach very high levels com-
pared to other businesses, since a law ®rm is generally not a capital-intensive ®rm.
Each year, the capital accounts for each partner were adjusted according to the
partner's share of additions to the capital of the ®rm for that year. Newly admitted
partners were not required to make a capital contribution at the time of admission.
A partner who died, retired, withdrew, or was expelled was entitled to the amount
that was in his capital account at the date of his death, retirement, withdrawal, or
expulsion.
The amount in a partner's capital account represented his entire interest in the
equity of the ®rm, and no additional payments were made to him based on the good
will of the partnership or the value of any tangible or intangible asset or property
interest of the ®rm, whether or not such asset or property interest was, under
generally accepted accounting principles, contained on a balance sheet of the ®rm.
In the event that additional capital was required, each partner made a contribution
to the capital of the partnership in proportion to his or her share of the total capital
of the ®rm.
This compensation system tended to be exceptional. In effect, many ®rms that, at
the time of the study, were `suffering' from decreasing growth rates made efforts
to divest unproductive partners of their partnership interests, reinforcing distinc-
tions between the strata of lawyers in the ®rm, with some partners forming
an entrepreneurial elite controlling the greatest share of power and pro®ts, and
other partners assuming de facto status as salaried employees (Nelson 1988). This
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compensation system made defection an issue for very productive partners, such as
Partner 15:
With very little effort, I could transform Of®ce III into a different law ®rm. It would be
easy and in the short term ®nancially advantageous. But I am not motivated to do that.
(1) I come from Spencer Grace in Of®ce I, I am rooted there, in terms of friendship, and
it is against my nature to be disloyal. (2) The size of the overall entity, three cities, gives
me access to clients and the type of work that I want, high pro®le. In the long range,
it would be a mistake. Financially, status on the short term would be enhanced. . . . In the
long range, I want to make this of®ce bigger. Loyalty and business are equally impor-
tant. I am asked to do important and interesting things because I am in a large ®rm. Fun
and loyalty and interesting work are more important to me than more money. When I
get referrals for national clients it is because I am in a prestigious ®rm capable of
throwing ten litigators in a suit, and a general practice ®rm capable of representing
large clients.12
For a sociologist, it makes sense to suppose that, in many ways, SG&R's system
relies on speci®c forms of generalized exchange to protect overall prosperity
against individual opportunism or parochial interests. I will look at this hypoth-
esis, and at the extent to which it characterizes collegial organizations, in the next
chapter. Saying that does not mean that partners were naive, or that they had
affection for each other. They counted on forms of indirect and postponed reci-
procity, but they also monitored the situation closely; they watched each other as
much as their practice allowed it. There was something Rawlsian13 in partners'
rationale for equality, not only in that it controlled status competition, but also
in that it was assumed to correspond to the facts in the long run (average
contribution).
Admission to and expulsion from the partnership
As seen in Chapter 1, status differences between partners and associates are a
characteristic of collegial organizations. The up-or-out rule is a mechanism central
to many law ®rms and their efforts to protect their human and social capital. Valued
associates must perceive a reasonable chance for advancement. In this ®rm, an
af®rmative vote of 80 per cent of all partners was required for this decision, with
abstention considered to be a vote in favour of admission. A newly admitted partner
participated in the pro®ts and losses of the partnership, and assumed the liabilities of
the ®rm jointly with the other partners. Young partners needed to prove them-
selvesÐthat is, bring business to the ®rm and show that they could keep associates
busyÐsometimes by doing some of more senior partners' `dirty work'.
In the presentation of the ®rm to prospective law students, and in partners'
discourse about their ®rm, it was stressed that members cared about their personal
and family life. This signalled that it was supposed to be accepted, in this ®rm, that
members did not consider their relative status within the ®rm to be the most
important thing in the world. This also signalled that they were prepared to mod-
erate their competition for resources because their status comparisons were not
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exclusively local and limited to the ®rm. They had other reference groups in life.
Partners' discourse was often moral about the fact that people's self-esteem should
not depend very strongly on how large their incomes were in relation to those of
other partners. Indeed, the partnership tried to make sure that such problems did
not emerge (particularly with its informal rules presented below). But this discourse
was also ambiguous: hard work was encouraged, and moral sanctions against
concerns about relative position were legitimate only when protecting the com-
pensation system, the relative equalization of income.
Along with admission to partnership, it is useful to mention issues of withdrawal,
disability, termination, expulsion, and dissolution. There were procedural rules
regulating the way in which partners were allowed to withdraw. Retirement was
mandatory at age 70, and the partner was entitled to his or her share of the cash
distributions and to the amount of his or her capital account. At 65, partners were
supposed to start reducing their efforts, `phasing themselves out', and their share in
the partnership's cash distributions was reduced. The partnership could also look at
these partners' past performance and reduce their share by up to 25 per cent of their
prior year's share if it thought it was justi®ed. Payments upon death, expulsion,
retirement, and withdrawal were expensive for the ®rm. The partnership spread
them over several years and, for example, restricted the annual amounts of such
payments to a percentage of the ®rm's net distributable cash income. Withdrawing
partners who left the ®rm to practise law elsewhere were forbidden from soliciting or
attempting to establish an attorney±client relationship with any client of the ®rm
during three months. Violation was sanctioned by a reduction in the amounts given
back to the departing partner as part of reimbursement of his capital account.
A `permissible period of disability' allowed a partner to receive his or her share of
the partnership pro®ts during twelve months. A partner was considered `disabled'
when he or she had failed or was failing or was unable to devote his or her ordinary
and expected time to the partnership affairs because of a physical or mental con-
dition. Whether or not a partner was to be considered `disabled' was determined by
an 80 per cent vote of all of the partners. Beyond twelve months, an 80 per cent vote
could reduce such a disabled partner's share in the partnership's cash distribution or
eliminate such shares entirely. A disabled partner could be forced to retire or
withdraw from the partnership upon an 80 per cent vote of all of the partners.
A partner could be expelled only upon a vote of 90 per cent or more of all the
partners. An abstention was recorded as a vote against expulsion. The partnership
could be dissolved and terminated upon the af®rmative vote of 80 per cent of the
partners.
The rule is 90 per cent af®rmative votes of all partners to expel a partner. Abstention
counts against expulsion. We have expelled only two partners in twenty years. Both
extremely serious situations. For one of them, there was a unanimous vote: this person
went way around the bend with a number of things. The second guy didn't want to be
part of us. A petition was circulated, saying `I would vote to expel him.' He was pre-
sented with that and resigned. But expulsion is extremely hard to exercise. Three
persons can block it. At least two of our partners are good examples of that. One of
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them is a decent guy on a personal level. He says that under pressure he does things;
but he is a corporate lawyer, and there is no pressure on him usually, so he just doesn't
do it. The other partner is in a different situation. He was at the low end [of the per-
formance scale] for a long time. Partner 5 went to talk with him. He claims that there
isn't anything to do. He says: `I am a corporate lawyer, my kind of work has dried up,
I am out there in the bushes, hustling, doing everything I can.' That is dif®cult to
check. But there is also the fact that some of the people he has worked with do not
want to do so again, because they think his competence is in doubt. Partner 17 is
extremely good in his ®eld. He once volunteered to go and see this partner to share
some work with him. He went to see him, but he says this partner did a horrendously
poor job. So with our 90 per cent rule, we don't cover for that. Apart from these
examples, all the other partners do carry their weight. Of course, `You're hot this year,
you'll be down next year.' But there is no need for a compensation committee that
would just do what it wants to do, with all the subjectivity involved. (The managing
partner at the time of the study)
IN F OR M AL R U LE S
The above list of characteristics of formal structure (partnership rules) and core
issues has to be extended with a set of informal rules adopted by the ®rm. These rules
were not included in writing in the partnership agreement and were mainly designed
to prevent con¯icts among partners. These rules re¯ect the fact that, as in many
other ®rms, partners at SG&R viewed their ®rm as an elite institution, with its
`uniqueness stories' and speci®c culture.
Partner 19 summarized these informal rules as follows:
1. We don't take an ownership interest in any client. If we are offered stock, we don't
take it. Cash for services.
2. We don't invest in a building together. Purposely, the ®rm does not own the ¯oors it
occupies in the three cities. Owning your building complicates your life. It adds a level
of complexity, and an element of greed: we make money in this building, let's buy
another one. Lawyers often mix in other businesses because they have access to
investment information. But we are not so superdriven by money. If you come to the
®rm and say: `I don't want to represent this company because they are unethical,
shady, someone who would complain about the bill all the time, become litigious,'
the ®rm would agree.
3. Anti-nepotism rule: we don't hire anyone who is related to a partner. A son who is a
lawyer doesn't work here. That's very important. Otherwise you get into very
important problems. The same is true with a partner's wife [when she is an associate].
Can you imagine voting for partner when the person [coming up for partnership] is a
partner's wife?
4. Everybody is expected to the best of his or her ability to be considerate and decent to
anybody lower (associate or staff ). You get yourself kicked out if you disobey. We had
a partner kicked out for threatening associates with bad reviews if he didn't like their
answers. That's a fast way to be ®red as a partner.
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5. No moonlight work. Most have high standards of integrity, they won't try to
compensate themselves outside the ®rm. In other ®rms, people make side deals, mix
roles, because they are both the lawyer and a colleague investor.
6. We don't borrow to pay partners. If there is no money at the end of the month, the
partners don't get paid. Zero. It is healthy: you don't build up a huge debt.
7. You don't tolerate sexual advances to a secretary or a younger lawyer. That would be
a major breach of propriety. You would be ®red right away. Most partners have stable
lives, happily married, very straight in that way, very moral.
Investing in a client, side deals, sexual advances, children in the ®rm, those are all
forbidden, very explosive issues. Most ®rms don't forbid that. I know an accounting ®rm
where they invest in real estate together, get paid in kind (a suit at the clothing ®rm), not
in cash. They accumulated debt to pay partners. That ®rm blew apart. It is tempting to
get stock from a client, to help them sometimes. But we don't. All these rules are useful
to keep cohesiveness. There are one or two people who don't ®t in that category.
You can tolerate a few, not many. We are not very greedy. Not driven by maximizing
income. If a ®rm is driven by pro®t to the point that it would start bending the rules,
you start losing cohesiveness. Money is perceived as a measurement of your value. If
somebody tinkers with the money formula, it is much more than the money itself.
It is symbolic.
Together with the formal rules about ®rm operations, such as compensation and
governance, this set of rules was a consistent system. It certainly de®ned restraints to
several types of behaviour and exchanges between members. And yet, as often noted
by specialists of professional services ®rms (Maister 1993) in many members' per-
ception the ®rm was not very organized, and the informality of some of these rules
expressed a form of resistance to bureaucratization that could be explained as an
expression of traditional ideals of professional autonomy and participation:
I would de®ne our culture as a `passion for anarchy', that's one way of putting it. It is
not organized, nothing is organized. I think the hallmark of the ®rm is non-organization.
Not disorganization, but non-organization. Completely informal. There is an antipathy
to organizing anything, to doing anything in an organized way. We will have to seriously
organize ourselves eventually, but the fact that we have a managing partner, that's as far
as we got so far in recognizing that. (Partner 6)
Here, non-managers manage lawyers, the hierarchical system is not as important as
most people think. It is tough to get someone's attention. What keeps the ®rm together
is the managing partner and partnership meetings. Very little time is spent on mana-
ging. Nobody has been to a management, leadership, or group dynamics course. This is
management by trial and error. Planning, training, personnel management, marketing:
people don't spend time on this. (Partner 3, a former CEO of a large company)
Apart from the fact that the partnership kept ultimate control over the most
important decisions, the extent to which the ®rm should structure itself more
formally was debated at the time of ®eldwork. It could have reduced even further
the number of standing committees performing or supervising essential functions.
It could have departmentalized (what some partners called a form of `regi-
mentation') to detract from former informality, or have established a very clear
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and tight accountability structure, with powerful department chairs, stricter client
intake and assignment procedures, and more controls over ®nancial and human
resources. The strength of the administrative side of the ®rm could have been
enhanced too: the ®rm could have gone from a weak and specialized administrator
to strong business managers reporting exclusively to a managing partner who
would have delegated to them a great deal of authority and responsibilities.
Chapter 8 derives value commitments by partners from policy choices on the
agenda of the ®rm. It uses such choices to look at the regulatory mechanism from
a structural perspective, one that goes beyond the simple description of the culture
of the ®rm.
In the next sections of this chapter, I present additional and important organi-
zational characteristics of SG&R. Their description provides the background of the
social mechanisms identi®ed in subsequent chapters.
TH E EX A M P L E OF DE P A R T M EN TA L IZ A T IO N
Among changes in governance structure, the departmentalization of the ®rm, for
example, was seen by many partners as a critical step on this path to reorganization.
It would introduce signi®cant changes in the actual organization of work and it was
debated in the ®rm. Creating formal departments and shifting several important
functions to them focus members' accountability: someone is in charge and
responsible for the productivity of every individual. Departments then become
increasingly in¯uential, even though they may not always make the biggest differ-
ence in terms of revenue; they play an important role in associate training, in
partnership decisions, in improving pro®tability through control of intake and
assignments (making better use of human capital), and supporting partners' mar-
keting activities.
But in 1991, many other partners at SG&R already felt that the ®rm was too
bureaucratized, burdened with too many rules and procedures. In addition, some
areas of practice (such as the corporate practice) were more dif®cult to depart-
mentalize; they needed more than the creation of an administrative umbrella.
Since corporate practice comprises different areas supporting corporate clients
(general corporate law, banking, securities, labour, and so on), it has required
more distinctions between practice groups, and very ¯exible systems of collabora-
tion and coordination. Others felt that departmentalization would be a positive
step if department heads could restrict themselves to diffusing information,
improving the ef®cient performance of routine tasks such as keeping controls in
place or making sure that everyone ®lled in the forms for the associates' evaluation.
Many worried about department heads losing sight of the interests of the ®rm
as a whole, especially when trying to promote their own associates to partnership.
A few voices argued that growth creates the need for more ®rm-wide conscious
integration and coordination efforts between formal departments throughout
the ®rm: there should be departments looked at as pro®t centres even if that
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created interdepartmental tensions; everyone's performance should be monitored
and appraised more tightly; department heads should be able to force partners to bill
on time and to speed up collection:
What changes with the departments is accountability. You can't run a law ®rm like a club
anymore. Or a nice place to hang your hat and to be convivial and collegial. We hope
we are still collegial. We are. We hope we can continue that and still be businesslike. But
it's a different world out there. There was a time when people came to SG&R because it
was SG&R. Period. That's where you went to get good-quality legal work done and
there wasn't a hell of a lot of competition. It's not true anymore. There are lots of terri®c
smaller ®rms, some bigger ones out there. If you don't pay attention to business . . . you
have to be out there hustling and marketingÐit's becoming more of a business, to the
regret of a lot of people, but a lot of other people say it's about time, you know. It's a
service business. (Partner 26)
But SG&R was not departmentalized at the time of the study. The ®rm met with
resistance either when it considered dropping areas of practice for marketing pur-
poses, or when it pushed some of its lawyers towards different practice areas.14
Collective action thus was very loosely coordinated in terms of leadership and
procedures to follow.
R E LA T IO NS B ET W EE N OF F I C ES I N A M UL T I- C I TY F I R M
There are at least two major differences between a single-of®ce ®rm and a multi-city
®rm. First, it is more complex to hold together a ®rm with multiple locations.
Secondly, the cost structure is much less ef®cient in a multi-of®ce ®rm than in a
single location ®rm, because of the need to duplicate many functions and positions
in several of®ces (law library, rent, support staff ). Growing to become multi-city
creates a management challenge in itself (the duplication of everything, for
instance), owing to the question of centralization: how far is it possible to centralize
such a ®rm without controlling the market itself ?
In some ®rms each of®ce operates very independently. Of®ces basically have their
policy-making and management structure; they simply refer work to each other, and
share a central overhead such as the accounting system in one location, or computer
services for the whole ®rm. Otherwise, they are really a group of independent of®ces.
Other ®rms have a strong centralized management, and each of®ce follows the rules
coming from the main of®ce. Of®ces are really branch of®ces: decision making is
central and local of®ces implement it.
Like other ®rms, SG&R developed self-conscious strategies for growth in new
specialities and through merger and branching, in order to diversify into new ®elds
and new geographic markets. A good indicator of the rise in entrepreneurial activity
has been the attempts to establish a presence in different markets, through opening
branch of®ces in other large cities and mergers with smaller ®rms (Nelson 1988).
This had serious consequences for the internal organization of both previous ®rms,
forcing the ®rm to develop an ef®cient and ¯exible structure. SG&R grew through a
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merger between what was called Of®ce I and Of®ce II, and the ®rm as a whole was
still one pro®t centre. Of®ce III used to be a branch of Of®ce I before the merger.
Formally the ®rm was not highly centralized. Its partners liked to think of it as a ®rm
without one single centre. But, informally, the situation was different. On the one
hand, Of®ce I was still twice as large as Of®ce II. In addition, there was no speciality
in Of®ce II that was not replicated in Of®ce I; but there were several disciplines in
Of®ce I that were not replicated in Of®ce II. Therefore, Of®ce I was much more
central. On the other hand, some of the ®rm's biggest clients were in Of®ce II; thus it
did not make much sense to consider Of®ce I as a real centre controlling the ®rm's
business.
Especially after the merger, the relationships between of®ces were dominated by
the feeling of one of®ce versus the other.
In the beginning there was clearly an Of®ce I mentality and an Of®ce II mentality.
They weren't different pro®t centres, but they would look, the ®gures were there,
how much money did you make, what percentage of our total did you contribute,
what percentage of your total did we contribute, and there was a sort of looking
down upon one of®ce as those people who are not as sophisticated, not as well
trained, they are a smaller of®ce. I don't sense that as much now as I did then
because six years have passed and an increasing number of partners and asso-
ciates have never known anything but this single ®rm, and because the small of®ce is
growing. (Partner 6)
In this ®rm, one problem with being multi-city was that partners did not always
get to know associates from other of®ces, which could count when partnership
decisions were made. The fact that all the specialities were not represented in one
single of®ce created interdependence between of®ces. A partner from one of®ce
could use a senior associate from another of®ce, because the senior associate might
be the only person in the ®rm to know bankruptcy law well enough to work on a
particular case. Nevertheless, partners from one of®ce could have super®cial opin-
ions about the associates from another of®ce if they had not used them for their own
work. Another risk with being multi-city was the risk of polarization of the ®rm.
There were always issues that could create tensions between of®ces, although for
every issue of ®rm management there could be people on both sides of the issue in all
three locations. Management issues might be determined geographically, and not by
members' interests. Here is an example:
One issue which may polarize the ®rm could be whether we should stop our insurance
defence work or not; it would have in®nitely less effect on Of®ce II lawyers, who do
almost none of it, than it will on Of®ce I lawyers, where a number of partners really don't
have the con®dence to go on to other things, or they haven't grown intellectually to go
on to more complicated litigation, but who do this thing very well. It would have much
greater effect upon Of®ce I lawyers than Of®ce II lawyers; but even there I don't think
that the decision of whether to do more or not will be a Of®ce II vs. Of®ce I issue
because there are a number of lawyers in Of®ce I who feel that we shouldn't
continue. (Partner 6)
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Efforts to interact on a more personal level with people from other of®ces were
perceived to be effective by some, not by others (for lack of time or for any other
reason).
Of®ce II has a culture different from ours. People who work in our of®ce have more sense
of humour than in the other of®ce [laughs]. We're more fun. There were economic
advantages to the merger, but also drawbacks, although not dramatic: it is now a more
impersonal ®rm. People don't know each other as well. There are newer people in the
other of®ce I am less comfortable with. Firm culture is not as well de®ned now as it was
before the merger. But this is a small drawback to other advantages. It's work. Most
people have too much to do until they do it. The impression is that this is one of the best
places to work in. It's work, but once you accept that, it is hard for me to imagine a nicer
place to work. We are all frustrated sometimes, but it is a cooperative place compared
to what goes on elsewhere. (Partner 22)
SG&R claimed that there was a balance between decentralization (independence)
and centralization, and that loyalties were not divided between the ®rm and the
geographical market of each of®ce. The extent to which policy issues could really
polarize the ®rm, transform of®ces into solid and opposed blocks, was dif®cult for
members to measure. The ®rm did not acknowledge such dif®culties. On the one
hand, management issues could be considered as determined by interests, not by the
site; an issue like `what effect will certain pension plans have on younger partners
who want to make money now, as opposed to older partners who would like to save
it for their retirement', did not polarize the ®rm in terms of of®ces, because there
were older partners and younger partners in both places.
The risks with being multi-city that were perceived and expressed in the inter-
views were of different types. First, when of®ces were of very different sizes, it
introduced the risk that they be considered as satellites of the largest, not as parts of a
whole. Secondly, ®nancial controls were broken down by of®ce: comparisons could
be made, which might create tensions. In some ®rms, partners accept not having
access to such data and leaving it to the discretion of the managing partner to decide
when a situation becomes problematic or unpro®table to the point that it has to be
brought to the attention of the partnership. Third, despite the fact that sophisticated
communication systems made coordination easier, people who were not in the main
or largest of®ce could feel that they did not always know enough of what was going
on at the centre. Management was sensitive to this and tried to organize institutional
events to `bring them in'. Assignments and practice groups helped in this, as did ®rm
functions and partners' meetings. Most committees had representation from at least
two of the of®ces. Fourthly, the evaluation of associates could be more problematic
and had to be organized. Fifthly, the way members used one another could be linked
to their specialities, but patterns of relationships and cooperation could develop
between lawyers in the same place, thus creating social niches (see Chapter 3).
Of®ces developed their own idiosyncratic rules, which threatened the integration of
the ®rm. Here again, informal social mechanisms will be shown to help deal with
this issue.
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W O R K F LO W : I NT A KE A N D A SS IG NM E NT S
SG&R formal structure attempted to coordinate the work process. In its effort to
organize its practice, the ®rm formally regulated intake (mainly, who decides
whether or not to take in a case, based on what criteria) and assignment (mainly,
who will do the work). There were many reasons for implementing an intake
policy. The ®rm wanted to be sure that it was not using its resources on work
that was either less interesting or less pro®table than other work that it might be
able to get. (`We are trying to bring in the most productive work possible and get
rid of the work which is less pro®table without penalizing the lawyers who
happen to be doing it at the time' (Partner 22)). It was also preoccupied with
situations that were not technical con¯icts of interest, but were nevertheless
undesirable in business terms (a `political' con¯ict of interests). There were various
reasons to implement assignment policies, such as increase the productivity of a ®rm
by using people and human capital more ef®ciently, or establishing some fairness
in the distribution of the workload. The latter was often expressed by members of
the Assignment and Training Committee (ATC), called the `schedulers' by some
associates:
I have to make sure that people are busy doing the right things, taking on the right case.
When a matter comes in, that issue of who is going to be assigned the case is a very
important issue for most law ®rms and certainly has been for us, and we've had an
increasingly sophisticated process for doing that. Fifteen years ago it was absolutely
accepted by every lawyer in the ®rm that, if a client called you up and said would you
handle this case, you could handle it. It was yours. Nobody would ever challenge that.
That is no longer true. Now, no matter who you are in the ®rm, if somebody calls you up
and says will you handle this case, that lawyer does not have the authority to take the
case on his own. He should run it through an intake procedure, which may be me, and I,
along with the other section, or along with our managing partner, we may talk about
whether or not the lawyer who originated that case ought to get to handle it. And in fact
some of the biggest and really the only ®ghts we ever really had have involved that issue
where a very large case with a lot of publicity came into the of®ce to a particular lawyer
and we concluded that he shouldn't handle it. That he was not the best lawyer for the
case. And we said it's going to another lawyer. And that lawyer didn't like it and he took
it to the managing partner, and to the partnership meeting, and we had a lot of dis-
cussion about it. And the decision we made stood. And we established a fairly
important precedent that our intake system was going to decide who's going to get the
case and who's going to do the work. Most of the time it's not a problem. Most of the
time the lawyer who originates the business is perfectly appropriate to do it. Sometimes
also a lawyer will originate business, he'll get a call from someone, and he won't want to
do it. Then in the process of intaking it through me he'll say to me can you ®nd someone
to do this? That's also something that I will do. I'll assign it to somebody. . . . My job is
not so much a job of making sure that everybody's busy. It is really making sure that
some people aren't too busy. And the problem is not ®nding enough work for people.
The problem is making sure that some people don't have too much. And we often try to
take work away from people. Say `look, you got too much, take these ®les, give them to
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so and so who doesn't have as much as you have to do right now.' We try and keep a
fairly even workload, but it's very hard to do, frankly, because some people enjoy
working 2,500 hours a year, other people don't like to work more than 1,800 hours a
year. (Partner 13)
In such ®rms, intake and assignment procedures are always somehow ¯exible
(Maister 1993). Flexibility, at least in the implementation of one of the two steps,
seems to be imperative, because work¯ow depends on the nature of the practice and
on variable client relationships. In some areas, clients usually come directly to the
lawyer. In others, lawyers may work on ®les because they were given these ®les when
they were associates and they stayed on these ®les. SG&R was well established and
corporate clients were passed down from partner to partner over the years. Clients
came to partners through referrals from other lawyers in the community or through
cross-selling by partners from another area of practice.
SG&R had an intake procedure. Its lawyers, like most lawyers working in
large ®rms, thought of themselves as the ultimate professionals because they
had to handle the most complex legal cases, as opposed, for instance, to inside
counsels who dealt with more routine matters. This meant that it was selective in
terms of choice of clients and, consequently, recruitment of new lawyers. I was not
able to reconstitute a homogeneous representation of the `good client', but
three criteria were often mentioned: large and solvent corporations, absence of
con¯icts of interests with the largest corporate clients already represented, and
the possibility of repeat business. In any case, new clients had to be cleared with
the managing partner. But this requirement was not systematically respected. I
even met a partner who did not know about it. Others acknowledged that they
had problems saying `no' to people. Clients whose work had been turned away
might not call again. Partners just took in the work, knowing that some colleagues
were cooperative and would help with the workload. Unless there was an
obvious reason to think about a political con¯ict (a con¯ict of interest with
another partner or a client represented by another partner), they just went ahead.
Partners at SG&R had been talking for years about moving towards being more
disciplined.
On the corporate side of the practice each lawyer develops an expertise in two or
three areas, and work is funnelled to them on an ad hoc basis; there is no formal
channel or organized way of making these decisions. It is done very informally amongst
partners: somebody would walk into my of®ce and say `Sam, are you busy?' and I would
say yes or no. Work comes from partners in the same speciality or from other areas of
practice. When you do corporate and commercial litigation, you service clients of
the ®rm when corporate partners ask you to. That is not true for people who do
insurance defence work (serious product liability cases, professional malpractice cases),
where the lawyer is the contact person with the insurance company. The strength and
the growth of the ®rm have been more heavily than in the past in the litigation side.
There are good reasons for this. First, intake also depends on the sources of work, which
vary a lot. Second, assignments also depend on clients' requirements, which also vary
a lot. (Partner 16)
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Assignments were more formally organized for associates, through an associate
committee (the ATC). This procedure was based on the traditional view about
professional training: associates should be trained mostly on the job, informally,
or by a `mentor'.
Associates get it by osmosis. For instance, they see how I deal with my clients because
they sit in conferences with me, and I think they pick up from that the way I picked up
when I was an associate, how you do it. A lot of it is judgement, a lot of it is instinct.
Everything is really client speci®c, situation speci®c, facts speci®c. There are times
when I want the associates to speak up because an associate may have a knowledge
of an area of fact or an area of law that if he does not speak up the client would be
misled in the course of the conversation. There are other times when the associate may
legitimately feel that I am doing something that doesn't seem to make any sense. But
I know why I do it this way. I know why I am holding back or coming forth with some-
thing. It is based upon my knowledge of the client and my knowledge of when to say
things and when not to say things. The associate in that situation may very well be
tempted to say something and he shouldn't say anything. Because he ought to sense,
and I hope he does sense, that I am deliberately not saying what he thinks I should say,
what I think I should say at this time, because the situation isn't ripe, and the ultimate
goal would be better achieved if that came later, or came in a different setting, over
dinner, in a one-on-one conversation. If for instance I am telling the client, an important
person, that he's made a fool of himself, that he's made a stupid decision, that is not the
sort of thing I would say in front of another person. I would say it tactfully, and I would
say it in a such a way that no one else would hear me saying what might be embarrassing
to him. (Partner 6)
Following this philosophy of apprenticeship in the legal profession, partners analyse
and break down a complex problem into several parts, and assign to each associate
working with them and observing this exercise a small part of the tasks that they
perform.
But often, assignment is actually done by the partners who brought in the client.
In this multi-city ®rm, in particular, some partners were so used to assigning work
themselves (without resorting to the ATC) that they often complained about the
problems of identifying associates with the right expertise, and of putting together
the right task force. Sources and types of assignments seemed to vary and to be
differently distributed. Lawyers differed in the extent to which they spent time on
assignments received directly from clients, on those received through a formal
assignment system, and on `spot assignments' (no continuing involvement in the
matter). It varied with the ®eld, with the amounts of work received through referrals
in the community, or through cross-selling. More systematic research would have
been necessary to establish how work was initiated, divided, performed, and
reviewed. Access to that information, however, was not provided.
In sum, at SG&R, management had to be ¯exible with assignment as much as with
intake. With regard to intake, new clients had to be cleared with the managing
partner, but this requirement was not systematically respected. As for assignment,
the staf®ng of cases was often done by the partners who brought in the client. But
80 Spencer, Grace & Robbins
assignments were more formally organized for associates, through an associate
committee. This was not surprising in a ®rm that was not departmentalized and
where compensation was based on a strict lockstep seniority system. The ®rm
counted on the cooperative spirit of its partners to smooth dif®culties related to
work¯ow.
A SS OC I A TE T R A IN I NG , W OR K F L OW , A ND CA R EER
As Nelson (1988) summarizes it, at the base of the law ®rm's professional pyramid
are the young partners and associates, or `grinders'. They play an important
economic role, and their recruitment and organization are a critical function in
every large ®rm. In the long run, they are obviously indispensable for the repro-
duction of the organization. In the particular conditions of the economy at the
beginning of the 1991, ®rms were anxious to hire the `right people' who would
adapt to the ®rm. Associates' income went up in the 1980s. Such ®nancial
incentives can be explained partly by competition between ®rms, but also by the
heavy workload coupled to uncertainty as to whether associates would be made
partners and offered an opportunity to pursue their career in the ®rm where they
grew up as lawyers.
In the short term, attempts of SG&R to manage growth were immediately
translated into decisions about associate recruitment. For instance, lateral hires
made it even more dif®cult for associates who had come up through the ranks. Every
associate was reviewed twice a year by the partnership for work performance and
`collegiality'. There was competition between associates, but, given the fact that the
process was very long, they were not often visibly competing with each other; the
partners played down the fact that the ®rm was a competitive environment. The ®rm
denied having reached the point where making it to partnership did not depend
exclusively on the quality of the work and the associate's relation to partners, but on
economics. However, the criteria could vary with economic pressure experienced by
the ®rm. In addition, apart from market pressures and built-in pressures to grow,
leverage ratios (that is, number of associates per partner) depended on the nature of
the practice and the area of law. Since anticipating demand has not always been easy,
the criteria to decide whether or not an associate was satisfactory could change
(loosen or become tougher) over time.
We try to anticipate demand. We do not grow for the sake of growing and we certainly
don't hire associates for the sake of maintaining any kind of arbitrary leverage ratio. We
do not do that. That is very stupid to do that. You must grow so that you have enough
people to get the work done for your clients. And it's a tricky thing, because you don't
want surplus capacity. You don't want lawyers, whether they are young associates or
older lawyers, sitting around with nothing to do. That's very expensive. Very, very
expensive. On the other hand, you don't want to be in a position where you can't serve
the clients properly because you have too few people. So it's always a guessing game.
But we try to put ourselves in a position where we have just a bit too few. People wish
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they had another couple of people. `Gee, we've got too much work to do. If we only had
another guy.' Don't get that guy. Just keep going that way. You'll be ®ne. (Head of the
hiring committee at the time of the study)
One criterion for associates who wanted to become partners was that they were
expected by partners to prove themselves economically pro®table to the ®rm.
Starting associates in corporate law ®rms such as SG&R were paid large salaries
compared to other young professionals coming out of graduate school. Partners
routinely complained that the cost of practising law had increased (mainly because
of associates' salaries and because new technology had made it a more capital-
intensive business), and that the increase in billing rates for starting associates was
lagging behind the rise in the salaries they were paid.
Hard work and the extent to which the fees were collected were indicators that an
associate was given good work and that it was carried out well. A rule of thumb in
the ®rm was that, after a few years, associates should gross three times what they
earned as a salary. A ®gure that often comes up in the professional literature is that
total cost of an associate is on average 1.3 times his or her direct salary. Data were
not available to push the analysis much further. Hours worked minus hours billed is
equal to non-billable time; it is equivalent to a capped service agreement, or to
training time, but it is often read as an inef®ciency index. Some partners considered
this as a good but wasted hour resource. This difference was expected to be high for
young associates and to go down with senior associates. There was no formal penalty
for this difference in the ®rm, but associates knew that, if it did not go down, their
chances of becoming partners decreased. Pro®tability of associatesÐthat is, what
they were paid minus what they earnedÐhad to increase with time. Hours billed
minus hours collected was also a dreaded index: associates knew that if it was high
for someone on a whole year, he or she could be blamed for it.
I was not able to collect `hard' data about the number of hours worked by each
associate for each partner. But, as mentioned above, SG&R's accounting system
prevented systematic fudging of associate ®gures by partners (that is, at the
associates' expenseÐwhich would not prevent both from doing it jointly).
A look at the Martindale±Hubbell Directory shows that the ®rm recruited from a
broad range of law schools, including the most prestigious. Career patterns were still
modelled after the Cravath system, although the up-or-out rule was in fact being
called into question. The ®rm experienced high levels of turnover by associates, and
that turnover was increasing between 1988 and 1991.
Nelson's work (1988) shows that the major events in careers within law ®rms
are linked to specialization, to large cases or transactions, to gains in client
responsibility, and to phases of subspecialization or management responsibilities.
Law schools tend to prepare generalist lawyers. Lawyers in traditional ®rms have
less structured careers than those in more bureaucratic ®rms. As happened in many
other ®rms, and sometimes without acknowledging its in¯uence, SG&R manage-
ment guided the distribution of workforce into needed areas. Careers were shaped in
various ways to suit the needs of the ®rm. The organization used indirect pressures
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(shaping opportunities) instead of requiring lawyers to do what they were told to do.
This is shown in Partner 29's presentation of the beginning of his career:
Let's say you have the average typical associate; they will work for a while with a lot of
different people, they will get training in our in-house seminars and little by little they
are going to say `Gee I like tax and securities, I ®nd those areas particularly interesting,'
and they will let that be known, and they will probably start getting more and more
assignments if they are doing good work in those areas, and they will start building up
their own expertise in those areas. As a result of that they will probably somewhat
narrow the number of partners they work with, and it isn't unusual for you to get the
mentor relationship coming out of that narrowing. I can think for example that there
were two or three partners here when I was an associate who I worked a lot with, and
one I think was very key in training me in securities law; another one was very key in
training me in the utilities law area. It just turned out that I probably worked more with
those two because I started doing more and more securities and utility work, I started
getting known by those clients more, so I was gaining client acceptance, and you just
start that sort of snowball downhill so that they start teaching you more, and relying on
you more, because you are gaining that knowledge and experience that they ®nd
helpful.
As already mentioned, two ®rm-wide associate committees, one for litigation, the
other for corporate lawyers, were supposed to assign work to associates, decide
about priorities, and control their productivity. However, the span of control was
too wide, and the members of the committees sensed that they were losing control
over their people; there were too many associates to keep track of. In addition, to the
extent that associates could be satis®ed with their training and supervision, the ®rm
was conscious that it was not doing as well as it would have liked to with training (it
was not formal enough). Each associate had a `mentor' who was supposed to read
his or her work, but this was not always happening; the pressure of business pre-
vented many attorneys from sitting down and chatting or socializing together, or
partners from giving associates the whole picture of the case on which they were
working together. There was a dif®culty communicating with associates, since they
were not always upfront in their criticism of the partnership. Associate review was
done by the same committee that interviewed all the partners. In a multi-city ®rm,
this could be problematic, and most partners had to rely on the report of this
committee. There was a growing fear of back-stabbing when the ®rm got so big that
associates had to be judged not only on the quality of their work, but also compared
to other associates competing for a limited number of partnership slots.
Most associates were never certain that their loyalty would eventually be
rewarded by partnership. For example, friends and contacts that young associates
needed to nurture to show that they could bring in new business were often still in a
position of being unable to afford the ®rm (present billing rates were too high for
them). In the meantime, they worked long hours and were well paid. Judging by
their strategic evaluation and attempts to work with important partners, they tried
to create a good reputation for themselves while learning as much as they could
from the partners they considered the best professionals (in terms of solving legal
83Spencer, Grace & Robbins
problemsÐthat is, the content of the tasksÐand in terms of the management
of client relationships). In the absence of a career prospect within the ®rm,
associates were told that they would receive the training and develop the skills and
competencies that would help them manage their own career elsewhere. However,
recall that training was often judged insuf®cient by both partners and associates. It
depended on the pedagogical capacity of partners, but also on relationships with
partners, which were not always direct. From a business perspective, after a few
years, they could become potential competitors for partners, although usually not
very threatening ones.
B U IL T - IN P R ES SU R E S T O G R OW AN D
S TR A T EG I C P LA N NI N G
The problem of growth is one of the main problems for medium-sized law ®rms (by
1991 standards). It is the question of controlling uncertainty and facing change in a
market that may not carry a larger ®rm. The issue of how to deal with growth forces
the lawyers to build an overall view of their business. Minders and practice leaders
usually act as such `guardians of the long-term' (Maister 1993). Attempts to control
growth can take several forms. First, ®rms train and employ a growing core paralegal
workforce, which is not on a partnership track, but whose work often does not differ
much from that of an associate. Secondly, they try to predict, through strategic
planning, the nature of demand in legal services. To the extent that demand is
predictable, a ®rm will try to reshape the nature of the practice and, instead of
hiring, request more ¯exibility from attorneys, sometimes forcing them to switch to
more lucrative specialities. Assimilating laterals is often considered to be a pro®table
operation facilitating growth, an asset for generating new business. But some lawyers
also consider lateral partners' loyalty to be mixed. Thirdly, some ®rms think of
dropping hourly rates as a system of evaluation of work, to replace it with a different
form of evaluation, identifying the value of what is done by the ®rm and charging for
it regardless of how much time it takes to do it. Fourthly, another method is to
impose more selective constraints on client intake, looking only for the most
interesting and pro®table business (in spite of the fact that lawyers do not like to
turn work away). Finally, leverage is no longer the only key to success: ®rms usually
want to concentrate on hiring and keeping `really good people', including a growing
proportion of lateral attorneys.
Firms also reach different degrees of sophistication in their strategic planning and
self-restructuring, which often means more bureaucracy. To most lawyers, strategic
planning means thinking about the future, essentially de®ning the size that the ®rm
wants to be, and that the community will support. The traditional way of dealing
with the risk of growth getting out of hand was always to be a little too small (to
run a `lean' operation) rather than too big. Additional elements such as associate
turnover (lateral movement) also make it more dif®cult to make projections about
growth. For SG&R in 1991, strategic planning was ®rst a question of reshaping
the nature of the practiceÐfor instance, by designing new intake policies, or by
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dropping or developing some areas of law. The most urgent problem was to identify
the practice areas that were solid and worth investing in for the future, the areas
where the ®rm was strong for one reason or another.
No we don't have a policy concerning growth. Some of our partners have begun to
say wait a minute, why are we just automatically hiring x new people next year, have
we really analysed what we are doing, whether we need those people, whether we
are doing things in an uneconomic or inef®cient way that we require all these new
people, whether there are areas of the law that we are practising that themselves are
uneconomical. (Partner 6)
The answer to the question `Do we know where we want to be?', I would say the
answer is no, there is a great deal of discussion and debate about that right now,
which came up in the last couple of weeks in the context of how many new
associates are we looking for next fall, and that opens the question, some people
say hey we are too big, we are bigger than we ever wanted to be when we joined
the ®rm, others say you can't just stop growth, so I would say that at this point we
don't know what we want to be, but that's one of the things we focus on right now
I think, and I would guess next year we'll come to a better understanding and
agreement. (Partner 20)
The ®rm did not have a growth policy per se, provided that such an expression has
a realistic meaning. Members projected their needs for the next year and hired
accordingly. Strategic planning was not used as a measure of performance and the
®rm did not have a sophisticated master plan over ®ve years. Compared to the
beginning of the 1980s, the percentage of lawyers hired had fallen in 1989 and 1990.
The average time to partnership was eight years, and it was becoming longer. The
up-or-out rule was still the general one, although some at the ®rm were considering
the creation of different types of partnership (or permanent salaried positions).
There was already one permanent associate.
But the choices that planners faced were ultimately choices that could be con-
tested within the ®rm, and therefore they were in a way `political', not purely
technical. SG&R partners seemed divided between, on the one hand, a certain
resistance to the pressure to grow, and, on the other hand, a more managerial
approach to the control of growth and to reorganization.
Some thought that they did not particularly want the ®rm to get bigger; they
felt that its size was very nice because it was big enough to do most things
they wanted to, from the most complex litigation to the most complex cor-
porate transaction (they could staff it). These lawyers favoured the traditional
technique:
What you see happening now is each year the hiring committee will come to the
partnership with projections of what they would recommend as the number of
associates we would hire for our summer programme and as full time associates in the
Fall. And those numbers are derived based upon the partnership's projections of future
business, you are looking ahead a number of months so you can be right on target, you
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can be a little off on the high side or the low side, and you won't know that until you are
there. And I think that we tend to take the long view on that. My own feeling is that in
most instances in the past we probably underhired, in terms of ®nding yourself midway
through the year and thinking `Gee everybody is really very busy, you can't get the help
you wish you could'. (Partner 29)
There was a kind of growth that they wanted to avoid:
Whether our growth will be because we reach a momentum where we keep growing
whether we have to or not, it is hard to tell; in a sense work may very well expand to
give work to the people who are there, it may be that a law ®rm will do things for a
particular client that it needs not do in order to give that client quality service, just
because it has the people there and has to keep them occupied. It may take ten
depositions when only one would be necessary. Until ultimately there is the economic
point where the client says `Why are we doing this?' And of course you cannot say
`because we have a lot of people and we have to keep them working'. That's what
you are trying to avoid. (Partner 6)
From the traditional attitude towards growth, the risk of stopping growth was also
to face a change in relationships among professionals, particularly among associates.
So far we haven't had the bad ®ghting, the back-stabbing, the competition between
associates for partnership. We never said `OK we have ®ve associates, only one of you is
going to be a partner,' we have never done that. We argue about this in partners'
meetings, we right now are going through the growing pains as to who we want to be.
I think we are big right now, but do we want to continue to get bigger, do we want
to hold the line, are we too big, is the client base enough to support where we are
growing, is the community we are in big enough to support where we are at? I don't
know, I came here in 1965, and I honestly say that we went from x lawyers to whatever
we are today, without giving any serious thought to that growth, it just happened, and
the work has been there. We have always said that the work would be there if you hire
good people and if you do good work. (Partner 13)
A more entrepreneurial attitude was expressed by Partner 5:
The law ®rm industry is very crowded and very undifferentiated in the sense that
everybody's got the same problems, and everybody's dealing with the same issues, and
you come up against something and you think `This is such a terrible problem' and then
you realize that everybody's got exactly the same problem. Some people may not have
dealt with it yet, some people may have already dealt with it, but everybody's going to
deal with it sooner or later and nobody's got terribly innovative answers. I mean it's not
like an industry where somebody is going to invent the electric light bulb or the new
microchip or some other thing that's going to completely turn everything upside down
and make one player in the industry the clear leader. Just you've got a lot of dogs
chewing on the same bone or trying to chew on the same bone. And growth is one of
those issues. The common wisdom used to be grow, grow, grow, you had to grow really
fast, and leverage is the key to success, and the more associates per partner you had,
that's the way you really run a pro®table business. There has now been a backlash
against that in the literature, I mean in the consultant literature and things like the
American Lawyer and those rags that comment on the practice of law in large ®rms.
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They are saying that it's crazy to have this kind of perpetual motion machine of growth
completely divorced from demand and that if you run a factory, you don't say `I've got
a certain number of people on the assembly line and I've got to promote them this
year, so I'm going to promote them and pay them more money even if the business isn't
there.' You make adjustments depending upon what the demand for your product is.
And law ®rms traditionally have not done that. If you had said two years ago `What's
your plan of growth?', we would have said `We have no speci®c plan, but we really have
to grow and more growth is better.' I think that we are starting to realize that that is
not necessarily so, particularly when there has been this huge explosion of the number
of lawyers and the size of law ®rms, and it is increasingly dif®cult to hire and keep good
people. So we want to have a more ¯exible approach to all of those things. But will
we be bigger? Yes. I think that we have to grow, but I also think that we are better off
always being a little bit too small rather than being too big. And we think that we are
not going to grow as quickly in the next ten years as we did in the last ten years. I'd much
rather be in a position of saying `Jesus, we just don't have enough people to get
the work done' than `Holy Christ, what are we going to do with all these mouths to
feed?' It can really undermine your ethics if you have a lot of idle capacity, because it
really puts you potentially at odds with the client. On some level, you always have a little
voice saying to you, `Well you know, you could justify doing this work for the client, and
wouldn't it be nice because old Rob down the hall doesn't seem to be that busy right
now.' (Partner 5)
EL U SI VE C O M M I TT EE S A ND S EL EC T ED
M EM BE R S W I TH ST A TU S
One of the consequences of the managerial changes in north-eastern law partner-
ships in the 1980s and 1990s was that they left many partners with the feeling of
being shut out of the decision-making process, and with the feeling that relation-
ships among themselves were changing too. This was particularly true when the
reorganization of the ®rms included the creation of new and different partnership
statuses. As Nelson (1988) and Maister (1993) summarize it, one pervasive phe-
nomenon occurring in law ®rms is increasing strati®cation among lawyers. Whether
recognized formally by changes in the partnership agreement or not, many ®rms
consist of a dual partnership in which lawyers with substantial client responsibilities
run the ®rm and take home a major portion of the pro®ts while other lawyers
function as little more than salaried staff.
At SG&R, which operated under a one-partner-one-vote rule, most partners did
not feel left out of the decision-making process, even though the formal committee
system was not very active. In effect, the partnership meeting, the committee of the
whole, was well attended, remained sovereign, and ran the ®rm without much
subcommittee work. Partners often felt too busy to carry out much of that kind of
task. As in many professional services ®rms, they were timekeepers, and much of the
time spent on subcommittee deliberation was often considered a waste, the typical
`postponable activity' (Maister 1993), a topic for jokes. Informal social mechanisms
obviously supplemented this weak form of formal coordination.
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It is nevertheless useful to identify the partners who were of®cial members of
these committees, while at the same time representing various forms of status in
this collegial organization. In this section, I anticipate some of the later chapters by
identifying such key partners, or oligarchs, who could be considered important
to collective action in speci®c ways. This identi®cation is based on ethnographic
material, performance data, and the network study of the ®rm (which will be
presented in the following chapters). I have narrowed the choice down to ten
persons.
Partner 1 was an Of®ce I litigator, the most senior partner in the ®rm, a
memberÐwith Partner 5, the most senior partner in Of®ce IIÐof the compensation
committee. He was considered to be a very strong personality, an authority ®gure,
extremely focused on his professional work, and hard working. He was considered
very important to the ®rm. `All litigation people look up to Partner 1, who taught us
everything we know' (Partner 13). Of Partner 26, people said that he was `brought
up in Partner 1's world'. One partner called him `Partner 1 the Monarch', another
`Straight model citizen type, a model of rectitude'.15 He ranked fourth on the
performance scale in terms of dollars brought in in 1990.16 He belonged to a
category of partners who had high scores in all the key networks examined in the
later chapters.
Partner 2 was an Of®ce I corporate lawyer, a man from an `established and
intellectual family', as one of his partners called him. He was next in seniority to
Partner 1. Considered `a man of breadth, judgement, and compassion', with `very
decent, humane, sensitive instincts', he ranked ®rst on the performance scale in
terms of dollars brought in for 1990. When comparing him to Partner 1, Partner 26
said: `If they both had a problem at the same time, I'd open the window and jump
out of it!' Partner 2 was Partner 17's mentor. Given the stature of Partner 17, he was
directly and indirectly one of the most respected partners in the ®rm, in the three
of®ces. He was very much listened to at partnership meetings for policy orientation,
and had a very high centrality score in the advice network, but not in the co-workers'
or friendship networks.
Partner 4 was a corporate lawyer in Of®ce I.17 Some called him, when comparing
him to Partner 1, the `Secretary of State'. He was part of a closely knit group of
corporate partners. Others referred to them as `bright but groupy: they drink hard,
they play hard, they work hard'. He was active on the marketing committee and
ranked fourth in the seniority ladder and second on the performance scale (in terms
of dollars brought in). He was very much listened to at partnership meetings for
policy orientation, and had a very high centrality score in the co-workers' network,
but not in the advice or friendship networks.
Partner 5 was the most senior litigator in Of®ce II, a typical minder, a man with
`stature', an assistant to the managing partner and a memberÐwith Partner 1Ð
of the compensation committee. `He is easy going and concerned about his co-
workers. Most of us feel comfortable with him. He is very responsive' (Partner 18).
He ranked seventh on the performance scale in terms of dollars brought in. He was
listened to at partnership meetings for policy orientation, but did not have very
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high starlike centrality scores in the other networks, perhaps because there fewer
members in Of®ce II than in Of®ce I.
Partner 6 was a widely recognized specialist in his domain, who sat on American
Bar Association committees. He had the reputation of being a formal and outspoken
partner who `does not suffer fools lightly', `a prima donna' who `tends to be on his
own more than the rest of us'. In spite of his professional status, some thought that
he viewed Partner 1 `somewhat jealously professionally'. He had an average ranking
on the performance scale in terms of dollars brought in. He was not much listened to
at partnership meetings for policy orientation. He had a high centrality score in the
advice network (coming mainly from associates), but not in the co-workers,' or
friendship networks.
Partner 13 was a senior litigator in Of®ce I. He was the typical minder who sat
on the ATC. One of his partners said about him that he was `a family man, a
sensitive, insightful, compassionate, helping kind of person. He is the real Mr Nice
Guy, a kind of a kinder gentler partner, he is notable for that.' `He is a big
cheerleader around here.' Associates considered him one of the easiest partners to
talk to, but others saw him as the main `scheduler' on the litigation side. In spite
of record high centrality scores in the three key networks (co-workers', advice,
and friendship), he was not much listened to at partnership meetings for policy
orientation. He ranked fourteenth on the performance scale in terms of dollars
brought in in 1990.
Partner 17 was a medium-seniority corporate partner in Of®ce I. He was also a
member of the ATC on the corporate side. He had an average ranking on the
performance scale in terms of dollars brought in, but he was one of the most central
persons of the ®rm, with an Ivy League background and a unique structural pro®le
(see Chapters 3 and 8). Some compared him to Partner 1 without the seniority.
Partner 2 had been his mentor when he was an associate. He was very much listened
to at partnership meetings for policy orientation, and had a very high centrality
score in the three key networks.
Partner 18 was a medium-seniority litigator in Of®ce II, a typical ®nder who
ranked third on the performance scale in terms of dollars brought in in 1990
(and ®rst the next year). He was a former proteÂgeÂ of Partner 5, with an entre-
preneurial outlook on the ®rm. He did not have high centrality scores in the
®rm's networks.
Partner 20 was the managing partner of the ®rm at the time of ®eldwork, a
medium-seniority litigator in Of®ce I. He was the ultimate minder, considered to be
a true consensus builder, who consults before he decides: `He knows everybody,
what everyone's problems are. He talks on a con®dential basis with more people
than anybody around.' He is `a very good role model for the future managing
partners'. He had high centrality scores in the advice network and was very much
listened to at partnership meetings for policy orientation; but he did not have very
high scores in the co-workers' and friendship networks.
Partner 26 was an assistant to the managing partner who also sat on the hiring
committee. He had high centrality scores in the three key networks and was very
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much listened to at partnership meetings for policy orientation. His relational
pro®le will be shown to be exceptionally complex and diversi®ed. He ranked tenth
on the performance scale in terms of dollars brought in.
This list is closed only arti®cially. Many partners were important in ways that are
not accounted for here. For example, Partner 15 was a typical entrepreneur; he had
left Of®ce I to establish Of®ce III with three associates in a different city. Partner 30,
a young lateral partner from a large New York City ®rm, supported Partner 26 in his
attempt to change the rules of the partnership. More can be found on several others
in next chapter's section on niches and power. Each partner was a character in his or
her own way. For the purpose of this book, however, it is not necessary to account
for all this diversity.
SG&R's organizational form between bureaucracy and collegiality implemented the
partnership contract. In this form, members ideally adopt rules consensually to
coordinate their actions without coercion. Rules for conducting the ®rm's affairs are
of course meant to enable members of the ®rm to devote most of their productive
energy to practising law. The formal organization clearly has an effect on how
members work. It attempts to allocate key resources such as cases and workforce
according to rules speci®ed above (intake and assignment). But committee work is
often inef®cient and endless, and rules still have to be contextualized, interpreted,
applied, or enforced. In spite of the consensus needed for this type of organization to
thrive, committees and rules are not ef®cient by themselves, in the sense that there is
nothing automatic in their ef®ciency. Then what explains why members bow and
comply? Organizational sociology has long shown that it is the concrete action
system (Crozier and Friedberg 1977; Reynaud 1989; Sainsaulieu 1977), which does
not correspond exactly with the formal structure designed by management rules,
that makes collective action possible. No ®rm agreement can function without this
system, the social mechanisms that characterize it, and the commitment of the
members of the ®rm. A ®rm such as SG&R thus faced standard problems of col-
lective action in the enforcement of its partnership agreement.
In this action system, bureaucratic rationalization is limited. Relationships and
various forms of authority (status) are important to the ef®ciency of rules. As already
stated, my goal is to show that three generic social mechanisms construct this com-
mitment to living by this agreement and provide structural solutions to SG&R's
problems of collective action among peers. The next chapter identi®es the niches
built by the members of the ®rm, the bounded solidarity that these niches represent,
and the relationship between niches and forms of status in the ®rm.
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3Niches and Status in the Firm:
A Speci®c Exchange System
In this chapter, I am concerned with identifying the social niches and the forms of
status that could be found in the ®rm; then with testing for the existence of the ®rst
mechanism that helped members manage their social resources in order to ful®l
their commitment to a broadly understood labour contractÐthat is, generalized
exchange within these niches and in the ®rm as a whole. I ®rst identify the
resources exchanged; I then use various statistical analyses to con®rm the existence
of niches, identify their characteristics, and check for the presence of cycles of
indirect reciprocity characterizing generalized exchange among members, parti-
cularly in the network of exchanges of the ®rst basic resourceÐthat is, co-workers'
goodwill.
L O O K I N G A T TH E P R O D U C T I O N S T R U C T U R E
A S A C O M P LE X E X C H A N G E S Y S T E M
Following the description of this institutional form in the previous chapter (the
Cravath system), it is also useful to summarize what we know about how SG&R
actually operated on a day-to-day basis. The partnership agreement de®ned the
partnership as a whole as the ultimate authority, but a managing partner operated
without much committee work, and the boundary between what he decided and
what went to the partnership as a whole was kept somewhat fuzzy. Regulatory
participation of all partners made it dif®cult sometimes to reach consensus. Much of
members' work was complex, non-standardized, and dif®cult to control by formal
peer review committees. Client intake and work assignments were formally orga-
nized, but actual work¯ow often bent the rules. Compensation was based on a rigid
lockstep seniority system, but some instability was created by actual (two partners
out of thirty-four) and potential free-loading. Division of work was as sophisticated
as in any other corporate law ®rm, but SG&R was not departmentalized. The ®rm
was considered a single pro®t centre by its accounting system, but there was a risk of
polarization between its two main of®ces about policy issues stressing some diverg-
ing interests. Associates' work was lucrative and important to the ®rm, but their
career was still highly uncertain. In a competitive and downturn market, strategic
planning did not help much with ensuring economic growth and in dealing with
built-in pressures to grow in size.
The formal structure of this organization was therefore clearly unable to ensure,
by itself, ongoing collective action among peers. It clearly relied on informal
mechanisms for its operations and its reproduction. In order to explain the observed
stability of the ®rm at the time, we need to uncover these mechanisms. I have argued
that a structural approach helps in this task. In effect, in organized settings, partici-
pation in collective actionÐthat is, task-force production, regulatory activity, or
enforcement of previous agreementsÐrequires cooperation with others. This
cooperation can be looked upon as routine transfers or exchanges by members of
various kinds of resources (Bearman 1997; Bienenstock and Bonacich 1993, 1997;
Blau 1964; Bonacich and Bienenstock 1997; Breiger and Ennis 1997; Cook 1987,
1990; Crozier and Friedberg 1977; Ekeh 1976; Flap et al. 1998; Galaskiewicz and
Marsden 1978; Gouldner 1960; Han and Breiger 1999; LeÂvi-Strauss 1949; Lin 1982,
1995; Willer 1999): such resources include information, co-workers' goodwill,
advice, friendship, emotional support, and many others. From a structural per-
spective, this means that speci®c local and multiplex1 substructures of social ties
must crystallize for members to get access to such resources and to be able to
cooperate on an ongoing basis.
Structural analysis of cooperation and management of various types of social
resources enhances understanding of effective participation in collective action by
highlighting the relationship between choices of important sources of resources in a
speci®c type of organization. I look at how three important production-related
resources (co-workers' goodwillÐunderstood as strong commitment to collab-
orationÐadvice, and friendshipÐunderstood as a form of role distance) were
exchanged by members. Speci®cally, I analyse the interlocking of ties among
members and de®ne broader sets of expected interdependencies among transfers
and exchanges that went beyond any transfer of a single resource. I argue that
regularities in these substructures contributed to the creation of typical transfers and
exchanges providing structural answers to the problem of members' participation in
collective action.
To understand how these resources can be both an individual and a collective
asset, it is useful to represent it as a multiplex and generalized exchange system. In
effect, when staying at the dyadic level, it is dif®cult to get a sense of how exchanges
use different resources at the same time, and of the overall pattern of exchanges of
these resources in the ®rm. Recognizing this more generally, LeÂvi-Strauss (1949)
distinguished two forms of exchange: direct or restricted exchange (dyadic) and
indirect or generalized exchange (structural). Asymmetries in the transfers of
resources, along with the dependencies attached to them, can create a generalized
exchange system. This form of generalized exchange system can also be said to be
`locally multiplex'. This means that productive members can share several types of
resources with task-force members, with or without immediate reciprocity (Blau
1964). Their cooperation involves forms of bounded solidarity and indirect reci-
procities that take several resources into account.
In order to share these resources on an ongoing basis, members try to build or
join stable quasi-groups, or niches, in which these resources are more easily available
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to them as individuals in this organization. A social niche is de®ned as a position in
which ¯ows of important resources have been, at least temporarily, secured by
members among themselves (that is, by members sharing common attributes and
identities). A niche can thus be represented as a position of structurally equivalent
members and as a dense group of members (a clique) (Borgatti and Everett 1992;
Freeman 1992). The important point is that such niches are a necessary intermediate
level between individuals and the overall structure. It is often where most transfers
and exchanges of resources happen for a given member. It provides the organization
with the means of putting pressure on the members (thus increasing their pro-
ductivity) and of circulating resources in a context where opportunism and strategic
rationality are suspended. It provides members with resources needed to produce
and survive in this organization, as well asÐfor the most central onesÐwith
opportunities to exploit or play off non-members against each other. Acknowl-
edging the existence of this level with its advantages and dangers to both the indi-
vidual members and to the ®rm makes it possible to understand various social
processes within the ®rm.
T H R EE P R OD UC T IO N R ES OU R C E S: C O- W OR K ER S '
G OO DW I L L, A D VI C E, A N D F R I EN DS H I P
The role of these substructures in the exchange mechanism can be grasped by
recalling the work process typical of professional members in this organization, as
well as the resources needed to carry it out. In this context, temporary task forces
composed of partners and associates (at least one of each) constituted the core of
multifunctional and sometimes multidisciplinary (litigation, corporate) work
groups. Recall that, in such partner±associate task forces, partners kept their
autonomy in the negotiation of means and ends, and associates couldÐand were
often expected toÐshare knowledge and expertise. Legal task forces were case driven;
they had to be suf®ciently large to handle speci®c tasks. They could also become
specialized boutiques within the ®rm, created by the fact that a general practice ®rm
had to grow and, given the increasing complexity of the law, transform its generalists
into specialists narrowing their focus. Under pressure to achieve, members could
work simultaneously on several ®les and participate in several task forces. The ®rm
was thus broken into small, ¯exible, and heterogeneous work groups (Lazega 1992b),
which had to be able to cooperate quickly and ef®ciently, to react to complex non-
standardized problems, solve them, and dissolve themselves. The importance of
cooperation in these task forces to effective individual participation was evident from
the fact that individual economic performance was positively and signi®cantly
associated with task-force membership and constraint, as will be shown below.
This picture of case-driven task forces thus illustrates why and how a structural
approach to cooperation should examine transfers and exchanges of resources
central to the functioning of such organizations. Speci®cally, it suggests that regu-
larities in the transfer and exchange of resources should enable members to parti-
cipate effectively in collective action, in an orderly and ongoing basis. In other
93Niches and Status in the Firm
words, the analysis of a locally multiplex and generalized exchange system is the key
to showing, on a case-by-case basis, how members managed their social resources in
order to cooperate in the production of quality service. In fact, this approach to
collective action in terms of resource dependencies and exchange substructures had
the advantage of taking into account multifunctional and instrumental dimensions
of collective action.
I consider three types of resources to be central to the functioning of the ®rm.2
Such resources were important, because many things could go wrong in the orga-
nization when they were too scarce or distributed in a way that gave some members
too much damage potential.
The ®rst type of resource is co-workers' goodwill.3 Given the ¯exibility needed
to accommodate clients' needs, and the size and complexity of some of the ®les, a
good co-worker was a real resource for the individual attorneys in ®rms such as
SG&R. As seen above, formal structure imposed constraints on the work process.
In general, a ®le (a case) was handled by at least two lawyers, one partner and one
associate. The partners analysed a complex problem and broke it down into several
parts, assigning to each of the associates working with them, and observing this
exercise, a small part of the tasks to be performed. In this type of structure,
partners and associates need one another. Partners depend on each other for many
reasons. They may have the same clients, represent large and complex ®les. The
form of cooperation is thus dictated by the requirements of the market. In
addition, one well-known way of keeping a client is to cross-sell services that can
be provided by partners of different specialities. Thus, a client who initially needs
advice for a speci®c problem, say buying a shopping mall, will also be offered tax
and litigation services by the ®rm. This increases revenues and helps to establish a
relationship with the client.
As mentioned earlier, interdependence among attorneys working together on a
®le at SG&R could be strong for a few weeks, and then weak for months. Access to
work opportunities depended on intake and assignment policies, on which partners
relied to try to prevent possible (ethical and business) con¯icts among themselves.
In its effort to organize its practice, rather than hiring lawyers from outside the ®rm,
the ®rm could impose undesired co-workersÐrival partners, associates unknown to
a partner, dif®cult or unhelpful partners to associates. Associates and partners had to
be prepared to work with ®rm colleagues, and sometimes with other partners and
associates who would not be ®rst on the list of preferred co-workers. Forced
cooperation was routine for many partners and most associates, but members also
gave themselves room to manúuvre and be strategic in their choices of co-workers.
Sharing work and cross-selling among partners were done mostly on an informal
basis, although less so when including associates. Given the classical strati®cation of
such ®rms, work was supposed to be channelled to associates through speci®c
partners, but this rule was only partly respected. Members did not rely entirely on
the assignment committee to form their task forces. Recall that ®rm policy was not
always enforced exactly as it was formally meant to be. It con¯icted mainly with
lawyers' own strategic preferences when they put together a task force to work on a
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®le. Formal assignments did compete with individual preferences. This meant that,
to some extent, members selected their strong co-workers themselves. To choose
co-workers in this collegial context was thus a delicate operation. Associates com-
peted for the attention of partners. Partners competed for the best associates and for
prestige within and outside the ®rm.
Under such constraints, members of the ®rm had two preoccupations: ®nding
interesting work, and getting cooperation from colleagues to carry it out, especially
colleagues interested in a long-term relationship, and not in taking advantage of
them. The ®rst preoccupation of individual members who were timekeeping was
with building strong, secure, and durable work relationships with others: partners
with other well-connected partners and with reliable associates; associates with
rewarding partners. Members thought that they were more `assured' of receiving
the cooperation that they wanted from strong work ties than from more super®cial
ones. Strong work ties are thus both a form of perceived interdependence and a sort
of insurance policy. They open the horizon beyond short-term security. Most
members wanted to share work with reasonable people who pulled their weight and
did not grab all the credit for themselves, especially in successful cases.
The second type of resource is advice. Members involved in `certainty work' rely
constantly on advice from others. Advice is an important resource in professional
and collegial organizations (Wilensky 1967). Without it, corporate lawyers could
not solve in a satisfactory manner the usually complex legal problems that they
handle. The nature of knowledge-intensive work requires accumulation, transfers,
and exchanges of knowledge and experience. SG&R organized work among experts,
who often referred to abstract legal knowledge. In this context, transfers and
exchanges of advice among members could be seen as vital, indeed as one of the
main reasons for the existence of such knowledge-intensive ®rms in general. Advice
could be seen as a product of goodwill, but it was also different from goodwill in the
sense that it could be provided by someone who was not a strong co-worker. In law
®rms of this type, advice is not billed to the advice-seeker. It does not show in
lawyers' time sheets or in ®rm accounts. Advisers may not claim of®cial credit in
successful cases. Lawyers who are not assigned to a case may advise, but if they want
to claim their share of the credit they would have to become of®cial co-workers on
the case. This is accepted only beyond a certain contribution and negotiated with the
lawyers already in charge. It is dif®cult to predict unilaterally when providing advice
may become collaboration. To seek advice in such a context of business, career, and
symbolic competition is, therefore, sometimes a delicate operation. In a law ®rm
that structures itself so as to protect and develop its human and relational capital
(Gilson and Mnookin 1985; Nelson 1988; Smigel 1969; Wilensky 1967), such a
resource is particularly vital to individual members. Members at SG&R saw expertise
as accumulated by the ®rm, andÐin their situation of collective responsibilityÐ
ended up relying constantly on advice from others. For example, how far-reaching
was yesterday's decision by the State Supreme Court on a basic question of corporate
law? What about the upcoming partnership decisions? How about Partner X's way
of putting this or that deal together? In sum, members sought out for advice could
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be considered to be members with high status (Blau 1964). Whereas the strong
co-workers represented members' perceived reliance and interdependence upon
each other for cooperation, advice represented intelligence and experience that were
exchanged for status recognition. To illustrate this connection between advice and
status, here are some of the statements provided along with the sociometric choices:
Usually advice involves something of another area of law, one that I am not practising.
Among the people who can answer, I choose those with experience and the smartest,
those who have proved that they have good ideas. With associates, it is different: I can
ask for their reaction, but I have to decide for myself. One thing I have learned is that
nobody knows everything. Don't ignore the young people. The most stupid guy can
sometimes have a good idea. (Partner 12)
On a particular ®le, I would go to the partner with whom I work on this ®le. So the list
looks a lot like the co-workers' list, although not entirely. There have been times where I
got other people's perspectiveÐfor instance, when other partners with whom I have
already worked on similar ®les have helped me, or when I need to know the implications
for the client in other ®elds. I am a corporate lawyer, and the people I ask are usually in
the litigation department. (Associate 42)
In this law ®rm, as in many others, the difference between advisers and
co-workers was based on the fact that a partner could seek another partner's advice
without including the adviser as a co-worker in the ®le at hand (and thus share risks
and credit).
I never hesitate to bring other partners in on an advice basis because I can control how
much of that time gets billed. Because of our compensation system, I don't fear any
personal repercussions from calling other partners. I may or may not write it down, but
as the billing partner I have the ®nal say, together with the MP, on what to bill a client.
The general rule is: bill straight time for the attorneys on the case. If I feel that I have a
justi®cation to bill it up for partner consultation or down for associate inef®ciency, I have
the responsibility to take that up with the MP to determine the bill. Changes in the
compensation system would mean a change in my way of thinking about cases. Advice
would get billed, and I am not sure I would consult a partner and bolster his hours on
one of my ®les. Nor would I be likely to introduce him to `my' clients. That's one of the
reasons we stay with this system. (Partner 25)
The third type of resource will be called friendship, a ¯exible form of open-ended
support that is not related to the tasks themselves. Rather, it is a form of `backstage
resource', to use Goffman's idea (1961) of a place where actors retreat to get the
distance that is needed to show that the demands of their roles are beneath their
capabilities.4 I understand the resources provided by this friendship in a non-
sentimental way: a willingness to help in dif®cult situations, socialization, motiva-
tion, emotional support, information, exciting approaches to otherwise boring and
sparkless work, and a de®nition of the situation (Maister 1993: 163). A friend is
considered as a potential source of many resourcesÐfor example, of help in
asserting or negotiating one's roles and status, or in carving out a place for oneself in
the group. Indeed, at SG&R, mutual friendship ties were extremely valuable because
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they represented a form of insurance policy against expulsion. Recall that partners
could be expelled only when 90 per cent of all partners af®rmatively voted for the
`termination' of one of their own. With thirty-six partners, it took abstention by two
`unconditional' partners to deadlock the vote. The importance of this de®nition of
friendship is that it does not assume reciprocity and is not directly connected to the
work process itself. However, among business heads, sympathizing hearts also mean
interference. Therefore, in the professional context of SG&R, choices of friends and
management of friendship ties were not easy. More than interdependence was
needed to strengthen them. Lawyers said that, in their ®rm, such ties tended to be
forged among associates of the same class, or between associates who went together
to the same law school, and lasted throughout their careers.
Friendship ties have been shown to strengthen participation to collective action,
especially in organizations where collective indecision is frequent. They are important
to participation, commitment, productivity, and involvement (Krackhardt 1992).
The more you think you have friends, the more you participate, and the more you
accept the negative outcomes of status comparisons. Status games are sometimes
mitigated by friendship (Lazega and Van Duijn 1997), because it helps peers keep
their exchanges (giving and taking) vague. Friends can therefore help members
buttress and deal with potential threats of opportunism and mitigate the potentially
negative effects of interdependence; they help in gaining approval from partners with
whom collegial relations are fragile and unstable, subject to stress and centrifugal
forces.
Friendship sometimes means providing support and approval, even multilateral
solidarity. But, since power and status are systematically personalized and deperson-
alized in collegial organizations (Bourricaud 1964), it might still be surprising that
friendship ties are emphasized here as a third type of resource to be considered sys-
tematically in a competitive corporate environment. When speaking about the ®rm in
general, many members perceived that, at SG&R, there were not many bases other
than business for building ties with others. This underlied discourse about the ®rm as
`almost exclusively' an economic unit. Listen for example to Partners 18, 6, and 19:
Our ®rm is almost exclusively a joint economic enterprise. If I were to pick up a paper
tomorrow morning and learn that a lawyer was hit by a car, I would be concerned. If he
is in my ®rm, I would be more concerned. But that marginal difference would not be
that signi®cant. Unless I work with him, know his family and his children. There are lots
of lawyers in the community that I care more about than some of my partners. I see a
partnership more like an economic unit. There is the economic sense of mutual obli-
gation, of enhanced goodwill and cooperation. We help each other with work. I expect
more goodwill from a partner than from a stranger, but that's all. `I'll be glad to do that.'
But my whole life does not revolve around my partners. When people are too close, it
creates problems too. And it is not necessary for partnerships to survive. There is a leap
of faith that's required that a partner would not seek a circumstance that is harmful to
me. That may be naive. Our compensation system is a guarantee for that leap of
faith. A change in that would undermine the sense of security that I feel with my
partners. (Partner 18)
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To the extent to which we deal less and less with human beings and more and more
with corporations and corporate personalities, it also has an effect on the perception of
the ®rm as a business rather than a profession. There is a certain hardening of the
people in the ®rm. You are not dealing with the individual, you don't see the tears roll
up in the eyes of individual human beings, you are dealing with corporations and
businesses who talk about the bottom line all the time. That makes you think of yourself
as a business dealing business to business, rather than a profession with whatever
mystique that has. And that also hardens you, we are only talking about money here,
we are not talking about lives, feelings, compassion, it's all business. One tends to
imagine that the ®rst two reactions of any lawyer in one of these of®ces to the news that
a lawyer has dropped dead will be: how will I get his larger of®ce, and how will that
affect the increase in my compensation since there is one less slice in the pie? When
Kennedy was assassinated, I was in my of®ce with an associate, and someone burst in
and said, `Have you heard Kennedy was assassinated', and the associate said, `How
will that affect the stock market?' That was his natural, instinctive, immediate ®rst
reaction. (Partner 6)
This ®rm is not a family. You get very little emotional reward or support. Rather lonely in
that regard. Some here and there, within friendships, but not overall. Some partners go
out drinking. There is an awful lot of heavy drinking here. You have a committee
meeting at the end of the day, and many partners would have two or three martinis and
a bottle of wine with dinner. That's one of the ways they release stress and become
somewhat personal. Traditional bonding. Our lemon parties are cocktails. Firm social
get-togethers is more for sharing information and catching up with what people are
doing. . . . Very little energy has been devoted to people really becoming friends. There
is a certain reluctance to letting down one's guard. In the beginning, you are being
evaluated and judged all the time. Now I feel when I go home that I retreat to lick my
wounds, but I am not going to show my partners. I was ®red by a client a few weeks ago.
It is unpleasant, and I felt stunned. But I wouldn't go and tell my partners. I'll go home
and tell my wife. There is a good side to it too: you don't have to deal with your partners
too. (Partner 19)
Against this background, collective expressions of personal support were rare, and
surprising to some members:
When my mother died in January, she was the only person in my life, I was struck by the
letters I got from my partners, and by what they said. They were handwritten letters,
showing a genuine understanding and compassion, not just pro forma. Which indicates
to me that there are reservoirs here that can be tapped, and the ®rm has to be careful
not to dry these reservoirs up. I have seen too many ®rms dry up all the wells of
compassion, money machines ®lled with dislike: `I've got what I want and the hell with
you.' (Partner 6)
Indeed friendship ties were not needed to drive the work process itself. Therefore,
partners tended to keep associates at arm's length, and friendship ties with most
other partners were often uneasy. But, even when general discourse on present-day
collegiality often stressed the contrast between a business-oriented ®rm and an
idealized collegial past, members did mix professional and social ties with some
selected colleagues in the ®rm. The select few could still help accept negative
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outcomes of status comparisons, and help deal with potential threats. The partners
quoted above spoke more of a general atmosphere, not of the existence of selected
friendships and personalized relationships in the ®rm. This comes across in Partner
13's following observation:
When the ®rm was small among other things all partners had a good idea of what other
partners were doing. There was a much greater level of social integration, I think, ®rm-
wide. And a tendency to look much more inwardly towards the ®rm almost as a sort of
family away from a family. In our instance probably thirty years ago the partners in the
®rm tended to represent the most central social circle for themselves. When the ®rm
gets to be this size there is still a tendency to look inwardly toward the ®rm but it's
obviously no longer a closely knit family because there are lots of partners that you
won't see for weeks at a time. And so there tends to be if anything a tendency for
partners to start to look outward from the ®rm as opposed to inward to the ®rm. The
closeness tends to be reduced. Now what you have are people whose predominant
social circles may include other lawyers within the ®rm. But probably include many
more people outside the ®rm. That's a healthy development, not an unhealthy
development.
Direct interaction between lawyers could be closed, guarded, and sometimes
hostile. Much of their time could be spent jockeying for a position, as much as trying
to solve a problem. Struggle for status was permanently present within the ®rm.
However, this being said, members did mix professional and social ties with some
selected colleagues.
LO NG - T ER M I N DI VI D UA L IN TE R ES TS , I DE NT IF I C A TI ON S,
A N D B OU ND ED S OL I DA R I TY
Considering this organizational analysis of resources associated with production,
one might ask where members ®nd such resources. In Chapter 1, I theorized that
they are likely to ®nd them in social niches, along with indirect reciprocity and
solidarity. For work ties, recall Partner 29's explanation of the informal process by
which young associates joined a niche of two or three partners, who would represent
their strongest work ties and who would help them specialize and begin their career.
Niches exist because exchanges are constrained by many forces, including special-
ization. Thus, if one looks at the ®rm as a set of substructures, con®rming the
existence of an exchange system does not yet indicate under what constraints these
exchanges of production-related resources take place. When choosing sources of
advice, for example, members may think of their immediate individual interest, of
their long-term interest (based on identities or similarities in attributes used for
mutual identi®cation), or in terms of collective interests (that of the ®rm). They also
think of existing organizational rules of allocation of such resources. IdentitiesÐand
bounded solidarity rules that come attached to themÐare what is needed to deal
with long-term con¯icts in the distribution of resources. Usually most members can
play on similarities and some can pull rank on others; but in collegial organizations
pulling rank is costlier in terms of relationships and impossible among partners.
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By using their similarities, actors can signal preferential treatment to each other or
the fact that they will not take advantage of one another. Therefore, an important
step in the analysis will be to check that SG&R's exchange system did contain niches
shaped by the formal structure of the ®rm, by members' homophilous choices of
sources of resources, and by their appropriateness judgements.
A ®rst ethnographic illustration is provided by interviews such as that of
Partner 11:
Firm cohesion has changed dramatically as a function of size, and as a result of change
in the nature of the profession. The size factor is just a question of time and number of
¯oors. Before, it was impossible not to know what the others were doing. Sharing
experiments, knowledge, perceptions of what was important, how the ®rm should
react, was easy. At the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, there was an
awful lot of socializing outside the ®rm, partners and associates alike. At least once a
month the entire ®rm went out together. Now the picture is different. A different
atmosphere. We don't have any choice. As you make the decision to grow and to
remain a general practice, you have far less contact; in many cases not at all, with many
of your partners and associates. I don't have the slightest idea of what many other
partners do. You place emphasis on statistical analysis. Pro®tability. That's my own
point of view. I consider myself close to nine or ten partners with whom it isn't different
from what it was in the 1970s. But that's all.
To do their work and survive in such a partnership, interdependent members of
the ®rm needed durable relations with at least some colleagues, which provided
access to resources such as clients, knowledge, and social support. As seen above, the
organization helped members get access to some resources, such as clients and
workforce. It conducted its affairs based on a formal structure and formal rules,
which expressed choices among policy options, and allocated, directly and indir-
ectly, resources to members. For instance, in order to organize cooperation and help
members in getting some cooperation, the ®rm allocated members themselves to
formal positions that were used to enter into exchanges with one another: formal
hierarchical status, seniority rank, of®ce membership, speciality. It also allocated
resources such as salaries, compensation, and ®les, based on such positions.
However, the formal organization did not make an unambiguous allocation of all
the resources needed to work and survive in this environment. Its rules could
con¯ict. Many solutions abided by these rules, but there was also a need for arbi-
tration that resorted to particularistic criteria: for example, ®les might not all be
allocated through formal channels, and, even when they were, there could be several
solutions other than the formal channels to choose from. In addition, resources such
as advice and social support were rarely allocated formally. To get access to such
resources, members did not entirely rely on formal organization and rules. They
were selective in their relational choices, and this selectivityÐtogether with insti-
tutional constraintsÐproduced patterns of interest to understanding exchanges in
the ®rm. Members managed their interdependence in their own ways, which are
economic and politicized. As seen above, to get access to such resources, members
entered exchanges, which were multilateral and multiplex. Thus, they intervened in
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the process of resource allocation by using formal identities in politicized ways or by
introducing other particularistic identities and preoccupations (for example,
gender, or law school attended). These attributes, more informal and ad hoc, were
not necessarily of®cially recognized by the ®rm as characteristics that should be used
to promote cooperation.
To some extent, dimensions of formal structure of the ®rm should serve indi-
vidual members' immediate interests in shaping access to such resources. They
should also create room for niches by shaping members' games of identity politics
within the ®rm (Sainsaulieu 1997). In effect, as seen in Chapter 1, the stability that a
niche offers in terms of access and exchange of resources comes from introducing
timeÐthat is, a long-term perspectiveÐto the exchanges. Identity, via appro-
priateness judgements in exchanges, is what introduces time in action by de®ning
long-term individual and collective interests. Identity is usually a stable and mul-
tidimensional set of attributes that members use to de®ne themselves and get
individual and collective recognition as sources of their actions (for credit,
accountability, and the de®nition of a collective purpose) on an ongoing basis.
This raises the issue of how these transfers and exchanges are handled over time.
Informed by this understanding of the reasons for choosing some colleagues (as
opposed to others) as sources of resources, it is reasonable to expect the existence of
social niches. In the next section, I identify these niches at SG&R. Based on the above
organizational analysis of resources associated with production, standard socio-
metric data were collected in the ®rm. The name generators used to conduct the
network study are presented in Appendix A. Analysis of the distribution of key
resources shows the existence, at the structural level, of the subsystems that were
called niches.
A general methodological indication can be useful at this stage. In this book, the
different networks observed in the ®rm are analysed either stacked together or
separately. The ®rst approach (several networks stacked together) is used mainly to
identify SG&R's social niches system, but also to understand how access to various
kinds of social resources within the ®rm are interdependentÐthat is, how inter-
locked different kinds of multiplex ties can be. The second approach provides cues
for several social mechanisms that become particularly visible when speci®c ties are
observed in one single network (as if it had a life of its own).
N I C H ES I N TH E O R G A N IZ A TI O NA L E XC H A N G E SY ST EM :
A V I EW A T TH E S TR UC T UR AL LE VE L
I de®ne a niche analytically as a dense position clustering a subset of approximately
structurally equivalent5 members across as many types of resource networks as
needed to work and participate durably in the cooperation system of the organi-
zation. It is not simply a `resource space', but also a quasi-group in which members
bring in identity criteria, priorities in partner selection, and eventually bounded
solidarity. Technically, this means that a niche is a subset of approximately struc-
turally equivalent members in the organization, across multiple networks (here
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co-workers', advisers', and friends' networks); these subsets, or positions, are also
cliques. They are easily identi®ed on the diagonal of the density tables constructed
based on multiple networks (see Appendix B).
An analysis approximating structural equivalence among members of the ®rm
across the three networks provides a simpli®ed overall view, represented in
Figure 3.1.6 The density tables on which this ®gure is based are presented in
Appendix B. To summarize, it shows that the three networks stacked together break
down into nine positions of approximately structurally equivalent members. These
positions visualize seven niches as de®ned above; in effect, Positions Four and Eight
are not dense enough across the three networks to qualify as social niches. Some
niches are more dense than others, re¯ecting a stronger and richer type of bounded
solidarity.
Positions One, Two, and Three are positions of partners; all the others are posi-
tions of associates. The thick grey linesÐthat is, reciprocated advice tiesÐre¯ect the
backbone of the ®rm: the positions of three partners and their senior associates. Note
that requests for advice converge towards them. One subset of senior associates on
the litigation side stands out (among associates) as an important intermediary
between litigation associates and litigation partners, especially Position One partners.
Many of the relationships between positions are not symmetric. Indeed, the asym-
metries in the transfers of resources, along with the dependencies attached to them,
re¯ect the multiplex exchange system in the following way.
Position One was a dominant group of Of®ce I litigation partners who got advice,
strong collaboration, and friendship from Positions Two and Five. Theirs was a
protected niche: its members got almost what they wanted from the people they
chose. Many positions of associates were directly indebted to it for advice and
collaboration, but it was not the top performing position (third in average indivi-
dual dollar collection). Position Two was a group of Of®ce I corporate partners
almost in the same dominant situation as Position One, except that it had an
exchange of advice for friendship with Position Five. Many positions of associates
were directly indebted to it for advice, but not for friendship. It was the top per-
forming position economically. Position Three was a group mixing Of®ce II cor-
porate and litigation partners, in the same category as Positions One and Two in
terms of dependence on others for resources. It claimed strong collaboration from
Position Two, but unreciprocated in kind: Position Two members tended not to rely
on Position Three for strong collaboration, but did so for advice and friendship.
Here reciprocity tended also to be direct, but not necessarily in kind. Note that
Position Three had direct exchanges of strong collaboration only with two positions
of associates, Positions Six and Seven, not with other positions of partnersÐbut
cross-selling could still take place, for example, since it was a mixed position. As for
Position Two, many positions of associates were directly indebted to it for advice,
but not for collaboration or friendship. It ranked second in average individual dollar
collection.
To anticipate on further analysis (see below) at the dyadic level, partners' positions
were characterized by a comparatively very high proportion of `Blau ties', (ties in
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Figure 3.1. Overall view of transfers and exchanges of resources in the ®rm: The co-workers',
advice, and friendship networks superimposed
Note : This ®gure is a reduction representing the pattern of relationships between positions of approxi-
mately structurally equivalent members across the three networks of all attorneys in the ®rm. Boxes
represent positions of partners. Circles represent positions of associates. Thick lines represent mutual
exchanges of a speci®c resource. Thin arrows represent unreciprocated transfers of a speci®c resource.
Black lines represent the co-workers' network. Grey lines represent the advice network. Dotted lines
represent the friendship network. All the positions are social niches, with two exceptions: the dotted
circles representing Positions Four and Eight mean that the latter are not social niches.
Source : Reprinted from E. Lazega, ReÂseaux sociaux et structures relationnelles, p. 71. Copyright 1998 with
permission from Presses Universitaires de France.
which `i chooses j and j chooses i as strong co-workers, and j chooses i as adviser'),
whereas associates' positions were characterized by the corresponding high propor-
tion of ties in which they were the advice-seeking party. Such partners' positions were
cohesive: mutual triplex ties were over-represented in them. Thus, at the aggregate
level, all three resources tended to circulate within positions of partners and among
the two Of®ce I positions. Partners from Position One were in a socially advantageous
situation for reminding partners from Position Two of their commitment or to
moderate status competition among them, but not partners from Position Three.
Partners from Position Two, in turn, were in a socially advantageous situation for
pressuring Position One and Position Three partners back to good conduct. These
indications show two forms of embeddedness and visualize the enforcement of the
partnership agreement through a blend of task-oriented and social ties. Although they
were not often asymmetrically indebted to each other and dependent on indirect
reciprocity from each other, economic relations among partners were clearly over-
embedded for Position One and under-embedded for Position Three, with Position
Two members playing a key role of balancing the two forms.
This also con®rms that the forms of embeddedness of the labour contract for
partners and associates were radically different. Here, multiplexity was also more
extensively used to enhance the productivity of this economic tie. Associates tended
to feel indebted to partners for strong collaboration, advice, and sometimes
friendship (mostly unreciprocated). Two senior associates' positions, Positions Five
and Six, had a less clear pro®le (in terms of direct reciprocity) than partners'
positions. Position Five exchanged the three resources with Position One partners.
In that sense, it had almost a partners' pro®le. It had other uniplex and directly
reciprocal exchanges, and did not have to exchange one resource for another (with
the exception of friendship for advice with Position Two). Two positions of
associates were directly indebted to it for collaboration, advice, and friendship.
Position Six was in a different situation. It had more direct exchanges of strong
collaboration with partners' positions and also had a direct exchange of advice with
a partners' position. But it did not exchange friendship with partners (remember
that it was constituted of lateral associates who had not come up through the ranks
but had been taken on from other ®rms). It claimed friendship with Position Two
but this was not reciprocatedÐunlike Position Five's access to Position One's
friendship. Position Six thus sometimes claimed to get friendship from colleagues
(Positions Five, Seven, and Eight) other than those to whom it provided it.
Already at this stage of the analysis, small cycles characterizing generalized
exchange can be found in this representation of the system: multiplex and local cycles
re¯ecting the existence of highly embedded strong co-workers' task forces existed, for
example, among Positions One, Five, and Nine, or among Positions Two, Six, and
Eight, or among Positions One, Two, and Four. This is due, in particular, to the fact
that indirect reciprocity was at its strongest with less senior associates, who were
never in a position, for instance, to reciprocate for advice. They most often had to
reciprocate in Blau-type status recognition and strong commitment to work. This
reciprocation in commitment to work was not necessarily directed to sources of
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advice. For example, Position Eight got advice from Position Three, but was only
indirectly involved in strong work ties with Position Three through Position Six.
Another example is Position Seven, which got the three resources from Position Five
but was not in a position to reciprocate directly at all. It thus remained indebted,
providing Position Three with a strong commitment to work and friendship. A
similar short cycle was also present among Positions Three, Six, and Seven. Position
Four was in the same dependent situation as Position Seven with regard to the three
partners' positions with which it had ties. Note that it did not get friendship at all
from other positions, not even indirectly, which shows that the exchange system
failed to provide this resource to some of its members.
A large spectrum of forms of embeddedness were present here to fuel social
mechanisms and help them enforce the labour contract for partners and associates. It
would be too simple to reduce the situation by saying that performance of indivi-
duals was directly affected by these forms of embeddedness because high performers
were always involved in very multiplex exchanges and low performers in less mul-
tiplex ones, or because resistance to the general circulation rule always produced low
performers. For some associates high productivity went hand in hand with strong
friendship ties with partners: Positions Five and Seven over-billed and over-collected
compared to the other associates. Associates could often feel that they were kept at
arm's length, and that `partners didn't let them in', but here we also see that some
partners were nevertheless in a favourable social situation to extract high commit-
ment from these associates. And, at the other extreme, Position Four associates were
also highly productive but much less socially connected to the partners they worked
with: requests for advice still indicate social embeddedness through status recogni-
tion, but partners were less in a position to extract work for friendship. In contrast,
junior associates were less productive economically and claimed friendship with one
another and with senior associates. Here partners could play on resource depen-
dencies to get commitment from associates in different ways, sometimes indirectly
through the dependence of junior associates on senior ones. Senior associates could
also play this resource dependence game with strongly socially embedded junior
associates (in Position Eight, pure friendship ties were highly over-represented and
Position Seven included a record proportion of unreciprocated triplex ties), but not
so much with partners. Further descriptions of relationships between embeddedness
and performance are presented in Chapter 4.
Still at the dyadic level, reciprocal work tie combined with a unidirectional advice
tie (Blau ties) were very frequent in Positions Two and Seven, One and Nine, Two
and Four, Three and Six. This compound re¯ects one of the most frequent types of
embeddedness of exchanges in niches. Partners also concentrated requests for
advice, as well as unreciprocated citations as friends and advisers, or as co-workers
and advisers. Such citations converged towards all partners' positions but were
strongly over-represented for Position One. Moreover, associates' positions were
much less cohesive, which is con®rmed by a low proportion of mutual triplex ties.
In Position Three, empty ties and mutual duplex (co-work and advice) ties were
over-represented.
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In the next section, I identify the forms of status that could be found in the ®rm
and locate them within this system of social niches. This network analysis is ad hoc
by construction, but its results make sense from a theoretical point of view.
ST A TU S I N T H E OR G AN I ZA T IO NA L EXC H A N G E SY S TEM :
NI C H ES A N D P OW ER
To identify the forms of status in this ®rm, Table 3.1 looks at simple correlations
between dimensions of importance in this partnership (measurements of centrality7
in the three different networks, as well as measurements of economic performance
that will be elaborated upon further below). This provides a view of the con-
centration of resources at the structural level.
The three different forms of status identi®ed in the Introduction (®nder, minder,
and grinder) can be found at SG&R by analysing these correlations: ®rst, obvious
®nders, who were central in the co-workers, and advice networks, as well as strong
performers in terms of time input and fees collected; secondly, minders, who were
central in the three networks but not strong performers themselves; and, ®nally,
grinders, who were not central in any of the networks but strong in time input and
fees collected. The ways in which these forms of status, which overlapped for a few
partners, drove collective action and were important for speci®c social processes
(such as quality control, monitoring and sanctioning, and many others) are pre-
sented in detail in the chapters below. The simple existence of such an informal
strati®cation shows that members reached out of their niches and combined
maintenance of niche ties with status competition.
In effect, strong and multiplex cohesion among rival members is a de®ning fea-
ture of the collegial phenomenon. It does not mean that status competition is absent
from niches. As de®ned above, this process is built into the blend of collegial
relationships; it is more visible when members rely on each other for strong colla-
boration, or actually work together, but it does not necessarily need to be so. In this
section, I describe each niche, its role in the circulation of resources within the ®rm,
whether or not it was very centralized and dominated by key persons, its members
Table 3.1. Correlations between indicators of status in the ®rm
Indicators of status Mean SD 1 2 3 4
1. Fees collected * * Ð
2. Time input (hours) 1,407 335 0.46
3. Centrality (advice) 18 12 0.64 0.19 Ð
4. Centrality (friendship) 11 7 0.21 0.18 0.60 Ð
5. Centrality (co-workers) 22 9 0.44 0.23 0.76 0.52
Notes: N 71. SD: standard deviation. Correlation table for measurements of actors' importance in the
®rm (indicated by centrality in ®rm's social networks and by economic performance). Centrality scores
are computed based on choices of partners and associates. * means that the information may not be
disclosed.
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with ®rm-wide status, and its possible dif®culties with regard to access to resources
or capacity to deal with demand for resources. This description will be useful for
analyses in subsequent chapters.
Position One (a niche for Partners 21, 27, 24, 11, 26, 13, 8, 1, 22, 36, 20, and 23,
and Associates 38 and 40) was made up of Of®ce I litigators, almost all partners. This
was a very strong niche, including several key characters mentioned in the previous
chapter, providing large quantities of work and advice to others. However, its
members were not the most central colleagues in the friendship network: in that
respect, most Of®ce II partners and ®rm associates were kept at arm's length. It had
no unreciprocated ties and, although it is hard to picture its members, at this level of
reduction, as heavily dependent on others for one of the key resources, triplex
reciprocated ties with Position Five senior associates indicate strong reliance
on them. Absence of work ties with Of®ce II partners and associates re¯ects the
existence of two clearly separate markets and pools of workforce; ties were main-
tained at the level of exchanges and transfers of advice. At the time of the study,
members of Position One did not rely much on Of®ce II or Of®ce III colleagues, and
their pattern of ties does suggest a self-contained ®rm within the ®rm.
The senior partners in this niche were Partners 1, 8, 11, and 13; medium-seniority
partners included the main minders in Of®ce I (such as Partners 20, 24, 26, who,
along with Partner 13, had heavy administrative responsibilities at the time of the
study) and in particular two senior associates (38 and 40). Indegree centrality scores
(re¯ecting the number of times each member was selected by all the other members)
in the co-workers' network were very high for Partners 24, 26, 13, and 22 (members
of the associates committee), and Associate 38, a senior associate who was one of the
most active brokers between partners and associates on the litigation side; they were
among the highest in the advice network, especially for Partners 21, 24, 26, 13, 1, 22,
and 20 and for Associate 40; and low in the friendship network (except for Partners
21, 27, 24, 26, and 13, because they sat on the associates' committee (the ATC); or, in
the case of Partner 27 because she attracted many citations from women associates).
In terms of performance, Partners 21, 26, 13, 8, and 1 were among the ®fteen highest
fee collectors for the previous year. In terms of associate performance, Associates 38
and 40 were the highest fee collectors for the previous year, in spite of lower hourly
rates. Others, such as Partner 1, were typical ®nders.
This niche was very dense: its members exchanged many resources with one
another. Members of this niche worked a lot with each other; they tended to have
reciprocal work ties with members of Positions Two (partners, corporate, Of®ce I),
Five (senior associates, litigation, Of®ce I), and Nine (junior associates, mainly
litigation, Of®ce I), and tended to be cited as strong co-workers by Position Four
(associates, litigation, Of®ce III). Notice that they tended not to cite Of®ce II
partners (Position III) as strong co-workers or friends, only as advisers. They had
dense advice ties with each other, reciprocal ties with Positions Two, Three, and Five,
and were sought out for advice by all the other niches except Position Six (senior
lateral corporate associates). Members tended to have dense friendship ties with each
other and reciprocal ties with Positions Two and Five.
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Many medium-seniority partners transferred large amounts of the resources
examined here, which makes sense, since they had been in charge of running the
organization that ultimately produced their larger share of the pie. In many ways,
their heavy investments in others were multidimensional. Several partners were
examples of that: Partner 22 was a typically focused and hard-working ®nder on
whom a record number of associates relied for work and advice (but not friendship).
Partner 27, a very active woman partner, had a speci®c relational pro®le in the sense
that, in addition, she advised and provided friendship for many women associates.
Partner 20's management of resources was of the same type, with a speci®city
probably related to his being the managing partner: he was intensely sought out for
advice and relied upon for cooperation, but these were unreciprocated; and when he
mentioned members on whom he could rely for work, from whom he sought advice,
or as friends, they often did not reciprocate either.8
Some in Position One, such as Partners 1 and 26, managed their transfers and
exchanges of resources in common. Partner 1 in general was very much relied upon
for provision of work and sought out for advice, although sometimes inaccessible.
On big cases, he had worked with seconds, such as Partner 26, who had an entirely
different relational pro®le: he was a hard-working partner, heavily involved in the
business of the ®rm, and this shows in his relational pro®le: he was the person with
most ties in the ®rm. There were only nineteen people with whom he had no tie of
some sort. He was among the record holders for Blau ties, the typical partner±
associate relation (a mutual work tie and an advice tie from the associate to the
partner), for the very close and dense exchanges with other partners (triplex mutual
tie), and for concentrating requests for advice; as for Partner 13, many associates
said that they liked him and claimed to be friends with him. He was a work-oriented
all-round exchanger and investor of social resources. Another category of partners in
this niche, Partners 13, 24, and 31, also had an approximately similar relational
pro®le, with, however, an emphasis on large amounts of dense multi-resource ties
with other partners and provision of friendship to associates. They could be called
key status competition mitigators. Prototypical of these minders was Partner 13,
who, in addition to many instrumental relationships with associates, was involved in
many exchanges of advice and friendshipÐthat is, not directly functional or focused
on a particular case. An indication of that is that he was among the only partners
who mixed work-related and friendship ties, breaking the taboo brought to light by
the analysis of the blend of collegial relationships presented below; he was one of the
few who did not keep associates at arm's length.
Position Two (a niche for Partners 12, 29, 16, 17, 2, 10, 9, 34, 4, and 15) was made
up of Of®ce I and Of®ce III corporate partners. This niche was also dense and cen-
tralized, although less so than Position One. It also provided work and advice to
several other niches, and its members tended to be much closer to Of®ce II partners
in the friendship network; here again most associates (except again Position Five
members) were kept at some distance. Members tended to rely on Position One for
all key resources, but they also diversi®ed their sources of resources more (compared
to Position One partners): they did not rely much on Of®ce II colleagues for strong
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collaboration, but maintained advice and friendship ties with them, which was more
than Position One members did.
The senior partners were Partners 2, 4, 9, 10, and 12. The minders at the time of
the study were Partners 29 and 34. The ®nders tended to be Partners 2, 4, 17, and 15.
This niche was also very dense or cohesive: its members exchanged all three key
resources with one another. Firm-wide status as indicated by indegree centrality
scores in the co-worker's network was high for most members, especially for
Partners 29, 16, 17, 34, 4, and 15, some of whom sat on the associates' committee;
among the highest scores in the advice network were those of Partners 12, 16, 17, 2, 34,
and 15; and the niche was low in the friendship network (except for Partner 17). In
terms of performance, Partners 12, 2, 4, and 15 were also among the ®fteen highest
fee collectors for the previous year. As mentioned, they tended to have strong work
ties within the niche, and reciprocal ties with members of Positions One, Four, Six,
and Eight. They were cited as strong co-workers by members of Position Three. They
sought each other for advice, had reciprocal ties with members of Positions One,
Three, and Six (senior and lateral corporate associates), and were sought out for
advice by associates from Positions Four, Five, and Eight. They had friendship ties
with one another, reciprocal ties with members of Positions One and Three, and
they tended to cite (unreciprocated) as friends members of Position Five, and to be
cited (unreciprocated) by members of Position Six. Note that they tended to have
triplex reciprocated ties with members of Position One and that they also tended to
have duplex reciprocated (advice and friendship) ties with Of®ce II partners, which
was one of the structural features differentiating them from Position One partners.
This feature allowed them to act as intermediaries between the two competing
positions of litigators (Positions One and Three). In turn, this brokerage function
explains the strength of Position Two in spite of the lower revenues brought in by its
members (a lower economic performance characterizing SG&R corporate lawyers in
general at the time of the study).
Among senior partners, Partners 2 and 4 had a relational pro®le comparable to
that of Partner 1, although less inaccessible and more directly involved in work ties
(without a broker such as Partner 26 for Partner 1). The two contributed largely to
the exchanges with Position Three. Partner 12 had the speci®city of personalizing
work relationships so much that he maintained the densest exchanges within the
niche and with Position One partners. But the ¯ip side of this involvement was his
position as a hanger-on in the friendship network: many of the partners from whom
he sought friendship did not reciprocate. Note the presence of Partner 10, one of
the least productive partners (whose relational pro®le will be examined more closely
in the next chapter). Again, medium-seniority partners were among the most active
circulators of resources. Partner 17 was probably the dominant ®gure in this
niche. The characteristic of his pro®le was the fact that he maintained ten triplex
reciprocated ties, an absolute record in the ®rm. Others such as Partners 16, 29, and
15 were very work oriented: they mixed very little work and friendship. Partner 15
had a special pro®le and barely made it into this niche (instead of being lost to the
`residuals'Ðthat is, members who did not belong to any position). He was the only
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partner in Of®ce III, and his reliance on many partners in Of®ce I and II for strong
cooperation was not reciprocated. His efforts to keep ties with other of®ces was
more successful with younger associates who did want to work with him. He also
had distant work relationshipsÐthat is, not personalized by friendship effortsÐ
with `his' own associates in Of®ce III. Regardless of whether his efforts paid off, his
contribution to the centrality of his position as a whole is clear. Finally, another very
active ®gure was Partner 34, a junior partner who was very much sought out for
advice and friendship, and very much relied upon for strong cooperation, but which
were unreciprocated. Although a very central ®gure, she separated very clearly her
involvement in the ®rm from her personal life.
Position Three (a niche for Partners 32, 28, 30, 35, 18, 5, 7, 3, 6, 14, and 25, and
Associate 50) was made up of Of®ce II partners (plus one associate), a mix of
corporate and litigation attorneys. The niche was dense, but less centralized and
dominated by a few partners, as in the previous niches. Senior partners here
included Partners 3, 5, 6, 7, and 14. Indegree centrality scores in the co-workers'
network were low to average for most membersÐgiven the fact that there were
fewer attorneys in Of®ce IIÐbut very high for Partners 32, 28 (members of the
associate committee), and 30; they were average in the advice network, although
very high for Partners 28, 30, and 6; and very low in the friendship network, without
exceptions. In terms of performance, Partners 18, 5, and 7 were also among the
®fteen highest fee collectors for the previous year. Members relied on each other for
work, as well as on associates in Positions Six and Seven, and they tended to cite
(unreciprocated) as co-workers members of Position Two. They relied on each
other for advice, as well as on members of Positions One and Two. They were
sought out for advice (unreciprocated) by members of Positions Four, Six, and
Seven. They relied on each other for friendship, and on members of Positions Two
and Seven. This position had reciprocated advice and friendship ties with Position
Two, and only advice (reciprocated) ties with Position One. From a business
perspective, Of®ce II seems to have been less self-contained than Of®ce I. Its cor-
porate partners tended to share the senior and lateral corporate associates of
Position Six. With such exceptions as exchanges with (Of®ce I) Positions Two and
Six, the position's role in the circulation of resources within the ®rm was limited to
Of®ce II members.
Members with ®rm-wide status included partners such as Partners 5, 6, 14, 28,
and 31. Partner 5 had the same status in Of®ce II as Partner 1 in Of®ce I, although
less sought out for advice only, and more involved in many work ties with junior
partners and associates (without a second). Partner 6 was also very active in advising
junior partners and associates, and in addition had great professional status outside
the ®rm, making him a much sought-out adviser generally, which accounted for a
good proportion of the requests for advice received by his position. His relational
pro®le, though, was different from that of Partner 5: he was isolated socially and
personally. He had strong work ties, as he considered at least ®ve people as
important co-workers, but they did not reciprocate. Partner 28 was very active in
exchanges with all three resources: with a record number (six times the mean) of
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reciprocated work and advice ties to Of®ce I partners, he was an important bridge
between the two of®ces (although not very popular yet), and with ®ve triplex
reciprocated ties (twice the mean) he was a key social ®gure within Of®ce II.9
Partner 31, who was a very sociable and outgoing member (a cheerleader, as he
called himself) of the ATC, was a record breaker for unreciprocated uniplex ties: for
example, the number of persons he cited for friendship who did not reciprocate was
six times the mean, much like Partner 12. However, he also had a near record
number of triplex reciprocated ties with other partners, which accounted for a large
part of such ties with Of®ce I (especially Position Two) partners.
Note that a number of the partners in this Of®ce III niche had a less clear pro®le.
Partner 14 was a recent lateral partner, but he nevertheless had an above average
number of saturated (that is, triplex reciprocated) ties, including Position One
partners. Partner 18 was among the highest performers in the ®rm for that (and the
next) year, but also one of the most isolated persons in the ®rm, with mostly task-
oriented ties. Partner 33 was also a very productive attorney, but with few ties, many
of them unreciprocated. Conversely, Partner 25 was one of the lowest performers,
and also among the partners who had the fewest ties in the ®rm; his was a clear case
of a partner whose `insurance-policy' ties against exclusion were neatly identi®able
with two saturated (triplex reciprocated) relationships, which stood out in a pool of
many unreciprocated social ties.
As already mentioned, gravitating around the ®rst three niches in Figure 3.1, were
six positions of associates, who by de®nition were more dependent than, and on,
partners. They were less centralized than the previous three positions, which re¯ects
a lesser capacity for collective action among associates.
Position Four (in which Associates 47, 44, and 37 had approximately the same
pro®le) was made up of the three Of®ce III associates, who were quite marginal in
the ®rm; what characterized them was their absence of ties, even among each other,
except to Partner 15, their own Of®ce III partner. Indegree centrality scores were
among the lowest in all networks. In terms of associate performance, they were
among the average fee collectors for the previous year. They relied on each other for
work, as well as on Of®ce I partners of Position Two (which included Partner 15);
they tended to rely on Position One partners for work, but this was not reciprocated.
They did not rely on colleagues for friendship, not even on one another.10 They
sought advice (unreciprocated) from partners in Positions One, Two, and Three.
This position was a very weakly cohesive bloc of associates, which had no access to
production resources easily, and especially not from Of®ce II, thus remaining
extremely dependent on Partner 15.
Position Five (a niche for Associates 52, 41, 57, 43, 49, and 39) was made up of
Of®ce I litigation associates, a mix of senior associates and younger ones, mainly
de®ned in this exchange system by their strong triplex reciprocated ties with Posi-
tion One. Senior associates here included Associates 39, 41, and 43 (recall that two
other senior associates on the litigation side were members of Position One itself).
Indegree centrality scores in the co-workers' network were high for most members,
especially for Associate 52, who was also a broker, for example, for Partners 22, 23,
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and 24; they were average in the advice network, except for the very central Associate
41; and average in the friendship network (except again for the very central Associate
41). In terms of economic performance, these associates were among the average fee
collectors for the previous year, except for Associate 39, who was also a particularly
high performer. They relied on each other, and on Position Nine associates, for
work. They were also cited (unreciprocated) as strong co-workers by Position Seven
members (Of®ce II litigation associates). They relied on each other for advice,
in spite of the fact that they competed for the same partnership spots, not hesitating
to give each other signs of recognition of status, for which they also had reciprocal
ties with Position One. They tended to seek out Position Two, and to be sought out
(unreciprocated) by younger associates in Positions Seven and Nine. They did rely
on each other for friendship, but also tended to have reciprocal ties with members of
Positions One, Six, and Eight. They were cited (unreciprocated) as friends by
Positions Seven and Nine. The members of this position developed ties with each
other that helped them in managing the other associates for busy partners. Their
main role in the circulation of resources within the ®rm was obviously that of a
buffer and as intermediaries between Position One and the rest of the associates
(at least in Of®ce I). Close ties with Position II relieved any dif®culties with regard
to access to all specialities represented in the ®rm. But absence of direct multiplex
reciprocated ties to Position Three litigation partners (in Of®ce II) re¯ected an
informal `no bypass' rule (with respect to their own litigation partners in position
One). Interestingly, desolidarization attempts by partners did not have much effect
on this niche: it would have been too dif®cult for these associates to operate as
intermediaries without coordination. In some ways, this density represented a way
of keeping close to one's competitors.
Position Six (a niche for Associates 46, 60, and 45) was made up of three lateral
corporate associates (in Of®ce I and Of®ce II). In terms of their role in the circu-
lation of resources, they were often sought out by partners, but they could not be
compared in importance to Position Five associates on the litigation side: they did
not function at the same scale as intermediaries between corporate partners and
corporate associates (especially Position Eight), and they did not have the strong
friendship ties with partners (owing perhaps to their late arrival in the ®rm).
Indegree centrality scores in the co-workers' network were average except for the
very central Associate 45; they were low in the advice network; and low in the
friendship network. In terms of performance, the associates were among the average
fee collectors for the previous year. But they constituted a closely knit triad, with one
of the most complex relational pro®les: they relied on each other for work, and had
reciprocal ties with Positions Two, Three, and EightÐthat is, all the positions
including corporate attorneys. They relied on each other for advice, had reciprocal
ties with Position Two, sought out (unreciprocated) Position Three partners, and
were sought out (unreciprocated) by Position Eight associates. They relied on each
other for friendship, and had reciprocal ties with Positions Five, Eight, and Nine;
they tended to cite (unreciprocated) Position Two partners, and to be cited
(unreciprocated) as friends by Position Seven members. This created a dense niche
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for technically appreciated associates, but with a slight handicap in comparison to
Position Five colleagues, given their lack of personalized friendship ties to partners.
Position Seven (a niche for Partner 33 and Associates 51, 59, and 58) was an Of®ce II
litigation niche. Indegree centrality scores were low in all networks. In terms of
associate performance, they were among the average fee collectors for the previous
year. The niche had reciprocal work ties within itself, reciprocal ties with Position
Three (Of®ce II partners), and it cited (unreciprocated) Position Five as co-workers. It
had advice ties within itself, and sought advice (unreciprocated) from Positions One,
Three, and Five (the main other litigators in the ®rm). It had friendship ties within
itself, and reciprocal ties with partners in Position Three; it cited (unreciprocated)
Positions Five and Six, and was cited (unreciprocated) as friends by Position Eight. In
this niche, Partner 33, a typical `baby partner' operated as an intermediary between
young associates and more senior litigation partners in the same of®ce. The members
of this niche did not have ®rm-wide status, as Position Five associates did, and they
tended to be slightly marginalized (as hangers-on to Of®ce I litigation positions) by
the status competition between litigation partners in Positions One and Three.
Position Eight (in which second-year Associates 62, 61, 64, 42, and 70 had
approximately the same relational pro®le) was an Of®ce I corporate position built in
reference to Associate 42, a senior associate who was not clustered to Position Six.
These associates were survivors from the lay-offs of junior associates that had taken
place six months before the ®eldwork. Indegree centrality scores were low in all
networks, except for Associate 64 in the friendship network (she was older than most
young associates and played a role of con®dante for many of them). In terms of
associate performance, they were among the lowest fee collectors for the previous
year. The position had no work ties within itself, but had close reciprocal work ties
with Positions Two and Six. Members did not seek each other for advice, but sought
advice (unreciprocated) from Positions One, Two, Three, and Six. It had friendship
ties within itself, reciprocal ties with Positions Five, Six, and Nine; it cited (unre-
ciprocated) Position Seven. Members were heavily dependent on position Two, and
had no access to corporate partners in Of®ce II (again, the `no-bypass' rule).
Position Nine (a niche for junior Associates 68, 66, 71, 65, 67, 69, 55, 56, and 54)
included the young associates (®rst and second years) in Of®ce I, most likely to
become litigators under market pressures at the time of the ®eldwork. Indegree
centrality scores were low in all networks. In terms of associate performance, they
were among the lowest fee collectors for the previous year. The position had recip-
rocal work ties within itself, and reciprocal ties with Positions One and Five (their
brokers to partners). It had advice ties within itself, and sought advice (unrecip-
rocated) from Positions One and Five. It had friendship ties within itself, and recip-
rocal ties with Positions Six and Eight; it also cited (unreciprocated) Positions Five.
This niche of junior associates was heavily dependent on Positions Five and One for
most of its resources.
Examples of partners who were either nicheless or very marginal in their nicheÐ
that is, with a unique relational pro®leÐinclude Partner 19 (who was quite central
in the co-workers' network and one of the ®fteen highest fee collectors for the
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previous year), who was lost to the `residuals'11 by Position Two. His speci®city as a
partner was that his relational pro®le had a much more than average proportion of
unreciprocated ties (in an unusual direction, especially because he sought advice
from associates who did not seek advice from him). He had almost no friendship
ties, except two reciprocated triplex ties (his `insurance policy'). Partner 31 (who was
quite central in the friendship network, and an average fee collector) was lost by
Position Three; Associate 48 (who was a recent lateral recruit) by Position Six;
Associate 53 (who was an average performing `permanent associate' specializing in
tax law) by Position Four; and Associate 63 (who was a relatively high performing
junior associate in Of®ce II) by Position Three.
When staying at this structural level, it is easier to get a sense of how exchanges use
different resources at the same time, and of the overall pattern of exchanges of the
three resources in the ®rm. However, this representation is inductive. Statistical
analysis is needed to con®rm the existence of such niches, using at least indications
from the dyadic level. The next section summarizes the logic of identi®cation
underlying the formation of niches and provides such tests.12
C ON FI R M IN G TH E E XI ST EN C E OF N I CH ES:
A VI EW A T TH E D YA D I C L EV EL
Informed by this understanding of the reasons for choosing some colleagues as
opposed to others as sources of resources, it is also reasonable to expect that
dimensions of ®rm structure (indicated by formal and informal attributes of
members) had a signi®cant effect on the choices of exchange partners observed in
this ®rm. Here, to con®rm the existence of niches, I look at these respective effects of
attributes on interactions or access to resources. Speci®cally, I show how choices of
sources of resources were in¯uenced by formal dimensions of ®rm structure, such as
hierarchical status (partner/associate), of®ce membership, and speciality. I assume
that members perceived these categories as similarities and used these similarities to
guide their choices. I look at these effects for each resource separately. As already
seen, exchanges of different resources were not independent of each other, but they
did each have a life of their own because they solved different problems.
The effects of formal dimensions of structure (that partly de®ne niches) on
choices of co-workers were likely to be signi®cant for several reasons. Building such
strong work ties could depend on many factors such as availability of work, rules of
intake and assignment (since a committee tried to distribute work to associates so as
to prevent possible con¯icts and to expose associates to different partners), access to
partners with appropriate clients, and unchallenged power to choose co-workers.
Strong work ties were sometimes built on a common experience of previously
working together. Such experiences clearly depended on an opportunity structure
(members had different specialities, worked in different of®ces) and individual
preferences for potential co-workers' reputations or other characteristics. In this
context, partners had obviously more opportunities to choose associates based on
their preferences than the other way around, although the latter situation arose
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when an associate was much in demand. Thus, in their efforts to access cooperation
(work opportunities or colleagues), it was easier for members to obtain it on a
day-to-day basis in the same of®ce, and it was more likely that members of the same
of®ce would expect long-term solidarity from one another (as opposed to expecting
strong cooperative goodwill from members of other of®ces). Given that they often
worked together on the same ®les, it was more likely that members of the same
speciality would expect long-term solidarity from one another (as opposed to
members from other specialities). Given the big divide between partners and
associates, it was more likely that members of the same hierarchical status would rely
on each other for strong cooperation (as opposed to expecting strong cooperative
goodwill from members of a different status): in effect, partners knew that associates
might not be there for long. For associates, the picture was different, but with the
same effect: they might have expected strong cooperation (got suf®cient quantities
of interesting work, for example) from partners, but they knew that partners called
the shots, and that all partners' interests were not the same (for example, that the
schedulers tried not to let clientelistic ties get in the way of `fairness' in access to such
cooperation). Therefore, they were likely to fall back on other associates, in spite of
efforts by partners to scatter and desolidarize associates. Finally, it would make sense
to hypothesize that among business heads gender was not likely to have an effect on
the extent to which members relied on each other for strong cooperationÐalthough
there could be reasons to hypothesize the opposite. For the same (fragile) reasons, it
makes sense to hypothesize that solidarity based on having been to the same law
school (that is, having the same level of prestige) was also unlikely to have an effect
on the choices of strong co-workers, the latter being too closely associated with
actual work and business decisions.13
Given the importance of advice as a vital resource in this type of knowledge-
intensive ®rm, one could easily believe that ¯ows of advice were `free' or at least
that they did not encounter structural obstacles that would systematically prevent
exchanges of intelligence between any two members. However, even in a context that
was saturated with advice, several factors created obstacles for exchanges of ideas. In
several ways, the same type of reasoning applies to the two other resources. The
effects of formal dimensions of structure on choices of advisers were also likely to be
signi®cant, because it was easier for members to obtain advice on a day-to-day basis
in the same of®ce and in the same specialityÐthat is, in their own niche. However,
advice could be expected to come from more senior, experienced, and authoritative
members. Seniority should, therefore, come in as a more discriminant characteristic
in describing the ¯ows of this resource. In addition, the importance of status may be
connected with the nature of advice as a resource. Advice can include content that is
not always predictable in advance. It often happens that advisers reformulate the
question asked by advice-seekers, who thus may ®nd themselves in a situation of
`meta-ignorance' (Smithson 1985). In such conditions of uncertainty about the
question itself, the latter may include a quest for approval and legitimacy. Given
this dimension of advice-seeking behaviour, it made sense for some actors to let
face-saving status games or considerations of accountability (that is, covering
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themselves) frame their advice-seeking behaviour. In addition, advisers too were
aware of the fact that questions submitted to them were sometimes controversial
and could raise tricky issues of con®dentiality. Finally, for the same reasons as for
co-workers' goodwill, it makes (fragile) sense not to expect gender and law school
attended to have a signi®cant effect on advice seeking.
Finally, constraints of speci®c dimensions of formal structures on selection of
friends in a professional ®rm were likely to be signi®cant for several reasons. As seen
above, partners were often friends with other partners from the days of their
common associateship. Their selective socializing went well beyond the require-
ments of task-related cooperation, although many felt that socializing was hampered
by the fact that they did not see each other on a day-to-day basis.14 However,
compared to ties with other members of the ®rm (associates or partners from other
of®ces), ties with a friendship component were very distinctive. In this case, many
reasons could have explained these asymmetries in the selection of friends, especially
high sensitivity of members to formal dimensions of the structure. In a situation of
status competition where members exposed themselves, they could also want to
protect themselves from lack of control by choosing people who were familiar to
them with respect to various common characteristics. This is consistent with pre-
vious work on the determinants of the formation of friendship: members want
people similar to them (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987); they choose friends
among people with whom long-term exchanges are likely to be easy. Partners knew
that it could be painful to be entangled in friendships with associates about whom
they would make career decisions. Thus similarity in status was likely to count,
although such friendships could also mitigate con¯icts arising from exploitation. In
addition, it is easier to work when people who think alike, and friends, relative to
non-friends, often make similar attributions (Feld 1981; Krackhardt 1992; Krac-
khardt and Kilduff 1990; Lincoln and Miller 1979). Friendship induces agreement
on important things.15 Therefore, the effects of formal dimensions of structure on
personalization of workplace relationships were likely to be signi®cant for several
reasons. It was easier for members to maintain friendship ties with contemporaries
whom they met on a day-to-day basis in the same of®ce and with the same status.
Since members usually became friends when they entered the ®rm as junior
associates, and since they had not yet specialized then, having the same speciality
should have less effect here than for the two previous resources. Here, we would
expect characteristics such as gender and law school to have a signi®cant effect on
choices of friends, because these were components of members' exogenous iden-
tities, which preceded their membership in the ®rm. Therefore, such identities
created precisely the viewpoints needed to produce some role distance from what
was being experienced within the ®rm.
Thus niches are identi®ed by patterns that are predictable by interests analysis if
interests are de®ned as `long-term' interestsÐthat is, in a way that includes repeated
exchanges of various types of resources. Identities are not opposed to interests. They
simplify the perception of these interests and make dense and multiplex exchanges
easier. Access to resources depends on identities, because members compare
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themselves to members similar to themselves and use boundary management
to create solidarity in barter and multifunctional exchanges characterizing their
multiplex ties. Niche building or joining becomes an identity issue, because mutual
identi®cations partly de®ne long-term interests and solidarities. Niches thus allow
members to combine short- and long-term interests. In turn, in later chapters,
processes such as mitigation of status competition will be expected to depend on
the existence of these niches.
Endogenous and exogenous determinants of the
distribution of resources
To check and disentangle these effects of identity criteria on the choices of
co-workers, advisers, and friends, and therefore on the (re)creation of niches, I use
another speci®c methodology, p2 models.
16 These models estimate the effects of
various covariates on the presence of a tie, controlling for reciprocity and differences
between the individual actors in the number of ties in which they are involved. The
covariates can be related to the `sender' or to the `receiver' of the tie separately, and
also be used to express their similarity. These effects control for one another.17
Covariates used here are the three dimensions of formal structure of this ®rm that
were expected to be the most important for access to sources of resources, and thus
for the process of resource distribution: hierarchical status, speciality, and of®ce
membership. The ®rst covariate is hierarchical status, a variable with two levels,
partners and associates. This variable is elaborated upon in the second covariate,
seniority. This second covariate is a variable with ®ve levels, three of which are
possible for a partner, and ®ve for associates. Seniority is de®ned by the rank of
partners in the letterhead, which was mainly based on age and years with the ®rm
(with the exception of four partners who were hired from other ®rms). Coding of
seniority for partners in senior, medium-seniority, and junior levels is based on cut-
offs between Partners 14 and 15 (a difference of eight years in age) and between
Partners 27 and 28 (a difference of nine years in age). These categories were explicitly
used by the partners themselves. For associates, seniority had the meaning of being a
member of a cohort recruited the same year. We can thus look at gradual effects of
numerical rank on shaping ¯ows of resources. Of®ce membership and practice are
the third and fourth covariates. Of®ce is a variable with three levels, Of®ces I, II, and
III; practice with two levels, litigation and corporate. The next covariates are the
other, more exogenous, attributes, of the actors: gender and law school attended.
These attributes are included as control variables representing two characteristics of
the outside world that could have an in¯uence on shaping ¯ows of resources. Law
school attended is a variable with three levels, indicating whether a lawyer went to an
Ivy League law school, to a regional non-Ivy League law school, or to another law
school. Table 3.2 presents the distribution of lawyers in this ®rm per variable.
Using these characteristics, several p2 models were estimated to establish the
in¯uence of such dimensions of structure on members' choices of co-workers,
advisers, and friends. Analysis of the determinants of sociometric choices are carried
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out at the dyadic level.18 Table 3.3 presents the three best models provided by
this analysis, one for each type of resource. The exact de®nition of each variable
in Table 3.3 is provided by Table 3.2 and by Appendix C for derived similarity
variables. This chapter focuses on the choices made by both partners and associates19
at the ®rm-wide level. The parameter estimates of , , etc., are given together
with their standard errors. Including other effects did not improve the model. Overall,
effects predicted in the previous section are con®rmed by the statistical analyses.
In¯uences on the selection of co-workers
For the co-workers' network, the underlying story behind Table 3.3's ®gures can
be summarized as follows. First, in this ®rm, overall, differences in status, of®ce,
speciality, gender, and law school did not have a signi®cant effect on the propensity
to choose strong co-workers. Members of one of®ce did not cite more or less strong
co-workers than members of another of®ce did, members of one speciality more or
less than members of another, women more or less than men. In general, partners
did not choose more or less co-workers than associatesÐbut note the only one
signi®cant sender effect, that is, that senior partners tended to cite less strong co-
workers than other lawyers did.
Secondly, of®ce, speciality, or gender did not have a signi®cant effect on the fact of
being sought out as a strong co-worker. Members of one of®ce were not signi®cantly
sought out more or less than members of another of®ce, members of one speciality
Table 3.2. Distribution of members per variable
Variable Hierarchical status Total
Partners Associates
Seniority Level 1 14 7
Seniority Level 2 13 10
Seniority Level 3 9 5
Seniority Level 4 7
Seniority Level 5 6
Of®ce I 22 26 48
Of®ce II 13 6 19
Of®ce III 1 3 4
Speciality litigation 20 21 41
Speciality corporate 16 14 30
Men 33 20 53
Women 3 15 18
Law school Ivy League 12 3 15
Law school regional
non-Ivy League
11 17 28
Law school other 13 15 28
Total 36 35 71
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Table 3.3. p2 estimates of the effect of various characteristics of partners and associates on their selections of co-workers, advisers, and friends
Dependent variables Independent variables Empty model (W) Final model (W) Empty model (A) Final model (A) Empty model (F) Final model (F)
Sender Variance 2A 0.89 (0.12) 0.87 (0.12) 0.58 (0.08) 0.75 (0.11) 0.95 (0.13) 1.14 (0.16)
Status 0.41 (0.34)
Partner seniority level 1 ÿ0.80 (0.38) ÿ0.92 (0.30)
Partner seniority level 2 0.34 (0.38)
Receiver Variance 2B 0.48 (0.07) 0.41 (0.06) 0.76 (0.10) 0.49 (0.08) 0.67 (0.10) 0.61 (0.10)
Status 1.85 (0.64)
Associate seniority level ÿ0.19 (0.05) ÿ0.50 (0.06)
Sender±receiver
Density
Covariance AB ÿ0.44 (0.08) ÿ0.31 (0.07) ÿ0.25 (0.07) ÿ0.05 (0.06) ÿ0.38 (0.09) ÿ0.28 (0.09)
 ÿ2.34 (0.10) ÿ3.81 (0.22) ÿ1.87 (0.12) ÿ3.98 (0.22) ÿ2.89 (0.13) ÿ6.85 (0.51)
Similarity status 0.65 (0.15) 0.89 (0.22) 2.41 (0.51)
Similarity status 1 0.47 (0.20)
Similarity status 2 0.21 (0.21)
Similarity partner seniority ÿ1.30 (0.75)
Similarity associate seniority 0.98 (0.19) 0.98 (0.16)
Superiority seniority ÿ0.29 (0.11)
Superiority partner±associate 0.77 (0.19)
Similarity of®ce 1.03 (0.13) 1.79 (0.11) 1.82 (0.20)
Similarity of®ce II 0.85 (0.23)
Similarity of®ce III 0.35 (0.61)
Similarity speciality 1.41 (0.10) 1.60 (0.12) 0.38 (0.08)
Similarity status* speciality ÿ0.55 (0.14)
Similarity gender 0.29 (0.11) 0.29 (0.10)
Similarity law school 0.20 (0.09) 0.17 (0.08)
Reciprocity  3.16 (0.12) 3.16 (0.20) 1.42 (0.13) 1.46 (0.25) 3.28 (0.16) 4.92 (0.52)
Similarity status ÿ1.03 (0.26) ÿ1.41 (0.39)
Similarity speciality ÿ0.81 (0.28)
Similarity of®ce ÿ1.32 (0.45)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The de®nitions of the independent variables are provided in the text and in Appendix C.
Sources: Reprinted from Social Networks, E. Lazega and M. Van Duijn, `Position in Formal Structure, Personal Characteristics and Choices of Advisors in a Law Firm:
A Logistic Regression Model for Dyadic Network Data', 19: 390. Copyright 1997 with permission from Elsevier Science. Reprinted from European Sociological Review,
E. Lazega, `Teaming Up and Out? Cooperation and Solidarity in a Collegial Organization', 16: 253. Copyright 2000 with permission from Oxford University Press.
than members of another, women than men. There is one signi®cant receiver effect,
however: it shows that, the more junior the associates, the less they were cited as
strong co-workers. The choice of co-workers was, therefore, slightly asymmetric,
because it was sensitive to status, as represented by seniority levels: senior partners
and junior associatesÐthat is, at both endsÐbehaved differently from the rest of the
members.
Thirdly, various similarities account for many of the differences observed in the
choices of strong co-workers. Density effects show that the general activity in this
network tended to be signi®cantly higher among attorneys similar in terms of
various characteristics. Members tended to choose as strong co-workers lawyers of
the same speciality more than those in different specialities (strongest effect), law-
yers in the same of®ce (especially in Of®ce II), and lawyers of the same status.20
Mobilizing similarities in terms of several attributes was perceived by members to be
a useful device for creating strong work ties. When controlling for such effects, more
personal characteristics of members, such as gender or law school attended, become
insigni®cant. Other effects not quanti®ed here (and which are therefore included in
the `random' part of the model) operated as well.
Finally, these similarities did not account much for direct reciprocity among
members. A single extra direct reciprocity effect is signi®cant: it is an effect that
quali®es, or `moderates',21 the above-mentioned density effect: attorneys similar in
status reciprocated their choices of strong co-workers more to each other than to
attorneys different in status. The extra reciprocity between lawyers with the same
status (which is left `unexplained' by the corresponding density effect) was larger
than between lawyers differing in status. In other words, partners still directly
reciprocated more to other partners than to associates, and associates more to
associates than to other partners. This means that the probability of having a directly
reciprocal strong work relationship among people similar in terms of status was
stronger (than between people different in status). With the prudence imposed by
the negative reciprocity effect, it is possible to interpret the fact that partners directly
reciprocated more to partners than to associates, and associates more to associates
than to partners, as meaning that members of the same status considered each other
as direct providers of the kind of security represented by strong work ties. Associates
relied on each other for a certain kind of security beyond the immediate short term,
such as help in carrying out an assignment, in getting access to speci®c cases;
partners counted on other partners for the same purpose (getting access to other
clients, mainly, and cooperating in managing and selecting skilled associates)22 more
than they counted on associates. These effects suggest the existence of a complex,
two-tiered, and politicized indirect exchange system. The importance of status
underlies the differences in resources exchanged for security: help in work among
associates, clients and cases among partners.
To summarize, access to strong work relationships thus depended mostly on
determinants such as formal characteristics of members. Among these similarity
effects, the strongest were speciality, of®ce, and status in decreasing order. Building
strong work ties thus happened with colleagues in niches de®ned by the same
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speciality, the same of®ce, and the same status. In their exchanges of cooperation,
members tended to rely ®rst on homophily based on characteristics de®ned from
within the ®rm. Members sought similarity of attributes with signi®cant co-workers
across a limited number of dimensions. Notice that more personal characteristics
such as gender and law school did not have a signi®cant in¯uence on members'
citations; they did not contribute signi®cantly in shaping strong work ties when
controlling for more work-related attributes. Thus exogenous identities did not have
a clear effect on members' access to strong cooperation and building of strong work
ties. Overall, members tended to count on colleagues of the same of®ce and the same
speciality for strong cooperation. Thus they did tend to create specialized niches in
their local of®ce, niches that were nested within their general practice ®rm. On the
one hand, the distribution of resources was thus very functional. But, on the other
hand, this suggests a pattern of solidarity in which members exchanged this security
vertically as much as horizontally because partners usually worked with and tended
to prefer associates, not other partners (relatively weaker status effect). Such a
vertical solidarity is precisely an indication of the existence of patronage or client-
elism. Choices creating strongly knitted clientelistic niches also created the possi-
bility of ®rm disintegration. This dilemma will be dealt with in Chapter 6.
In¯uences on the selection of advisers
The ®rm's formal structure had to channel knowledge and expertise. Overall, of®ce,
speciality, gender, and law school did not have a signi®cant effect on the propensity
to seek advice. Members of one of®ce did not seek advice more than members of
another of®ce, members of one speciality more than members of another, women
more than men. The only strong and signi®cant effect was the status of top partners,
who sought advice less than attorneys below them (in terms of seniority). This
indicates that there was, in this ®rm, a Blau-type iron law of status: one does not seek
advice from people `below' (Lazega and Van Duijn 1997). Hence the only signi®cant
receiver effect, which shows that associates were sought out for advice much less
than partners. Again, the extent to which one was sought out for advice did not
depend on one's of®ce, speciality, gender, or law school.
Within this constraint of status, the overall density effects show that general
activity in the advice network tended to be signi®cantly higher among people similar
in terms of differing characteristics than among people different in terms of those
characteristics. Thus, advice relationships existed more between people in the same
of®ce than between people in different of®ces, between people in the same speciality,
and also between people similar in status. Among these similarity effects, the
strongest are of®ce, speciality, and status in decreasing order. Weaker but signi®cant
density effects are also of interest. Lawyers of same gender and same law school did
exchange more advice with one another than lawyers differing with regard to these
characteristics. As mentioned before, one can hypothesize that these dimensions
helped members in mitigating the severity of this iron law of status and seniority.
Members could still play on similarities in terms of of®ce, speciality, gender, and law
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school in order to bypass the seniority rule. For instance, in this ®rm, litigators had a
signi®cantly higher probability of choosing advisers among other litigators rather
than among corporate lawyers; a similar trend was observed among the latter. With
speciality, members could play on the content of the advice being sought. By playing
on similarity in of®ce membership, they could claim that seeking advice from more
junior persons in one's own of®ce was better than bypassing one's own local col-
leagues. Such choices thus did mitigate the severity of status games. Exchanges of
advice could become more personalized than exchanges of other, more directly task-
related, resources.23 A single signi®cant reciprocity effect shows that corporate
lawyers had a stronger probability of reciprocating to each other than litigators.
Absence of reciprocation as an extra effect tended to offset part of the positive effect
of speciality similarity as a density effectÐthat is, the effect of speciality as an
identity criterion chosen by members to secure legitimate access to advice.
To summarize, the p2 model shows how selected dimensions of formal structure
of the ®rm weighed heavily on interactions related to advice. Flows of ideas and
intelligence in this collegial ®rm were indeed affected by status games among
members. Advice seeking tends to go upward. As a possible way to mitigate or
neutralize such status games, reciprocal exchanges tended to happen much more
within niches de®ned by formal boundaries such as of®ce and speciality areas, or to
rely (to a lesser extent) on homogeneity based on characteristics de®ned from
outside the ®rm, such as gender or law school attended. In turn, such constraints
on exchanges of ideas among members were managed in different ways by the
members of the ®rm, which created disadvantages and inequalities among them (see
Chapter 4).
In¯uences on the selection of friends
Even on this more `intimate' aspect of members' lives, formal structure did have a
constraining in¯uence. Access to this type of resource, the way friendships were
created, was prearranged by an opportunity structure. Within these constraints,
friendship choices aggregated into an informal structure too. What does this structure
tell us about the way members helped each other `be somebody', assert their identity,
take some distance by de®ning their relationship vis-aÁ-vis the group, and ultimately
reach a position from where they claimed credit and recognition in the ®rm?
In this ®rm, differences among attorneys did not have an effect on their pro-
pensity to cite friends. For instance, senior partners did not cite fewer friends than
junior ones. If it was lonely at the top, it was no less so at the bottom. But partners
did tend to be cited as friends more than associates, the latter expecting more
support from the former than the other way around.24 It is interesting to note, again,
the massive effect of homophily and similarities in terms of formal attributes, but
this time also in terms of personal attributes, on general activity in the friendship
network. All the dimensions retained count here, which is unique for the three
networks. General activity in the friendship network tended to be signi®cantly
higher among people similar in terms of the characteristics retained than among
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people different in terms of those characteristics. Status differences between partners
and associates came ®rst. Among partners, this was more true for senior ones than
for more junior ones. Being in the same of®ce was the next strongest determinant of
the choice of friends. Two signi®cant reciprocity effects added an extra weight to
status and of®ce, whose members cited each other symmetrically more than they
cited members of different status and of®ce. Thus in this ®rm friendship ties were
particularly sensitive to similarities.
Being on the same level of seniority, for partners and for associates, was the next
most important determinant. But note that, consistent with the status receiver effect
mentioned above, this was `countered' by the fact that members lower in seniority
tended to consider members higher in seniority as friends. Friendship citations also
tended to go up, although less so than advice citations. Finally, the weaker but
signi®cant density effects already noticed above for other resources emerge here
again on the ®rm-wide level. Similarity with respect to speciality, gender, and law
school did have a signi®cant effect too, although weaker, on the existence of
friendship ties among members. Thus members could play on more attributes (than
for other resources) to engage in exchanges of resources attached to friendship
(de®nition of the situation, emotional support, etc.).
In short, these analyses show how all dimensions of the formal structure of the
®rm, as well as more exogenous attributes, weighed on interactions related to
common socializing outside the ®rm and helped members secure legitimate access
to resources offered by this form of socializing outside work.25 Formal structure and
role distance combined in niches. Whereas advice seeking tended to go upward,
friendship ties tended to follow members' similarities and to be more horizontal.
To summarize, when taking into account exchanges among all attorneys, char-
acteristics based on formal dimensions of ®rm structureÐsimilarities in terms of
of®ce, speciality, and status respectively and across the three networksÐconsistently
affected exchange interactions and informal allocations of resources needed to
produce and survive in this context. In addition to such consistent and strong
determinants, some variations also emerge: for example, members also sought
advice from more senior colleagues, while selecting friends among colleagues of
roughly the same seniority. More personal attributes, such as gender and law school
attended prior to joining the ®rm, had a comparatively weak, but nevertheless
signi®cant effect on the circulation of less directly task-oriented resources (advice
and friendship-related resources). Reciprocity effects were more consistently
dependent on status.
The two attributes that members most consistently and discriminantly activated
in their appropriateness judgements were of®ce and speciality. In other words,
controlling in each network for the effects of the other dimensions, similarity in
terms of of®ce counted most for access to all three resources and for the de®nition of
niches. Each of®ce operated as its own exchange subsystem. In particular, the of®ce
organized complex horizontal cooperation ties and interdependencies. For example,
this driving factor in the choice of co-workers could represent market forcesÐthat
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is, clients drawing partners together (and perhaps an element of geographical
inertia).
The same was true for similarity in terms of speciality, which counted for access to
all resources among all attorneys, although less strongly than of®ce membership.
Within each of®ce, members with the same speciality tended to exchange with one
another more than with others. Other discriminant effects, although less con-
sistently so, included similarities in terms of status, gender, and law school attended.
Similarity in terms of status counted for access to advice and friendship, not to get
cooperation in work. In other words, attorneys seemed to play status games more
when advice and friendship were involved than when they were concerned with
performing actual work. Attorneys similar in ascribed characteristics such as gender
and law school attended tended to be friends and to rely on each other for advice
more than on attorneys of the other gender or from a different type of law school.
These latest effects were not signi®cant in work relationships, and were the weakest
of all effects; they are nevertheless signi®cant in the other networks.26
In conclusion, transfers and exchanges of resources at the dyadic level were
institutionally driven, based on formal identities, but also personalized ones. In this
collegial organization, the relational structure in each network (especially co-
workers) resulted both from formal rules taking into account members' interests,
and from informal and mutual adjustments made by people.27 The analysis shows a
polarized, specialized, and strati®ed system, thus statistically con®rming the exis-
tence of social niches at SG&R. Finally, it is important to show that this exchange
system carried with it the social mechanism (that of generalized exchange) that is key
to understanding bounded solidarity among rival partners or interdependent entre-
preneurs. For that purpose, it is indispensable to reach beyond the dyadic level, at
least the triadic one. In the next section, I present an analysis of the co-workers,
network that con®rms the existence of this mechanism. This analysis uses a model
called p* (Pattison and Wasserman 1999), presented in Appendix E.
T H E FI R M A S A W OR K - R E LA T ED G E NE R A LI Z ED
E XC H A N G E SY ST EM
Using this p* model,28 speci®c local substructures are identi®ed that illustrate var-
ious ways in which members cooperated. These dyadic and triadic substructures and
their parameter labelling are presented in Figure 3.2. In this section, I focus only on
the local distribution of co-workers' commitment in such substructures. This dis-
tribution is represented in the resulting model presented in Table 3.4.
The co-work relation appears to have had a local structure that is strongly sug-
gestive of both restricted and generalized exchange (e.g. Bearman 1997; Breiger and
Ennis 1997). Two of the parameters that are large and positive correspond to
con®gurations in which co-work was exchanged directly among pairs of lawyersÐ
namely, 11_W,W (direct exchange for two individuals) and 6_W,W,W,W (direct
exchange of co-work by one lawyer with each of two others). In addition, the
parameter for cyclic exchange among a group of three lawyers (10_W,W,W) is also
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large and positive.29 The other positive parameters are 12_W,W, 14_W,W and
9_W,W,W and indicate several ways in which co-work ties could occur less sym-
metrically. In the case of 12_W,W and 14_W,W, it appears that some individuals
expressed or were nominees for unreciprocated co-work ties with several (uncon-
nected) others. In the case of 9_W,W,W, some transitivity in the arrangement
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Figure 3.2. Con®gurations corresponding to p* model parameters
Note: The symbols a, b, c, d, e, and f may refer to any of the uniplex or multiplex
relationsÐnamely, W (co-work), A (advice), F (friendship), WA (co-work and advice),
WF (co-work and friendship), AF (advice and friendship), WAF (co-work, advice, and
friendship).
Source: Reprinted from Social Networks, E. Lazega and P. Pattison, `Multiplexity,
Generalized Exchange and Cooperation in Organizations', 21: 81. Copyright 1999 with
permission from Elsevier Science.
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Table 3.4. Relational substructures in the ®rm: Pseudolikelihood estimates
for three univariate p*models
Term PLE
Co-work relationa
15_W ÿ3.32 (0.28)
14_W,W 0.09 (0.01)
13_W,W ÿ0.08 (0.01)
12_W,W 0.07 (0.01)
11_W,W 4.18 (0.41)
10_W,W,W 0.28 (0.04)
9_W,W,W 0.13 (0.01)
8_W,W,W ÿ0.04 (0.01)
7_W,W,W ÿ0.08 (0.01)
6_W,W,W,W 0.20 (0.03)
3_W,W,W,W ÿ0.13 (0.02)
Advice relationb
15_A ÿ2.09 (0.18)
14_A,A ÿ0.01 (0.00)
13_A,A ÿ0.07 (0.00)
12_A,A ÿ0.01 (0.00)
11_A,A 1.45 (0.13)
10_A,A,A ÿ0.20 (0.02)
9_A,A,A 0.28 (0.01)
Friendship relationc
15_F ÿ3.25 (0.18)
14_F,F 0.02 (0.01)
13_F,F ÿ0.12 (0.01)
12_F,F 0.05 (0.01)
11_F,F 3.08 (0.16)
10_F,F,F ÿ0.18 (0.05)
9_F,F,F 0.32 (0.02)
aÿ2LPL 2,913.7; MAR 0.177.
bÿ2LPL 2,855.6; MAR 0.17.
cÿ2LPL 1,795.9; MAR 0.102.
Notes for the three models: PLE: Pseudolikelihood estimates (approximative
standard errors in parentheses).ÿ2LPL:ÿ2 times the log of the maximum pseudo-
likelihood. MAR: mean absolute residual. See Figure 3.2 for visual representation of
 terms.
Source: Reprinted from Social Networks, `Multiplexity, Generalized Exchange and
Cooperation in Organizations', E. Lazega and P. Pattison, 21: 79±80. Copyright
1999 with permission from Elsevier Science.
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of co-work ties is evident. The negative estimate for 3_W,W,W,W suggests that
con®gurations that `break' the exchange balance inherent in the 3-cycle were un-
likely. Taken together, these parameters suggest a structure of co-work ties that was
consistent, at least in part, with both direct and generalized exchange of co-work.30
Further, it is clear from con®gurations such as 6_W,W,W,W that these exchange
structures could overlap, and this leads one to view the overall co-work structure as a
collection of overlaid smaller exchange substructures. In addition to these structural
tendencies, though, it is clear that co-work ties had some properties that would not
be expected in a structure whose only `logic' was that of exchange. These latter
properties include a propensity for differentiation among lawyers in the expression
and receiving of co-work ties, as well as a weak tendency towards transitivity. These
characteristics are further discussed in the context of the multivariate p* model in
Chapter 5.
The existence of this generalized exchange system is consistent with the basic
behavioural assumption that members of collegial organizations seek niches where
they can rely on various forms of bounded solidarity with otherwise potential
competitors (rival partners or associates). The presence of this social mechanism is a
®rst contribution of the structural study of this collegial organization. In the next
section, I stress the fact that, although it was useful to the ®rm as a whole, this
mechanism also relied on desolidarization, if not exploitation, of associates.
D ES OL ID A R I Z AT I ON O F A SS OC I A TE S
In the pattern presented by Figure 3.1, some positions, mainly partners', could use
their centrality and the opportunities offered by its derived `structural holes' (Burt
1992). For example, they could more easily force unconnected associates from
different positions to compete for interesting cases, advice, and moral support.
Opportunistic behaviour was less accepted within niches where partial suspension
of strategic behaviour was required. But in this structure, members of the ®rm who
were not part of one's niche were potentially members that could be more easily
played off against each other and exploited. Especially in the crucial advice net-
work, partners in Position One could play that game systematically with associates
of Positions Five against Nine; partners of Position Two with associates of Posi-
tions Six against Eight; and partners of Position Three with associates of Positions
Six against Seven. This list of opportunities to desolidarize and exploit associates
does not even take into account the structural holes between them in different
of®ces.
In effect, in spite of being vital for the economic success of the ®rm, associates
were much less autonomous in their practice and not formally involved in regu-
latory deliberations or in control processes (except perhaps in the monitoring of one
another). Many did not get to trial and their practice could easily become tedious
and burdened by documents and discovery. For them, the ®rm was ®rst and fore-
most a job machine. Recall that the up-or-out `survival of the ®ttest' rule was still a
central mechanism by which the organization tried to protect its various forms of
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capital. Partners did not worry much about systematic coaching and training.
Associates thus tried to manage their career from a position of weakness. What
usually kept them going was high salary and the dream of becoming partners.31
Valued associates had to perceive a reasonable chance for advancement. They did
not want to be blocked by a small but dedicated group of naysayers (Eickemeyer
1988). Any hint that loyal service was becoming a less reliable path to partnership
was therefore profoundly demoralizing (for example, when lateral associates were
brought into the ®rm precisely because they had accumulated special expertise
somewhere else). During the year of ®eldwork for this study, the ®rm decided to
postpone all decisions about new partners, a change that unnerved associates,
bringing out explicitly issues of competition between them.
Associates could feel that the generalized and multiplex exchange system
described above was forced upon them because they could be dropped out before
their returns on investments (in relationships with partners) materialized. In this
situation, the source of their exploitation was also less easily detectable than in a
dyadic situation (Ekeh 1976: 213). In a way, dealing with this risk was part of their
socialization into the dif®culties of permanently personalizing and depersonalizing
(`embedding' and `disembedding') business transactions in the company of nominal
equals. But the implications of the existence of this multiplex exchange mechanism
for associates can be summarized in one word: desolidarization. Two facts provide
support for this observation. The ®rst is the nature of patronage. The second is a
closer look at associates' niches.
Partners put much pressure on associates to work hard, closely monitored their
work, observed their cooperative attitude, socialized them, evaluated their behav-
iour with clients, and eventually selected a few to become their partners. Rela-
tionships between partners and their subordinates were extremely asymmetrical; but
they could nevertheless be both very hierarchical and, temporarily, very collegial. As
will be closely examined in Chapter 5, whether defending or bringing suit, the
client's ®le needed to be intellectually `digested' by the task force assigned to the case,
explored without too many preconceptions, especially when there was a lot of law on
the subject. Attorneys dealing with it needed to probe the issue from scratch. Col-
legial brainstorming was the key in cases that did not ®t regular patterns. Then,
much of what survived from this collegial brainstorming as case strategy depended
upon the ways in which the partners in charge of that client switched back from
collegial, knowledge-intensive work to the hierarchical power allowing them to
handle the distribution of tasks (Hazard 1989). Some partners assigned only discrete
segments to various members of a team without sharing the whole picture and the
overall game plan of the case. As a result, associates often felt frustrated or that they
did not know what they were doing.
Thus, they had to try to carve out a place for themselves in this speci®c social
environment, with its strong emphasis on achievement and subsequent expectations
and impending frustrations (Blau 1964). They had to learn to recognize, and adjust
to, partners' status games and social niche seeking. They had to learn to be careful in
their own status games. For example, in their further analyses of this data-set, Robins
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et al. (2000)32 show a `ceiling effect' on the number of advice ties that an associate
could have towards partners. This con®rms the ambiguity of advice seeking for
associates: they did not want to seek advice from too many partners because they
thought that it might, at some point, suggest to these partners that they (advice-
seeking associates) were incompetent. In effect, they sought strong sponsors among
these partners, and the latter valued their relationship with other partners more than
with associates. Another example: when an associate named a partner a friend, he or
she was inevitably considering that partner as a potential help for promotion. To
partners, friendship to associates'Ðif anyÐwas more relative; in the best of cases,
they sometimes voted for an associate hoping that the personal relationship with
another would not be affected.
A strong cooperation tie to an important partner could be invaluable in the race
for partnership. Investing in a relationship to the wrong partner could be damaging.
For example, associates saw that junior partnersÐwith whom they worked directly
more often than notÐwere not always treated as they would expect to be by senior
partners. In turn, associates feared bad treatment from these `baby partners', who
needed to prove themselves, bring the ®rm business, show that they could keep
associates busy, and do some of more senior partners' `dirty work'. A true patron
was a strong sponsor who stuck up for his or her associates, did not let other lawyers
take credit for these associates' ideas, lobbied for support from partners from other
specialities, and guaranteed years of good work; but who, in exchange, also required
cooperation, loyalty, and support (in status competition) from these associates on a
dyadic, one-to-one, basis. As one senior associate put it: `At the end of the process
[the race for partnership], it is a lot of politics.'
In such clientelistic ties, associates were kept uncertain as to their patron's ties to
other partners and to other associates. For example, it was dif®cult for associates
(and for observers) to follow partners' power plays concerning staf®ng task forces or
partnership decisions involving back-room deals, if any. Partners used this uncer-
tainty in a subtle divide-and-rule strategy that was typical of patronage. A good
example of such a strategy is provided by partners' use of status competition when
brainstorming with associates (see Chapter 5). A raw indication of this desolidar-
ization is that density in the strong cooperation network among associates dropped
to 0.13 (from 0.22 in the overall network of partners and associates). Work ties were
strong to partners, but in general associates did not rely that much on each other for
cooperation.
Another, but related, indication is that associates alone could not create niches of
the same type as partners' niches. As seen earlier in this chapter, associates did create
niches of their own to get access to needed resources. But at SG&R, desolidarization
was manifest in the fact that there were no niches mixing associates of different levels
of seniority, and in the fact that these niches were less multifunctional than partners'
ones. Even associates who were very close in terms of seniority levels, speciality, and
of®ce membership played status games with each other. They were rational when
seeking to create niches among themselves; but status competition interfered with
niche building much more than among partners.
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Statistical analyses at the dyadic level, combined with information in Figure 3.1,
con®rmed that niches existed for associates at SG&R, but in a slightly different and
looser way than for partners. To summarize the substantive ®ndings, associates
tended to rely on cooperation from other associates in the same of®ce and in the
same speciality, but not across seniority levels. The same was true for advice ties.
There was not much reciprocity in advice relationships, but, among themselves,
senior associates similar in terms of of®ce and speciality had a 69 per cent chance of
having a reciprocal advice relationship with one another, a 22 per cent chance of
having a one-way relationship, and an 8 per cent chance of not having an advice
relationship at all. Between senior associates and associates of seniority level 2, the
chance of a reciprocal relationship dropped sharply to 29 per cent, the chance of a
one-way relationship increased to 36 per cent, and the chance of not having an
advice relationship at all increased to 34 per cent. Among themselves, seniority level 2
associates also similar in terms of of®ce and speciality had a 59 per cent chance of
having a reciprocal advice relationship with one another, a 27 per cent chance of
having a one-way relationship, and a 14 per cent chance of not having an advice
relationship at all.
A sharp contrast in this latter respect appears between associates who worked in
different of®ces and different specialities. In terms of advice relationships, they
almost lived in two different social worlds. Even among senior associates, two
persons now had a virtually zero chance of a reciprocal advice relationship with one
another, 9 per cent chance of having a one-way relationship, and a 91 per cent
chance of not having an advice relationship at all. This trend increases when dif-
ferences in levels of seniority are introduced. For instance, a senior litigation
associate in Of®ce I was almost entirely unlikely to seek advice from a senior cor-
porate associate in another of®ce, and even more unlikely if the latter was in a lower
level of seniority. In sum, associates tended to seek advice from other associates in
the same of®ce, in the same speciality, and from more senior associates. Associates
were very unlikely to seek advice from someone more junior (that is, someone who
had been with the ®rm for a shorter time, or who was below them in the letterhead).
The seniority rule was strong. Concerning friendship ties, associates left to them-
selves tended to seek friendship from other associates in the same of®ce, in the same
seniority level and, after a few years, in the same speciality. Associates were unlikely
to establish friendship ties with someone more junior.
It is interesting, however, to see that gender mattered much more among
associates at SG&R than among partners. Choices of strong co-workers were more
reciprocal when they were in the same gender. A sharp contrast appears between
associates of different gender who worked in different of®ces and different special-
ities. But this gender-based homophily was also limited in several ways. It was not
signi®cant for advice seeking among associates. In addition, although associates
tended to mention friendship ties with same-gender associates more than with
associates of the other gender, reciprocated friendship ties tended to exist with
associates in the other gender more than with same-gender associates. It also turns
out that having been to the same law school, another exogenous characteristic, is not
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statistically important for the choice of co-workers, advisers, and friends among
associates at SG&R.
These looser associate niches were easily exploitable by partners but useful in
associates' search for resources, for example, in learning the ropes of survival in the
clientelistic gameÐincluding, sometimes, how to resist it by relying on informal ties
with selected other associates. For example, they learned to pay attention to what
they did not know, and whom and when to ask, so as not to reveal this ignoranceÐ
except perhaps to someone considered to be a friend, and based on exogenous
characteristics such as gender. They also learned to strike a fragile balance between
cooperation and competition by playing with the (often unspoken) rules: for
example, seeking advice from partners not involved in the case at hand. But this in
turn tended to be tolerated less for some than for others, thus becoming a double-
edge sword.33
Cooperation is systematically amenable to structural analyses at the dyadic, triadic,
and overall levels. Looking at the ®rm as a multiplex and multilevel exchange system,
in which members vied for resources needed to produce and survive in this environ-
ment, provides a realistic view of how such a collegial organization operates. A
complex exchange systemÐwhich is a politicized social systemÐis at work in
the allocation of these resources. In this speci®c system, three types of resources
(co-worker's goodwill, advice, and friendship) were identi®ed as central. An overall
and multiplex view of their exchanges at the structural level was provided, thus
allowing for the identi®cation of social niches in which members found bounded
solidarity in access to such resources. To con®rm the existence of such niches, both
formal and particularistic identities of members of the ®rm were shown to have an
effect, at the dyadic level, on the way they accessed such resources and cooperation.
Members with long-term interests (represented by identities) in mind built or joined
niches re¯ecting strong structural determinants (but not only formal rules) of
resource allocation. Various forms of ®rm-wide status in this ®rmÐand the part-
ners who achieved themÐwere described using this network analysis. These ten-
dencies show that cooperation among peers required a speci®c form of niche
building, and a speci®c social mechanism (generalized exchange). This complex
exchange system supported production in this ®rm. Further below, I show that,
without such a social mechanism, in the absence of a credible formal hierarchy,
coordination of collective action would raise insoluble dif®culties.
Getting durable cooperation among peers is thus a process constrained by formal
structure, involving different types of resources, and a form of rationality helping in
their multiplex exchange. In turn, this exchange system and its niches sustain other
processes in such a knowledge-intensive ®rm. The next chapter looks at two such
social processes: pressure to perform and quality control. The analyses used here
show that separate individual networks also re¯ected partial orders on their own.
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4Economic Performance and
Quality Control
Both niche seeking and status competition represent two potentially advantageous
micro-political activities for individuals (providing resources and motivation). This
chapter focuses on their usefulness in connecting the interests of the individual and
that of the ®rm as a wholeÐthat is, the micro- and macro-levels in the ®rm. This is
done by showing how social niches and status competition have an effect on eco-
nomic (or quantitative) and professional (or qualitative) forms of performance: by
making tenured partners work and by ensuring a form of unobtrusive quality
control among peers. Performance in a corporate law ®rm, as in any knowledge-
intensive organization, is related both to the quantity and to the quality of work.
Like many such ®rms, SG&R competed by emphasizing both quality and price:
You market yourself by saying that we are as good as they are, and cheaper. I mean:
you don't want to push cheaper. I don't think marketing on the basis of price is such an
excellent idea, but it is a fact and they all know it. I don't know that doing more than that
is really useful. Some clients you cannot get anyway, because in-house counsels or vice-
presidents for operations want to cover themselves and won't take the risk of hiring
someone other than Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York. (Partner 24)
Among members, concern for quantity was widespread, but the solution was
relatively simple: the more partners and associates were pressured to work (espe-
cially partners, because their hourly rates were high), the more revenue they brought
in. Concern for quality was also permanent, but here the solution could not be
standardized (by de®nition of a profession). Lawyering being knowledge intensive,
based partly on a series of information management tasks, formal instruments were
available (library, computer memory, standard documents). But there is no pre-
de®ned standard of quality for this type of `certainty work'. Much of it consists of
using past experience to adjust to new problems through individual and collective
learning (Favereau 1994; Hatchuel 1994; Starbuck 1992). Thus it had to be done
in common: cognitive efforts were more or less shared in brainstorming processes
familiar to knowledge-intensive organizations. To avoid using the cognitive
psychologists' term of `distributed cognition', I use here the expression `distributed
knowledge'.1 Knowledge was shared in two types of situation at least: in common
work on cases or in case-related advice relationships. Saying that knowledge was
`shared', however, does not do justice to what really happened in the ¯ows of
intelligence and experience. The important characteristic of such ¯ows is shown to
be that knowledge as a resource is ef®ciently distributed/allocated through two
processes: selection of exchange partners (niche seeking) and concentration of the
authority to know (through status competition). Some members emerge as having
the authority to know, although such status was fragile.
Recall that partners, and to a lesser extent associates, were strategic in their effort
to choose quality and reliable co-workers. They were constrained by specialization
and (other) partners' decisions. Unlike an elusive prede®ned standard of quality,
brainstorming processes included an informal quality control through common
monitoring and advice seeking. Finally, this chapter looks at the relationship
between distributed knowledge and economic performance at SG&R, thus identi-
fying a few conditions under which the pattern of knowledge ¯ows is most pro-
ductive for ®rms stressing quality professional services. Thus economic performance
and quality control depend on a social mechanism supporting individual efforts and
competencies. The exchange system within and beyond niche boundaries is shown
to provide a structural solution to problems of motivation and supervision in the
absence of strong hierarchy.
E CO N O M I C P E R F OR M AN C E: W H A T M A KE S
T EN UR E D P A R T NE R S W OR K?
Under their partnership agreement, it was in partners' collective economic interest
to produce as much as possible, but it could also be perceived to be in their narrow
individual interest to free-ride in the economic sense, especially in an organizational
environment where several forms of status were available to individuals who sought
to carve out an `honourable' place for themselves. I argue that niche-level relational
pressure and status competition are key processes by which this form of opportu-
nistic behaviour was overcome. They both created various forms of commitment, if
not involvement, in projects that were often felt to be too numerous. In effect, niches
provided members with a sense of their long-term interest and with resources, but
there was also an element of self-entrapment in them. Individual economic per-
formance is shown to be associated with task-force membership.2 In effect, through
status competition, task forces produce social approval and emulation, which in
turn reinforce performance. Therefore local substructures such as dense work
groups in niches could favourably affect performance when they supported strong
commitment. Organizational ef®ciency depends on the quality and con®guration of
interpersonal relationships between members (Lewin 1952). Performance also
depends on the con®guration of these relationships. The multilevel exchange system
helped members produce and enhanced individual (and therefore corporate) eco-
nomic performance. The analysis of the co-workers' network is key to this argument.
Recall that, in this ®rm, the production process was dif®cult to routinize. Pro-
fessional expertise and advice cannot easily be standardized, and therefore `internal'
transaction costs for the ®rm as a whole could be assumed to be a large part of total
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costs. As seen in the previous chapter, under such circumstances, high density and
cohesion in strong work relationships at the work-group level were represented by a
`locally multiplex' exchange systemÐthat is, a pattern of ties among members that
helped them get access to various resources, supported strong work ties and gen-
eralized exchange of cooperation, and maintained a speci®c form of solidarity.
Focusing on intra-organizational performance data, this chapter shows that such an
exchange system constrained its membersÐpartners and associatesÐinto reaching
higher economic performance (mainly de®ned in terms of number of hours worked
and dollar amounts brought into the ®rm). In other words, the members' `labour
contract' (the partnership agreement for partners and the employment contract for
associates) was combined with constraining social ties both at the dyadic and at the
structural level.
In effect, in the economic conditions of 1990, it can be assumed that, when
performance of partners and associates was good, ®rm performance was also good.
However, in this ®rm, partners could free-ride and associates could threaten the
quality of work. But getting cooperation and keeping production going are also a
result of exchanging these resources in a multiplex and ¯exible way. Therefore, the
exchange system can be assumed to have maintained members' commitment and
the circulation of social resources in the ®rm so as to sustain individual and col-
lective performance. To show this, each member's combination of ties (with all the
other members) and position in the ®rm's relational structure are examined below
and related to his or her economic performance. Two categories of effects should be
expected from this basic principle of economic sociology.
First, the social system should sustain members' commitment to their labour
contract: members strongly socially integrated (both through relational investments
in the ®rm and, for example, through norm conformity) should perform well
economically, others less well.3 On the one hand, formal dimensions of structure, in
particular status and seniority, should have the greatest in¯uence on economic
performance. In general, partners put in less hours but collected more than
associates because they charged more; in this ®rm, the more senior attorneys were,
the higher their hourly fees. Associates collected less, although they put in more time
than partners. On the other hand, however, the pattern of individual ties should also
have an in¯uence on economic performance: since attorneys who were informally
sought out for advice and for collaboration by many others (very central ones)
charged higher rates, they should also bill and collect more than others. In addition,
when the pattern of each member's ties is measured in terms of Burt's constraint
scores (1982),4 results should con®rm that members (both partners and associates)
with a constraining co-workers' network put in more time, and collected more
hours and more dollars. At SG&R, constraint represented the extent to which col-
leagues could exercise unobtrusive but insistent pressure on a member. The more
constraining one's co-workers' network, the higher one's economic performance.
High constraint in a speci®c network means that clique members in that network
have high investments in each other and high expectations from each other. The
denser a member's personal network of co-workers, the more his co-workers can
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coordinate their informal efforts at prodding him or her back into performing more.
They could, for instance, try to increase their own collaborations with him or her,
and exercise this unobtrusive but insistent pressure to put in more time. One can
therefore hypothesize that, in the case of this ®rm, high constraint facilitated high
economic performance.5 Thus, position in informal structure and the pattern of
one's personal network in this position should count for explaining performance,
although these effects should compete with that of institutionally de®ned hourly
rates.
Secondly, the effect of individual social ties on economic performance should be
con®rmed by looking more closely, at least at the dyadic level, at speci®c multiplex
combinations of ties that provide a decisive push in performance increase (or that
represent a liability that decreases performance). For example, speci®c con®gura-
tions of social ties, such as mutual triplex ties, should be strongly correlated with
high performance. This would ¯esh out a positive effect of constraint scores in the
co-workers' network. High performers should draw heavily on their social resources,
and, in that respect, the ®rm as a whole should bene®t from the networks that some
individuals have (dense multiplex networks, especially those constrained at the
niche level in the co-workers' network), and suffer from the networks of others
(sparser networks, especially those weakly constrained in the co-workers' network).
To put it in Polanyi's terms (and then those of Granovetter 1985 and Uzzi 1997),
performance should be higher for members whose work ties are embedded in a way
that offers access to advice (which, in this ®rm, was a form of free collaboration),
creating economies of time, providing ¯exibility in exchanges by allowing a resource
of one type to be exchanged for a resource of another type, and helping in forgoing
immediate self-gains for a smoother and longer-term collective action. This social
structure, to put it in Uzzi's words (1997), should govern the intervening processes
that regulate performance outcomes, both positive and negative.
Pricing a tie? A caveat on performance data
Before moving on to test such ideas, a caveat should be made about performance
data. In any organization, measurements of performance are intrinsically dif®cult to
interpret and, at SG&R speci®cally, their informative value could change from one
year to another. For example, given the way a partner was compensated at SG&R,
looking at the dollar amount actually collected in 1991 does not indicate exactly how
productive this attorney was in 1991. Work done in 1990 could be compensated in
1991 (or perhaps even later), and such overlaps make it dif®cult to disentangle an
attorney's productivity in one year as opposed to his or her productivity in another
year. Simultaneously, looking at the number of hours billed in 1991 gives an idea of
an attorney's productivity in 1991, but does not mean that all the work was done in
1991. Performance data are never as `hard' and indisputable as one often expects
them to be, especially in situations where real productivity gains are dif®cult to
identify. In fact, managers know and learn that such data must be handled with great
care. Therefore, using performance measurements as a dependent or independent
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variable is not easy, and rarely provides spectacular results. In spite of correlation
between hourly rates, human capital (years with the ®rm), and performance, one
should not expect easy, strong, and clear-cut correlations between performance and
social connections within the ®rm.
More importantly, given the dependence of economic performance on social
processes, the relative contribution of speci®c individuals to economic performance
was a highly political issue. Allocation of credit within task forces (that is, clearly
disentangling members' contributions) was often dif®cult. Thus, looking at how an
organization, especially a collegial one, extracts economic performance from its
members requires a sociological conception of performance that must pay attention
to the micro-political context of members' action and to their strategic behaviour in
this context. This approach therefore entails a micro-political conception of eco-
nomic performance. Narrow econometric conceptions ignore the fact that no
measurement of performance in organizations ever goes unchallenged within the
organization (Flap et al. 1998; Friedberg 1993; Meyer 1994). To some extent, criteria
used to measure ef®ciency of actors were negotiated by members themselves. This
negotiation politicized measurements of ef®ciency. In effect, such measurements are
always multidimensional. Practitioners know that it is impossible to ®nd simple
measures of performance for organizations with multiple and often con¯icting
goals. Meyer (1994), for example, shows that performance measures can be con-
sidered to be temporary constraints to which members of the organization adjust. It
is thus impossible to de®ne absolute measurements of performance outside a
strategic context or institutional conventions.
This is also why a direct and quantitative evaluation of social ties in purely
economic terms is absurd. Social ties represent conduits for various kinds of
resources, and their accumulation represents various forms of status that cannot be
reduced to economic power. Rather, a single social tie can be an asset one day, a
liability another. It can be a component of social processes enhancing or weakening
relationship with work performance. As will be shown in Chapter 5, actual per-
formance often depends, at some stage, on the capacity of the task force to uncouple
or disembed the actual work peformance from the social ties that made it possible at
an earlier stage.
In the complex context of the law ®rm examined here, task-force work, autonomy
and ¯exibility in selection of co-workers, and a weak hierarchy unable to force
partners to cooperate, all made it harder to provide one ideal measurement of
performance by individual employees and task forces. In spite of timekeeping,
performance measurement at SG&R was not comparable to Taylorian piece-rate
schemes. It was, therefore, dif®cult to get a reasonable idea of individual pro-
ductivity differences in such complex production processes. The slope of the SG&R
earnings schedule could not come close to re¯ecting such differences, since it had no
formal link to productivity and since partners got their compensation regardless of
what they billed. Note that the lockstep system itself was partly explained by the fact
that it was dif®cult to measure actual contributions of each member. The process by
which attorneys produced legal services through their collegial interactions was too
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complex to allow such measurement. This is why, even with SG&R's compensation
system, partners often insisted on `spreading credit around generously', or sharing
potential `blame':
Our accounting system is designed so that, if you are the billing partner and you rate off
time, you can't charge it against a particular timekeeper without doing it to yourself
too. The system will rate down things on a pro rata basis without distinguishing
between partners and associates working on the ®le. People do not make themselves
look good in that way. (The managing partner at the time of the study)
Finally, there are several reasons for which variations in ®nancial performance are
not entirely explained by the number of hours worked and by hourly rates. For
example, billing partners did not bill all the hours worked by their task force.
Underlying ®rm accounts, there was always a permanent preoccupation with client
relationships. There were capped service agreements. Payment itself was rarely in
full:6 large ®rms rarely get 100 per cent of their bills, because clients can threaten to
go elsewhere. This went much beyond the behaviour of what some partners called
`crummy clients'. There were various forms of non-chargeable time, and very often
there was a negotiation between the ®rm and the client as to what was an acceptable
price for the `services rendered'. When billing partners billed a client, they could
write hours off early, as a courtesy: the billing partner called the client to ask for his
or her approval; communication about the bill happened before the bill was sent. Or
they could write hours off after the bill was sent, to please a valuable client who
reacted negatively.7 They sometimes wrote off a considerable proportion of hours
worked. Like any service ®rm, corporate law ®rms have notorious dif®culties col-
lecting what has been billed, and many partners choose to live with high account
receivables rather than antagonize a client from whom they expect more business in
the future. This was considered a serious problem by some very business-minded
partners within the ®rm.
We have not reached the point where partners can be penalized if their account
receivables don't go down fast enough. For instance, someone should come up with a
way to reduce the investment we have in receivables and unbilled time and to improve
our realization rates. We are not that bad on the realization rates because we are a
pro®table ®rm, for a ®rm of our size, but we'd like to add ®ve or six percentage points to
the realization rates, which again is found money. I mean, it's right there, we just have to
pick the thing up off the sidewalk where it is sitting, if we can ®gure out how to do it.
Otherwise it's a stupid way to run a business. (Partner 30)
Another reason was that, to some extent, attorneys could also fudge their time
sheets. For some associates, hours worked should also have included time spent at
the of®ce (as opposed to time spent on a client)Ðfor example, training time,
professional reading time, and so on. But the ®rm did not always give credit for
some of these activities, since they did not include chargeable time. This is why a
study of the relationship between social ties and economic performance necessarily
leads to issues of fairness (see Chapter 8) and to an examination of the politicized
nature of performance measurements.
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Many factors accounted for members' individual performance. These factors
could be external or environmental (some areas of practice provided more work,
some markets were temporarily more lucrative), individual (some attorneys were
personally more motivated or hard-working), and relational. In spite of their limited
character, the following analyses combine available measurements of members'
economic performanceÐnarrowly understood as the number of hours worked and
the amount of dollars brought into the ®rm at the end of the previous year, a few
weeks before ®eldwork took placeÐwith information on ®rm structure, work
process, and members' social status and intra-organizational ties in early 1991.
Following the embeddedness perspective, differences in such performances may be
explained, in part, in terms of relationships within the ®rmÐfor instance because
relational factors could help gain access to needed resources, reduce `transaction
costs' with co-workers, or help pressure colleagues back into more productive
behaviour.
Partners' contributions and returns at SG&R
We know that partners' compensation was based exclusively on a seniority lockstep
system without any direct link between contribution and returns. The ®rm did not
have a formal peer-review system that could provide intermediate steps between
informal control and formal court procedures against free-riders.
Our compensation system has no built-in peer review process. There is no committee
meeting with each partner, no interview devoted to pulling out from that individual his
or her state of affairs. With the compensation system there is no built-in ®nancial
incentive for people to do things. If you have people who are motivated by other
things, like self-respect, pride in craftsmanship, intellectual curiosity, competitiveness,
whatever those different personal attributes are, that's not a problem. There are people
who aren't as motivated by those other things as certain other people and may wind up
resting on their laurels, sitting on their hands, whatever euphemism you want to come
up with for becoming lazy both intellectually and how much they are willing to work.
(The managing partner at the time of the study)
Great managerial resources were nevertheless devoted to measurement of each
partner's performance (time sheets, billing, collecting, expenses, and so on), and this
information was available to the whole partnership. A low performance could not be
hidden for long. Partners 1 and 5 were the two members of the compensation
committee (the `whack-down' committee) in charge of carrying out exceptional
measures preventing a member from reaching the next seniority level on the com-
pensation ladder. It should also be recalled that most partners in this ®rm managed
to have at least one `safety partner'Ðthat is, a friend who would presumably side
with them unconditionally and become their insurance policy against expulsion.
Therefore, despite the existence of direct ®nancial controls, the ®rm did not have
many formal ways of dealing with free-loading. This strengthens the suggestion that
performance depended also on the social circulation of resources in the ®rm.
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Co-workers' constraints and economic performance: Niches as hell
Based on this discussion, to study the effect of position in ®rm structure on eco-
nomic performance, I look at the relationship between measurement of economic
performance and various social factors related to ®rm structure, work process, and
members' ties in 1991. I use again as covariates the dimensions of formal structure of
this ®rm that were expected to be the most important (status, of®ce, speciality), as
well as two attributes of members de®ned from outside the ®rm (gender and law
school attended). To locate members in the informal structure of the ®rm and
capture the relevant characteristics of their relational con®gurations, I use six
variables based on the co-workers, advice, and friendship networks. From this
data, I derive two types of index. First, individual indegree centrality scores in
these networks. As already seen, indegree centrality represents a measurement of
the extent to which members were `popular' in these networks and therefore
accumulated resources circulating in them (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 169±219).
One can therefore hypothesize that they will be in a better position to perform
economically.
Secondly, their individual constraint scores as de®ned by Burt (1992) in the same
networks. In other words, in this type of collegial organization, a constraining net-
work of strong ties, in which members over-invested, tended to create task forces of
partners and associates who relied on each other, at least for work. With regard to
partners, such task forces represented an element of self-entrapment compensated by
status recognition: task forces allowed partners to create emulation and rede®ne what
was an acceptable performance within their work-group, including for themselves.
But coordination was also made easier in such work-groups: they brought associates
together productively in the kind of intellectually challenging attitude that partners
encouraged within their task forces. This does not mean that associates' fate (in terms
of making it to partnership) was necessarily improved by this high constraint; but
one can hypothesize that economic performance should have been. In effect, struc-
tural holes could represent a competitive advantage for associates lobbying for
partners' votes, not for partners who could pool colleagues' resources such as
knowledge and experience. Thus measurements of relational capital add a set of
covariates to the initial model. In this approach, the effect of centrality and of
relational constraint on economic performance is expected to be positive.
Using the above-mentioned covariates, several models are estimated to explain
quantitative economic performance measured as the amount of fees in dollars
brought to the ®rm (managing partner not included) and the number of hours
worked in 1990. It is important to realize that not all the covariates representing
various dimensions of position in ®rm structure can be used at the same time,
because of strong dependency between them. This was typically the case for status
and seniority; in the following models, the most re®ned covariate, seniority, is used.
In addition, status and seniority overlap, as explanatory variables, with the number
of hours worked and hourly rates. The more senior their position in the ®rm, the
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more attorneys charged per hour. Associates worked longer hours than partners.
Therefore, to avoid this problem, analyses below test the robustness of relational
con®guration effects using three different models. The dependence between some of
the covariates will be taken into account in the interpretation of results. In terms
of economic and relational variables, the best overall models predicting the number
of hours worked and the amount of fees brought in (and achievable with this data-
set) are presented in Table 4.1.
As predicted, Model 1 contains an important effect con®rming our expectations.
It shows that, in this ®rm, constraint by task forces of co-workers had a positive and
strong effect on the number of hours that members put in. The density of members'
network of co-workers helped the latter control and increase the amount of effort
invested in hard work. In that respect, the effect of members' relational capital on
their performance is con®rmed. However, beyond this con®rmation, an additional
and unexpected dimension of relational con®gurations also emerges here. Inter-
esting negative effects of dense friendship ties (and centrality in the friendship
network) on performance are also apparent. One can speculate about the reasons for
Table 4.1. Variables explaining economic performance
Independent variables Standardized estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Seniority 0.01 0.76***
Hourly rates 0.78***
Time inputa 0.40***
Of®ce 0.24** 0.15* 0.05
Speciality ÿ0.16* 0.01 0.07
Gender ÿ0.03 0.00 0.02
Law school attended ÿ0.14 ÿ0.03 0.02
Centrality co-worker 0.17 0.01 ÿ0.02
Centrality advice ÿ0.02 0.27* 0.23*
Centrality friendship ÿ0.27* ÿ0.11 ÿ0.01
Constraint co-worker 0.23* 0.16* 0.13*
Constraint advice ÿ0.04 0.05 0.04
Constraint friendship ÿ0.81*** ÿ0.15 0.11
aIncluding the interaction effect of time input and hourly rates does not provide additional insights here
because senior partners who charged high rates were not among the members who put in the greatest
number of hours.
Notes: N 70. ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Adjusted r2 for three models are 0.66, 0.86, and 0.89
respectively. Economic performance is measured by the number of hours worked (Model 1) and by
the amount of dollars brought into the ®rm in fees (Models 2 and 3) in 1990. The managing partner, who
concentrated on ®rm policy and administrative work and was not a timekeeper during his tenure, was not
included in the computations of these parameter estimates.
Source: Reprinted from Corporate Social Capital and Liabilities, R. Leenders and S. Gabbay (eds.).
E. Lazega, `Generalized Exchange and Economic Performance', 250. Copyright 1999 with permission
from Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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these effects, such as spending more time on personalizing work relationships
outside work than on actual work.8
Focusing back on the positive effect of constraint in one's network of strong
co-workers, Models 2 and 3Ðwhere the weight of economic variables such as hourly
rates is more visibleÐshow that such an effect was robust. Indeed, it is also present
as a predictor of the amount of fees brought into the ®rm at the end of the year. It is
thus relatively independent of the way performance was measured. In Model 2,
status and seniority count heavily. Partners did collect more money than associates,
and, the more senior lawyers were, the more money they tended to collect. As
already mentioned, in general, partners put in less hours but collected more dollars
than associates because they charged more. Associates collected less although they
put in more time than partners. The more senior in their status associates were, the
more hours they billed and the more they collected. Market circumstances had a
mixed effect on economic performance: in terms of of®ce membership, Of®ce II
attorneys put in more time than Of®ce I attorneys, and collected more; but in terms
of division of work, no speciality (corporate or litigation) seems to have been sys-
tematically more lucrative than the otherÐin spite of a general advantage for liti-
gation in the early 1990s in north-eastern US corporate law ®rms.
Given our interest in the connection between informal relationships and per-
formance, it makes sense to look into the latter effects in more detail for associates
and for partners separately. The following results are then obtained. For partners
only, effects considered here for hours billed were either weak, or at best unstable.
Practice also had a very weak effect: litigation partners billed slightly more than
corporate partners. Again, partners popular as friends tended to bill slightly less. For
associates only, centrality in terms of friendship also affected collection negatively.
This means that associates who were very active socially and specialized in providing
on average more social support to others could have ended up, on average, being
handicapped in terms of working and collecting. Obviously the link between the two
phenomena is very indirect and remains to be explained, but it exists nevertheless.
The more central associates were in terms of their number of co-workers (that is, the
more colleagues they worked with), the more hours they billed. The only associates
who collected more hours were those who were also central in the co-workers'
network (they tended to be senior associates). For associates, seniority was the best
predictor of performance in terms of hours collected, but seniority and centrality as
a co-worker were the best predictors of performance in terms of hours billed.
In this context, the analysis of the effect of individual relational con®gurations on
economic performance also shows that attorneys who were informally sought out
for advice and for collaboration by many others tended to bill and collect more than
others. This extra effect is partly due to the fact that senior partners were central
advisers. As already mentioned, the effect of relational capital measured in terms of
Burt's constraint scores is still present in Model 3, in which seniority is replaced by
hourly rates and time input. This con®rms our expectations: members with a
constraining co-workers' network put in more time, collected more hours, and
collected more money. The more constraining the co-workers' network, the higher
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an attorney's economic performance (even measured in such a narrow way). This
effect is robust, as shown by the fact that it is still present in Model 3, in which
seniority is replaced by hourly rates and time input. Constraint in the advice net-
work and in the friendship network, however, did not have a consistent effect on
performance.
Thus, overall, multivariate analyses show that position in informal structure and
relational con®gurations characterizing this position (including niche membership)
did count for explaining performance, but these effects were weaker than the weight
of seniority or hourly rates as formally de®ned by the institutional setting. The next
sections provide a more detailed illustration of such effects.
Status, self-entrapment, and economic performance
As suggested, in particular, by the effect of constraint in the co-workers' network,
economic performance was indeed rooted in the con®guration of individual rela-
tionships in the ®rm. This raises the question of the relative weight of speci®c
combinations of ties in providing a decisive push in performance increase (or
representing a liability that decreased performance). In this section, I look at similar
effects from a different angle by showing that, within a given niche, a speci®c
con®guration of social ties was required, at the dyadic level, for high economic
performance in this ®rm. This is due to the fact that maintaining production
(collective action) required many kinds of contributions. Describing this con®g-
uration is equivalent to understanding how social resources combined with one
another to increase or decrease individual performance. Results obtained above are
translated into a description of speci®c con®gurations of ties that were associated
with economic performance. These associations can be measured by the correlations
between the frequency of more or less multiplex con®gurations of dyadic ties for
each actor and his or her performance measurements.
Many combinations of ties were possible at the dyadic level in the three networks.
For example, the most frequent type of such combinations (besides the `no-tie'
possibility) between two persons in the ®rm was the Blau tie. Many partners had
such ties with themselves as advice distributors and associates as advice-seekers. In
contrast, there were no duplex mutual co-work and friendship ties. The complete
absence of such ties is not surprising. As will be seen in Chapter 5, although
friendship and work could coexist when an advice component was also present, the
two resources seemed to be of a very distinct nature and to intervene in the status
competition at very different moments.
The extent to which kinds of social ties varied with performance can be measured
by the correlations between the frequency of more or less multiplex combinations of
types of ties for each actor and his or her performance measurements. Table 4.2
presents correlations between speci®c con®gurations of dyadic ties for each indi-
vidual in the ®rm and several measurements of performance. Only ties and com-
pounds of ties with a strong correlation with at least one performance index are
retained in Table 4.2.
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This exploratory analysis provides several results. First, there was a strong and
negative correlation between having many `no ties' (or many `empty' tiesÐthat is,
potential ties not actually realized) and putting time in, billing, and collecting. The
less resources exchanged with others, the lower an attorney's performance. Secondly,
there was a strong and positive correlation between having many ties such as `being
sought out (unreciprocated) for advice exclusively' (no co-work or friendship
component) and dollar amounts invested (time worked by hourly rate), billed (time
billed by hourly rate), and collected (fees actually collected). The same correlation
holds when the tie included an unreciprocated friendship component. This is partly
Table 4.2. The Importance of Blau-ties: Correlation table for performance measurements in 1990
and most frequent types of combination of ties among dyads of actors
Combination
of ties
between
i and j
Performance measurements
Hourly
rates
measured
in dollars
Time
input
measured
in dollars
Time
input
measured
in hours
Fees
billed
measured
in dollars
Fees
billed
measured
in hours
Fees
collected
measured
in dollars
Fees
collected
measured
in hours
No ties ÿ0.34 ÿ0.31 ÿ0.08 ÿ0.31 ÿ0.15 ÿ0.31 ÿ0.17
iFj and
jFi
ÿ0.36 ÿ0.20 0.11 ÿ0.26 0.05 ÿ0.26 0.01
jAi 0.47 0.36 0.11 0.42 0.19 0.41 0.20
j Wi and
j Ai
0.36 0.15 ÿ0.08 0.21 ÿ0.01 0.20 0.01
i Wj and
j Wi and
j Ai (Blau tie)
0.54 0.44 0.10 0.43 0.18 0.45 0.24
i Wj and
j Wi and
iAj
ÿ0.52 ÿ0.34 0.04 ÿ0.40 ÿ0.05 ÿ0.39 ÿ0.04
i Wj and
j Wi and
i Aj and
j Ai
0.22 0.28 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.16
i Wj and
j Wi and
i Aj and
jAi and
iFj and
j Fi
0.39 0.43 0.19 0.46 0.25 0.48 0.30
Notes: `F' refers to Friendship, `W' to co-worker, `A' to Advice. `iFj ' represents a friendship tie from i to j.
`iFj and jFi ' represents a reciprocated friendship choice. For example, having many ties of the `jAi ' typeÐ
which means that many people ( j) seek out your adviceÐis strongly and positively correlated (0.41) with
collecting high fees measured in dollar amounts.
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related to the fact that senior partners, who were often sought out for advice and
cited as friends (without reciprocating), billed and collected more given their higher
hourly rates.
Thirdly, and more surprisingly, there are no strong correlations between having a
lot of ties that were exclusively reciprocated work ties and any performance index.
`Work-only' relationships were quite neutral in terms of their association with
economic performance. Such ties indicate work relationships without status com-
petition. They were more frequent for associates than for partners. However, adding
one component to this combination changes this result. Given that partners worked
with associates more than with other partners, there are strong and positive cor-
relations between having many such ties with the added component `being sought
out for advice' (unreciprocated), and performance indexes. Such ties were much
more frequent for partners than for associates. This con®rms that an element of self-
entrapmentÐthat is, of strong involvement and commitment that increased with
niche densityÐby partners in small task forces of co-workers within their niche was
a good predictor of economic performance compensated, among others, by Blau-
type status and professional recognition. When adding friendship components
to Blau ties (such as citing the other as a friend or citing each other as friends),
positive correlations become stronger, although there were fewer occurrences of
that type.
Fourthly, and conversely, there are mostly negative correlations between having
ties with components such as `having a reciprocated work relationship and seeking
out advice (unreciprocated)' and dollar amounts put in, billed, and collected. Such
ties were more frequent for associates (particularly non-senior ones). Finally, there
are strong and positive correlations between having individual triplex mutual
reciprocated ties and dollar amounts billed and collected. Dense exchanges of that
type were much more frequent among partners. In short, these results translate our
previous statements into relational terms. Partners' higher economic performance,
for example, shows in the correlation between having, within one's niche, many
`reciprocated work ties with the added component `` being sought out for advice''
(unreciprocated)' and the amount of money collected.
To illustrate this analysis, I provide examples of low and high economic perfor-
mers and their speci®c combinations of social resources. In these examples, each
attorney had a relatively different pro®le, but important common characteristics
were related to low or high performance.
Low and high performers
Among low performers (still in terms of dollars brought in 1990), a ®rstÐthe least
productiveÐpartner was a member of Position Two, the Of®ce I corporate niche
(see Figure 3.1). He had, in terms of compounds of ties, a higher than average
proportion of persons (that he cited as strong co-workers) who did not reciprocate,
a much lower than average proportion of Blau ties, and a much lower than average
proportion of triplex reciprocated ties. He considered many people to be his friends,
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but they did not reciprocate. His partners did not listen much to his opinions about
®rm management and policy issues (that is, he had a low indegree centrality in the
in¯uence or `listening' network presented in Chapter 8). The strong pattern here is
the absence of direct reciprocity and multiplexity in most ties. None of the con-
®gurations associated with strong economic performance was present in this part-
ner's pro®le. Recall the managing partner's comments about this partner, which
re¯ect the absence of constraint: `[Jack] is a decent guy on a personal level. He says
that under pressure he does things; but he is a corporate lawyer, and there is no
pressure on him usually, so he just doesn't do it.'
A roughly similar pattern characterizes a second low-performing partner.
He barely made it into the Of®ce II niche: he had a much higher than average
proportion of `no ties' and a higher than average proportion of persons that he
cited as strong co-workers but who did not reciprocate; he also had a lower than
average proportion of Blau ties. He nevertheless had an average number of
reciprocated friendship ties. Most of the partners did not listen much to his opinions
about ®rm management and policy issues. Very few came to him for advice,
and he had a relatively low number of co-workers. At the dyadic level, the
speci®city of this partner's relational pro®le is the contrast between his very few
ties with others in the ®rm and two very strong (triplex reciprocated) ties with
unconditional partners (his insurance policy against expulsion). Recall again the
managing partner at the time of the study:
[Frank] was at the low end [of the performance scale] for a long time. Partner 5 went to
talk with him. He claims that there isn't anything to do. He says: `I am a corporate
lawyer, my kind of work has dried up, I am out there in the bushes, hustling, doing
everything I can.' That is dif®cult to check. But there is also the fact that some of the
people he has worked with do not want to do so again, because they think his com-
petence is in doubt. Partner 17 is extremely good in his ®eld. He once volunteered to
go and see this partner to share some work with him. He went to see him, but he says
[Frank] did a horrendously poor job.
In sum, the two low performers were marginal members in their own niche and
were less involved than others in exchanges of social resources in the ®rm. They did
not create task forces that triggered the commitment and self-entrapment process
with associates who could rely on them for work and provide status recognition.
Among high-performing partners, there were broadly speaking two types of
relational pro®les. The ®rst type included some of the most senior partners, espe-
cially favoured by their high hourly rates and by their centrality in their respective
niches. Their ties often seemed `generous'Ðthat is, to combine unreciprocated
transfers towards others more than exchanges with them. They were more often
sought out than they themselves sought someone outÐthat is, they were providers
rather than bene®ciaries. This made economic sense, because they were in charge of
running the organization that ultimately produced their larger share of the pie. But
it also made sense socially. For example, Partner 1 was highly sought out for advice.
He cited few co-workers, because he mainly worked with a junior partner, who acted
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as a `foreman', concentrating co-workers' exchanges. Partners 2 and 4 had roughly
the same relational pro®le as Partner 1, except for their more frequent involvement
in mutual co-workers' ties and higher than average proportion of Blau ties. In
addition to the work-oriented components, Partner 4 had an exceptional ®ve triplex
mutual ties with other partners. Thus, in general, unless they worked with a `fore-
man', senior high performers were strongly work-oriented persons intensely
involved in co-workers' ties and highly sought out for advice. Their compounds
did not include many friendship components, except with a very few select
other senior partners, with whom reciprocity was taken for granted.9 They
unquestionably always won the status competition. The taboo concerning friend-
ship with associates was also true for young partners, with a few exceptions for
contemporaries.
The second type of high-performing partners also included work-oriented per-
sons with an above average proportion of Blau ties. They did, however, diversify
their exchanges of resourcesÐthat is, their types of tiesÐmore than their more
senior partners. They seemed to belong to an old niche while investing efforts in
building a new one. Their compounds were more personalized and included more
friendship components. Typical of this relational pro®le was Partner 26. He was
hard-working, heavily involved in the business of the ®rm, one of the people with
most ties in the ®rm altogether, among the record holders for Blau ties and for the
triplex mutual ties (with his Of®ce I contemporaries, whoÐfor reasons linked to the
history of the ®rmÐformed a very cohesive clique of partners). But, in addition to
many mono-resource uniplex ties (such as being often sought out for advice and
only for advice, although not as much as Partners 1 and 6), he was involved in many
duplex or triplex ties with colleagues who worked with him, but also came to him for
advice and friendship (unreciprocated). He was thus more relaxed about person-
alizing work ties and showed more social openness (than senior partners) to col-
leagues working with him. He was a work-oriented all-round exchanger and
investor of resources.
The contrast between low and high performers' relational pro®les shows that high
performers (in terms of hours worked and dollars brought in) drew heavily on their
social resources and had common speci®c relational characteristics, in particular
those involving them (not surprisingly) in work-related exchanges with associates.
This highlights the fact that, as suggested by the effect of constraint scores in the
co-workers' network and by the illustrations above, such con®gurations of ties
(described at the dyadic level) favouring high economic performance were not
distributed randomly in the ®rm. Their distribution depended on the wider pattern
of social ties presented in Figure 3.1, the ®rm's exchange system. As will be described
in the next chapter, the structural tendencies in this ®rm could be summarized by
two separable forms of interdependence: ®rst, the interplay of co-worker and advice
ties; secondly, the interplay of advice and friendship ties. Mutual strong work ties
occurring in conjunction with either unidirectional (associate to partner) Blau ties
or mutual advice tiesÐwhich were positively correlated with economic performance
in Table 4.2Ðhad a higher chance of occurring in niches with constraining
146 Economic Performance and Quality Control
co-workers' ties. In that respect, productive co-worker ties were embedded in advice
ties. In turn, advice ties were often driven and controlled by more personalized ties.
While there was a very weak association between duplex co-worker and friendship
ties, 10 there was a strong one between advice and friendship ties. This con®guration
also had a higher chance of occurring in cohesive niches and it is especially con-
sistent with the strongest positive correlation in Table 4.2 between triplex recipro-
cated ties and high economic performance. Thus, strong and stimulating (that is,
pressuring or constraining) co-workers' ties combined with advice ties or with both
advice and friendship ties had a chance of being economically more productive than
other ties and more likely to happen in dense niches.
Multi-level embeddedness of the labour contract: A virtuous circle?
It can thus be asserted that, if economic performance is rooted in the con®guration
of individual social ties, the latter is itself rooted in a collective relational structure
encouraging the emergence of work groups. Recall that, given informal constraints
guiding the choices of co-workers, advisers, and friends in this ®rm, and given the
existence of such multiplex and local cycles re¯ecting the existence of highly
embedded (in niches) strong co-workers' task forces, givers have a guarantee that
they will become receivers, although not necessarily in kind. In other words, the
®rm had found in this exchange system a structural solution to the problem of
cooperation and commitment to the labour contract, a sort of partial `equilibrium'
in the circulation of resources needed to ful®l it. By allowing such a system to exist,
this ®rm maintained certain forms of resource circulation that can be understood
more generally as a precondition for group solidarity,11 but also for individual and
collective performance. This social system grew around the formal dimensions of the
organization and around constraints imposed by interdependencies in the pro-
duction process. It was part of this ®rm's `corporate social capital': it helped
members accept terms of the labour contract that they did not necessarily have a
narrow short-term interest in accepting. Performance grew out of this commitment.
In effect, since strong and stimulating (that is, constraining) co-workers' ties
combined with advice ties had a chance of being economically more productive than
other ties, and of being more likely to occur in dense work groups, the overall
structure described in Chapter 3 should be considered, back at the structural level, as
a precondition of an individual's productive relational patterns, because it main-
tained the circulation of social resources in the ®rm. This structure interlocked work
and social ties in a way allowing strongly knitted positions to perform better by
extracting and facilitating higher involvement and efforts from their members, often
in exchange for status. The forms of embeddedness described above helped enforce
the labour contract between partners and associates. It made them more productive
by creating chains of mutual obligations and debts, as well as relational taboos.
Partners were especially well positioned to play on resource dependencies to get
associates' commitment to their labour contract (which was not necessarily in their
narrow and short-term self-interest).
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Thus, individual commitment to labour contract and individual economic per-
formance were increased by membership in dense niches, which themselves needed a
wider, more multiplex and oligarchic exchange system to operate. Individual per-
formance that bene®ted the ®rm as a whole was driven by task-force pressure and
the social system of the ®rm: the organization helped its members perform, thereby
helping itself through aggregated performances. In many ways this mechanism was
good for the ®rm as a whole as well as for the partner. The con®guration of indi-
vidual relationships transformed itself into corporate advantage because the ®rm
as a whole was more successful in billing and maintaining labour contracts and
integration.
For this `virtuous circle' to operate, however, an important condition needed to
be respected. The embeddedness of individual economic performance in a social
exchange system again raises the issue of the relative contribution of individual
relationships and ®rm social mechanisms to collective action and performance.
When several resources circulate, exploitation is also present but not easily mea-
surable. The fact that this system helps some individual members reach high per-
formance does not mean that it was egalitarian in the distribution of resources and
in the provision of structural solutions to individual problems. This will be illu-
strated in the next section of this chapter by looking at the relative chances of
selected senior associates to become partners. In their competition for the attention
of partners, associates with the right connections to the right partners had a
structural advantage in the highly selective race to partnership. They were `in the fast
lane', because these connections, among other advantages, allowed them to play
with organizational rules in an rewarding way, in particular to cross internal
boundaries (for example, to seek advice from very senior partners), provided that
such `infractions' were limited and well localized.
Another example of this precondition is that, if the ®rm social exchange
mechanism helps individual members perform economically, then members who
participated in building up this social system are also entitled to some of the credit
that goes to high performers. In this situation, members' commitment to equality in
compensation, their restraint both in keeping track of all their contributions and
returns, and in politicizing dramatically the use of measurements, were therefore
micro-political conditions for the ef®ciency of this system. This was especially the
case with task forces, where others' behaviour could easily be perceived to be
opportunistic. In fact, members' restraint was often weak: many con¯icts in cor-
porate law ®rms or other private professional services ®rms are disputes about
fairness in compensation to individual partners. But many `cultural' aspects of such
organizations, such as an ideology of collegiality, are also explicit exhortations to
such restraint.
Thus measuring individual economic performance tells only one side of the
story of contribution to collective action. This limiting condition for the ef®ciency
of such a virtuous circle was the reason for managing partners often to emphasize
`spreading credit' as widely as possible. Nevertheless, recognizing and measuring
the relative and speci®c importance of social mechanisms cannot be done without
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understanding this political negotiation, which enables members to evaluate their
contributions. This illustrates the fact that the relative value of social resources is
negotiated, and that this negotiation is political. Following in detail these politicized
negotiations, and how they tried to disentangle the merits of the ®rm as opposed to
that of its individual members in the production of a speci®c performance, was not
possible and therefore beyond the scope of this book. The principle, however, shows
that social mechanisms can be very productive for collegial organizations, but their
manipulation can be double-edged.
As mentioned above, measurements of performance are a politicized issue, all the
more easily politicized because members can make their relative contribution to
®rm performance unmeasurableÐfor example, by bringing more resources into
their barters, which was made possible precisely by the existence of a multiplex
exchange system. Members of this ®rm knew that measuring economic performance
described only one aspect of their contribution to collective action. In other words,
the forms of embeddedness discussed in this chapter did not produce, by themselves,
a self-sustaining social order. The structural solution provided by this exchange
system raises new problems, that of the fragility of this virtuous circle. For example,
niche-level solidarity also threatened the cohesion of the ®rm: well-knit teams could
defect and take away with them valued members and clients (Lazega 1992b).
This problem had its own structural solution and is dealt with further below (see
Chapter 6).
P R OF E SS IO NA L P ER F OR M A N C E: Q UA L I TY C ON T R OL F O R
K NO W LE DG E - I NT EN SI VE O R G A N IZ A TI ON S
The second part of this chapter looks at another effect of the exchange system in the
®rm: its ef®ciency in terms of quality control. Maintaining quality through capi-
talization of authorized knowledge and sharing experience is not an easy process in
collegial organizations. A ®rm such as SG&R was not a (®nancial) capital intensive
organization producing material goods and relying on economies of scale. It pro-
duced knowledge-based services evaluated by their level of quality. But quality in
`certainty work' is dif®cult to measure. There are formal mechanisms, as stressed by
Waters (1989), such as of®cial peer review committees, that can perform this task;
but these mechanisms often raise suspicions of being too strongly politicized. The
question is then: does the ®rm rely on its exchange system to provide an informal
mechanism of overall peer review and quality control? The importance of Blau-ties,
i.e. the barter of self-entrapment against status recognition, to economic perfor-
mance, suggests that it is the case. If so, does it do so by ensuring accumulation and
distribution of authorized knowledge and experience?
Lawyers' work is knowledge intensive (see Chapter 2), in the sense of `knowl-
edge-in-action' accumulated by experience, tacit knowledge, or `judgement'Ða
word often used by members to characterize the quality of a colleague's lawyering.
This experience is necessary to the provision of legal advice to corporations. This
task requires designing new solutions to complex problems, taking risks, and
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sometimes persuading the client to adopt untested strategies. For this kind of
creative work, often invisible and not very spectacular, accumulation of this
knowledge-in-action or experience seems indispensible. Managing this capital of
expertise means using all the available information technology (libraries, on-line
services, a ®rm electronic memory, and so on), but alsoÐand most importantlyÐ
recruiting the best possible attorneys, keeping them, and helping them manage and
update their knowledge base. This is often referred to as a ®rm's `human capital'.
Members must build and convert tacit and innovative knowledge into a shared
instrument, and perhaps eventually into more codi®ed and routinized knowledge
where pieces of information are already related to one another. Tacit knowledge
tends to be mobilized at the local level, in a decentralized way, between individual
members. Indeed, if tacit knowledge and what collective learning produces are
dif®cult to capitalize in a central database, actors' `live' and educated thinking
must be taken into account.
In the light of this understanding of professional work, the social distribution of
knowledge (as an organizational response to environmental complexity) is supposed
to help. Contrary to what is asserted by many specialists in professional services
®rms, information technology and human capital are not suf®cient to ensure a high
level of quality. In addition, activities driven only by reaction to market do not
necessarily encourage innovation and creativity (Alter 1993; Maister 1993); they can
develop short-term adaptation. This raises the issue of quality control as a social
process, and that of sharing experience in order to improve the quality of work when
needed. The way in which SG&R managed this issue was called `peer review'. Here I
show that many partners at SG&R considered ex post formal peer review com-
mittees to be costly, dif®cult to implement, and inef®cient. But informal peer review
also took place to try to maintain a high level of quality. Members observed each
other's performances and evaluated (mostly informally) each other's production:
they praised big successes, and indirectly sanctioned (that is, criticized and gossiped
about) blunders and mistakes (on this issue see Bosk 1979; Reynaud 1989; Wittek
and Wielers 1998).12 In the ®rst section, I examine how members of the ®rm
conceived peer review, in particular peer review of the quality of work.
The ®rm counted on a more proactive form of quality control. By this they meant
(1) the fact that its members shared the whole picture of the cases with their co-
workers, and (2) the fact that they sought each other's advice or second opinion and
shared their experience before they made decisions or sent opinions out to clients.
From the perspective of the organization, relationships between members were
necessary to share knowledge and experience. Especially in situations where mem-
bers worked together, they depended on each other for these resources. Knowledge
can be capitalized in members' individual live memory, but its use also depends on
their relationships. Indeed reasoning exclusively in terms of human capital, as
economists and management theories have done for a long time, presupposes that,
once in business, members freely share their knowledge and experience with one
another. We know that this is not an obvious fact, especially since Blau (1964) has
showed that status is central to such games.13
150 Economic Performance and Quality Control
This chapter shows how peer supervision and evaluation of quality was in SG&R's
task-related advice network. In order to look at the importance of social exchanges,
especially knowledge sharing, for quality control, one has to accept that quality is not
a manifest variable (White, forthcoming). It is grasped as an implicit ranking.
Transfers and exchanges of advice re¯ected this speci®c pecking order and form of
status at SG&RÐa fragile order, since everyone had been allowed to hope to climb
the ladder by impressing his or her colleagues. Indeed, competition for professional
status may be one reason why the act of providing advice was kept so distinct from
that of collaborating on a case. Moreover, personalized access and multiplex ties to
sought-out and selective advisers could help advice-seekers in stretching advice as
much as possible before it became collaboration.
In effect, at SG&R, as in many professional services ®rms, members did meet
on a regular basis for updates on the evolution of their knowledge base (the law,
regulations, and court decisions). But knowledge was still mainly mobilized and
shared while working together. To understand how knowledge and experience were
managed in such an organization, it is important to insist on the work process as
simpli®ed in Chapters 2 and 5: members work together on cases, and they compete
for professional status in the deliberation, or `brainstorming', process. This takes us
back to the question of how members resort to some kind of authority to stop the
professional status competition process and take responsibility for quality. The issue
of quality is not so much who knows what, but who has the authority to know, and
how this authority is negotiated, constructed, and maintained (Lazega 1992a).
Indirect control over collective action is often `epistemic'Ðthat is, related to
knowledge construction. Attention to one aspect of a case rather than to another
may be the object of a debate. Authority to know helps members impose a certain
focus of attention after a deliberation. In the selection of relevant and appropriate
information (the interactive elaboration of information), actors need the authority
to make an issue salient: people with status can impose that; they are attributed the
authority to know. One can, therefore, expect members to share expertise and
experience in their niche and to share it in the status games too: knowledge cannot
be shared outside such identity politics and status competition. It cannot be shared
without an authority argument providing members with the authority to know.
Since members tend to work in niches, it is likely that they will ®nd this authority
within this niche. But it is also likely that they ®nd it outside the niche, thus using
resources provided by the ®rm as a whole (®rm-wide status of speci®c partners) to
manage local quality problems raised by the work process.
Thus, it was in members' collective economic interest to share information and
experience as much as possible, but it was also in their individual interestÐgiven the
status competition processÐto do so while increasing as much as possible their
individual credit and stressing the value of their own experience and authority.
Knowledge is not only shared under task-force and niche-level relational pressure.
It is also shared by the prospect of increasing one's ®rm-wide and more general
professional status. Once they have been provided, by their niche, with resources
and with a sense of their interests beyond the short term, members need another
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level of social approval if they want to increase their status within the ®rm. This form
of status can be called `professional authority or reputation'. Whereas individual
economic performance is strongly associated with task-force membership, profes-
sional reputation is also based on the capacity to be recognized out of local niches.
The multilevel exchange system was thus a form of productive social mechanism
when it helped members reach out of their niches. In this second section, I also look
at whether members shared knowledge and how they concentrated the authority to
know in the professional status of a few select partners. I argue that much of the
proactive quality control was performed by seeking these members' advice on task-
related matters. Professional status allowed these central members to push and
sometimes impose their standards and criteria of quality.14
The main actors in the advice network of the ®rmÐwho had acquired a form of
status that attracted great deferenceÐare identi®ed below. Several local rules related
to the circulation of advice within the ®rm have already been extracted from the
analysis, among which was the most important: one did not seek advice from people
`below'. This concentration of the authority to know may still be puzzling in an
organization where members were jealous of their professional discretion and
individual intellectual autonomy. It is less so when considering the problems raised
by formal peer review of quality of work. The social process of capitalization and of
knowledge distribution being inextricably related to quality control through pro-
fessional status and epistemic alignment, it was necessary, but also costly, to protect
this expertise from opportunistic behaviour.15 The purpose of this chapter is ®nally
to show how such a co-orientation was made possible informally in this type of
collegial organization.
A picture of the advice network at the structural level is useful at this point.
Indeed, describing the inner workings of the organization as an exchange system for
authoritative professional information may help in looking at the connection
between individual interests, individual management of knowledge and experience,
and ®rm structure. The distribution of knowledge produced by the multilevel
exchange mechanism can be inferred from the overall pattern of the advice network.
This structure con®rms that co-orientation was achieved and stabilized in the
organization through the concentration of the authority to know. The ®rm's main
resourceÐits expertise and creativity with regard to solving complex legal problems
for corporationsÐwas located not only in its mainframe computer, but in the
structure of this network (in speci®c niches and in central advisers). Co-orientation
thus happened within and across niches, and requests for advice and professional
status recognitionÐthat generated this co-orientationÐconverged towards posi-
tions of partners, with senior associates as exceptions. Seniority and concentration
of the authority to know are shown to be important for achieving cognitive align-
ment or co-orientation, and for the de®nition of the situationÐthat is, of the
legitimacy of decisions made on cases at hand.
This social solution to the problem of quality control through selective capitali-
zation of socially authorized knowledge, however, also has an effect on other pro-
cesses in the ®rm. We know that members also tried to reach out of their niches: to
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cut across boundaries, to use short cuts to members in other niches, thus increasing
their autonomy from a constraining set of niche fellows. For example, this system of
circulation of advice favoured a few selected associates in their race towards part-
nership: through short cuts in the network, it provided them with access to very
senior partners. Here again, the exchange system is shown to have been a productive
form of social mechanism: it helped members manage valuable experience and
learning. But it was also a selection mechanism, because it allocated immaterial
resources in an unequal way.
Avoiding formal peer review
Among organizational processes that collegial ®rms (as well as others) deal with,
peer reviewÐthat is, the evaluation of one's partners' workÐwas certainly one of
the most sensitive and sometimes upsetting, especially when the review applied to
the quality of work, and not only to the economics of productivity. Some ®rms have
a peer evaluation mechanism that looks at every person's `professionalism' and tries
to improve it. Especially under pressure from malpractice insurers, professional
®rms recognize the need for maintaining or upgrading their overall level of pro-
fessionalism. Financial incentives are given to ®rms by these insurers to extend their
understanding of collective responsibility and to implement quality control. The
®nancial incentives are tied, for instance, to in-house continuing legal educational
courses, or to intake policies that allow the ®rm to stay out of work that is likely to
cause any kind of insurance claim. Despite a tradition of Yankee individualism and a
belief that they were part of the elite of the profession, the ®rm had raised the issue,
and was looking for a methodology that would help partners look at what other
partners did.
At the time of the study, it had not implemented a formal peer review system for
the quality of work in which some partners went and looked through other people's
®les and determined whether `they did the matter right'. They relied on a less
systematic system (complaints). The main of®cial argument against a more formal
system was its high cost. It cost the client or the ®rm money to put two lawyers on a
matter where one suf®ced, where one was seen as just serving as a shadow of the
other. Resistance to the implementation of formal review mechanisms was wide-
spread. The more senior lawyers did not welcome any change that seemed to detract
from the informality of earlier practice. Many partners said that they did not worry
about the quality of work of their colleagues, that the problems were with partners
who were not working hard enough or taking in lousy business. They saw a peer
review as a review of one's contribution to the ®rm as a partner, as opposed to the
quality of the work that went out.
I think it's a measure of my feeling of respect for my partners. A broad system of peer
review, meaning reviewing every major brief, or going in and reviewing ®les, I think it
would be excessively time consuming and that would clearly be an affront to the
independence, and I don't think it would reveal much. (Partner 4)
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Many were sceptical about quality peer review, either because of such practical
dif®culties or because of more substantive ones, such as de®ning the quality of
service rendered.
Probably it (control of partner' work by other partners) exists in the most informal way
and that informal way would be triggered if someone catastrophically screws up, but I
don't know what my partners do, I don't see their correspondence and the briefs that
they ®le, they don't see mine. (a) We are too busy, we are all too busy. (b) It was never
that way even twenty-®ve years ago, they never looked at what the others were doing. I
am not aware of any place where partners are looking at what other partners are doing.
There is talk about the fact that they should, increasingly for malpractice purposes, for
ethical purposes, the fact that we are `each responsible for each'. Ethically we are liable,
from an ethical standpoint before the grievance committee, and from a malpractice
standpoint before the court. That does not change; it may change, but I don't see it. I
think it might change because people talk about it in the national media and the
professional press. And I suspect that there will be ®rms that will devise structures and
methodologies for doing this. And that there will be some catastrophe at some ®rm
and the senior partners will say `We'd better have something like this, let's borrow what
these people do.' One of the problems obviously is that, in order to judge the quality of
your work product, you presumably have to know something about the substance, the
substantive law, in order to make that judgement. So, because of the specialized
nature, you can tell if a letter is sloppily written but I couldn't look at my tax partners'
letters and determine whether he has missed the latest IRS rule. It has to be done by
other lawyers in their special area in order to be meaningful. And also part of the
problem is knowing the fact situation. The example I gave you earlier of sitting with the
client and not saying everything you might say because the occasion is not right and
you expect an occasion that is right to occur, or because someone else is there, or
because you know that based on something that happened two days ago this client
would be unreceptive to that suggestion now, but more so later, will persuade you not
to say something. The not-saying of that thing may very well in isolation be viewed as
malpractice. So strategy, tactics, timing are also part of the decision to give or to
withhold advice, or which advice to give when or to whom. The example I gave of that
letter: certain things I can say to the top man of the corporation, but the subordinate
will not understand and not appreciate, and it might be counterproductive to say it to
the subordinate because he will interpret your letter to the top man in such a way as to
undercut your ability to persuade the top man once you get there. So it is very dif®cult
for me to judge whether partner X should have mentioned this alternative to client Y
in that letter, because maybe there is something else going on, some reason not to use,
at that particular time in that particular format, a letter as opposed to an oral point. So
there is some inertia: `If it ain't broke, don't ®x it.' I suppose that one can say that, we
haven't had that experience. And I suppose that, if the quality of the work is so bad,
there is the likelihood that the client will either drop the ®rm or hopefully not drop it but
seek out another partner to say `This work I have been getting is pretty bad' and that
would trigger peer review. (Partner 6)
The uncertainty surrounding any mechanism of peer evaluation was sometimes the
extent to which it would be a perfunctory operation as opposed to a real in-depth
look at a whole matter or at a partner's behaviour.
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Thus, at the time of the study, SG&R considered of®cially that the usual ®nancial
supervision of partners' productivity represented a suf®ciently tight form of control,
and that a formal peer review system for quality control was too expensive to install.
For instance, there was a debate about whether or not partners should be obliged to
reach a certain amount of billable hours. A formal peer review process was to be
triggered only when somebody (mainly: a client) complained. SG&R was thinking of
creating either a committee reviewing the letters sent out by partners to clients or a
procedure by which no formal opinion letter would go out without being reviewed
by another partner. The malpractice insurance carrier did provide incentives for an
institutionalized opinion committee (by offering a high deductible). Many clearly
recognized that they needed to have a review on formal opinions; but opinions that
had any potential for dif®culty were supposed to be reviewed informally by a second
partner. The rationale was that somebody might be so involved with a deal, for
example, that he or she could lose the forest for the trees, and it was always useful to
have somebody else looking with a fresh mind at one's work.
A committee system was also perceived by some as a good mechanism, because it
would avoid shopping practices that occurred in a less formal system where `people
go to the fellow who will give you the right answer'. But, besides formal opinion
letters, informal discussions among partners were considered to be frequent enough
to constitute a good safeguard, an informal peer review process of getting second
opinions. Informal review was seen as part of the cooperative spirit of the ®rm.
If someone was not on the top of his or her game, the managing partner would have
to intervene indirectly and informally. People were afraid not so much that their
judgement would be called into question by a more formal review system, as much
as of the fact that the mechanics of such a system might be dif®cult to implement,
partners being very busy.
The peer review that we have right now is everyone sits down in the partners' meeting
and you have in front of you the print-out that shows you how many hours I worked, how
many hours I billed, how many hours I collected, and how outstanding my account
receivable is, and then you get people grumbling at the meeting about the account
receivables going up and not coming down. But as far as whether I am doing a good
job on my work, unless they get a call from a client complaining about me, some kind of
peer review as to quality of work, I think that will be hard to implement. I suspect it
would be resented by many, and at least at the stage we are at, I don't think I want to be
reviewing somebody else's work and decide whether it is good or not. I am too busy, I
don't want to do somebody else's work, I want to do my own. The managing partner
will have a hard time implementing a systematic second opinion. (Partner 29)
In summary, the ®rm still counted on informal and indirect forms of peer review
and quality control. It was planning to have at least a formal system for opinion
letters, which were reviewed before they went out, but hesitated to go any further in
this process of bureaucratization. This issue is further elaborated upon in Chapter 8,
because it re¯ects underlying tensions in precarious professional values. I now look
at how the ®rm managed quality control through the idea that it happened in the
process of work-related sharing of knowledge and experience. The characteristics of
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this mechanism are used to show that quality control takes place through
`co-orientation' and `epistemic alignment'. In effect, for quality control to be pos-
sible in the work process itself, members' brainstorming needed to be based on a
form of deliberation that shared the whole picture of the case at hand. In the next
section, I focus on members' comments on their cooperation with their declared
strong co-workers. I look at how they perceived status competition in their
exchanges of background, case-related information in their niches. These comments
con®rm that the conditions for informal quality control to be possible in task forces
were present most of the time.
Sharing the big picture?
How did members of this professional services ®rm share knowledge with
co-workers? In task forces and niches, members combined cooperation, status
competition, and knowledge management in various ways, depending on their
experience of this competition with speci®c co-workers. In order to show that quality
control was ensured by the multiplex exchange system in the ®rm, it is important to
show that members shared knowledge in the brainstorming process and competed
for professional status derived from `knowing best' in the deliberation. Additional
data were collected about this topic, building on the strong co-workers' network
analysed above. Speci®cally, the lawyers were all askedÐas mentionedÐwith whom
they had intensive work relationships within the ®rm; then they were asked to check
the names of their co-workers with whom they felt that they usually shared the whole
picture of the cases on which they worked together (see Appendix A). A sub-network of
co-workers, the `whole-picture network', was thus identi®ed: it includes the subset of
colleagues with whom knowledge and expertise were felt to be shared. Arguments
were then provided to explain why sharing did or did not take place. These arguments
were examined for interpretation focused on status competition.
In other words, members tried to work in niches, but in such niches they com-
bined status competition (hierarchy) and knowledge or information in various
ways, depending on their experience with speci®c co-workers. In a niche, members
might or might not share knowledge, but this issue was often connected to that of
the authority to know. A partner handling the case was often in a position to select
among his colleagues those with whom he or she would allow status competition to
take place. When a partner did not share the whole picture of the case with a
colleague who also worked on this case, there could not be much deliberation.
Someone who did not know enough about a case could not display professional
judgement. When a partner shared selectively the whole picture of the case with
some colleagues working on this case, but not with others, status competition was
usually limited to dyadic tournaments. The following excerpts of members' inter-
views about `sharing the whole picture' show that, explicitly or implicitly, status and
knowledge were combined in members' attitudes to work. The examples are taken
from the arguments provided by respondents to justify their sociometric choices in
this vignette.
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Several partners did not enter the status competition process. They usually
happened to be so senior that such a competition was probably meaningless to
them. The main reasons given for this were the costs to the client and the style of
practising law:
I don't share the whole picture of the case with my partners. It is shared on an
appropriate basis, but not totally. It costs too much to the client. We each have different
responsibilities. Same with associates. I also do a lot myself. Partly it is the nature of the
practice. I have to learn the case if I am responsible for the case. The way we operate on
the litigation matter is at least one partner, one associate, and very consuming, very
intensive work. (Partner 1)
Associate 65 con®rmed Partner 1's quote only partly:
The higher up you go on the list, the less they give you details. But most of the time,
they end up sharing with you. I am a type of person who learns by working with others.
Here you have access to people. If you need it they give you the information. They may
not share at the beginning of the case, but they will eventually, even when it is only a
narrow part of the project.
Less senior partners, such as Partner 23, sometimes also shared this view:
I don't hold back anything, but I am not going to apply more resources to the case than
I can bill. You have to balance the nature of the case and the resources of the ®rm you
mobilize. If I can do that without ®lling the associate on the whole case, I do that. It is a
desirable thing to do, in general, but sometimes inef®cient. I can't have everybody
rethink everything I have. Time always comes into play. Generally, my clients are not
Fortune 500, they are not willing to pay for anything. (Partner 23)
Some partners acknowledged a more selective attitude as to whom they allowed in
the status competition game. They shared the whole picture only with other part-
ners, or only for speci®c types of cases.
I work in a consultative way with partners; it is generally a matter of dividing and sharing
responsibility depending on area of expertise, corporate or litigation. If the matter is in
the court, a litigator couldn't do what he is doing without the whole picture. I tend to
handle large matters, complicated cases. I have at least one partner who knows as
much. I need another head to consider the complications of the matter. With associ-
ates, the question is how reliable their judgement is. With associates, I'd say I am more
selective. They take pieces out. To think about what to do about a case, I don't rely on
what the associate is saying. I de®ne for them the task, and they do that with various
levels of sophistication and talent and experience. The associate has a snapshot view of
the case. Associates are usually not truly my colleagues. Unless I have tested their
judgement and feel comfortable with it. You have to give them the opportunity to learn
and grow. But it's not like you have associates to do your work for you. At least
50 per cent of work with associates you could do it quicker and cheaper. You couldn't
do everything though. (Partner 14)
By and large, I do share with other partners. I am looking for their judgement to test my
judgement. I also believe that if it's a shared project, I want them to share the upside
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and the downside of the project. I'll ask an associate to do a discrete task. It would be a
waste of my time and his otherwise. My view is I want them to be involved as much as I
can, to help their development as lawyers, but often it's a matter of how you're dealing
with the reality that there is not enough time. (Partner 26)
In contrast, many other partners considered that a Taylorian division of labour
was dif®cult to sustain. The whole picture was shared with all, because cases were
complex, associates needed training, and that was their style of practising law.
Brie®ng associates (and sometimes paralegals and support staff) on the big picture
was therefore perceived to generate interest in the matter and to discourage them
from going off on wild tangents.
In general, yes I share. We are working together, and I concede that I don't know
everything. Sometimes I want to do something, I get their opinion about whether it is
too aggressive. I learned that the advice you get from someone who knows nothing
about the case is worth nothing. In terms of managing the case overall, they have to
know the nuances of the case. It is only useful then. People do not do a speci®c limited
chore. That's not the nature of my practice. They don't have to know absolutely
everything about the case, but their input is better if they know the overall picture. The
people with whom I work are good: it does not take a long time to give them the overall
picture or to answer questions if they need to. The client won't pay for it if it takes too
much time, but you do what the matter requires and over time the bills take care of
themselves. (Partner 5)
All of them. The more they know about the case, the better the job. They are doing
analysis for you. The fun of this business is precisely that. I usually hear too much rather
than too little on all cases. I need that because I have to persuade the client. My
suggestions have to be persuasive. I always say to my partners and associates: `If you
don't agree with me, tell me.' The client has to be persuaded. Persuasion is a big part of
this business. Part of this business is making sure clients understand. To the extent that
partners and associates are really involved, they do a better job. It's the Japanese style:
I need their brains and interest. (Partner 22)
Traditionally, associates complain about lack of training, about being kept in the
dark, about not really knowing how what they do ®ts into the whole picture of the
case. They may work very hard to make urgent deadlines, but they sometimes do not
know why things have to be done in a hurry and what was the scope of the project, or
the game plan. The decision as to whether they are getting the whole picture was the
partners', not theirs. At SG&R, such complaints also re¯ected the frustration of not
being able really to participate in the professional status competition. They came
almost exclusively from junior associates, although not from all:
Certain partners like to retain control over a given ®le. It can be a question of con-
®dence in your ability to do the work for them; or it can be that they are extremely busy.
But sometimes it's because they don't let go: ego reasons. It is hard for you to nail them
down to get the whole picture. Two of these partners are people who like to keep tight
control on their ®les. They would tell you: here is the problem, here is what I want you to
do, go and do it. I never see the client with those two. It also depends on the level of
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dif®culty and intellectual interest of the work. Relinquishing control is dif®cult. But other
partners want more input from you, they are more cautious, they want to see if they have
missed a connection. At least if you ask a question, they will tell you. (Associate 49)
When you ®rst start, cases have sometimes been going on for years. They are too busy
to explain what's going on. That stinks. I think it's hard when you start. Often you are
given a task in a vacuum; you end up being terribly confused. A lot of it may be because
you are new and it's easy to be confused. As a new associate, you learn whom you
can approach and whom you should stay away from. Some are personality wise
inaccessible. (Associate 71)
More senior associates usually had the feeling that they participated much more:
When I worked with Partner 17, for example, who is a corporate partner, it was on a
limited issue, and I didn't need to know about the whole picture, nor did I care to. But
when a case turns into a full-blown litigation, I get the whole picture. I work with
remarkably fair people. They all give me adequate information and I am not shy about
getting more if I need it. I wouldn't put up with somebody who does not give me
enough. I give the whole picture to them. I have limited time too. (Associate 39)
The partners usually let us in. It is the style of the ®rm in general. Partners here do not
spoon-feed you with things. Sometimes they give you the ®le, tell you `read up, ®nd out
what it's about, and draft this or that', which is the right way to do it. Most of them give
you the whole ®le. Smallness [of the of®ce] results in a full exchange. There is an
element of trust, of familiarity, of being comfortable with you. When the full exchange is
not there, it is because the partner is not comfortable with the associate or does not
care about what the associate would have to say about the case. Most partners I deal
with are interested in what my views are. There are exceptions, of course, but they are
dif®cult to separate from personality issues. (Associate 50)
Thus, the decision to share was surrounded by reasoning about cost, about
personal style, about the nature of the task, and about control. A very unclear
division of labour existed in the sharing of background information. The delib-
eration process was quali®ed here in various ways, and the ongoing attempts at
controlling the authority to know was made explicit several times. Note that part-
ners were never openly accused of mistreating associates. They were sometimes
accused of not playing the status competition game in a way that provided the
associate with an opportunity to increase his or her professional status.
The analysis of the whole-picture network shows that respondents were selective
in their identi®cation of knowledge sharers. But the density of the network was still
0.16, which was not much lower than that of the co-workers' and advice networks
(respectively 0.22 and 0.18). Analysis of the aggregated choices shows that sharing
knowledge also took place in the niches identi®ed above. The same formal
dimensions of ®rm structure were used as identity criteria by members who felt that
they shared knowledge with their co-workers, thus con®rming the importance of
niches in this process. They tended to feel that they shared the whole picture with
same speciality colleagues, in the same of®ce, although this was the case for Of®ce I
members much more than for Of®ce II members. Litigators felt that they shared
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mostly with other litigators, mainly in Of®ce I, and almost equally for partners and
associates. The same was true with corporate lawyers, although a little less obviously
so. When lawyers felt that they shared with members of other of®ces, it was mainly
with partners. One important result is that status differences did not prevent
partners from feeling that they shared within the same of®ce, although it did across
of®ce boundaries. At least, overall, partners felt more often that they shared mostly
with other partners, but that effect is not statistically signi®cant. It seems that, for
partners, status differences did not matter as much as one would expect when
sharing the whole picture. Status mattered much more for associates, who felt that
partners who worked intensively with them also shared background information
much more than other associates (that is, potential competitors) did. Associates who
felt that they shared with other associates were mainly litigators from Of®ce I.
Centrality measures in the network show that many partners and senior associates
were identi®ed as background information sharers by many others. Senior partners
even tended to underestimate the extent to which they shared, when compared to
what their younger co-workers felt about the issue: many co-workers considered
that these senior partners did share the whole picture with them, whereas the latter
thought that they did not. In contrast, a few partners (for example Partners 15, 24,
and 26) strongly overestimated the extent to which they shared: they asserted that
they shared with almost all their co-workers, whereas only one-third of the latter
con®rmed it. Status differences seemed to be temporarily downplayed in the
deliberation process with one's immediate co-workers and to be more salient
(overplayed) with other members of the ®rm.
These results are quite similar to that of the broader and encompassing
co-workers' network. Since individuals tried to harness the advantages of their own
social ties and status, and that of the ®rm itself (the existence of such task forces and
niches), they con®rmed that members also shared background information in
niches of `same speciality, same of®ce' task forces. Background information was
indeed an important task-related resource, and members in this situation did have
the feeling that partner±associate status differences tended to be temporarily
downplayed in the deliberation process, thus often allowing for minimal levels of
informal quality control.
I NF O R M A L LY D I ST R I BU T ED K NO W L EDG E AN D
C O M P ET I TI ON F O R T H E A U TH O R IT Y T O KN OW
Quality control depended heavily on the way the ®rm managed to capitalize and
share knowledge and experience in live interactions. This anticipates Chapter 5
(professional brainstorming) and raises the question of how members resort to
some kind of authority to stop the professional status competition processÐand
thus take responsibility for quality. Professional status was recognized in colleagues
when they were sought out for advice. As seen above, advice was a key resource in
such a knowledge-intensive organization. Members needed it to solve complex legal
problems in a creative way. In the advice network, on average, lawyers had in their
160 Economic Performance and Quality Control
network twelve colleagues with whom they could exchange basic work-related ideas.
We saw earlier that status competition was controlled by the fact that partners held
the authority to know in the deliberation and that advice was rarely sought out from
colleagues `below'. The issue here, as seen before, was not so much who knew what,
but who had the authority to know, and how this authority was negotiated, con-
structed, and maintained. Attention to one aspect of a case rather than to another
could be the object of a debate in the deliberation. Authority to know helped a
partner impose a certain temporary focus of attention in a deliberation, although
attention could not really be decreed in such a context. In the selection of relevant
and appropriate information, members needed this authority to make an issue
salient and provide the brainstorming with a conclusion. Indirect control
over collective action was often `epistemic'Ðthat is, related to authority in the
management of knowledge (Lazega 2000d).
Since members tended to work in niches, it was likely that they would ®rst ®nd
this authority within a niche. But it could also happen that they would ®nd it outside
the niche, especially if they could not agree on an authority within it. Members did
so by expanding their search out of the local task force and niche boundaries to
reach and use a ®rm-wide form of authority and status. They used resources pro-
vided by the ®rm as a whole and created ®rm-wide professional status for speci®c
partners to manage local problems raised by the work process. Professional
and hierarchical forms of status combined to control the production process. This
form of status can be called `professional reputation'. As already stated, whereas
individual economic performance was strongly associated with task-force mem-
bership, qualitative professional performance was also based on the capacity to reach
beyond local substructures and niches. The multilevel exchange system was also a
form of productive social mechanism in that it helped members in reaching beyond
their niches. The exchange system, this time in spite of its propensity to create
niches, provided a structural solution to the problem of quality control by orga-
nizing in a credible way the distribution and use of knowledge and experience.
As established above, peer evaluation of quality was in the task-related advice
network. The way in which the advice network16 was shown to be strati®ed is a
useful characteristic for our purpose. Since quality in this context was linked to
knowledge and experience, a reputation `market' was created in the ®rm. The
analysis of the advice network is therefore the key to my argument. In Figure 3.1, it
can be seen how exchanges of advice provided a ®rst view of how knowledge was
managed within the ®rm. We already know that the advice network had both
hierarchical (or centre±periphery) and clustering tendencies17 with an emphasis on
hierarchical arrangement. Advice was sought within and across niches; requests for
advice and professional status recognition converged towards positions of partners,
with senior associates as exceptions. Seniority in general was important here for
achieving cognitive alignment or co-orientation around a common de®nition of the
situation in collective actionÐthat is, for the legitimacy of a certain course of action.
Members rarely sought advice from others below them in the seniority scale: thus
the longer you were in the ®rm, the more people came to you for advice (and the less
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you sought advice). They also tended to seek advice from others in their own
nicheÐthat is, from members similar in of®ce and speciality. However, given the
number of seniority levels in the pecking order, it was unlikely that junior associates
would seek advice from senior partners. The latter would be overwhelmed with
questions below their status. Therefore, it was very likely that members would seek
advice from more senior members closer to them on this ladder.
The joint analysis of indegree centrality scores and prominence scores con®rms
precisely this multilevel dimension of professional status. Indegree centrality scores
show that members cited most often (more than twenty ®ve times) were the fol-
lowing: Partners 4, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, and 34, and
Associates 40, 41, 42, 55, 65, and 66. This list includes a few senior partners, in
particular those with an open-door policy, either for senior associates, or even, as for
Partner 13, for everyone. Senior associates and younger ones with high scores were
mostly cited by other associates below or near them, with exceptions who will be
examined below. However, Burt's prominence scores (1982), which include a mea-
surement of the importance of the people who cited the focal member, identify
Partners 1, 2, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 28, and 34 as the most prominent.
The difference between the two measures shows that Partners 1, 2, 6, 15, and 21 were
cited by few colleagues, but by colleagues who were themselves important ones,
mainly partners and senior associates. In addition, prominence scores for top part-
ners were increased by the fact that, while being heavily sought out, they themselves
sought out fewer people.18 Partners 13 and 34 were still in the list but with relatively
lower scores because they attracted a heavy volume of associates' citations (women
associates for Partner 34, who was one of the three women partners).
In sum, a nested centre±periphery structure shows the existence of ®rm-wide
professional status, an important form of status in knowledge-intensive organiza-
tions that count on the capacity of members to innovate and maintain informal
quality control. This implies a convergence of requests for knowledge in the system
of `distributed knowledge'. The distribution of the authority to know produced by
this exchange mechanism and inferred from the pattern of the advice network
provides a clearer picture of the informal quality control process that took place in
the ®rm as a result of avoidance of formal peer review.
It would be too simple, however, to say that just a few central partners and senior
associates were key to this form of informal and indirect control. Next, I use an
analysis of approximated structural equivalence in this advice network to show that,
in a collegial environment, distributed knowledge also means multiplication and
competition between professional authorities. Such a multiplication characterizes
the learning process in knowledge-intensive ®rms.
A DV I CE F L OW S , D IS TR IB U TI ON , A ND C O NC E NT R A TI ON
OF P R OF E SS IO NA L A U T H OR I TY
Members carefully bounded the set of people from whom they sought advice. They
were also included in or excluded from other members' selections. Dimensions of
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the ®rm's formal structure also weighed heavily on knowledge sharing and advice-
seeking behaviour. This resulted in a relational structure that re¯ected the existence
of the seniority rule (regarding transfers and exchanges of advice) and the joint
construction of co-orientation through professional status competition. The pattern
describing the shape of ¯ows of advice is described below, using again an analysis
approximating structural equivalence between members (Burt 1982, 1991). Eleven
clearly different positions were thus identi®ed in the advice network. Figure 4.1 is
a reduction providing an overview of the relations between these positions.19
Appendix D includes the density table from which it is derived and a detailed
description of these positions and the relationships between them.
Position
Eleven
Atypical
associates
Position
Five
Women
litigation
coordinators
Position
Ten
Peripheral 
associates
Position
Eight
Beginners
Position
Seven
‘The boys’
Position
Nine
Office II
litigation
associates
Position
Six
Universal
advisers
Position
Two
Atypical
attorneys
Position
One 
Hard core
Position
Four
Office II
litigation
partners
Position
Three
Office II
corporate
partners
Figure 4.1. Advice seeking in the ®rm
Note: This ®gure represents the pattern of relationships between positions of approximately structurally
equivalent actors in the advice network for all member. Positions represented by a box are composed
mainly of partners. Positions represented by a circle are composed mainly of associates. Positions in grey
have at least one rival position among the other positions in grey of similar status. Thick lines represent
reciprocated advice relationships. For more details about these positions and the relationships among
them, see Appendix D. Note that, when analysed separately, each network breaks down into positions that
are different from the positions identi®ed when all the networks are superimposed and analysed together
to provide a multiplex pattern (Figure 3.1).
Source: Reprinted from Revue Suisse de Sociologie, E. Lazega, `Concurrence, coopeÂration et ¯ux de conseil
dans un cabinet ameÂricain d'avocats d'affaires: Les eÂchanges d'ideÂes entre colleÁgues', 21: 73. Copyright
1995 with permission from Revue Suisse de Sociologie.
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Positions represented by a box include mainly partners, and positions represented
by a circle mainly associates. Thick lines represent reciprocated advice relationships
between positions. As established above in the statistical analysis, partners tended
not to seek advice from associates.
To summarize, Position One, the `hard core' of this network, was composed of
Of®ce I partners of all specialities. Position Two clustered the `atypical' attorneys
(either `laterals'Ðthat is, lawyers recruited from other law ®rmsÐor representatives
of non-lucrative corporate speciality) from both main of®ces. Position Three was
that of Of®ce II core corporate partners. Position Four was that of Of®ce II core
litigation partners. Position Five was that of the `coordinators', mostly senior
women litigation associates in Of®ce I. Position Six clustered the ®rm's `universal',
advisers, all litigators in Of®ce I. Position Seven was composed of a group of Of®ce I
litigation associates called `the boys'. Position Eight was that of the most junior
associates in the ®rm, all Of®ce I litigators and called the `beginners'. Position Nine
clustered Of®ce II litigation associates. Position Ten was mainly that of lateral
corporate associates in the whole ®rm. Position Eleven was mainly composed
of `atypical' Of®ce I corporate associates. A category of `residual' actors (that is,
actors whose relational pro®le was different from that of everyone else) does not
appear in this ®gure. As an example of relations between two positions, note that
members of Position Ten tended not to seek advice from members of Position
Eleven; or that members of all positions tended to seek advice from members of
Position Six.
The analysis of the directions taken by the ¯ows of advice in the ®rm con®rms this
strati®cation and concentration of professional authority. Very generally, this
context can be described by an obvious strati®cation between those who were often
sought out for advice and those who were very rarely consulted. Within each of these
two categories, interesting absences of relations can be detected and interpreted as
speci®c characteristics of this context.
The ®rst category includes members of Positions One to Six in Figure 4.1. Given
the nature of the concentration described in the previous section, it is not surprising
to ®nd that blocks of partners (as opposed to associates) occupied a central place in
this relational pattern and thus represented professional authority. In particular, six
of the most central and prominent partners belonged to Position One (the `hard
core', of the network) and ®ve to Position Six (universal advisers easily accessible by
associatesÐoften because they belonged to the ATC). As shown by Figure 4.1, the
®ve positions of partners (One, Two, Three, Four, and Five) formed a subset
towards which requests for advice converged from all positions. For instance,
exchanges with Position One were very frequent; all tended to seek its members for
advice, and they often reciprocated, except with Position Four (Of®ce II litigation
partners sometimes perceived as rivals). Position Six was potentially the most
effective at building `epistemic alignment' and co-orientation in the ®rm: its
members tended to be sought out for advice by the members of all the other
positions, but they tended also to reciprocate only to Positions One and Five (and
especially not to Two, Three, and Four).
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The second category included members of Positions Seven to Eleven in Figure 4.1.
For instance, members of Positions Seven and Eight had access to the rest of the ®rm
through the members of Position Five (the `coordinators') or Six (the `universal'
advisers). Members of Positions Ten and Eleven were exceptions to this trend. They
had direct access to the most important partners in the ®rm. Such trends can be
explained by the ethnography of the ®rm: we know, for instance, that most
associates in Positions Ten and Eleven were laterals; they had not `grown up' in the
®rm, and might not have internalized the norms and informal boundaries that
inhibited other associates who had come up through the ranks. In addition, given
their seniority, they could try to intensify their direct ties with partners to make
themselves known and increase their chances of being made a partner.
Figure 4.1 also provides a glimpse into the dynamics of professional status
competition between members. Positions in grey had at least one `rival' position
among the other positions in grey of similar status. Absence of mutual relations
between positions indicates speci®c asymmetries in the ¯ows of advice across the
®rm. They describe the context in which advice seeking occurred in terms of
informal strati®cation (concentration of choices on the `elite' of advisers and on
speci®c positions in the overall pattern) and polarization (between of®ces and
specialities). The most striking and special aspect of the pattern in Figure 4.1 is the
absence of mutual exchanges between certain positions of partners (between Posi-
tions One and Four, and between Positions Three/Four and Six). Focusing on the
relationships among partners shows both that the One±Six axis was dominant in the
control of the ¯ows of advice, and also the absence of reciprocity in these ¯ows,
especially among Of®ce I and Of®ce II litigation partners who competed for the best
associates, and for status and prestige within the ®rm. This asymmetryÐwhich
could be explained by economic incentives to withhold advice or let other partners
downÐwould be shown even more strongly if Figure 4.1 were simpli®ed to retain
only reciprocal relations between positionsÐthat is, truly collective exchanges of
advice. Polarization between Of®ces I and II would still be present, as well as the
centrality and prominence of Position One in terms of advice ¯ows. Members of this
position, for instance, obviously preferred to seek advice from associates of Position
Five rather than from their own partners in Position Four. This structure shows how
quality control and co-orientation through knowledge management was achieved
and stabilized in the organization through concentration and polarization of the
authority to know. This description of the inner workings of the organization as an
exchange system for authoritative professional knowledge is informative when one
looks at the connection between individual interests, individual management of
knowledge and experience, and ®rm structure.
The distribution of the professional authority to knowÐproduced by the mul-
tilevel exchange mechanism and inferred from the pattern of the advice networkÐ
provides a clearer picture of the informal quality control process that took place in
the ®rm as a result of avoidance of formal peer review. The next section stresses the
fact that professional status and economic performance went hand in hand, which in
turn strengthened the informal quality control regime.
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DI ST R I B UT ED KN OW L ED G E A N D
E C ON OM I C P E R F OR M A NC E
These dynamics driven by concentration and distribution of professional authority
underlie the quality control process and are measurably correlated with economic
performance. In effect, in this collegial organization, as perhaps for any ®rm
stressing quality professional services, the conditions under which the pattern
of knowledge ¯ows was most productive included the existence of at least two
processes: ®rst, the selection of exchange partners in the co-workers' network (niche
seeking), as seen above; and, secondly, the concentration of the authority to know in
the advice network (through a form of professional status competition). The fact
that some members emerged as having the authority to know, although such status
was fragile, was the result of a micro-political process that seemed to be ef®cient too.
This ef®ciency can be measured in statistical evidence concerning the relationship
between crude measurements of economic performance and position in social
networks related to the allocation of knowledge. By going back to Table 4.1 it is
possible to test the idea that speci®c relational patterns shaping the ¯ows of
knowledge in the organization were correlated with various measures of economic
performance.
The signi®cant effect of centrality in the advice network in Models 2 and 3 sug-
gests that seniority and concentration of requests for knowledge were a determinant
of strong performance in this case. This effect is added to that of higher hourly rates
for senior partners and to that of constraint in one's work group (or task force).
Recall again that members got their advice in social niches, but also outside the
niche, among partners with a speci®c form of status: it was not only technical
expertise, but authority based on experience and the pressure to risk an already well-
established reputation. Partners with high indegree scores in the advice network had
high hourly rates (r 0.47) and brought in more fees (in terms of dollars collected;
r 0.42). Being sought out for advice was strongly correlated with being senior
(r 0.46), with years spent in the ®rm (r 0.48), with age (r 0.43), with being a
partner (as differentiated from senior associates, who were also sought out for
advice; r 0.30) and with coming from an elite law school (r 0.28). Members
sought out for advice tended to seek others for advice less (correlation between
indegree and outdegree centralities was negative: rÿ 0.28), which con®rms a
status competition effect (one did not seek advice from people below). In short,
processes connected to social status as well as to density of one's work relationships
were the key to the ef®cient distribution of knowledge. Obviously, partners with
high professional authority and strong economic performance belonged to the
oligarchy of the ®rm, a strong argument in favour of informal quality control in that
®rm. The next section stresses the fact that the dynamics underlying this quality
control process generated competitive advantages for some associates who were able
to reach up and out of their niche. In effect, this was made possible by the fact thatÐ
as shown by the patternÐthe seniority rule was not as rigid as the expression `iron
law' would suggest.
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S H OR T C UT S F OR C OM P ET IT I VE A DV A NT A G E
A M ON G AS SO C IA T ES
Another form of ef®ciency of this pattern in the distribution of the authority to
know can be derived from the previous analysis, this time for selected associates. In
Figure 4.1, absence of advice ties among senior associates is also interesting. For
instance, notice that members of Positions Seven, Eight, Nine, and Eleven exchanged
advice within their own respective position, but very little with the members of other
positionsÐanother sign of patronage where clients were kept apart. This may be
explained by the fact that members of each position struck a fragile balance between
cooperation and competition. They needed each other for advice, but they also
tended to be rivals in their relationships with partners. This was particularly true for
the members of Positions Five, Nine, Ten, and Eleven, who were supposed, at the
time of the ®eldwork, to come up for partnership within the next two years. This
competition between associates could result in the design of different relational
strategies with regard to the use of professional status. Position Five members, for
instance, could try to reduce the number of situations in which the members of
other associate positions would get a chance to show their capacity to provide
adviceÐfor instance, by insulating them in compartmentalized domains de®ned by
traditional and formal internal boundaries. Similarly, lateral or `foreign' (from
another of®ce) associates could let themselves be used more often, because they were
perceived to be easier to exploit or less threatening in terms of loss of status for the
advice-seeker.
This pattern also re¯ects serious structural inequalities among members, which
become visible in the differences in their respective individual relational capital.
Anticipating Chapter 5 results, the form of interdependence of advice and friendship
ties displayed at SG&R was based on the fact that each had a separate local structure,
but at the same time a strong propensity for multiplexity and for barter of one for
the other. Thus, trading on friendship was an obvious `short cut'.20 In such a
competitive context, some members had direct access to advice from prominent
partners; they could reach these partners within their own niche, thus crossing the
hierarchical boundaries identi®ed above. Such infractions to the rules were tolerated
for some, and less for others. These others would have had to pay a relatively higher
price to get access to the same resources. Such personalized acquaintance with the
adviser could be decisive. Members of Position Five, for example, could trade more
than members of Position Eleven on personalized ties to get advice and thus obtain a
form of professional blessing, even informal, for their work. Their easier access to
professional status put them in a position to control the quality of work of their
associates. For example, Associates 38, 39, 40, 41, and 43 (among whom 39, 40, and
43 were to become partners very quickly) had a competitive advantage over
Associates 42, 48, 53, and 64 (none of whom were partners in 1999). As a con-
sequence, it could be argued that judgements about the quality of their work would
not be as clear-cut for Position Eleven associates as it was for Position Five
associates: quality would not be guaranteed by the powerful and would thus remain
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debatable. The distribution of advice as an invisible resource did indeed count for
the allocation of credit and promotion.
This system of circulation of advice thus favoured a few selected associates in their
race towards partnership: through short cuts in the network, it provided them with
access to very senior partners. Thus, the exchange system is again shown to have
been a productive form of corporate social capital: it helped members manage
knowledge and control quality. But it is also shown to have re¯ected a selection
mechanism, because it allocated immaterial resources in an unequal way. A com-
partmentalized structure emerges, where some had more or better resources to deal
with competition and get access to resources such as advice, whereas others were
clearly cornered and dependent on their competitors' judgement. This context of
advice seeking was thus constraining in terms of ef®ciency, but also of control and
internal politics.
In sum, the problem of quality control, which was considered to be equivalent to a
problem of accumulation and distribution of authoritative knowledge and experi-
ence in the ®rm, was another structural problem to which the exchange system
provided a structural solution. Formal peer review being highly problematic, the
focus was on yet another way in which this system was productive: by allocating
authoritative knowledge and helping members share experienceÐa crucial resource,
too often considered to be exclusively individual `human capital'Ðin spite of
professional status competition. The exchange system provided a functional
equivalent of peer review, an informal mechanism of quality control. The multilevel
(from the individual to the relational, then to the collective level) analysis of the
pattern of advice network in the ®rm shows how the distribution of professional
status concentrated the authority to know and functioned as an informal quality
control mechanism providing professional `co-orientation'.
In such a knowledge-intensive organization, this form of relational mechanism is
even more important for collective action than it is in other types of organization.
The pattern of advice relationships sustains quality control by distributing profes-
sional authority, while providing a social solution to the problem of capitalization of
knowledge and experience, a crucial problem in such organizations. Flows of advice
are not `free'; they do encounter obstacles, which could systematically prevent
exchanges of intelligence between any two members. In spite of the relative density
of the advice network (0.18), it is obvious that such ¯ows were socially constrained
and structured in a way that solved quality problems more easily for some than for
others. This mechanism, consequently, also had an effect on other processes in the
®rm; in particular, it generated structural inequalities between members in niches
including prominent professionals and members who had to pay a heavy price to try
to reach out of their niches and access professional advice by bypassing a con-
straining set of niche fellows.
This chapter has focused on showing how the exchange system helped with
economic (or quantitative) and professional (or qualitative) forms of performance:
by making tenured partners work and by ensuring a form of quality control
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among peers. In many ways, the generalized exchange system described above
could be expected to prevent tenured partners from free-riding too much (with
exceptions such as Partners 10 and 25), in spite of strong incentives to do so. It did
so by involving partners in more than one type of exchange. Most partners depended
on others for many resources, had to care about others' judgement, and eventually
did what was expected from them: that is, participated in status competition,
worked hard, and submitted to informal, proactive, and task-related quality control.
Having shown that this exchange system could be productive by helping to solve
such problems in collegial organizationsÐsometimes by cultivating status compe-
titionÐI turn in the next chapter to a process of mitigation of this status compe-
tition. This process of cultivation and mitigation of status competition is shown to
be based on the collegial blend of several types of relationships. Indeed, in social
niches, articulation of different resourcesÐthe intersection of networksÐcan be
explained and symbolized by this process. This will enhance our understanding of
participation in collective action among peers by highlighting the combined effect of
the three networks that together re¯ected an order imposed on familiar and chaotic
processes such as brainstorming among interdependent professionals.
169Economic Performance and Quality Control
5Too Many Chefs?
The solidarity that is provided to members through a generalized exchange system in
social niches is fragile, and status competition is a threat to the existence of such a
positive social mechanism. This reiterates basic questions: how do niche seeking and
status competition coexist, and are they not contradictory drives? This chapter is
about this coexistence, as it plays itself out in a process that helps the organization
deal with the potentially negative effects of status competition. It describes the way
in which the intersection of networks can help a social and informal mechanism that
contributes to organizational governance. Multivariate p* models are used to
identify a socially constructed equilibrium between the two drives. They show how
multiplex social ties (co-work, advice, and friendship) within niches can be used in
such a context both to cultivate and to mitigate status competition among profes-
sional colleagues. As mentioned before, status competition can get out of hand; but
social ties can interlock in substructures, showing that it is mitigated by a delicate
process involving advice and friendship ties.
Here, status competition is examined as an `unbounded' status auction process.
Sutton and Hargadon (1996) provided rich descriptions of bounded or segregated1
status auctions in design ®rms; the status auction that they described is con®ned to
the brainstorming room and designated brainstorming sessions. Here, I look at
`unbounded' and diffuse status auctions in which status displays and challenges
occur throughout the organization. When status auctions cannot be con®ned or
segmented away from day-to-day operations, they need to be governed in some
other way.
U N B O U N D E D ST A T U S A U CT I O N S A N D
T H E C O L L E G I A L B L E N D O F R E L A T I O N S H I P S
The process that combines these resourcesÐthat is, that makes multiplexity in
exchanges again so importantÐis the process of mitigation of status competition.
Knowledge-intensive work is inextricably mixed with status games (Blau 1964). This
type of work in a partner±associates task force is very deliberative. As mentioned
earlier, temporary partner±associate task forces at SG&R constituted the core of
multifunctional and sometimes multidisciplinary work groups. In such task forces,
associates are often expected to brainstorm with higher status members. When
deliberating about a case, associates and partners play a temporarily collegial and
egalitarian game involving status auctions in which all substantive arguments have
equal weight. However, at some point, the partners' greater experience, greater skill
and judgement, responsibility to the client, or simply hierarchical position become a
justi®cation for stopping these exchanges and making a decision about how the case
will be handled and efforts allocated. This is often perceived to be autocratic
behaviour of partners imposing idiosyncratic standards of proper practice on frus-
trated associates, but the latter rarely say so. They hope to advance to the top of the
associate pyramid, and to make it to partnership. Among partners, differences are
played down and treated as differences in style, and having the ®nal word with
associates is considered to be an obvious necessity, either as a service provider, or as
a professional educator.
However, status competition can also get out of hand. Status can be endlessly
challenged, especially on behalf of different conceptions of professionalism. At
SG&R, as in any ®rm, status competition was thus a double-edged sword. It was both
encouraged and contained. This creates management problems for professional,
knowledge-intensive organizations, always in danger of unravelling (Olson 1965). It
raises the question of how status competition is handled. Economic approaches to
labour markets (Frank 1985) assert that incentives such as speci®c compensation
systems take care of the negative effects of status differences. Thus, low performers
and low status members tend to be overcompensated relative to the value they
produce, whereas high performers and high status members tend to be under-
compensated relative to the value they produce: they pay a price for being recognized
as high status members. SG&R's lockstep system could, therefore, be considered to be
a mitigation device for status competition among partners. A majority of partners
supported it because they believed that it prevented yearly con¯icts among them-
selves, especially con¯ict about each member's value to the ®rm.
EC O NO M IC M I TI G A T IO N OF ST A TU S C OM P ET IT I ON
If the compensation system was in itself a mitigation mechanism, it was not suf®-
cient, because it was not directly tied to the tasks, the work process, and the rela-
tionships between members carrying it out. With the lockstep system, comparisons
and relative standing evaluations were frozen. This meant that senior partners had to
®nd younger ones who would accept waiting in order to bene®t from postponed
reciprocity (hence the tough selection to make it to partnership: selecting people
who would work hard, but also stay). In effect, partners engaged in both local and
global comparisons. Some of them knew that they could improve their rank and
status by `choosing another pond' (Frank 1985)Ðthat is, by switching to another
law ®rm and de®ning another group as their peers. But they also knew that they
would incur a cost, which sometimes seemed quite high, in the process. Listen to
Partner 18, one of the highest collectors for the year:
Our system costs me money. With a different system, I would have made more money.
But not enough more to make me go into a more competitive environment. With
people who don't know each other well, you are taking more risks that they would
leave. And we don't have such stars that they would make twice as much somewhere
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else. We have the type of people who are not concerned with the extra 10 per cent that
they would get elsewhere, and the type of people who don't like to ®ght. It used to be
said that in business you shouldn't change jobs unless the change brings you 25 per cent
more. Most of us don't have such an opportunity. I operate under that theory. If you
give up security relationships and status, you want a substantial increase to justify that.
You disrupt your life. I wouldn't even consider moving for less than that kind of increase.
It's just easier for me to sit here and be a partner with Partner 8, we don't agree on
anything, but I don't have to argue with him about his compensation. If we had a
different system, I would be much more worried about his views. Shakespeare: bearing
the ills you have rather than ¯eeing to others that you don't know. The problem is with
people who underperform consistently. Do you keep them or not? This is a much more
dramatic decision to make. They continue to draw their full compensation until dis-
satisfaction is such that they are expelled.
This economic mitigation was not obvious at all. In fact it is a rare case that
characterized this ®rm and very few othersÐwhich is why it is so interesting for the
study of the idealtypical collegial form and its cooperation mechanisms. On the one
hand, it was dif®cult to measure the extent to which Partner 1 or Partner 18 were
paid less than the value they produced. But, on the other hand, it was easy to see that
Partner 18 and Partner 16 were paid almost the same amount of compensation. Yet,
in 1990, Partner 18 brought in around 40 per cent more than Partner 16. In 1991, the
difference was close to half a million dollars. What made Partner 18 remain within
this ®rm? Would he not have been better off choosing another pond? The answer
to this question was, ®rstly, as the managing partner said, `You're hot one year,
you're down next year.' So in this ®rm, relative status did not create a very stable
oligarchy; therefore the fact that Partner 18 really belonged to another pond was
not easily established. But the answer was also, secondly, because he preferredÐas
shown aboveÐbeing a big ®sh in this smaller ®rmÐthat is, experiencing high
status compared to lower status partnersÐto being a smaller ®sh in a larger pond,
in which he would run the risk of being the lower status partner. In this ®rm,
Partner 18 accepted a cut in compensation worth tens (if not more than a hun-
dred) of thousands of dollars in exchange for status and its advantages, including
the satisfaction of comparing favourably with others (at least for a few years) who
placed a lower value on intra-organizational status and tolerated being lower on
the totem pole in exchange for an increase in returns compared to what they
brought into the ®rm.
Members in such a law ®rm earned much more than the average American
income. Therefore, it is safe to assert that they cared more about relative than
absolute income.2 Concerns about relative economic standing, and worries about
rank, did exist, but partners could not contest for position, because this position was
assigned to them once and for all. Strong restrictions were placed on such contests.
There was only one way to gain in formal status: staying with the ®rm for a longer
time. With time, you got status anyway, and you repaid it with loyalty to the ®rm. On
the other hand, members could not suffer a great loss of economic status, unless they
were punished for a consistently low economic performance, which was extremely
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rare. In Frank's terms (1985), they could expend too little effort, but this would not
have made them extremely vulnerable or increase dramatically the costs of being
lower-rank members. Thus, high performers were indeed very often undercom-
pensated compared to the revenue they brought into the ®rm, whereas low achievers
were often overcompensated with regard to the same comparison.
C U LT I VA T IN G A ND M I T IG AT I NG S TA TU S C O M P ET I TI ON :
T H E B LE ND I NG P R O C ESS
Professional status competition (among associates, between partners and associates,
and among partners) could not be handled in the same way. It was an ef®cient
mechanism for motivating members at work. If receiving social approval from peers
is one of Weberian value-oriented actors' goals, allocation of this approval through
honours and recognitionÐalong with the privileges of rank in the pecking orderÐis
indeed a powerful motivation device. The following is an example of how partners in
this ®rm typically liked to talk about `their' associates, and the kind of intellectually
challenging attitude (a form of professional status competition) that they encour-
aged within their task forces:
Ours is a fascinating structure built on, to some extent, maximizing a certain type of
ef®ciency. All are encouraged to think hard. You look good as an associate if you can
convince a partner that he is wrong about something. You have freedom of thought
within legal problems. . . . There is a great intellectual freedom here. An associate
yesterday told me that she didn't think that a decision of mine in a ®le was correct. She
stuck to her guns, and ®fteen minutes later I called her to tell her that she was right. In
other places, if the boss says something, everyone says, `Good idea, boss.' Not here.
(Partner 19)
Since compensation in this ®rm was tied to seniority, and since each member's
rank in the seniority scale was de®ned once and for all, status competition lost one of
its most dangerous stakes: money. But it was thus refocused on other stakes, such as
professional involvement, commitment, reputation, and authority in work groups.
For example, partners could put down associates through associate reviews, which
could also be considered to be humbling rituals, illustrating to associates that there
were acceptable limits to challenges to partner status in the work process. The effects
of these humbling rituals were softened by comparisons to other associates or by
other members who indicated that they would have behaved or handled the case in
another way. They nevertheless `underscored the status differences among their
ranks' (Bosk 1979: 143).3
I argue that if cooperation is systematically amenable to structural analyses at
the dyadic, triadic, and higher-order levels, it is possible to enhance understanding
of participation in collective action among status competitors by highlighting
the relationship between choices of important sources of resources in any speci®c
organization. At SG&R, this is possible by looking at how the three important
production-related resources (co-workers' goodwillÐunderstood as a strong
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commitment to collaborationÐadvice, and friendship) were exchanged, or bar-
tered. Speci®cally, this section formulates expectations about such multiplex
exchanges. The next section analyses the interlocking of ties among members to
show how this exchange system provided a structural answer to the problem of
participation in collective action among competing professional peers.
Given the above understanding of the functioning of work groups in this ®rm, it is
reasonable to expect interdependence of relationships in the work process both to
cultivate and to mitigate status competition. Direct exchanges of resources by a pair
of lawyers were likely to occur, since such exchanges supported the regularity of their
speci®c joint participation in task forces. In addition, it is also reasonable to think
that effective collective participation required interdependencies of transfer and
exchange that went beyond direct relations involving a single pair of ®rm members.
Although it is dif®cult to make precise predictions about the detailed nature of these
more complex dependencies, it is nonetheless possible to derive some expectations
about their general form. In particular, indirect transfers and exchanges of resources
(in triadic chains or cycles of cooperation) were likely to be strong because niches
helped members expect that resources transferred to a colleague would eventually
come back, either directly or through a third colleague. Thus, extra-dyadic depen-
dencies were also likely to be observed in the circulation of each resource, since it
was only dependencies involving three or more lawyers that could provide a
structural basis for the coordination of ongoing collective participation.
With regard to the interlocking of the different types of resources, previous
argumentation suggests that, to structure the work process, interdependence bet-
ween co-workers' ties and advice ties was strong in this exchange system. Speci®-
cally, members should have mixed work and advice ties so as to bring in status to
control the deliberation process. In addition, to mitigate status competition,
interdependence between advice ties and friendship ties could be expected to be
strong in this exchange system. In other words, members should tend to mix advice
and friendship ties so as to soften the potentially negative effects of status compe-
tition. Finally, given that partners could always have the upper hand over associates
in the same task force, and that partners in the same task force sought out other,
usually more senior, partners outside the task force to sort out status competition
among themselves, interdependence between co-workers' ties (often mixing part-
ners and associates) and friendship ties should have been relatively weak and
infrequent. In other words, members, in general, should have sorted their ties so as
not to mix work and friendship directly, even to uncouple them.
Without further analyses, it is dif®cult to evaluate these expectations about the
form of interdependence between resources for the members of this ®rm, and to
understand the ways in which these exchanges help mitigate status competition in
collegial organizations. The description and analyses of the exchange system in this
®rm provide evidence for testing these hypotheses. As mentioned in Appendix E, the
p* class of multivariate random graph models (Frank and Strauss 1986; Pattison
1993; Pattison and Wasserman 1999; Robins et al. forthcoming; Strauss and Ikeda
1990; Wasserman and Pattison 1996) were developed speci®cally for the analysis of
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tie interdependencies. They are used here to analyse the interplay between the three
social resources shaping cooperation among these professionals. They help identify
the speci®c local and multiplex exchange substructures on which this cooperation is
based.
S OC I A L M I TI G A T IO N OF ST A TU S C OM P ET IT I ON :
A M U LT I P L EX S OC I AL M EC H A N IS M
Substructures and their parameter labelling have already been presented in
Figure 3.2. After the local distribution of co-workers' ties were described in Chapter
3, advice and friendship ties were added in such substructures. This distribution is
represented in the last two models presented in Table 3.4 (advice, then friendship).
The advice relation has positive parameters for both reciprocity (11_A,A) and
transitivity (9_A,A,A), although the reciprocity parameter is not as strong as for the
other two relations, mainly because people sought out for advice tended to have
equal or superior status to advice-seekers. In addition, the 2-path parameter
(13_A,A) and the 3-cycle parameter (10_A,A,A) are large and negative. This pattern of
parameter values is consistent with tendencies towards both local clustering and
partial ordering. It suggests an advice structure that was globally hierarchical, with
some local clustering.
The friendship relation has even larger positive reciprocity (11_F,F) and transi-
tivity (9_F,F,F) parameters than the advice relation. In addition, the 2-path para-
meter (13_F,F) and the 3-cycle parameter (10_F,F,F) are also negative, suggesting
that the friendship relation also displayed strong local clustering as well as some
hierarchical organization. In fact, the values of the reciprocity and transitivity
parameters suggest that local clustering was stronger for friendship than for advice.
The weak but positive 2-out-star parameter (12_F,F) suggests that at least some
individuals chose friends who were not tied to one another; thus, at least some
friendship ties bridged denser local clusters.
Thus, overall, direct exchanges by a pair of lawyers are shown to have been strong
for all resources, enabling joint participation in task forces and availability of
advisers and friends for cultivation and mitigation of status competition. However,
generalized exchange characterized work relationships much more than any other
types of relationship. Transfers and exchanges that went beyond direct relations
involving a single pair of ®rm members were not needed for all resources in order to
manage the status competition process. The next section uncovers the kind of
interdependencies between the three types of relationships that were able to mitigate
status competition among peers. Speci®c multiplex substructures allowing for this
mitigation are identi®ed by an analysis of the interplay of these relationships.
TH E IN TE R P L A Y OF R ES OU R C ES A M O NG M E M B ER S
The number of possible distinct dyadic and triadic substructures involving three
relations is very large. As a result, the class of substructures used to de®ne an initial
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multivariate p* model was restricted to: dyadic structures of level four or less; triadic
structures of level three or less; and the level four triadic substructures identi®ed in
the univariate analyses. The pseudolikelihood estimates for parameters in the ®nal
model are presented in Table 5.1.
The estimates are organized according to the types of tie involved in the
corresponding con®gurations. A discussion of the structural implications of these
estimates follows, but ®rst note that, in addition to the unirelational substructures
already described, there are at least three different types of multirelational net-
work substructures that are important to modelling the multivariate network.
These are: (a) multiplex ties linking one lawyer in the ®rm to another, suggesting
some alignment of resource dependencies across the different types of resource;
(b) multiplex dyadic exchange structures in which a pair of lawyers exchanged
different types of resource, suggesting some complementarity of resource depen-
dence; and (c) various triadic con®gurations involving multiple resource ties,
suggesting more complex patterns of structural interlock among resource ties. The
structures involving each combination of types of tie are discussed in turn, noting
the implications that they had for the form of interdependence of ties in
the ®rm.4
The parameter estimates in the multivariate model corresponding to multi-
relational con®gurations are generally very similar in magnitude to those already
discussed for the univariate models. There are just three exceptions to this pattern.
The ®rst and arguably most important is the estimate for the co-work transitivity
parameter (9_W,W,W): it is small (and negative) in the multivariate model but
positive in the univariate model. The absence of a positive transitivity effect in the
multivariate model suggests that, once the various associations between co-work
and the other two types of tie are taken into account, there was no separate structural
tendency for co-work transitivity. In other words, it is possible that the transitive
tendency apparent in the univariate model is largely attributable to the entrainment
of co-work ties with the highly transitive advice (and, to a lesser extent, friendship)
ties. The second exception is the absence of negative 3-cycle parameters for advice
and friendship (10_A,A,A and 10_F,F,F): in the multivariate model, these parameters
have a less substantial contribution to model ®t, presumably because of the asso-
ciations between the various types of tie (particularly, advice and friendship). The
third exception concerns the positive 2-in-star and 2-out-star parameters for advice
(14_A,A and 12_A,A) in the multivariate model; these were not evident in the uni-
variate model. The positive parameters in the multivariate model suggest that, once
various across-tie dependencies are taken into account, there was a tendency for
differentiation among ®rm members in their seeking and being sought out for
adviceÐbut this differentiation is most evident in those advice ties that were not
accompanied by co-work and friendship ties.
The large number of parameters in the multivariate model corresponding to
con®gurations comprising both co-work and advice ties suggests that co-work and
advice ties were distributed in a highly interdependent manner. We note ®rst that
the multiplexity parameter (lawyer i sends a duplex tie to lawyer j) is large and
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Table 5.1. Multiplexity of ties in the ®rm: Parameter estimates for ®nal multivariate p* model
Co-work Advice Friendship
Term PLE Term PLE Term PLE
15_W ÿ3.49 (0.25) 15_A ÿ3.46 (0.25) 15_F ÿ4.65 (0.29)
11_W,W 4.45 (0.47) 11_A,A 1.33 (0.24) 11_F,F 2.91 (0.24)
12_W,W 0.06 (0.01) 12_A,A 0.06 (0.01) 12_F,F 0.07 (0.01)
13_W,W ÿ0.04 (0.02) 13_A,A ÿ0.06 (0.01) 13_F,F ÿ0.06 (0.02)
14_W,W 0.10 (0.02) 14_A,A 0.06 (0.01) 14_F,F 0.03 (0.02)
9_W,W,W ÿ0.03 (0.02) 9_A,A,A 0.28 (0.02) 9_F,F,F 0.28 (0.02)
10_W,W,W 0.30 (0.06)
7_W,W,W ÿ0.09 (0.02)
8_W,W,W ÿ0.06 (0.02)
3_W,W,W,W ÿ0.11 (0.02)
6_W,W,W,W 0.21 (0.04)
Co-work and advice Co-work and friendship Advice and friendship
Term PLE Term PLE Term PLE
15_WA 2.44 (0.13) 15_WF 0.96 (0.17) 15_AF 2.42 (0.22)
11_W,A 0.61 (0.21) 11_W,F 0.48 (0.18) 11_A,F 1.30 (0.19)
12_W,A ÿ0.01 (0.01)
13_W,A ÿ0.03 (0.01) 13_F,W 0.01 (0.01) 13_A,F ÿ0.01 (0.01)
13_A,W ÿ0.04 (0.01) 13_W,F ÿ0.00 (0.01) 13_F,A ÿ0.03 (0.01)
14_A,W ÿ0.02 (0.01) 14_W,F ÿ0.01 (0.01) 14_A,F ÿ0.02 (0.01)
11_W,AW ÿ0.39 (0.17) 11_W,FW ÿ1.13 (0.23) 11_A,AF ÿ0.87 (0.24)
11_A,AW ÿ0.82 (0.14) 11_F,AF ÿ0.90 (0.27)
9_A,A,W ÿ0.08 (0.02)
9_A,W,A ÿ0.10 (0.02) 9_A,F,A 0.07 (0.02)
9_W,A,A ÿ0.12 (0.02)
9_A,W,W 0.13 (0.02)
9_W,A,W 0.18 (0.02) 9_W,F,W 0.07 (0.02)
8_W,W,A 0.03 (0.01)
10_F,F,W ÿ0.13 (0.02) 10_A,A,F ÿ0.15 (0.02)
13_F,AF ÿ0.07 (0.02)
11_AF,AF 1.55 (0.45)
Co-work, advice, and friendship
Term PLE
15_WA ÿ1.00 (0.21)
11_W,AF ÿ0.30 (0.24)
11_W,AFW 1.51 (0.31)
Notes: PLE: Pseudolikelihood estimates (standard errors in parentheses). For presentation of multi-
relational p* models, see Appendix E.
Source: Reprinted from Social Networks, `Multiplexity, Generalized Exchange and Cooperation in
Organizations', E. Lazega and P. Pattison, 21: 83. Copyright 1999 with permission from Elsevier Science.
positive and suggests that the co-occurrence of the two types of tie was likely; to
some degree, co-work and advice were aligned in structure. Secondly, the exchange
parameter (i sends an advice tie to j, who reciprocates with a work tie) is also
positive, re¯ecting a tendency for the two types of tie to be exchanged. Thirdly, these
tendencies towards alignment and exchange were somewhat disjunctive, as is
evident from the negative estimates of the parameters 11_W,AW and 11_A,AW.
5
Fourthly, there was a clear and interesting form of triadic interdependence for advice
and co-work ties: 2-paths comprising one advice and one co-work tie appear to be
likely to coincide with a co-work tie, but not with an advice tie. Thus, being a
co-worker of an adviser or an adviser of a co-worker was not a suf®cient quali®-
cation for being a direct adviser. Such indirect ties were more likely to be associated
with direct co-worker ties. In this sense, the advice and co-work ties participated in
con®gurations having some of the characteristics of the interlock of strong and weak
ties, with advice ties the stronger of the two (Breiger and Pattison 1978; Pattison
1993). It might be hypothesized that advice ties drove the creation of new co-worker
ties, in the sense that new co-worker ties could be forged with either the co-workers
of one's advisers or the advisers of one's co-workers. Indeed, it is interesting to note
that the two triadic advice and co-work con®gurations with positive parameter
estimates contain as substructures two of the few likely co-work forms in which
exchange is not evident (namely, 12_W,W and 14_W,W). One possibility, therefore, is
that the advice tie had a stabilizing role in what otherwise might be a less stable
pattern of work distribution in a system driven largely by exchange. That is, the lack
of exchange in these con®gurations could be offset against the opportunity to work
with individuals at a higher status; it is in this sense that status-signalling advice ties
were strong and helped to articulate the distribution of resources for collective
participation. But note that this capacity for work ties to straddle status differences
did not extend too far: the advisers of one's advisers were not likely to be co-workers
(as the negative estimate for 9_A,A,W indicates). Further, note that status-signalling
advice ties played a role in providing access to work opportunities, and that this
might have helped mitigate against status games. In all, and as expected, the
interdependence between co-worker and advice ties was strong in this exchange
system.
Advice and friendship ties also exhibited quite strong interdependence, with
substantial multiplexity (i sends a duplex tie to j) and exchange (i sends an advice tie
to j, who reciprocates with a friendship tie) effects. In addition, the positive estimate
for 11_AF,AF indicates an enhanced reciprocity effect for one type of tie in the
presence of a reciprocal tie of the other type; the enhancement was not observed,
however, in the presence of an unreciprocated tie of the other type (as the negative
estimates for 11_F,AF and 11_A,AF indicate). At the triadic level, the only positive
estimate is associated with a triadic structure in which friendship links the advisers
j and k of some lawyer i. Arguably, just as advice ties served to articulate co-work
relations, so friendship ties may have served a weak articulatory role with respect to
advice ties (since con®gurations in which the friend of an adviser was also an adviser
have a positive parameter estimate). It is interesting also to note that in 42 per cent
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of such triads in which the advice-seeker was an associate, the advisers were both
partners. Thus, in these cases where advice was sought by associates from partners
who lay outside a current task force, friendship often linked the partners, and helped
to offset the dif®culties that arose from their giving different advice or from their
comparison to one another by a common subordinate.
Negative parameter estimates are associated with 3-cycles comprising two advice
ties and a friendship tie (suggesting that, even though the adviser of an adviser was a
source of potential advice, such a person was unlikely to return a direct friendship
tie). Thus, one might argue that the interdependence of advice and friendship ties
can be described largely in the dyadic terms of a propensity for multiplexity and
exchange, although there is also a weaker articulatory relationship between friend-
ship and advice ties. These patterns of interdependence of friendship and advice ties
can also be interpreted as suggesting that friendship `softened' the status differences
inherent to advice ties, both directly (through multiplexity and exchange effects)
and indirectly (by tending to link the advisers of an individual). Thus, these patterns
are consistent with the general expectations regarding the role of friendship ties in
the mitigation of status competition.6
As predicted, the parameters for con®gurations involving co-work and friendship
tend to be much weaker. The multiplexity and exchange parameters are weak but
positive, and, since the parameter for the con®guration in which a mutual co-work
tie occurs in the presence of an asymmetric friendship tie is large and negative, these
effects appear to be disjunctive. At the triadic level, cycles comprising two friendship
ties and one co-worker tie were unlikely, and there was a weak tendency for
friendship ties to link the two lawyers with whom a third claimed co-work ties. This
latter effect is similar to, but much weaker than, the pattern by which advice was
claimed to help sustain one of the asymmetric co-work con®gurations. Thus,
members tended to sort their ties so as not to mix work and friendship too directly.
Finally, a very small number of dyadic con®gurations involving co-work, advice,
and friendship have large estimated parameters. In particular, the triplex tie from
i to j has a negative estimate, whereas the triplex tie accompanied by a reciprocal
co-work tie has a positive estimate. This suggests that, even though pairs of lawyers
might have been linked by duplex ties more commonly than the overall frequency of
individual ties would suggest, the observation of all three ties linking a pair was not a
common structural form (unless also accompanied by a reciprocal co-work tie).
In conclusion, cooperation between members of an organization can be looked at
as routine transfers or exchanges of various kinds of resources. To summarize these
structural tendencies, a number of separable forms of interdependence describe the
interlocking of the three relations. First, each type of tie appears to have its own
characteristic pattern of organizational distribution. Co-work ties were strongly (but
not entirely) organized around principles of direct and generalized exchange,
whereas advice and friendship ties exhibited a pattern of local clustering and partial
ordering (with a greater emphasis on clustering for friendship, and a greater
emphasis on a hierarchical distribution for advice). Secondly, despite these appar-
ently quite different organizational principles, there is some evidence for the
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alignment of the different types of tie, particularly of advice ties with each one of the
two others. This provides quite direct evidence for some form of mutual accom-
modation of the different types of tie.
Thirdly, there is also some evidence for dyadic exchange of different types of tie.
This suggests another form of interdependence between the separate tie distribu-
tions, but one that might also be expected to have provided a structurally supportive
role. As for the alignment effects, the combination of advice with either co-work
or friendship yielded the strongest manifestation of this form of tie dependence.
Finally, a third type of interdependence links the arrangements of the different types
of tie. This third pattern is one in which one type of tie appears to serve as a
bridge supporting another. The pattern was strongest for co-work and advice: advice
ties linked individuals who were only indirectly connected through (asymmetric)
co-work ties. A much weaker version of this pattern is also seen for advice and
friendship (with friendship bridging individuals whose advice was sought from a
common source) and co-work and friendship (with friendship again in the
bridging role).
These results also help to show that cooperation was made possible by a speci®c
generalized exchange systemÐthat is, by the ways in which members exchanged
resources connected to their work life in the ®rm. They also show that such con-
®gurations represent the existence of a social mechanism providing a structural
solution to a structural problem, here the problem of dealing with status compe-
tition among professional members and peers. Such a synthesis contributes to a
theory of collective action by developing our understanding of how a collegial
organization creates a structure that helps individuals ®nd indirect ways to exercise
restraint in the pursuit of status, and thus keep production going. This examination
of the ®rm as an exchange system enhances our understanding of commitment to
collective action among members.
TH E S OC I A L ST R U C TU R E O F B A R TE R
In sum, it is important to note that the generalized exchange system (10 in the
`co-work only' part of the ®nal model) represented a fragile form of solidarity that
could not just stand and last on its own. It needed to be protected both by credible
commitments and rules, and by a structural mechanism facilitating individual
restraint, which was called mitigation of status competition. Based on these analyses,
the process can be summarized by two steps. First, when partners and associates
brainstormed together on a complex case to ®nd a solution to a problem, their
deliberation could not always reach consensus. At some point, the partner in charge
stopped the deliberation without consensus about a solution. This happened often,
but it was tricky because `autocratic' behaviour discouraged the other partners and
associates working on the same case from garnering again the enthusiasm that was
required to participate in such brainstorms. Therefore, although the decision may
have been made, members who disagreed were allowed to seek advice from people
outside the task force. They often sought advice from people higher up in terms of
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status. This is what can be seen behind parameters in the `co-work and advice'
section of the model, in which the member sought out for advice was most often a
partner. Bringing status into this type of duplex (co-work±advice) substructures
(mainly in the Blau ties) con®rms this assertion.
The second step of the status competition process came from the fact that
members of the same task force could seek advice from two different advisers. This
might mean simply carrying the brainstorm upstairs. This helped only if advisers
then agreed, but they might not, and the advisers involved in this second step would
then also need help when they tried to reach a solution. This help came from three
facts: (1) these advisers were not of®cially involved in the case (there was less at stake
for them); (2) there was generally more pressure on senior people to reach con-
sensus; and (3) they were likely to be connected by a friendship (or an advice) tie.
This is how parameter 9, in the `advice and friendship' section of the model, can be
interpreted. Bringing status into this type of duplex (advice±friendship) sub-
structures shows that members connected by the friendship tie were often partners.
In other words, as long as such ties connect the chefs, the latter are not too many.
Barter of resources among them helps mitigate professional status competition. The
fragile solidarity that was provided to members through the generalized exchange
system in social niches was thus protected from excessive status competition by
speci®c kinds of substructures blending collegial relationships and resources.
These relational substructures characterize barter, a form of `silent exchange',
which was controlled, as mentioned earlier, by politicized boundary management
and the existence of social niches. With this view and analyses of multiplexity in
social mechanisms, however, Blau's notion (1964) of social exchange takes a more
important dimension. The blending process described above is an organized one.
A good theory of barter must look at it as a moment in a social process solving
speci®c problems of collective action. If that is not done, the intrinsic ef®ciency of
barter is not recognized and barter itself is conceived only as bilateral and compared
unfavourably to market exchange. Thus, a structural approach to participation in
collective action in general should examine the interlocks between production-
related resources, because they represent the social structure of multiplex barter in
different mechanisms that are central to the functioning of work groups and ®rms,
especially collegial ones.
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6Organizational Integration:
A Montesquieu Structure
In spite of providing bounded solidarity and generalized and multiplex exchange to its
individual members, niche seeking may also be a threat to the organization. In effect, a
task force in a social niche can turn itself into a group, team up and out, and start a
disintegration process in the ®rm. In this chapter, I argue that, under speci®ed struc-
tural constraints, status competition at the individual level can have positive effects at
the collective level. Two processes illustrate such positive effects. First, as noted by Blau
(1964), status competition encourages cross-niche exchanges. Secondly, it can help
handle opportunistic behaviour encouraged by the niche structureÐthat is, it can
prevent task forces in such social niches from reaching a critical mass necessary for easy
defection. This prevention is made possible by a balance of power between two forms of
status, a balance characterized by a Montesquieu structure.
Indeed, getting durable cooperation from peers and associates is not a straight-
forward matter in collegial organizations, where many centrifugal forces are at work.
Income equalization has its drawbacks: for example, the lockstep system bene®ts low
performers but not high performers. Nevertheless, workers of different productivity
levels coexist under the same roof. Social mitigation of status competition works
best within niches precisely because members can ®nd in them a form of economic
and social solidarityÐthat is, some of the resources needed both to produce
knowledge-intensive services and to get cooperation in the long term. Recall that,
even in constraining niches, members combine selected forms of identi®cation to
each other to ease access to, or barter of, these multiple resources.
However, niches are still insuf®cient in themselves to solve problems of resource
allocation and rule enforcement, and they represent a risk. Their contribution to
collective action comes at a price: that of endangering the cohesion of the organi-
zation. In this context, the integration of the ®rm is a puzzle. The niche solution to
the structural problems of resource dependencies and status competition generates a
new, higher-level structural problem. What makes a heterogeneous peer group hang
together durably in spite of many centrifugal forces?
C E N T R I F U G A L F O R C E S A N D
C R O S S - B O U N D A R Y E X C H A N G E S : R E L A T I O N A L S T I T C H E S
The structural contribution to the study of the social integration of collegial organ-
izations remains at the informal organizational level. Economic factors are very
important to explain the cohesion of an organization, and the formal decision-
making structureÐthat is, the committee systemÐcan also have the same effect
when it actually works (Musselin 1990). However, this chapter does not focus on
such factors. Instead, it looks at patterns of relationships among the members of the
®rm as a basis for integration.
Using the information collected on the three different types of ties among
members, I show that aspects of the informal structure integrated the ®rm beyond
niches and across its formal boundaries because strong interpersonal ties were
created without respect to these boundaries. By formal boundaries I mean hori-
zontal differentiation (that is, division of work, represented by type of practice:
litigation or corporate), vertical differentiation (that is, hierarchy, represented by
partner/associate status), and geographical differentiation (which actually repre-
sented different markets and client bases, and was represented by the three of®ces
of the ®rm).
As seen in Chapter 3, these internal differentiations had an effect on the way
members built reliable work relationships, advice relationships, and friendship ties.
Hierarchical status, of®ce, and practice all in¯uenced such choices among partners
and associates, thus creating niches: in the aggregate, there was an `inbreeding' bias
along these three boundaries. Geographical distances had the strongest in¯uence on
the creation and maintenance of all types of relationships. They were followed by
differences in status; differences in type of practice had the weakest in¯uence. These
internal boundaries were no mystery to the members of the ®rm. The question
addressed here is how did the ®rm deal with the centrifugal threat represented by
such boundaries?
A closer look at the patterns of relationships, as they emerge from a series of
cohesion analyses,1 shows that each network created by these relationships was
segmented into dyads or very small groups of members strongly tied to each other by
long-term repeated interactions. Such substructures were `stitches' that brought
together two sides of the ®rm separated by these internal boundaries. In the
co-workers' network, this cohesion analysis shows that almost all the members of
the ®rm had strong work ties within the ®rm. With a few exceptions, these strong
working relationships did not cut across the geographical boundaries, or across the
practice boundaries. But, not surprisingly, they almost always cut across the hier-
archical status boundary; they mixed partners and associates, and in some cases
senior and junior associates. All the members did not belong to such groups. They
did have signi®cant work relationships with others, but these ties did not aggregate
into small `cliques'.
The same trend was observed in the friendship network. Many small dyads or
groups of two or three partners and slightly larger groups of three or four associates
can be identi®ed as groups of persons who socialized outside work together. There
were eight persons (out of seventy-one), mostly junior associates, who did not
socialize with anybody within the ®rm. With a few exceptions, these strong
friendships did not cut across the geographical boundaries, or the status boundary.
But most did cut across the practice boundaryÐthat is, included litigators and
183Organizational Integration
corporate lawyers. This was explained in Chapter 3 by the dynamics of friendship
formation in such ®rms via common associateship. The members who did not
belong to these subgroups did socialize with others, but these ties were weaker.
In the advice network, the same pattern was again observed. Many small dyads or
groups emerged, within which members exchanged basic advice with one another.
Six persons were isolated in this network. With a few exceptions, these strong advice
relationships did not cut across the status boundaries, or across the practice
boundaries. But they did cut across the geographical (or market) boundary much
more than other relationships; they mixed members in the three of®ces. The
members who did not belong to these subgroups did have advice relationships with
others, but these ties were weaker; these members tended to spread their advice
relationships among many other colleagues, which reduced the strength of each
speci®c tie with each particular source of advice.
In sum, strong ties were available to be used to bridge organizational boundaries
when a problem emerged, a process also spotted in other ®rms (Baker 1992; Maister
1993; Stevenson 1990). Dyads or small groups of co-workers cut across status
boundaries and countered the centrifugal effects of strati®cation. Small cliques of
mutual advisers cut across geographical boundaries and countered the effects of
distance and differences between of®ces. Small cliques of friends cut across practice
boundaries and countered the effect of the division of work. This shows that, at least
in the informal structure of the ®rm, there was no single strongest relational basis for
integration of the organization. Each type of relationship contributed in a speci®c
way to the cohesion of the ®rm. Speci®c ties observed in each network were
important for cutting across internal boundaries. They kept together the great
number of different and strongly cohesive small groups within the ®rm. They also
increased the ¯exibility and adaptability of the informal structure of the ®rm.
Figure 6.1 summarizes the strong ties and cohesive subsets that could be activated
to solve problems or deal with tensions involving such differences among members.
Two examples can illustrate the integrative role of such cohesive subsets. The ®rst
is about hierarchical status differences. Chances for associates to become partners
depended, among other criteria, on the ®rm's ®nancial basis, a situation about
Internal boundaries
Status Office Speciality  
Co-worker X 
Strong ties Advice X 
Friendship X  
Figure 6.1. Relational stitches: Strong ties cross-cutting internal boundaries in the ®rm
Source: Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega, `Analyse de reÂseaux d'une
organisation colleÂgiale: les avocats d'affaires', 33: 575. Copyright 1992 with permission from
Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
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which they often did not have of®cial information. This created tensions between
partners and associates, especially before the partnership decision was made for the
most senior cohort. Strong work ties between partners and associates then seemed
important to manage these tensions in a credible wayÐfor example, in reassuring
associates that their chances were not compromised. Regular and strong work ties
seemed to have the capacity to overcome associates' mistrust in pro domo of®cial
discourse addressed to clients as much as to personnel.
The second example concerns the differences between of®cesÐthat is, between
client bases. It was not rare for Of®ce I and Of®ce II interests to diverge. One of®ce
was more lucrative than the other for several years in a row. A partner from Of®ce II
could have a legal or a `political' con¯ict of interests with a partner from Of®ce I if
they happened to represent strongly opposed clients; one of the two might have to
disqualify him- or herself and give up an important client. Such situations generated
tensions that revived short-term comparisons between of®ces (which were not
considered pro®t centres by SG&R's accounting system). A reminder of the various
resources, chief of which was advice, circulating between of®ces was an important
way of taming tempers in such situations. Advisers from the other side were in a key
position to achieve such signalling.
Thus, the ®rm was integrated across its formal boundaries of horizontal, vertical,
and geographical differentiation when interpersonal ties were created without respect
to these boundaries. One of the ®rst lessons of this result is that, in the ®rm as a
whole, horizontal, vertical, and spatial differentiation impeded overall integration,
but strong cross-niches ties (stitches) contributed to the integration of the ®rm across
these formal boundaries. At the informal level, integration was secured differently, by
different types of relationships, in different corners of the organization. Cohesion-
based integration relied on exchanges criss-crossing niche boundaries.
In the following sections of this chapter, I focus on another integration process,
one that was made possible, paradoxically, by status competition. I show that
integration was also based on surveillance of choices of exchange partners within or
outside niches. This was particularly visible with the exchanges of task-related
cooperation and goodwill among members. In effect, given their responsibilities for
staf®ng and scheduling, minders tried to impose additional constraints on members'
choices of strong co-workers, especially on ®nders' choices. This second process of
®rm integration was based on two different forms of solidarity (welfare and
patronage) organized by different forms of status. In turn, the coexistence of the two
forms of solidarity was based on the control of one form of status by the other.
Maintaining heterogeneity of status thus helped deal with the danger of disin-
tegration created by social niches.
TW O F O R M S OF SO L ID A R I TY : W EL F A R E A ND
P A TR ON AG E IN M A NA G I NG W O R K FL O W
Professional members valued the ideology of autonomous action and consensus.
In such a situation, social solidarity and control mechanisms for maintaining
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cooperation were of particular interest. They were produced by the combination
of formal `intake and assignment' procedures and informal elective choices of
co-workers madeÐpartly autonomouslyÐby the members themselves.
To support this argument, a multilevel approach is necessary. I look at a speci®c
kind of solidary behaviour at the individual (using interests or strategic analysis),
dyadic, and structural levels (using network analysis). At the dyadic level (Linden-
berg 1997), this behaviour meant that a member was prepared to help out another
member who found him or herself in a dif®cult situation. Such solidary behaviour
(see examples in Chapter 1) led to the existence, at the structural level, of mechanisms
of control that help to explain the integration of this ®rm. It did so by creating a
pattern of exchanges and durable cooperation that prevented members from
reaching situations in which they were ready to defect easily. Individual interests,
solidarity at the dyadic level (help, whether mutual or not) between interdependent
members, combined with organizational rules, provided an unexpected social order
that created another kind of solidarity (prevention of exit) at the structural level, a
form of integration that had a clear political dimension.
How could this solidary behaviour be related to intake and assignment proced-
ures? The latter are extremely important in a corporate law partnership, as in any
professional services ®rm (Maister 1993: 156). As seen in Chapter 3, to do their work
and survive in such an organization, interdependent members of the ®rm needed
access to resources such as work for clients and goodwill from cooperative co-
workers. But work was not always very easy to ®nd at the beginning of the 1990s, a
period of economic downturn in north-eastern USA: levels of future demand were
not easily predictable. The organization helped members get access to such
resources. It conducted its affairs based on a formal structure and formal rules,
which expressed choices among policy options, and allocated, directly and indir-
ectly, these resources to members. Authority to handle new ®les or clients (intake) or
to allocate this new work among colleagues (assignment) was distributed more or
less formally (see Chapter 2). For many members (partners and associates), access to
work opportunities depended on such procedures. A basic `welfare system' was
establishedÐthat is, a committee that allocated such resources across professional
members of the ®rm and helped organize cooperation (the ATC).
In theory, members of the ®rm knew about these rules. But partnerships did not
function like formal and hierarchical bureaucracies, even when they had a strong
administrative component. As mentioned in Chapter 2, rules were not always fol-
lowed, and getting cooperation remained a delicate matter. In reality members of the
®rm often behaved differently; they did not necessarily trust or count on the welfare
system to get cooperation from one another and provide solidarity. They had an
interest and `political' incentives in not trusting the welfare system. Clientelistic ties
and more selective solidarities were established among partners, and between
partners and associates. The welfare system was thus intertwined with an informal
patronage system. Each system (welfare and patronage) responded to members'
interests and solved their problem differently, although the clientelistic match-
making process was not formally allowed.
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The two forms of solidarity coexisted in a collegial organization such as SG&R. In
fact, each type of solidarity was organized by partners with a different form of status.
The ®rst was organized by minders, the second by ®nders. The study of the two
forms of solidarity addresses directly the issue of durable relations because, as
already mentioned, in such professional partnerships, the existence of patronage
often represents a danger of ®rm disintegration. In effect, clientelistic solidarity
between partners and associates could create stable work groups that could defect
from the ®rm, taking lucrative clients away with them. This process was a result of
members' tendency to build or join social niches. Here I ®rst provide a strategic
analysis of work¯ow and, secondly, look at the selection of strong co-workers made
under such criteria and conceptions of interests.
S CH EDU L ER S AN D R A I NM A KE R S
As described in Chapter 2, the ®rm's formal structure attempted to coordinate the
work process. In its effort to organize its practice, SG&R formally regulated intake
and assignment. There were many reasons for implementing such policies. In par-
ticular, the ®rm wanted to be sure that it was not using its resources on work that
was either less interesting or less pro®table than other work that it might have been
able to get. According to SG&R's intake procedure, new clients should be cleared
with the managing partner. But recall that this requirement was not systematically
respected. Some partners did not even seem to know about it. Others acknowledged
that they had problems saying `no' to people. Clients whose work had been turned
away might not call again. Partners took in the work, knowing that some colleagues
were cooperative and would help with the workload. Unless there was an obvious
reason to think about a political con¯ict (a con¯ict of interest with another partner
or a client represented by another partner), they just went ahead.
Assignments were more formally organized for associates, through the ATC, also
called the associate committee. Assignment procedures were match-making and
match-breaking procedures. In general, a ®le (a case) was handled by at least two
lawyers, one partner and one associate. Assignments, however, were also often
distributed by the partners who brought in the client. Some partners were so used to
assigning work themselves (without resorting to the ATC) that they often com-
plained about problemsÐespecially in this multi-city ®rmÐwith identifying part-
ners and associates with the right expertise, and with putting together the right task
force to work on a case. I will call this informal assignment procedure a patronage, or
clientelistic, one: partners and associates chose one another based on more strategic
and status or `reputation'-based criteria (Raub and Weesie 1990).
Such a situation is not surprising in a ®rm that was not departmentalized and
where compensation was based on a strict lockstep seniority system. The ®rm
counted on the cooperative spirit of its partners to smooth dif®culties with work¯ow.
But the limitations and ¯exibility of intake and assignment procedures also came, in
part, from the fact that some members tended to be more in need of access to work
on an ongoing basis, and othersÐwho controlled access to lucrative clientsÐmore in
187Organizational Integration
need of cooperation from colleagues. Finders and grinders needed each other. Fin-
ders were even interdependent among themselves. As mentioned above, a good way
of keeping a client is to cross-sell services that can be provided by partners of different
specialities. This increases revenues and retains clients. As seen in Chapter 4, some
partnersÐoften ®ndersÐwere much more `productive' than others in terms of dollar
amounts billed and collected. It made sense for other attorneys in need of (good)
work to build strong, secure, and durable work relationships with such rewarding
partners, who needed reliable peers and associates to carry out the actual work.
Thus, business interdependence in the practice of law was as strong (if not
stronger) a determinant of the management of work as the commitment to pro-
fessional values and philosophy of apprenticeship. The form of cooperation was thus
dictated, among other determinants, by the requirements of the market. Therefore,
®rm of®cial policy was not enforced exactly as it was formally meant to be. Client
intake and assignment procedures did not really change the organization of work
into a highly regulated process. Flexibility with control and organization of the two-
step work¯ow was forced upon the ®rm by personal ties between ®nders and the
client. Partner 6 formulated this clearly: `I don't think of my clients as my clients in
an economic sense; but I think of them as my clients in a personal way. The people
I am doing work for, that I have a personal relationship with, that I know as friends
or whatever. It would be foolish for a ®rm to ignore that relationship.'
Under these organizational arrangements, the main preoccupations of time-
keeping members (getting a continuous ¯ow of good work from clients or from
(other) partners, and getting cooperation from colleagues to perform this work)
were also solved by a system of patronage. Partners had some leeway in choosing
co-workers and in building up temporary task forcesÐthat is, choosing one another
and associates to work on a case. Recall that, given the fact that interdependence
among attorneys working together on a ®le could be strong for weeks, and then weak
for months; given the ¯exibility needed to accommodate clients' needs; and given
the size and complexity of some ®les, a reliable co-worker was a highly valued
resource for individual attorneys.2 In this situation, members' interest, as perceived
by them, was in building strong ties to selected others. Such strong work ties,
members thought, should be a better guarantee for goodwill and cooperation than
weaker work ties. Strong work ties were perceived to be an insurance policy against
absence of (good) work and/or scarcity of workforce. They meant more than short-
term security. They meant that efforts would be actually shared (that is, everyone
would pull their weight), and that one's own work would be recognized (that is,
colleagues would not grab all the credit for themselves in successful cases). For
associates, for instance, they could mean access to partnership.
As an example, Associate 37 considered that there was a tacit contract between
himself and Partner 15, his obvious patron. His dependence on Partner 15, and his
distrust of the assignment committee, came across clearly in his interview:
Any partner wants to have his associates next door, to be able to go down the hall and
talk to them about their ®les. I have been here for ®ve years and it's been that way from
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day one. I have heard partners say, year after year, `We need to get Associate 37 to work
with partners from other of®ces,' and it doesn't happen. For example, I had an associate
review last August. One of the things which was said was that the corporate ATC
indicated that they wanted me to work with other partners, and they made a commit-
ment to do that. During the ®ve months since then, I have worked with only one new
partner. It takes time, a concerted disciplined effort to see that I get that kind of work, to
make sure that all partners are advised that it is worthwhile to work with me. Partner 15 is
quite supportive, and he would never do anything against my working with others, but
he leaves it to me. That's a touchy issue. And I have probably not taken enough initiative
in the past. Because of the way the ®rm is structured [ATCs], I cannot pick up the phone
and call partners one by one and ask them if they have work for me. I have to go through
the ATC. My hesitation in the past is that I didn't want to annoy them, to pester them, to
bug them, and also to annoy Partner 15. But after the review I realized that I couldn't
afford any more lip service. I have decided to call up the ATC and ask, `Which new
partner do you want me to work with this week?' The ®rm did not help me acquire a
speciality which makes me indispensable. I received assignments from Alan, I assisted
him on his ®les, and then the clients began to call me directly, and I became their
primary contact. Work for Alan and work for these clients represent most of my work.
Whether this will help next year with the partnership decision, I don't really know.
In the more general terms of Blau (1964: 21±2) and Flap (1990), members of an
organization have four possible alternatives to becoming someone's client (in a
patronage system), that is, to be deferential and promise future services in return:
immediate reciprocation with a service that the patron immediately needs; securing
the needed service elsewhere, with another patron; coercing the other into pro-
viding the service; or doing without the service. Associates at SG&R could try the
®rst and second solutions, but with dif®cultyÐthe original situation being one of
unequal access to diverse resources, and also the number of patrons being limited.
Strong opposition from one of them could ruin one's chances of becoming a
partner. But not the last two: clients compete for special treatment, and there is
always another potential client willing to take the place of an unwilling one (Flap
1990). Therefore, clientage was the only secure option, apart from the welfare
system of the ATC. Desolidarized associates needed a champion, and no enemies
(Burt 1992). In the case of SG&R, there was more than one partner, and associates
could try to align with other partners, using a factional structure. But they could
not do it too often without sinking costs and building a reputation of instability. It
would not have improved their prospects much, given the number of other clients,
the scarcity of the ultimate reward, and the limit de®ned by patrons to their own
competition.
Although it was certainly unpleasant for partners serving on the ATC, the coex-
istence of the two match-making procedures was not really a puzzle to anybody. It is
well known that, in professional services ®rms, schedulers and rainmakers often
challenge each others' staf®ng requests (Maister 1993). A short interest analysis for
partners and associates clari®es this point. Partners were interested in looking for the
best associates, who were close and easily accessible, and knew as much as possible
about the issue. Some got used to speci®c associates with whom they liked to
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brainstorm, and ATC choices did not always respond to such selection criteria. As
partners grew in stature, they became more involved in non-chargeable marketing;
their rates increased as their time sheets grew in non-billable hours: their immediate
preoccupation was with making the client happy by organizing their work themselves.
Recall Partner 6 expressing disagreement with the ®rm's minders as to whether or not
the formal assignment process worked ef®ciently (`This is supposed to go through the
associate committee . . . but I think the committee does not really work very well.
Associates do generally get work directly from their partners'). Associates' main
interest was in becoming a partner. They knew that they were expected to bill at
least 1,800 hours a year, or to gross three times what they earned as a salary.
`If you work hard, you are in demand as an associate. If fees are collected, that means
that you were given good work and that you carried it out well. The client perceives
value and has money to pay. You get judged ®rst on your collection rate' (a former
associate).
Under this kind of pressure, a regular ¯ow of good work was most welcome,
butÐas mentioned by Associate 37Ðassociates were also in a bind about how to get
this work. ATC membersÐcalled the `schedulers' by another associateÐcould
provide this work, and they also evaluated associates twice a year: associates had to
listen to them and abide by their rule. However, if associates followed the schedulers
systematically, they could often get stuck with assignments from which they would
not learn enough, or with a partner who would not introduce them to other part-
ners, thus reducing their chances in the internal labour market. Associate loyalty to
the ATC was good for insurance, but not so good for learning and relational capital.
Many wanted the best work from the best clients, not run-of-the-mill work from the
scheduler. The scheduler could provide diversity and access to many partners, but,
the more successful associates were, the more they became strategic, tended to avoid
the scheduler, and tried to manage their careers in a more `intrapreneurial' way.
They ended up saying yes to partners who could sometimes guarantee years of
good work (that is, work in which they learned something) for good clients,
instead of turning them down and seeking the schedulers' approval. Of course, the
minders might step in, but then associates counted on their patron to solve the
problem.
We do not know what the structure of assignments would have looked like
if work had been allocated exclusively by some sort of internal `market' and
reputation processÐthat is, if the clientelistic match-making process had been
undisturbed by ATC schedulers. Nor do we know what would have happened if
the of®cial ATC match-making process had been undisturbed by patronage
interference.3 Precise information was not made available about the number of
hours actually worked by each associate for each partner, and about options
before ATC members and their colleagues when the matches took place. But this
assignment and match-making problem obviously led to another problem, that of
the relationship between ATC partners and partners who did not abide by the
of®cial rule. My interest here is in ®rm integration. In short, and to simplify, the
problem of assignment is interesting here because the coexistence of the welfare
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system and the patronage system re¯ects the control relationship between two
forms of status, that of the minders and that of the ®nders. Seen from this per-
spective, the issue of assignment and match-making is indeed an issue of ®rm
integration.
Finders and minders had both common and different interests. Both forms of
status were indispensable to run the organization. There was an obvious trade-off
between them. Finders tolerated the lower economic contribution of the minders as
an exchange for the minders carrying some of the costs of control within the ®rm. If
the ®nders could not rely on the minders to keep everything running reasonably
smoothly, then they would have had to devote more time to this themselves and
forgo income anyway. In turn, minders tolerated ®nders' attempts to create per-
manent task forces, which also explains why the ATC was relatively ¯exible about
assignments. The ATC functioned as a `welfare system', even though this expression
rang somewhat awkwardly, given that ATC members also evaluated associates and
played an important role in their selection for partnership. It was true that associates
too close to one big ®nder often did not make it. But in several ways, what the of®cial
structure of assignment was doing was not so much providing opportunities to
associates, but suppressing and desolidarizing them. Associates wanted good work
and more experience, and formally the ATC was there to help them; but another
effect was the dismantling of close collaborations between associates and the cre-
ation of a strati®cation among them. Indeed, if as an associate you needed the
schedulers' help, you might be in trouble already.4 The ®rm did not have a formal
rotating rule, because the ATC needed the cooperation of all the partners in its
evaluation of associates and in the process of their selection for promotion to
partnership. The internal labour market would not work if ATC members were
blind to strong relationships between partners and associates, or to associates'
reputationsÐthat is, if their evaluation of associates were to focus exclusively, for
example, on the number of hours worked and the results of the training programme.
As in any internal labour market, SG&R's could be understood only if human and
relational capital were considered together.
However, the two forms of status could also con¯ict, and the issue of ®rm
integration became a problem of a balance of power. Finders controlled (often
temporarily) resources such as access to important clients. What was at stake in
the intake and assignment process was also the capacity of the minders to con-
trol another key resource in the ®rm: the allocation of workforce. From this
perspective, the use of the phrase `welfare system' for the ATC was again a bit
questionable, unless one considers that it was part of `welfare' to establish a
balance of powers and keep the ®nders in check. In effect, the clientelistic exchange
system, and its underlying social discipline, represented a `neat kind of social
plumbing' (White 1985, cited by Flap 1990; see also Centeno 1992 or Lomnitz
1988 for prototypical examples of the coexistence of patronage and bureaucracy
from the perspective of political sociology). It allowed individual members to
`trade horses', team up, and build strong, presumably repeated, more secure and
reliable work relationships with others, partners or associates, who would also
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pull their weight, recognize one's contribution, and share credit and responsibility
among themselves. But the ®rm tried not to allow these work groups to stabilize
and grow suf®ciently to defect to another ®rm. In this situation, the Montesquieu
structure re¯ected the existence of both a differentiation and an integration
process.
This danger of defection was clearly on partners' mind, as shown by the following
declaration:
There are client loyalties to individual lawyers within the ®rm; but among ourselves I view
all clients as clients of the ®rm. And indeed, if you are an individual to whom the client
has demonstrated a great degree of loyalty, one of your responsibilities is to make sure
that there are other partners to whom that client may also look and rely upon. Not
necessarily on an ongoing basis. But if for some reason, for example if I am away, if I
were suddenly to decide to go pump gas for the rest of my life, any number of things,
that client loyalty is not an asset that belongs to me. If I were to go to another ®rm, if I
have done my job well here at SG&R, if I call my client and say `I want you to know that I
am in ®rm DE&F now', that client's response should be `Whom at SG&R should I call
now?', it shouldn't be `What's your new number?' Whether that would be the case in all
cases, who knows, that's what ideally it should be. (The managing partner at the time
of the study)
This was con®rmed by Partner 7's story of two partners who left Of®ce II before
the merger that created SG&R:
I socialized [with my colleagues] until Salto and Bran®eld left the ®rm, young partners.
I think that cast a spell on the social life of the people in this of®ce. I thought they were
good friends, then I found out they had planned to leave for a long time, and they took
valuable clients with them. I think I felt that our trust had been betrayed. There was a
sense of betrayal because when you are partners you send your clients to another
partner because he can solve their problems. This is part of the job of a senior partner:
to bring in work and turn it over to young partners. They cultivated the client on a social
basis knowing that they would leave, with that purpose in mind. You cannot do anything
against that. You can't plan your life around distrust. Everyone is free to go where they
want to. Since that time, there hasn't been an active social life among senior partners at
the of®ce. The younger yes, not the older who have not made the effort to host parties
and include younger people in social events.
Because they induced two forms of exchange, the welfare and the patronage
systems provided two different bases for limited solidarity.5 The two forms of
solidarity or match-making system, and the two types of status (®nders and
minders), could compete, con¯ict, and/or complement each other. However, for
lack of information, following the emergence of this coexistence was not easy. The
establishment of strong ties depended on many factors other than rules of intake and
assignment. It depended on how the ATC operated, on availability of work, on
access to partners or associates with good reputations, on access to partners with
appropriate clients or with unchallenged power to choose their co-workers, on
previous experience of cooperation. Therefore, I look instead at the pattern of strong
work ties among members and interpret it as a representation of this coexistence.
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The transition from an interests analysis at the individual level to the dyadic then
structural levels provides a method for exposing the multilevel phenomenon of the
®rm's integration and durability.
TE A M I NG U P A N D OU T ?
Examining the ways in which the two forms of solidarity coexisted shows that the
®rm provided a second structural solution to this problem of integration. It
remained one ®rm because the coexistence of the two solidarity systems was actually
based on a process of control and counter-control between ®nders and minders. The
two intertwined systems created a speci®c and stable pattern of work relationships.
I have called this pattern (along with Kuty 1998) a Montesquieu structure, for one of
its main characteristics was that it established a balance of powers within the ®rm,
allowing the partners who tried to manage the ®rm's workforce to keep in check the
partners who managed the ®rm's lucrative clientele.
The Montesquieu structure re¯ected the existence of a partial political order, an
order already visible in status consistency measures provided in Chapter 3 (and
again in Chapter 8 below). This order functioned as a stabilizing force by trying to
prevent potential work groups from becoming niches and from mustering all the
resources needed to defect easily (in particular direct access to pools of workforce).
One of the goals of intake and assignment procedures was thus also to prevent the
creation of work groups that were `ready for easy defection' (RED). Ultimately,
democracy among the partners was necessary to the coexistence of the two solidarity
systems and to the durable maintenance of this structure. Otherwise there would
have been no power to keep the welfare system in place, and the ®nders would either
defect or be on the committee that controlled the welfare system. Interests analysis
and structural analysis are thus combined here to look at this new picture of the
work process and at the structural solution provided by the minders of a collegial
organization to the problem of ®rm solidarity and integration.
As seen in Chapter 3, choosing co-workers in this collegial context was a delicate
operation. Associates competed for the attention of partners. Partners competed for
the best associates and for prestige within and outside the ®rm. Partners and
associates recognized each other as strong co-workers based on long-term calcula-
tions and identity criteria, giving rise to socially constructed niches. These niches
could be stable work groups of attorneys who had specialized in the same area and
were able to defect from the ®rm in which they were nesting, and establish them-
selves elsewhere as specialized `boutiques'.
The fact that members found strong co-workers in such niches helps explain the
coexistence of welfare and clientelism. First, the niches were partly a product of the
two combined systems. Secondly, choices of strong co-workers aggregated and
combined, at the structural level, into a pattern of exchanges that created a balance
between the two systems. This balance was essential to ®rm integration. To show this,
it is necessary to use other methods where the individual (and not the dyad) remains
the unit of analysis. Speci®cally, the exchange system is described by an analysis of
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the co-workers' network in terms of approximated structural equivalence. It estab-
lishes a partial order, which helps account for the `political' integration of the ®rm.
R ED SE TS O UT O F N IC H E S?
A M ON TE SQ UI EU ST R U C TU R E
Analysis of the co-workers' network6 shows that the collective action system of this
®rm was made of ten different sets of approximately structurally equivalent actors.
Figure 6.2 represents these sets, their members, and relationships between the sets. It
is based on the density table that is presented in Appendix F, along with a detailed
description of Figure 6.2.
Members of each set, or position, were partners and/or associates occupying an
approximately similar position in this structure of strong co-workers' ties; they had
approximately the same relational pro®le, approximately similar work ties with ®rm
members outside this position, and often had strong ties within the position too.
The con®guration describes the system of interdependencies, which was partly cli-
entelistic and partly of®cial, and which was explained by the nature of legal work, by
members' common niche-seeking strategies, by power relations among members,
and by the ways in which the ®nders±minders relationship played itself out in the
two different specialities. The method helps to detect subsets that might have been
able to team up permanently (alone or with others), and createÐwithin their
nicheÐstable work groups bringing together ®nders with direct access to their
own associates.
A ®rst split7 re¯ects the strong in¯uence of speciality within the ®rm: corporate
lawyers on the left of Figure 6.2, litigators on the right. Each specialityÐparti-
cularly litigation during the early 1990sÐcould indeed have left the ®rm and
created a ®rm of its own. But none could be certain that the market could bear
it; `boutiques' of that size needed a highly concentrated market, such as that in
New York City. The next split is more illuminating with respect to the issue at
hand. Breakaway threats could presumably exist for all positions including part-
nersÐthat is, Positions One, Two, Four, Six, Eight, and Ten. An actual breakaway
threat existed particularly for Position One, and was lower for the other positions.
Some of the reasons for which ®rm integration was nonetheless maintained in this
situation are outlined below.
I qualify as `Ready for Easy Defection' (RED in short) a subset or a position in
Figure 6.2 that had three characteristics. First, it had a high enough average income,
which represented its capacity to be immediately `in business' outside the ®rm, and
thus the kind of revenue that compared with the income achieved at SG&R.8 Sec-
ondly, it was a stable team with high cohesion (that is, with strong work relation-
ships among its members) and suf®cient size to be immediately operational outside
the ®rm. To this form of economic and relational capital (clients and reliable
workforce), I will add a third conditionÐthat its individual members have not had a
lifelong investment in the ®rm as a whole; such an investment in economic and
relational capitalÐwith the compensation system rewarding loyalty with the highest
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incomesÐcould pay off only if one stayed within the ®rm. This means that positions
with ®nders in them (such as Ten and Six) do not necessarily qualify for RED status.
In effect, such ®nders, especially if they were very senior in that ®rm, had too strong
incentives to stay. Moreover, the positions may not have included good associates
willing to follow them elsewhere. Remember that associates were very strategic about
whom they wanted to work with, and being too close to a single rainmaker could
sometimes be counter-productive in terms of career. When reviewing partners'
positions to check for these criteria, none had RED status.
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Figure 6.2. Access to cooperative colleagues: A Montesquieu structure
Note : This ®gure represents the pattern of relationships between positions of approxi-
mately structurally equivalent actors in the strong co-workers' network. Thick lines indicate
mutual ties. For a detailed description of positions and their members, see Appendix F.
Note that, when analysed separately, each network breaks down into positions that are
different from the positions identi®ed when all the networks are superimposed and ana-
lysed together to provide a multiplex pattern (Figure 3.1.)
Source : Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega, `Analyse de reÂseaux d'une
organisation colleÂgiale: les avocats d'affaires', 33: 578. Copyright 1992 with permission from
Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
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Position One in this Montesquieu structure came closest to RED status. It
included six partners and three associates, all Of®ce II litigators. The position had
the second rank for economic importance in the ®rm (Partners 5 and 18 were
among the top economic performers), and it was a stable and cohesive team with
hard-working associates. However, it had low average centralities in the ®rm's
co-workers' and advice networks9 for that year, and, in spite of the presence of
Partner 32Ðwho represented the ATC in Of®ce IIÐwas not large enough (for large
and urgent cases) to be immediately operational outside the ®rm (too high a ratio of
partners to associates). In effect, it would need more associate workforce, but could
not get direct access to the pool of litigation associates (Position Three) or lure away
Position Nine senior associates, who had too strong an investment in Position Six
and Eight partners. In particular, Positions Eight and Nine would get in the way of
Position One's attempts at reaching Position Three, and control access to that
workforce. Finally, although two of its members were senior enough to receive very
high compensation, this rent did not include all the returns for lifelong investment
in ®rm social capital, especially with Position Two.
Position Two did not come close to RED status. It included ®ve partners and two
associates on the Of®ce II corporate side. The position was a cohesive team and most
of its members did not have lifelong investment in ®rm social capital (for example,
Partner 3 was a former CEO of a large insurance company who had just joined the
®rm; Partner 14 was a former managing partner hired laterally from another ®rm).
However, it ranked only fourth (out of six) in economic importance in the ®rm
(Partner 14 was its only top ®nancial performer for that year). In addition to this
average performance, it had low average centralities in the ®rm's co-workers' and
advice networks for that year, and was not large enough to be immediately oper-
ational outside the ®rm. It would also need more workforce, but could not get direct
access to the pool of corporate associates of Position Five. Position Four controlled
access to that workforce and would get in the way.
Position Six did not come close to RED status. In contrast to the two previous
subsets, it did have direct access to a reserve of workforce in the pool of associates.
But it was a weakly cohesive (in the co-workers' network) Of®ce I position and, in
spite of counting highly prominent and top performing Partner 1, grossed a rela-
tively low average amount of fees (it ranked ®fth in that respect). Its members did
work closely with Positions Eight and Nine, but it was dif®cult to conceive of this
subset as defecting without Partner 1 being at the origin of that move. For ®nancial,
social, and historical reasons, however, it was also dif®cult to conceive of him
leaving. He derived too much of his social status as `the Monarch' from speaking on
behalf of the ®rm and representing its sense of professionalism.
Position Ten came closer to RED status than Position Six. It was indeed a
powerhouse: it was the highest grossing position in the ®rm for that year, mainly
thanks to Partner 4's performance, and it had high average centrality in the co-
workers' network. However, many reasons prevented defection from happening. Its
three partners relied very little on one another for work, and their subset was not a
cohesive team. The position would not defect without the leadership of Partner 4,
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who had access to large clients and provided many colleagues with work; butÐas for
Partner 1Ðhe was at the top of his ®rm, with one of the highest incomes, and a
lifelong investment in the ®rm and its members. The three were simply so senior that
they would not bother leaving. Finally, it would be hard pressed to grow in size
suf®ciently quickly: the pool of associates on the corporate side (Position Five) was
`shielded' from these powerful partners by Position Four partners.
Finally, Positions Four and Eight were in special situations. Position Four could
come close to RED status. It included six Of®ce I corporate partners, among whom
Partners 12, 17, and 19 were top performers. Partners 16, 17, 19, 29, and 34 were also
highly central, owing to their ties with associates. It grossed an average amount of fees
and had a high average centrality in both task-related networks. However, it was a
cohesive position because members cooperated on ®rm management tasksÐnot so
much on large cases. It concentrated administrative authority, but did not have
enough of its own clientele yet. It did not include associates systematically, because
corporate work often did not mobilize as much workforce for long periods of time as
did litigation work. It had direct access to Position Five and Seven workforce, but as
much in its members' capacity as ATC of®cials as because of their rainmaking power.
The situation was somewhat different for Position Eight. It was not able to defect
easily. It included Of®ce I partners, mainly litigators, who were recognized as truly
good citizens by other partners. They were in charge of the welfare system for
associates on the litigation side, and did not seem to groom their own clients. It was
the lowest performing group of partners in economic terms (in spite of the presence
of top performers Partners 13 and 26). It had the highest average centrality scores in
the two task-related networks, but this was due to its ATC responsibilities rather
than its rainmaking capacity. It had direct access to Position Three and Nine
workforce, but again as minders.
By trying to be strategic in their choices of partners, associates10 may also play a
role in preventing some partners' positions from reaching RED status. Senior
associates in Positions Seven and Nine, for example, could help some partners'
positions grow suf®ciently quickly to be operational elsewhere without delay. But, in
order to increase their chances of making partner, they had learned to divide their
loyalties between, and invest in ties with, many partners (here at least between two
positions of partners); they may have hesitated too much between losing an
important broker position (for Position Nine) and helping defectors.
Thus, although many positions could defect, and seriously harm the business
of the ®rm, the fact that not a single one of them had RED status meant that it
could not do so easily or advantageously for its senior members.11 Within the
niches where they found easy access to the resources needed to work and survive
in the ®rm, members would ®nd it dif®cult to create stable and RED subsets. The
basic criteria for that purposeÐhigh enough average income, suf®cient size, the
right type of relational capital (high cohesion, workforce, few lifelong investments
in the ®rm as a whole)Ðmade it more dif®cult to defect in such a context than is
usually acknowledged. For example, based on their own declarations, as shown
in Figure 6.2, Positions One and Ten did not have systematic and direct access
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to pools of additional workforce (Positions Three, Five, and Seven) and could
not grow rapidly enough to become serious threats. For that purpose, they would
have needed to go through Positions Four and Eight, which were minders acting
as welfare state and selection committees for the associates. Recall that they
included partners in charge of the ATC who followed associates' level of activity
and monitored their work, even when these associates collaborated with other
partners.
As mentioned above, this system of interdependencies for strong cooperation is
partly a clientelistic one, partly a `welfare' one. Welfare was mainly represented by
Positions Four and Eight. Patronage was particularly likely with Positions One, Two,
and Ten. In this light, the welfare system appears to have had the function of a
political device for preventing stable RED work-group development, and therefore
for preventing ®rm disintegration. The ATC function was indeed as much a match-
breaking device as it was a match-making one. It prevented ®nders from building
many direct strong work ties with grinders.
Finally, the fact that the ATC considered both the possibility of colleagues'
defection and associate training or overload was not of®cial policy. It was never
acknowledged explicitly that the role of the ATC was to prevent defection. But the
danger of defection, as already mentioned, was obvious in such a ®rm. Enough
unobtrusive and circumstantial evidence was gathered that that was a serious
concern. As in any professional services ®rm, partners did perceive the creation of
stable work groups as a threat of opportunistic behaviour. Some partners were more
upfront about acknowledging it than others. Lawyers who did not commingle their
assets could take away with them a large volume of business, and continue to handle
that business somewhere else. Recall the words of the managing partner and of
Partner 7 above.
With this pattern of strong work relationships, the ®rm provided a structural
solution to a classical collective action problem, that of integration. The ®rm
remained one ®rm because the coexistence of the two intertwined solidarity systems,
the welfare system and the patronage system, created a speci®c and stable pattern of
work relationships. This balance between welfare and patronage imposed restric-
tions on the behavioural alternatives of actors, thus leading to political integration
and foreclosing violent con¯ict in such an institutional context (Flap 1988, 1990).
I called this structure a Montesquieu structure because of its main characteristicÐ
that is, because of the balance of powers between two types of strong statuses within
this collegial organization (minders and ®nders), each representing a different
solidarity system. In many ways, the power that made the Montesquieu structure
itself survive (by keeping the welfare system in place) was the partnership as a whole.
One could easily imagine that ®nders could have `in®ltrated' the assignment com-
mittee; but the members of this committee were elected by the committee of the
whole at partnership meetings that operated under the one-partner-one-vote rule.
One step removed, democracy among the partners was thus the real answer to the
coexistence of the two solidarity and control systems, to the maintenance of ®rm
integration and durable work relationships.
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ST A TU S H ET ER O G EN EI TY A N D TH E B A L A NC E OF P OW E R S
A M O NG OL I G A R C H S I N C OL L EG I A L S TR U C TU R E S
In sum, this chapter has examined two processes of social integration helping
members of collegial organizations ensure durable cooperation from peers and
associates. We know that internal differentiations created niches and weakened the
integration of the ®rm. However, members competing for status also reached out of
their niches. By doing so, they both gained some autonomy and created, at the
overall level, a cohesion-based integration process of `stitches' bridging sides separ-
ated by internal boundaries. Integration was thus partly ensured by different types of
relationships reaching various corners of the structure. In the second process, two
forms of social solidarity (a formal welfare system and an informal patronage
system) competed and intertwined to create a speci®c form of ®rm integration
through allocation of different members to different forms of status. Status het-
erogeneity and the articulation of the two solidarity systems helped maintain
cooperation in this partnership. It was produced by the combination of formal
`intake and assignment' procedures and informal elective choices of strong
co-workers made by the members themselves.
Given that members could manage their interdependence in their own ways
(which were strongly politicized)Ðas opposed to the ways imposed by the welfare
systemÐthey could also create niches including both partners and associates and
defect from the ®rm, taking lucrative clients away with them. The ®rm provided a
structural solution to this collective action problem. An analysis of the network of
co-workers shows a pattern of strong work relationships providing a new picture of
the work process, one that takes into account this politicized dimension of collective
actionÐthat is, issues of power in the allocation of this resource. This pattern shows
that the social construction of clientelistic ties around the welfare system produced a
partial political order. This order functioned as a stabilizing force by trying to
prevent potential teams from getting direct access to additional pools of workforce.
It offered the possibility for the two forms of solidarity to coexist in the ®rm. This
informal political order could thus become a necessary condition for the production
of a collective good such as social order in a collegial ®rm. The data collected do not
allow me to assert that this order was a stable one. However, since it offered a
structural solution to a heavy structural problem in this type of ®rms, it seems
reasonable to hypothesize the stability of the process.
Cooperation in such collegial settings was shaped by the ways in which this
organization structured itself and balanced different sources of power, as much as by
professional ideology (idealization of work well done, unconditional allegiance to
the law, priority of ethical considerations over business pressures). Durable relations
in and between social niches were made possible by status heterogeneity and a
division of powers within an oligarchy. This oligarchy was divided, and it was
precisely this division that provided the structural solution to the collective action
problem of maintaining durable work relations among peers in a relatively ¯at and
knowledge-intensive organization.
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These results con®rm that generalized exchange and status competition between
®nders and minders in the ®rm were not suf®cient in themselves to explain a
collegial compliance with the rules, especially prevention of potentially opportun-
istic behaviour. At this stage, the issue of constraint with regard to performance and
conformity remains abstract. For example, to say simply that the exchange system
was suf®cient in itself to ensure conformity to previous agreement would be to rely
too much on the economic `self-enforcement' theories. In the next chapter I show
that this ®rm developed another social mechanism, a horizontal control regime that
is speci®c to collegial organizations and that helped enforce the rules of the game,
especially in a ®rm that had an aggregation rule and a lockstep management of
partner compensation.
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7Pressuring Partners Back to Good
Order: A Lateral Control Regime
This chapter examines another social mechanism, that of protection of common
resources against free-loading. Recall that, at SG&R, signing the partnership
agreement was a strong commitment to rules, cooperation, and collective respon-
sibility. The ®rm was nevertheless confronted with the fact that some partners were
perceived to be systematically neglecting this commitment, while still deriving
de facto bene®ts from sharing common resources. As seen in Chapter 1, the
democratic method of government through deliberation that allows members to
conciliate interests also needs self-policing to enforce such rules and common
decisions. At least at an early stage of the control process, this collegial organization
policed itself in a speci®c way: colleagues themselves reminded deviant partners of
the need for conformity to rules.
Structural characteristics of the collegial organization have been shown above to
help deal with opportunistic behaviour: for example, niche building is associated
with a partial suspension of calculating behaviour, co-workers' constraint with a
spiralling involvement in work, or the Montesquieu balance of powers with the
protection of the integration of the organization. Such processes, however, do not
preclude the use of controls. Niche seeking and status competition among colleagues
are again important components of the control mechanism. The issue here is no
longer one of easy access to resources needed for production. It is rather one of
dealing with a form of social taxation. An individual partner's dilemma was between
`spending' or `not spending' his or her own social resources for the protection of the
common good. In effect, niches provided relational paths for lowering such control
expenses; status competition among peers was based on a form of status hetero-
geneity that allowed new forms of status to emerge, including one of `protector of
the common good' to whom such expenses could be shifted.
This mechanism, called `lateral control regime', is based on a counter-intuitive
complementarity between niche seeking and status competition. It helps most
peers exercise early monitoring and sanctioning by reducing their individual costs
of control. It maintains low costs through appropriate use of relationships between
members. In other words, sanctioners are chosen, or expected to act as such,
because they are structurally close to the infractors. However, such a proximity
also means that situations can arise in which infractors would be reserved pre-
ferential treatment because they are too close to pressureÐthat is, because they
control resources too important to their close sanctioners. Then the special form
of status called `protector of the common good' becomes useful: some of the costs
of control are shown to be shifted to uncontroversial partners who (for reasons to
be understood, including that of reaching this form of status) accept that they will
incur such costs.
While direct command or use of administrative hierarchy were considered
inappropriate means for exercising in¯uence at SG&R, partners closely monitored
everyone's performance. As part of what Waters calls `decision processes' (rati®-
cation, normative arrangements, compliance relationships, control patterns), the
®rm had a formal control system. Associates were reviewed systematically by the
ATC. For partners, this formal control system was limited to a broad monthly review
of each partner's ®gures by the partnership meeting. But, as suggested by mea-
surements of constraint in Chapter 4, collegial controls were also informal and
indirect. When every member has regulatory interests, all can be expected to par-
ticipate in the control system, if only in an unobtrusive or `stealthy' wayÐfor
example, by monitoring and formulating expectations about who should be brought
back to good conduct, and how. Such expectations were seriously constraining at
SG&R: partners had strong incentives to monitor and sanction each other, because
they were personally liable for the actions of the other partners, and because they
often depended on them for resources.
In the expression `lateral control regime', `lateral' is equivalent to both `hori-
zontal' and `indirect', but for a context without formal hierarchy, and therefore no
resort to hierarchical superiors. A lateral control regime thus re¯ects a speci®c
organization of enforcement of rules and decisions using third parties, or leverage
(Gargiulo 1993; Lazega and Vari 1992). In addition to suggesting how the niche
system helped members put pressure on each other to maintain productivity
(Chapter 4), this vocabulary characterizes this control regime as part of a niche-
related and status-based mechanism that partly accounted for members' conformity
to their commitment. This process helped them compel each other informally,
unobtrusively, and often cheaply, to contribute the required efforts and resources.
Network analysis and a vignette study show that, as part of this enforcement
mechanism, SG&R gave rise to speci®able pathways for lateral control through which
partners in this ®rm asserted that they would prod each other into cooperation at an
early but crucial stage, before formal and well-de®ned court procedures were used,
and without external intervention. Lateral control is a form of `in¯uence'.1 These
pathways, as perceived by individual partners, aggregated into a speci®c pattern
characterizing the ®rm. This pattern re¯ected members' convergent expectations
concerning who should put pressure on whom, and thus dispositions for action;
such expectations constituted standards that they must live up to in order to get
their colleague's approval (Blau 1964; Merton 1957). It was, therefore, inextricably,
both structural and normative.2 In effect, if everyone expects me to do something,
the likelihood that I will comply is higher than if this pressure is not exercised on me.
The pattern was closely anchored in key dimensions of formal and informal
structure of the ®rm, and thus re¯ected a credible niche-related mechanism for
202 Pressuring Partners Back to Good Order
helping members ®nd ways of exercising lateral control. Knowledge of this
mechanism helps in understanding how members kept monitoring costs low, and
therefore kept themselves motivated to carry on monitoring each other. It thus
offers a solution to the so-called second-order free-rider problem in formally egali-
tarian interdependent groupsÐthat is, the problem of who will enforce previous
agreements.
In this chapter, the complex relational pattern re¯ecting the lateral control
regime is simpli®ed and made visible by the aggregation of individual choices of
`levers' (or `sanctioners')Ðthat is, envoys of the ®rm in charge of pressuring
deviant partners (`targets' or `infractors') back to good conduct.3 The study of this
®rm's lateral control regime can thus show that it was also based on both the
existence of niches and the concentration of lateral control in the hands of a few
partners with a speci®c form of status, whom the rest of the partnership often
chose as levers. I describe the role and characteristics of these main levers, the
social `territory' in which each of them was expected to exercise control, and how
they were expected to control each otherÐthat is, the issue of who guards the
guardians. This control regime can thus be considered to be a strong component of
the governance system of this type of organization, one that ensures that coop-
eration remains possible.
E TH N OG R A P H I C EV I DE NC E OF LA T ER A L SA N CT I ON IN G
As seen in the previous chapter, behaviour perceived to be opportunistic is always a
preoccupation in private professional services ®rms. But at the time of the study
SG&R made little formal effort to protect itself (its various forms of capital) against
opportunistic behaviour:
[Opportunistic behaviour] is always a threat. I don't try to cover it. Partners come under
the partnership agreement, and the partnership agreement doesn't speak in terms of
protection along those lines, except in certain speci®ed areas. I don't have an invest-
ment in real estate, so there's no protection there in terms of if somebody leaves, what
happens and so on. In terms of clients and all that stuff, I also have no built-in protec-
tions; I have always relied on, and probably will continue to rely on, the fact that once
you're here, you want to stay. As a practical matter I'm not so sure that if I really ran into
somebody who wanted to leave although they were being treated fairly, I'm not so sure
I'd want him here as my partner anyway. The system got us this far. (The managing
partner at the time of the study)
As indicated by Partner 7's story (see Chapter 6, p. 192), it came out during
ethnographic ®eldwork that the ®rm had recently been confronted with behaviour,
by several partners, perceived to be opportunistic. Although they did not agree to
describe in detail what had happened, several partners mentioned that informal and
indirect control had been used and a mediator chosen to go and talk to the unco-
operative colleagues. The following interview of a second former partner presents
another case (told by the target himself who was perceived as behaving opportu-
nistically because he was seeking more freedom in his choice of a speciality within
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the ®rm). It illustrates the existence of early informal relational pressure, which
helped the ®rm to deal unobtrusively with this kind of behaviour.
I came into the ®rm in 1963. Bill Henderson hired me, I was in the same class as Partner
8. I became a partner in 1969. At the beginning, I did a lot of trial work, medical
malpractice litigation, I worked with the Mayor on city planning. Then Bill Henderson
came to see me and offered me to do probate work. I refused. He said, `You won't have
to do it forever.' And I still do this to this day. Henderson left around 1970. I continued to
develop the clientele and a reputation. In 1976, I became very restless. I did not ®nd a
lot of satisfaction in what I was doing. I was concerned with the lack of associates who
were specializing in this area. There was no commitment of the ®rm to that area of
practice. It can be very lucrative if you run it well. . . . In 1980, I was the only one left
doing this kind of work in the ®rm. Still no associates. I had a lot of work and respon-
sibilities on my shoulders. I was asking myself, `Do I want to be this ®rm's senior and only
trust and estate lawyer?' Partner 2 was doing some, but not enough. I wanted to get out
of this area and do something else. I had lunch with Partner 2. I said, `I want out; I want to
do something else'; Henderson had said, `You won't have to do it forever.' I talked to
him as a friend who was the only one who had a clue about what this speciality was
about. Nothing happended. Then came the committee meeting about how many
associates to hire for the coming year. I said: `You ought to hire a couple of probate to
replace me. I am not going to do this anymore. I need either two people who have had
some expertise, or four people without expertise.' Everone's jaws dropped: `What
happened to Partner X?' The next day Partner 4, one of the big billers, came to see me.
He wanted to know if I was sick. I said no. I wanted to do something else, move into a
different area of practice, go back to trial work. He said: `It is a very sel®sh idea, and it
would never work in any organization.' It dragged on. I announced that I was going to
take a leave of absence for a year, that was in the fall of 1980. I said, `I am leaving.' I had
a meeting with the managing partner to discuss this. He said, `A law ®rm is not a
university.' They wanted to schedule three other meetings with me for the following
year, but I asked that the partnership take a vote for or against a leave of absence. I said,
`I need to step aside, take some perspective, the ®rm needs to get other people to do
this work.' At the partnership meeting I got very limited support. Partners 8,9,11, my
contemporaries, did not stand up to support me. Three spoke in my favour, among
which was Partner 13. I was turned down. So I said, `I am going anyway.' There were a
number of attempts to talk me out of it. Partner 4 came to offer a newly vacated of®ce. A
large of®ce. That was ridiculous. So I ®nally left. . . . They had left open the possibility
that maybe they would take me back. I came back a year later. Partner 4 invited me to
lunch. He was the one who was the most curious and probably jealous of what I had
done. They had not hired other people to do this work. I insisted on practising in
another area of law. The managing partner sent the ®rst angry letter, `I do not want you
to count on coming back.' . . . So I went solo. I decided to use my expertise and do it on
my own. It would be more satisfying. It has been very successful. . . . There has been no
socializing with members of the ®rm since then. Before, it used to be like a fraternity.
Now some of the partners I hired (while at SG&R) still send me work when they have a
con¯ict [of interest]. I now represent so many relatives of the partners of this ®rm,
including the wives of some of these partners who give me their real estate work, that
I sometimes feel uncomfortable about this. I refer them to other people. (Former
Partner No. 2)
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The existence of such pressures brings us back again to the classical idea that
organizational ef®ciency depends on the quality and con®guration of interpersonal
relationships between members (Lewin 1952).4 But the control mechanism created
by such pressures has not been thoroughly studied in the sociological literature.
Just as relationships between members are important to performance, they are
also important to enforcement of previous agreement. Following Freidson's work
(Freidson 1975; Freidson and Rhea 1963), Charles Bosk (1979) characterizes such
collegial settings by their `atrophy of corporate self-control' and `hypertrophy of
professional self-control' of individual members. The study of SG&R, while not
ignoring the reasons for the existence of this `atrophy', shows that there is among
peers at least one informal corporate mechanism for early sanctioning, speci®cally
the lateral control regime.
A S TR U C TU R A L VI EW ON T H E SE C ON D- OR DE R
FR EE- R ID ER P R O B LE M
As theorized in Chapter 1, enforcement through negative sanctions can be costly for
the sanctioner, particularly when control is mobilized for the protection of the
common good in a formally egalitarian body. The relationship between cost of
control and choices of suitable sanctioners in a collegial organization plays itself
out in the following ways. Members are interested in getting the infractor going
again to the degree that they are dependent on resources controlled by the infractor.
Thus, at SG&R, partners were interested in sanctioning that was likely to happen
and that was likely to work. Based on this argument, niches should count in the
choices of levers: one can hypothesize that, the more similar members were to
infractors in terms of their formal organizational attributes, the more likely they
were to be chosen to act as sanctioners for these infractors. Then, if costs of inter-
action are reduced by structural proximity in such niches, it can be argued that
sanctioning is also more likely to happen if cost of control interaction is also lowered
by easy access to the infractor. Therefore, members connected to infractors through
personal ties must have been more likely than others to be chosen to act as sanc-
tioners for these infractors.
Since partners were also interested in sanctioning that was likely to work, we
can also predict that the relative seniority level of sanctioner and infractor was
an important variable. Seniority is often considered to be a substitute for hierarchy
and formal status (Black and Baumgartner 1983). Being sanctioned by people `from
below' would have been considered a loss of status and would have increased the
cost of intervention. In addition, senior partners often had more incentives than
others to act as sanctioners (because their compensation system rewarded seniority).
Therefore, the more partners are equal or superior to the infractor in terms of
seniority, the more likely they are to be chosen to act as sanctioners. Partners at
SG&R had a strong interest in motivating the malfunctioning partner and in pre-
venting damage to him or her because they depended on him for resources.
Therefore, they must have chosen as sanctioners other partners with whom they had
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a close relationship so as better to control the process. When they were not so close
to the sanctioners, one may predict that they would have chosen as sanctioner
someone who was powerful, so as to fend off interference from other partners and
shift the costs to the powerful levers. In other words, the more personal ties members
have with an infractor, the more likely they are to choose as sanctioners other
members to whom they are also personally close. In addition, the more control
partners have over resources in the ®rm, the more likely they are to be chosen as
sanctioners.
Finally, this concentration of leverage in the hands of a few partners in charge of
bringing their peers back to good conduct raises the classical issue of `who guards
the guardians'Ðthat is, who will perform early monitoring and sanctioning of
partners with this speci®c type of status. From a structural perspective it makes sense
to assert that this elite of levers will police itself. In effect, this is the cheapest way to
deal with the extra costs potentially incurred with control of partners with this type
of status. This solution, however, is a fragile one: this form of self-supervision by
oligarchs may sometimes amount to no supervision at all. One can speculate that
more formal sanctioning mechanisms would be used under such circumstances. But
the conditions under which this informal way is a robust way to guard the guardians
can also be safely speci®ed with the same structural approach if we look at the
meaning of status heterogeneity (see Chapter 6).
M E TH O DO LO G Y
In order to test these hypotheses, a data-set on lateral control was collected at
SG&R. I relied mainly on network analysis and a vignette study to examine these
channels of lateral control. Analysis of this data-set combined four types of
information. First, to identify a partner's expectations, I used a vignette to conduct
a network study derived from Krackhardt's technique (1987) to elicit three-
dimensional data on manipulation of relationships among partners. This vignette
was used, owing to the limited access (in time and possibility of following the
thirty-six partners systematically) provided by the ®rm. It confronted partners with
socio-emotional problems having repercussions on productivity, mainly because
partners found it inappropriate to discuss tougher issues of `deviance' involving
other partners. It asked each partner to match levers and deviant partners, or
targets, in the ®rm for lateral control purposes, and to justify their choices of levers.
These justi®cations are also used here as qualitative material to illustrate how
partners presumed that lateral control operated. Secondly, the standard sociometric
data on partners' ties with one another were used to locate the partners in the
informal structure of their ®rm, for speci®cation of the pathways of lateral control,
and for correlations between choices of levers and partners' management of social
resources. Thirdly, information on individual characteristics of partners (such as
speciality, of®ce membership, centrality scores in the sociometric networks, and
performance measurements) was used to describe the lateral control regime in
its relation to speci®c dimensions of formal structure. Finally, ethnographic
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information collected during ®eldwork was also used to make sense of many of the
results. The analysis presented below combines quantitative and qualitative
methods to describe the lateral control regime.
As mentioned before, it came out during ethnographic ®eldwork that the ®rm had
recently been confronted with behaviour by at least two partners that was perceived
to be opportunistic. Several other partners mentioned that informal and indirect
control had been used and a mediator chosen to go and talk to the uncooperative
colleagues. A vignette was designed to use this event for research purposes, as an
analyser for the description of pathways for lateral control. The data were elicited
from all partners using the following scenario:
Here is the list of all the partners in the ®rm. I would like you to imagine that you are the
managing partner. You notice that X is having personal problems. It could be anything, from
alcohol to depression, or divorce. But it has repercussions on his or her performance. As a
managing partner, it is your job to do something about it. You are looking for colleagues of his
or hers among the other partners of the ®rm to intercede on a discreet and con®dential basis,
to go and talk to him or her, see what's going on, what the ®rm can do to help, and give
unsolicited advice. You don't want to do this yourself because you want to keep it informal,
and your position would be in the way. My question is: who are the persons among all the
other partners whom you would ask to approach X, and why would you delegate this task to
them? What if this person were Y, or Z, etc.?
Each partner (or `respondent') was thus asked to choose one or a set of colleagues
(or `levers') who would be in charge of handling, at this early stage, the problem
created by a speci®c partner (or `target').5 This design elicited information on each
partner observed as a respondent, as a target, and as a lever. It provided two types
of data at the individual level: one matrix per respondent matching one or several
levers for each target, and arguments justifying the choices. Each partner was asked
about all the other partners as targets. All partners performed the task. As with
Krackhardt's type of data, I collected one `lever-by-target' matrix per partner, as well
as arguments justifying the choice of each lever. These matrices can be viewed as
representing `delegation networks' (White 1992) centred around targets for social
control. The result was a set of thirty-six networks of control relationships, one per
partner, and a set of arguments, one per lever used. Altogether, 3,043 paths of lateral
control were de®ned in the data. One knows, therefore, who would have expected
whom to perform this control task and collegial responsibility on whom, and why.
Partners were free to delegate this task to one or to several levers simultaneously,
thus often building task forces of social control.
Here are two examples of arguments provided by the partners to justify their
choice of each lever:
To see Partner X, I would send Partner 8 and Partner 11. They are close friends of his. If
you have to make communication not threatening, you have to ®nd someone close. You
know intimately and best the person of your age in the ®rm. That applies at any age.
Having been associates at the same time, having grown through such uniformity of
experience, creates strong links. The camaraderie born of that is important here. You
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don't want someone who shows up as an envoy of the ®rm. It has to follow from some
everyday discussion. I could also send Partner 27. She is his wife. But I may not, it could
be unfair on her to have to deal with this, assuming that she knows what's going on.
If she doesn't it would make things worse. (Partner 21)
If you send a friend, it can ruin the friendship and the friendship can trouble your
judgement. Partner X has very close friends here. Too close to go on behalf of the
®rm. I would send Partner 1: they have reciprocal respect but are not as close in terms
of friendship. You can dispatch Partner 1 depending on the problem and level of
concern. To see Partner 1 getting into your of®ce to tell you to pull yourself together,
the shock should be enough to straighten you out! What would happen if he leaves!
(Partner 13)
The design of the question also used the fact that the position of managing
partner did not imply an especially strong status in this particular ®rmÐfor
instance, in terms of controlling big clients, making long-term decisions, or having
a particularly strong professional reputationÐwhile still representing partners'
preoccupation with the common good (ultimately their individual interest) and
willingness to participate and act on behalf of the ®rm. In other words, given that
the position of managing partner was a short-term administrative job, it was
simply used to help partners worry about their common good, express potentially
convergent expectations, and thus identify dispositions based on which they were
likely to act. The vignette relied on each partner's capacity to think of this common
good and to design a relational strategy to protect it. In effect, partners had a
strong interest in monitoring the situation (and might easily one day themselves
serve as managing partner). They were asked not to get involved directly (which
would not be realistic) and to reconstitute their expectations and conception of
how lateral control would be ef®ciently exercised in the ®rm. With its mix of
personal and work-related issues, the vignette was received as a real-life question
about free-loading and collegiality.6
The task assumed that information about the trouble was available; as seen above,
information about partners' performance was systematically collected and dis-
tributed to the whole partnership. Given this great visibility of individual perfor-
mance, a problem partner was quickly detected. It also assumed that, in such a
position, differences (between respondents) in terms of access to levers would dis-
appear, since they acted on behalf of the common good. As the question was
designed to make all partners feel entitled to intervene on behalf of the ®rm, not on
their own behalf, it strongly reduced the individual cost of asking levers to intervene.
Corporate lawyers in general are used to performing such tasks: for instance, it bears
similarities with staf®ng a case when opening a ®le, and with representing the whole
partnership when writing an opinion.
The analyses below combine the different kinds of data collected. For example,
choices of sanctioners are combined with information on sociometric ties. The
dependence of the choices of sanctioners on the existence of interdependencies
between respondent and sanctioner, or between respondent and infractor, can
thus be assessed. These data are also used to locate the partners in the informal
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structure of their ®rm and for correlations between importance as a sanctioner and
importance in the control of such resources.
C O NC E P TI ON S OF H OW EX P EC T A TI ON S C ON VE R G E ON
L EV ER S A ND O N TA R G ETS
Using these data, it is useful to summarize partners' assumptions about how indirect
in¯uence would have been exercised at SG&R. As shown by examples of answers
selected below, respondents' arguments provided clear insights into the micro-
politics of their ®rm
A. `To talk to Partner 1? Who would dare? Who would go tell Partner 1 `` You've got a
problem''? I think when you are that senior and important to the ®rm as he is now, you
can only send someone who has approximately the same age, seniority, who is not a
litigator to avoid some sort of competition. I would pick Partner 3. But if you need also a
litigator who understands the consequences of the problem, who knows the clients, and
so on, then I would also send the deputy managing partner.'
B. `To talk to partner 6? I'd send Partner 5, the deputy managing partner. Partner 6 is a
more formal kind of person than anybody else on this list. So I would give him the
structure, the of®cial presence. Partner 5 is a good choice if I wanted more authority
brought to the meeting, and I would give Partner 5 a large bottle of scotch when it's
over.'
C. `I would send Partner 1: they have reciprocal respect but are not as close in terms
of friendship. You can dispatch Partner 1 depending on the problem and level of
concern. To see Partner 1 getting into your of®ce to tell you to pull yourself together,
the shock should be enough to straighten you out! What would happen if he leaves!
Both Partner 1 and Partner 5, anyone in the ®rm must think: `` This is serious if he comes
to me.'' '
D. `To see Partner 19, I'd send Partner 20, because Partner 19 has a history of emotional
problems, which would require a lot of meetings, someone with a lot of time to spend.
And someone who is also a psychiatrist. Partner 20 is a good psychiatrist. He would be
seen as supportive.'
E. `To see Partner 16, I'd send Partner 20. He is less confrontational than others. He has a
good temperament for dealing with these issues; that means that he gives the
impression that it hurts him as much as it hurts the other person.'
F. `Partner 2 is a senior, very thoughtful, respected, and ®ne person. An unusual person,
a man of breadth, judgement, and compassion. He would be received well for any kind
of judgemental matter like this and would handle it very well.'
G. `Partner 2 would be a good person to counsel with. You have to have a good amount
of humanity if you want people to take your advice.'
H. `Maybe it is old-fashioned to think of this in this way, but it seems that in work
relations, if you have a personal problem, you are likely to listen to someone who is a
contemporary if you are 30 as well as if you are in the 50s. You tend to get a sympathetic
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audience with people your age. It would be harder to take it from a younger person for
instance.'
I. `To talk to Partner 3? Partner 1 and Partner 9. Partner 3 started in the City I of®ce in the
1950s, then became CEO of [a large company], then to our of®ce in City II. Partner 1 and
Partner 9, because they made the deal to get him back here.'
J. `On this question, you want someone who is at the same time a friend but also
a good reporter back, someone who would keep in mind the accuracy of the
information and its helpfulness to you as a managing partner. Plus a good relation
to the target. Some would see it in a rose-coloured way or maybe cover up a
few things. I want someone who relates well to the person but who also gets good
information.'
As illustrated by answers A and B, partners as targets (that is, as free-riders) were
presented as more or less dif®cult (costly) to handle for different reasons, mainly
personality and status within the ®rm. This was the case, for instance, with Partners
1 and 6. A second category included partners who were perceived as easy to pressure,
because there was an obvious choice of levers to match with them. This was the
case, for instance, with Partners 5 and 18, who would most likely be sent to deal
with each other. As illustrated in examples C to G, partners as levers (that is, envoys
of the ®rm in charge of pressuring deviant partners back into good conduct) were
most often presented either in terms of personal qualities and authority as emis-
saries, or in terms of easy access to the target. This was how Partner 2 and Partner 20
were almost unanimously presented in these illustrations. Both were often chosen
as levers when respondents did not know about the personal relationships of
the target, or were unable to think of anybody else. Regarding access to the
target, respondents talked about leverage in terms of a personal or special rela-
tionship with the target, in terms of having something in common with the target:
being contemporaries (same age or seniority), litigators, friends, having expressed
mutual respect, could serve as a foot in the target's of®ce door. This is particularly
clear in answers reported in examples H to I.
In respondents' answers, trust from the ®rm and access to the target were the
two explicit dimensions of the ef®cient lever. Thus the main dilemma was between
sending a lever who represented the ®rm and spoke reliably on its behalf, and
sending a lever who was close to the target. Partner 15 summarized the dilemma
in example J. The special relationship between targets and levers was an important
factor, but it was presented as problematic when left unchecked, because the
lever might end up siding with the target at the expense of the ®rm. At least as long
as it remained informal, leverage was often presumed to be exercised through a `soft
cop, tough cop' approach. It worked through both friendly discussion and per-
suasion, provision of professional and impersonal support, but also pressure
through the use of intimidating partners with status and reputation. Partners'
expectations thus re¯ected a speci®cally `collegial' know-how, a strategic and micro-
political culture.
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S OC I A L N I C H ES A ND LA T ER A L C O NT R OL
If we look at peers' conceptions of lateral control at the level of individual partners,
it becomes easier to understand how they allocated costs of lateral control. The
following illustrations are provided to show that, for each member, this form of cost
management brought in niches through three preoccupations.
1. Investing one's own relational capital in the lateral control process or shifting
the costs of control by playing on others' (the lever's or target's) relational
capital (that is, resource dependencies). Good relationships with colleagues
(a form of individual relational capital) being both fragile and unequally
distributed within the ®rm, a partner had a choice, when selecting a lever,
between using his or her own social resources or not.
2. When shifting, spreading the costs of control among many members or
concentrating these costs on a few specialized members.
3. When shifting and spreading, bringing in niches by paying particular attention
to various similarities among protagonists, so as to try to `smooth' the control
process by using formal dimensions of ®rm structure.7
The fragmentation of lateral control
Partners had a comprehensive picture of the network of lateral control, which could
consist of several components or be all connected. For instance, Figure 7.1 shows
that Partner 35 thought, with very few exceptions, that Of®ce I targets should be
taken care of by Of®ce I levers, and Of®ce II targets by Of®ce II levers. A strongly
discriminant of®ce boundary thus fragments this structure.
For instance, to pressure Partner 1 (Of®ce I's most senior partner), Partner 35,
who was an Of®ce II partner, would use Partner 26, saying: `He was brought up in
Partner 1's world, he is his proteÂgeÂ. Partner 26 is also my catch-all on the litigation
side.' To pressure Partner 6, Of®ce II's prima donna partner, he would send Partner
5, Of®ce II's most senior partner, saying: `They are both here in Of®ce II, both are
pre-merger, they knew the founder of the ®rm, they have known each other for a
long time.' In this perception, each of®ce represented a world of its own, dominated
by a few heavyweights, but also identi®ed by the existence of close ties among
some of its members. This line of argument was pushed further by partners who
detected `groups' among other partners and used them for leverage purpose. For
instance:
To talk to Partner 23, I'd send Partner 24, Partner 25, and Partner 26. They were all
associates together, all are competent, well perceived by each other. I would turn them
loose on him. Then I would stick him back on the others. (Partner 4)
To talk to Partner 4, I'd send Partner 9. They are the two most senior corporate
lawyers in Of®ce I. Bright but groupy. They drink hard, they play hard, they work
hard. (Partner 30)
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Thus, perceptions of small groups based on different types of ties between levers and
targets also in¯uenced the extent to which members spread control costs.
Fragmentation also occured in other ways. In Partner 33's picture (Figure 7.2), it
is the presence of several couples of target and lever mutually chosen to control each
other that explains his low connectivity score (one of Krackhardt's 1994 indexes).
Partner 33 de®ned several worlds by choosing one heavyweight as a representative
for each, and by matching, within each world, levers and targets based on personal
considerations. He rarely crossed the of®ce boundary and did not raise personal
considerations about the target or the lever when doing so. Thus, since partners were
closer to other partners in the same of®ce, the leverage network created by this
respondent ended up being disconnected. This fragmented view of lateral control
also came from respect for other internal boundaries within the ®rm (speciality,
seniority groups). An additional reason for this fragmented view is that some
partners chose few levers for each target. Thus low connectivity was correlated with
high scores of `hierarchy'. I ®nd that respondents who saw a fragmented or dis-
connected world of in¯uence, a structure made of many components (low con-
nectivity scores), were new to the partnership (Partners 3, 21, 30, 31, 33, 35), or far
from it (Partner 15), with three exceptions: Partners 1, 8, and 26.
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Figure 7.1. Partner 35's expectations concerning leverage in the ®rm
Source: Reprinted from Quality and Quantity, E. Lazega and D. Krackhardt, `Spreading and Shifting Costs
of Lateral Control in a Law Partnership: A Structural Analysis at the Individual Level', 34: 159. Copyright
2000 with permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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The `overkill' strategy: Leverage as a collective effort
One way of reducing individual costs of control was to spread these costs between
several levers, each taking part of the responsibility for exercising sanctions.
Respondents were free to choose one or several levers for a given target. Respondents
differed in the extent to which they used one or several levers for each target. This
could vary from very lean paths of in¯uence to an `overkill' strategy. It is measured by
an index called graph ef®ciency (Krackhardt 1994), which relates to the extent to
which members used redundancy. High graph ef®ciency means using partners
sparingly to control one target. Respondents could systematically stress either the lean,
con®dential, or discrete effort in leverage, or the more public and collective effort. In
the latter case, it was mainly because they did not trust one single path of in¯uence
(for good feedback purposes, for instance), because they had a `good-guy±bad-guy'
conception of leverage, because they did not know what was going on in the other
of®ce (and therefore chose many senior levers), or because they wanted to be pro-
tective of some partners. Among such respondents, I found several ®rm minders, such
as Partners 5 and 20, but also partners recruited from other ®rms who played it safe by
choosing several levers for each target (because they did not feel absolutely sure of
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Figure 7.2. Partner 33's expectations concerning leverage in the ®rm
Source: Reprinted from Quality and Quantity, E. Lazega and D. Krackhardt, `Spreading and Shifting Costs
of Lateral Control in a Law Partnership: A Structural Analysis at the Individual Level', 34: 160. Copyright
2000 with permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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their choice; this was the case, for example, with Partners 14, 22, and 25). Figure 7.3
represents Partner 20's conception of the leverage structure and shows that he chose
systematically three or four levers to be sent to deal with each target. This does not
mean that, in these structures, all partners were chosen equally often as levers. Partner
20's approach to the choices of levers was explained by his own arguments:
Some of this is clearly of®ce-based, some of it is work-related, and in a few instances
it is friendship-based. And also sometimes authority-based: the target would look to
them [levers] as having authority. Some of it will have to do with age differences, but
not necessarily. I give you in general people who know best the person in trouble, to
whom the target would not react negatively. Plus those who know his business. In
another ®rm, it would sometimes be dif®cult to ®nd a single person. Here you always
have three or four persons you can think of. (Partner 20)
Partner 24 reasoned in the same way:
To talk to Partner 8, I would send Partner 17. They are close friends. He would know how
to get through to him without being too threatening, making him too defensive. But I
would also send Partner 2, because I don't think that Partner 17 would really be able to
deal with the business aspect of the situation. (Partner 24)
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Figure 7.3. Partner 20's expectations concerning leverage in the ®rm
Source: Reprinted from Quality and Quantity, E. Lazega and D. Krackhardt, `Spreading and Shifting Costs
of Lateral Control in a Law Partnership: A Structural Analysis at the Individual Level', 34: 161. Copyright
2000 with permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Statistical con®rmation
The fact that control was overwhelmingly expected to be exercised in niches is
demonstrated by the fact that important dimensions of the formal structure of the
®rm had a clear in¯uence on respondents' choices of levers. At the individual level,
the effect of a limited set of attributes derived from position in the formal structure
was analysed across the thirty-six actors. It tested the effect of each variable on each
partner's set of choices. Variables representing the use of similarities (and their
signi®canceÐas presented aboveÐin terms of lesser effort, increased competence,
and higher legitimacy of access to resources) to smooth the control process were
introduced by taking into account formal structural dimensions of the organization
relevant to respondents when matching levers and targets. The value of each
hypothesis was tested by including in a regression model the following effects:
1. lever and target were in the same of®ce;
2. lever and target had the same speciality;
3. lever and target were in the same level of seniority;
4. respondent and lever were in the same of®ce;
5. respondent and lever had the same speciality;
6. respondent and lever were in the same level of seniority;
7. respondent and target were in the same of®ce;
8. respondent and target had the same speciality;
9. respondent and target were in the same level of seniority.
Multiple regression analyses including variables 1 to 9 were replicated across the
thirty-six partners. Appendix G displays the distribution of strongly signi®cant
determinants for each respondent. Two effects are of particular interest to our study
of management of costs of control at the individual level. Many respondents looked
for similarities between lever and target in terms of of®ce location and in terms of
level of seniority. Thus, they tried to smooth the lateral control process by allocating
the control costs to targets close to the levers, both geographically and in terms of
experience (but not speciality), while still counting on the levers' use of the target's
dependence on such resources.
The niche effect in the design of pathways for lateral control is also con®rmed at
the aggregate level. Table 7.1 shows that respondents matched levers signi®cantly
more often with targets similar in their formal attributes, such as practice, of®ce, and
level of seniority, than with targets differing in these attributes.
All the variables included in the table signi®cantly affect the choices of levers for a
given target. Of®ce I levers were chosen signi®cantly more often to control Of®ce I
targets than Of®ce II targets.8 Symmetrically, and even more strongly, Of®ce II levers
were chosen signi®cantly more to take care of Of®ce II targets than Of®ce I targets.
Thus, partners of one of®ce were chosen to control each other, and comparatively
rarely to control partners in the other of®ce. In the arguments, this was often
explained by two reasons: ®rst, it was more convenient to ask a lever to intervene
who was located in the room next door to the target rather than to ask a partner in
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another city; secondly, targets from one of®ce were also likely to perceive control
efforts from `foreign' levers as intrusive.
Litigators were chosen signi®cantly more often to control other litigators than
corporate targets. Symmetrically, corporate levers were expected to take signi®cantly
more care of corporate targets than of litigation ones. The arguments provided two
main reasons for such a symmetry. One was that levers with the same speciality as
their targets were supposed to know their targets and understand their business
situation better than levers from other specialities. Another reason is to be found in
the differences in professional `subcultures': corporate lawyers had a reputation for
being more conciliatory and quieter, and litigators for being more combative and
more aggressive; thus, they were not perceived to be good matches with one another.
Finally, the ten most junior partners were rarely chosen as levers, and were more
likely to be chosen to control junior targets rather than more senior ones. Medium-
seniority levers were chosen to control junior and medium-seniority targets. Senior
levers were chosen much more systematically, and were not chosen to control any
one level of seniority signi®cantly more often than any other. Most notably, the
coef®cients for both seniority variables go up in the multiple regression as compared
with the simple regression. This con®rms that senior levers were chosen more often
than medium-seniority partners, and much more often than junior ones. Many
reasons were provided for this strong asymmetry and descending hierarchical
structure. Particularly, junior partners did not know older partners as well as their
contemporaries did, and were not perceived as carrying the necessary weight to
impress more senior partners. In general, partners said that they did not trust junior
partners for this type of task as much as they would trust more senior levers.
Overall, of®ce location, division of work, and seniority boundaries shaped
respondents' expectations. The weight of these internal differentiations can be
interpreted as a clear in¯uence of the formal structure on the pattern of the lateral
control. This embeddedness in formal structure increased the chances of lateral
control being an ef®cient solution to the second-order free-rider problem in such
Table 7.1. Effects of selected dimensions of ®rm formal structure on the choices of levers
Independent
variables
Models
1 2 3 4 5
Of®ce similarity 0.31*** 0.30***
Practice similarity 0.13*** 0.14***
Seniority similarity 0.18*** 0.29***
Seniority superiority 0.09* 0.25***
Notes : *p< 0.05, ***p< 0.001, one-tailed tests. Coef®cients are standardized in Model 5. For Model 5,
r2 0.2. Number of usable permutations: 999. Signi®cance levels were determined by the multiple
regression quadratic assignment procedure (Krackhardt 1988). For details about the procedure used in
these analyses, see Lazega and Krackhardt (2000).
Source : Reprinted from Organisation Studies, E. Lazega, `Enforcing Rules among Peers: A Lateral Control
Regime', 21: 201. Copyright 2000 with permission from Aldine-de Gruyter.
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niches. As such, it strongly points at niches as a fundamental component of an
organizational control regime.
Multiplex social ties and leverage in niches
The next question with regard to management of costs of lateral control is
whether or not the existence of niches had an effect on respondents' propensity to
invest their own relational capital in the lateral control process. The answer should
be obvious, since we know that members in general tended to ®nd their co-workers,
advisers, and friends in their niche. Another series of independent variables was
used to look more closely at the determinants of choices of levers at the individual
level. This was done mainly by looking at the relationship between choices of
levers and informal ties among partners, speci®cally at the effect of relations between
respondent, lever, and target on the choices of levers. The analysis was again
replicated across the thirty-six actors. For con®rmation purposes, variables repre-
senting issues of cost of control in terms of investment of relational capital were
introduced by the analytical question, `Whose friends, advisers, and co-workers does
the respondent mobilize to put pressure on the target? His or her own ties? The
lever's ties? The target's ties?'
The value of each hypothesis can be tested by including in a regression model the
following effects:
10. respondent saw the lever as a friend;
11. respondent saw the lever as a co-worker;
12. respondent went to the lever for advice;
13. lever saw the target as a friend;
14. lever went to the target for advice;
15. lever saw the target as a co-worker;
16. target went to the lever for advice;
17. target saw the lever as a friend;
18. target saw the lever as a co-worker;
19. respondent saw the target as a friend;
20. respondent saw the target as a co-worker;
21. respondent went to the target for advice.
Partner 14's responses illustrate this analysis in Table 7.2. There is only one
signi®cant effect in this example: Partner 14, in his conception of lateral control, was
sensitive to the fact that the target sought advice from the lever, and that such a
dependence could be used to put pressure on the target. He chose to make use of the
target's relational capital to monitor and sanction him or her. More generally,
Appendix G displays the results of this series of regression models and shows that
two effects are of particular interest to our study of management of costs of control
at the individual level. First, the fact that `target went to the lever for advice' and that
`target saw the lever as a friend' were important criteria: dependence of the target on
the lever for those resources was perceived to be a major way of reducing control
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costs. This suggests that many members did play on others' (target's) relational
capital, especially on their dependence for advice and friendship. This conception of
lateral control tended to shift the costs of control to the targetÐthat is, the person
responsible for the infraction. At the aggregate level, a general classi®cation of
choices of levers is presented in Table 7.3.
This table could again suggest that, in absolute numbers, the general trend in this
®rm was to use personal ties (considered separately one type at a time) very little for
lateral pressure. For example, in the ®rst sub-table of Table 7.3, members used levers
whom they considered to be friends in 29.9 per cent of the cases. These relatively low
rates of `conversion' of personal social resources into relational pressure could come
from the fact that the goal of such manipulations was to protect the common good,
not immediate individual interest. Members would have left it to others to invest
their social resources for that purpose, rather than `sacri®ce' their own.
However, the analyses at the individual level and the reading of absolute ®gures
at the aggregate level can provide a misleading view of what went on in niches. In
the next section, I show that, in fact, given the general density of the observed
network, respondents overused their own social ties, particularly in their niches. In
effect, size and density of each network in the ®rm de®ned limits to the number of
choices of levers: all actors did not necessarily have enough friends, co-workers, and
advisers to `cover' all their partners. If the `possible' was thus constituted by taking
for each pair of respondent±target all the theoretically available in¯uence paths
(thirty four of them), there were always, among the actually `observed'Ðthat is,
de®ned by respondentsÐpaths, more personalized relations than one would expect.
Table 7.2. An example of the effects of an individual partner's pre-existing ties on his choices
of levers: The case of Partner 14
Independent variables Parameter estimates
10. Respondent saw the lever as a friend 0.01
11. Respondent saw the lever as a co-worker ÿ0.05
12. Respondent went to the lever for advice ÿ0.12
13. Lever saw the target as a friend 0.10
14. Lever went to the target a for advice 0.04
15. Lever saw the target as a co-worker ÿ0.04
16. Target went to the lever for advice 0.14**
17. Target saw the lever as a friend 0.05
18. Target saw the lever as a co-worker 0.00
19. Respondent saw the target as a friend ÿ0.03
20. Respondent saw the target as a co-worker ÿ0.01
21. Respondent went to the target for advice ÿ0.00
Notes: N 1,260. **p< 0.01, one-tailed tests. Coef®cients are standardized, r2 0.08. Number of usable
permutations: 999. Results of multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (Krackhardt 1988).
Independent variables are numbered as in the text.
Source: Reprinted from Organisation Studies, E. Lazega, `Enforcing Rules among Peers: A Lateral Control
Regime', 21: 203. Copyright 2000 with permission from Aldine-de Gruyter.
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Actors can therefore be said to have used their social resources more than general
densities would suggest.9 This, in many ways, amounts to a form of `privatization' of
lateral control.
The privatization of lateral control
Privatization of lateral pressures is ®rst suggested by the fact that choices of sanc-
tioners varied with the types of mobilized ties. When partners `invested' their own
ties for the protection of the common good, they tended to mobilize their advisers
more than their co-workers and friends. The proportion of personal social ties
converted and `expended' for control (personalized paths), compared to all the non-
personalized paths (independent of the tie between respondent and target), varied
with the type of relationship: partners tended to be more `stingy' with colleagues
they considered to be friends than with colleagues they cited as advisers. Thus, on
average, 30 per cent of the choices of levers by respondents mobilized the latter's
friends, 38 per cent their co-workers, and 47 per cent their advisers. The higher rate
Table 7.3. Selection of levers: Conditions under which respondents invest their own relational
capital to exercise lateral control for the common good
Regardless of
relationship
with the target
Target
friend of
respondent
Target
co-worker
of respondent
Target
adviser of
respondent
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Lever friend of
respondent
No 2,133
(70.1)
1,787
(76.6)
346
(48.7)
1,483
(72.9)
650
(64.4)
1,453
(73.3)
680
(64.1)
Yes 910
(29.9)
545
(23.4)
365
(51.3)
551
(27.1)
359
(35.6)
529
(26.7)
381
(35.9)
Lever co-worker
of respondent
No 1,895
(62.3)
1,509
(64.7)
386
(54.3)
1,441
(70.8)
454
(45.0)
1,361
(68.7)
534
(50.3)
Yes 1,148
(37.7)
823
(35.3)
325
(45.7)
593
(29.2)
555
(55.0)
621
(31.3)
527
(49.7)
Lever adviser
of respondent
No 1,614
(53.0)
1,306
(56.0)
308
(43.3)
1,198
(58.9)
416
(41.2)
1,192
(60.1)
422
(39.8)
Yes 1,429
(47.0)
1,026
(44.0)
403
(56.7)
836
(41.1)
593
(58.8)
790
(39.9)
639
(60.2)
Regardless of
relationship
with the lever
2,332
(76.6)
711
(23.4)
2,034
(66.8)
1,009
(33.2)
1,982
(65.1)
1,061
(34.9)
Notes: N 3,043. Numbers in the table are counts, and percentages (in parentheses) are column
percentages. The unit of analysis is the choice of a sanctioner by a respondent for a given infractor.
Example: When the target is not a friend, respondent chooses a lever who is a friend in 23.4% of the cases.
Source: Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega and M.-O. Lebeaux, `Capital social et
contrainte lateÂrale', 36: 764. Copyright 1995 with permission from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
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for advisers can be explained by the fact that different networks had different
densities and that partners central in the advice network were often senior and
experienced partners. This con®rms that they were therefore often chosen to
represent the interests of the ®rm in front of the targets. Mobilization was all the
easier here since the advice for which they were sought out was usually `free'; when
representing the ®rm in front of the target, advisers could more easily carry on
advising him or her, this time unsolicited.
This relative compartmentalization of ties by membersÐthat is, this variation of
rates of conversion by type of tieÐsuggests that over-utilization of relational capital
(compared to the general density of each network) mentioned above was even more
pronounced when each type of relation is considered separately and when the tie
between respondent and target is taken into account. Table 7.4 presents a ®rst
analysis taking into account this relationship with the target. It provides the odds
ratios of the nine sub-tables in Table 7.3. The diagonal in Table 7.4 shows that
friendship ties were the `purest,' before co-worker ties. Ties among advisers were a
little less strong, more fuzzy and dispersed. Thus, when the choices of levers are
analysed, taking into account the tie between respondent and target, the conversion
of relational capital into lateral constraint appears to have been very selective.
This selectivity suggests that attention to the relationships between, on the one
hand, respondents and levers and, on the other hand, respondents and targets
should provide additional insights on how this lateral control regime helps in
overcoming the second-order free-rider problem. I ®rst checked whether each lever
chosen by a respondent was or was not mentioned by him or her as a friend, adviser,
or co-worker. I then looked at the extent to which the existence of a tie between the
respondent and the target had an effect on the respondent's choice of levers who
were part of his or her relational capital. Table 7.5 shows that partners chose to
invest their own relational capital for lateral control purposes, but mainly to protect
their own personal relational capitalÐthat is, targets who were also part of their
relational capital.
In this table, the dependent variables were constructed as follows. For the ®rst
model (`Respondent chooses the levers among his/her friends'), a dichotomous
variable with 3,043 observations was created in which the value is 1 each time
respondent i chooses a lever k and mentions k as a friend in the sociometric
Table 7.4. Table of odds ratios of the nine sub-tables of Table 7.3
Target
friend of
respondent
Target
co-worker of
respondent
Target
adviser of
respondent
Lever friend of respondent 3.46 1.49 1.54
Lever co-worker of respondent 1.54 2.97 2.16
Lever adviser of respondent 1.67 2.04 2.28
Source: Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega and M.-O. Lebeaux, `Capital social et
contrainte lateÂrale', 36: 765. Copyright 1995 with permission from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
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friendship matrix, and 0 when i chooses a lever k and does not mention k as a friend
in the sociometric friendship matrix. Dependent variables for the next two
models (`Respondent chooses the levers among his/her co-workers/advisers') were
recoded in the same way. Independent variables were reconstructed in the
same way. For instance, for the variable `Target is a friend of the respondent
(according to respondent)', a variable with 3,043 observations was constructed in
which the value is 1 each time respondent i chooses a lever for a target j and
mentions target j as a friend in the sociometric friendship matrix, and 0 when i
chooses a lever for a target j and does not mention j as a friend in the sociometric
friendship matrix.
These parameters show that choosing a friend as a lever (rather than a non-friend)
is explained by being friends with the target. This selectivity characterized what
could be called a relative homogenization of social control in function of type of tie:
respondents tended to favour choices of friends to put pressure on friends, advisers
to put pressure on advisers, co-workers to constrain co-workers. This conversion
was thus characterized by the fact that respondents tended to `protect' their rela-
tional capital. The same holds for the fact that the lever was friends with the target
(according to the lever). The type of conversion that emerged here required the
creation of a group of friends with cliquelike featuresÐthat is, choosing each other
mutually to deal with their own problems themselves, in a privatized manner.
Table 7.5. Logit analysis of the effect of relationships between respondents and targets and
between targets and levers on respondents' choices of levers among their own friends,
co-workers, and advisers
Independent variables Models
Respondent chooses the levers among his/her:
Friends Co-workers Advisers
Target is a co-worker of the respondent
(according to respondent)
0.10 (0.10) 0.93 (0.10) 0.35 (0.09)
Target is an adviser of the respondent
(according to respondent)
ÿ0.03 (0.11) 0.25 (0.10) 0.60 (0.09)
Target is a friend of the respondent
(according to respondent)
1.20 (0.10) 0.09 (0.10) 0.18 (0.09)
Target is a co-worker of the lever
(according to lever)
ÿ0.05 (0.09) 0.17 (0.09) ÿ0.06 (0.08)
Target is an adviser of the lever
(according to lever)
ÿ0.02 (0.10) ÿ0.28 (0.09) ÿ0.04 (0.09)
Target is a friend of the lever
(according to lever)
0.28 (0.09) ÿ0.20 (0.08) ÿ0.11 (0.08)
Notes: N 3,043. Unstandardized coef®cients, standard errors in parentheses. For details about the
combination of sociometric choices and selections of levers, see the text.
Source: Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega and M.-O. Lebeaux, `Capital social et
contrainte lateÂrale', 36: 765. Copyright 1995 with permission from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
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Choosing a co-worker (rather than a non-co-worker) as a lever is explained by the
fact that one was a co-worker of the target, but also by the fact that the target was not
an adviser of the lever (according to the lever). This type of conversion may be based
on the tendency for respondents to contain the dif®culties created by work ties
within the realm of such work ties, as well as on resistance of levers to this strategy
when the target was one of their advisers. The fact that respondents chose one of
their own advisers (rather than a non-adviser) as lever is mainly explained by the fact
that they sought advice from the target and that they were also co-workers of the
target. Having a strong professional tie, at least duplex, with the target (as adviser
and co-worker) explains the choice of an adviser as lever. This type of conversion
illustrates the idea that relational capital constituted by advisers, although very
precious, was more generally `expended' than relational capital of levers considered
as friends and collaborators.
In sum, partners pressured one another using their own personal ties more
than one would expect. To this relative privatization of lateral pressure, one can
add the fact that actors chose their levers among their advisers rather than from
other networks. They tended to prefer the choice of an adviser regardless of their
own ties to the target, whereas in the other cases they stayed within the sphere or
type of tie that they had with the target. They also used their own social relations
(friends, co-workers, advisers) more to exercise constraint on peers when the latter
were also part of their relational capital. Type of tie by type of tie, these strategies
show that members tried to stay en famille more frequently in the friendship or in
the co-workers networks than in the advice network (the latter's ties being more
easily interlocked with each one of the other ties, as seen in Chapter 5). This
selectivity can be explained by the will to protect this capital, type of tie by type of
tie, in the sense of not investing it in a random way, thus avoiding the potentially
negative effects of the exercise of power among peers. The conversion of relational
capital into lateral constraint thus followed a speci®c know-how or set of rules, in
particular a norm that had an `economic' dimension. Ef®ciency of pressures, as it
was anticipated by partners, depended on the type of resource circulating in each
network and on their desire to protect their relational capital.
Borrowing others' connections
If partners were disposed towards using their own relational capital for control
within their niche, they were also disposed towards borrowing others' resources for
the same purpose. The existence of these different modalities of conversion, which
varied according to the type of relational capital and according to the type of target,
made some in¯uence paths more likely than others. Table 7.6 describes the dis-
tribution of the different types of lateral in¯uence paths reconstituted based on these
data. Recall that these paths were comprised of two segments, the ®rst being the
relation (or absence of relation) between respondent and lever, the second being
the relation (or absence of relation) between target and lever. When choosing a lever
to put pressure on a target, a respondent could often count on the fact that there
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Table 7.6. Distribution of the different types of two-step control paths, according to the type of tie used in each step
First step: Ties between
respondent and lever
Second step: Ties between lever and target (according to the lever)
(according to the respondent) No tie Friendship Co-work Friendship
and
co-work
Advice Advice
and
friendship
Advice
and
co-work
Advice,
friendship,
and co-work
Total Baseline
frequencies
No tie 410
(13.47)
101
(3.32)
122
(4.01)
40
(1.31)
91
(2.99)
112
(3.68)
84
(2.76)
259
(8.51)
1,219
(40.06)
50.0
Friendship 72
(2.37)
26
(0.85)
11
(0.36)
9
(0.30)
20
(0.66)
36
(1.18)
11
(0.36)
44
(1.45)
229
(7.53)
5.9
Co-work 46
(1.51)
9
(0.30)
10
(0.33)
3
(0.10)
7
(0.23)
11
(0.36)
14
(0.46)
37
(1.22)
137
(4.50)
7.0
Friendship and co-work 9
(0.30)
2
(0.07)
3
(0.10)
1
(0.03)
2
(0.07)
6
(0.20)
0
(0.00)
6
(0.20)
29
(0.95)
1.4
Advice 109
(3.58)
21
(0.69)
22
(0.72)
10
(0.33)
22
(0.72)
23
(0.76)
19
(0.62)
53
(1.74)
279
(9.17)
7.4
Advice and friendship 42
(1.38)
10
(0.33)
14
(0.46)
9
(0.30)
10
(0.33)
11
(0.36)
15
(0.49)
57
(1.87)
168
(5.52)
3.5
Advice and co-work 205
(6.74)
42
(1.38)
29
(0.95)
6
(0.20)
25
(0.82)
43
(1.41)
44
(1.45)
104
(3.42)
498
(16.37)
12.8
Advice, friendship,
and co-work
152
(5.00)
33
(1.08)
51
(1.68)
21
(0.69)
35
(1.15)
49
(1.61)
44
(1.45)
99
(3.25)
484
(15.91)
11.7
Total
% column
1,045
(34.34)
244
(8.02)
262
(8.61)
99
(3.25)
212
(6.97)
291
(9.56)
231
(7.59)
659
(21.66)
3,043
(100.00)
Baseline frequencies 56.5 6.0 6.8 1.6 6.5 4.1 6.9 11.7
Notes: N 3,043. Figures in the table are counts, with percentages in parentheses.
Source : Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega and M.-O. Lebeaux, `Capital social et contrainte lateÂrale', 36: 769. Copyright 1995 with permission from
Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
were one or more types of relation between this lever and that target. Respondents
may not have always been conscious of the fact that they dug into the lever's rela-
tional capital, but the arguments provided to justify these choices show that they
were actually often conscious of it. In one case or another, the respondent still
depended, by construction, when exercising lateral constraints, on this relationship
between lever and target. We must focus on the nature of these relationships to
reconstitute the paths of lateral in¯uence.
Choices of levers by respondents are distributed into eight categories of paths
constituted by the eight possible combinations, according to whether the lever was
considered by the respondent as his or her adviser, co-worker, and/or friend. For
example, the choices of levers that could be called impersonalÐwhere the lever
chosen by the respondent was not one of his or her advisers, co-workers, or
friendsÐconstituted 40 per cent of all the choices of levers by the respondents. In
absolute numbers, in¯uence paths in which levers were at the same time advisers,
co-workers, and friends of the respondent constituted 15.9 per cent of all the choices
of levers. Still, in absolute numbers, the choices that could be considered entirely
personalized, where respondents invested the strongest and most precious triplex
ties in their relational capital, were thus more than twice as rare as the impersonal
choices. The same prudence, however, as in the reading of Table 7.3 is necessary
here. These absolute numbers do not mean that respondents were not disposed
towards investing much of their relational capital in this lateral control.
Generally, paths went through either the relational capital of the respondent or
that of the lever. In other words, the most frequent types of paths did not combine
personalized ties between respondent and lever with personalized ties between lever
and target. This is easily visible in the fact that completely impersonal paths con-
stitute 13.5 per cent of all paths and that 60 per cent of all chosen paths belong either
to the ®rst row or to the ®rst column of Table 7.6. For example, the paths going
through the very personal ties of the lever (that is, without personalized relationship
between respondent and lever, but with a triplex relationship between the lever and
the target) are the second most frequent case in the table (8.5 per cent of all observed
paths). Out of the two possible cases of triplex relations, paths combining all per-
sonalized ties between lever and target were more numerous than paths combining
the personalized ties between respondent and lever.10
Table 7.6 con®rms that paths went through advisers more often than through
friends or co-workers. One ®nds thus a primacy of paths in which the ®rst segment
was impersonal, then paths in which there was an advice tie between respondent and
lever (separated from or coupled with the two other types of tie). Advice ties seem,
once again, to have characterized personalized paths.
Relationships between levers and targets were also distributed into eight cate-
gories constituted by the same possible combinations. As already seen, impersonal
relationsÐwhere the lever chosen by the respondent did not seek advice from
the target, did not work with the target, and did not have a friendship tie with
the targetÐconstituted 34.3 per cent of all recorded choices. This constituted an
underutilization of impersonal paths compared to the `baseline' distribution. When
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choosing levers, respondents were likely, one time out of three, to exercise imper-
sonal pressure on the target. In this case, the lever did not invest his or her own
relational capital. In contrast, ties that could be considered entirely personalized
between lever and targetÐwhere the lever sought advice from the target, worked
with the target and considered him or herself friends with the targetÐconstitute
21.7 per cent of all recorded in¯uence choices, which corresponds to an over-
utilization of this type of path. It is interesting to note that the difference decreases
between these two extreme cases when compared to the relationships between
respondent and lever: this con®rms that, consciously or not, respondents con-
structed paths that mobilized more easily other partners' relational capital (that is,
levers' relational capital) than their own. Thus it is all the more apparent that
respondents seemed less discriminating and less careful with regard to the nature of
other partners' capital than when they invested their own. In effect, among paths
that involved only one type of tie between lever and target, those mobilizing a
co-worker tie with the target (8.6 per cent), or a friendship tie with the target (8 per
cent), or an advice tie with the target (7 per cent), were approximately equally
frequent, which was not the case in the relationship between respondent and lever.
In order to understand these paths from the partners' perspective, in particular
this difference between the use of one's own relational capital and the use of others'
relational capital (that of the lever), we need an analysis that re-introduces the
relationship between the respondent and the target. For this purpose, Table 7.6 was
simpli®ed by measuring the strength of ties among all protagonists with a scale going
from absence of tie to presence of the three types of tie, and thus by grouping paths
into four categories. This approach helps in analysing the expenditure of the lever's
relational capital. It is summarized in Table 7.7, which represents the tests of the
models that try to check that the relationship between the lever and the target was
not independent from the two other relationships in the triplet.
There was a strong interaction between the respondent±target relationship (RT in
Table 7.7) and the respondent±lever relationship (RL). But there was also a stronger
interaction between the lever±target relationship (LT) and the respondent±target
relationship (RT) than between the lever±target relationship (LT) and the respon-
dent±lever relationship (RL). Among the level 2 interactions, notice that RTRL
interaction was the strongest (its corresponding R is 67.4 per cent). The triple
interaction was also signi®cant, although more moderately so (it corresponds to
17.9 per cent of the chi-square of the baseline model).
The fact that the relationship between the lever and the target was not inde-
pendent from the relationship between respondent and target shows that res-
pondents expected the levers to use their own relational capital regardless of the
strength of the tie that respondents had with the lever or with the target. More
precisely, levers were expected to `spend' their relational capital in an undiffer-
entiated manner, whereas respondentsÐas seen aboveÐtended to `invest' their
relational capital more when they wanted to protect their own relational capital
(that is, more carefully). Respondents tended to expect levers to be less strategic with
their use of their ties.
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The fact that the triple interaction is signi®cant means that levers were expected to
spend their relational capital in a less discriminating way, although still in a weakly
discriminating way. Respondents did not expect levers to use their relational capital
entirely `randomly'. The difference may be described by the fact that respondents, when
they had no relationship to the target, chose in 52 per cent of the cases a lever who
had no relationship to them (respondents), but who also had no relationship to the
target in only 36 per cent of the cases. The path between lever and target was expected
to be personalized in two out of three interventions, and in one out of two inter-
ventions between respondent and lever. Respondents tended to choose a lever who
spent overall more personal relational capital than they (respondents) would when
there was no personalized tie between themselves and the target. When they were
relatively external, distant, and personally unconcerned, respondents tended to choose
a lever with personalized ties to the target. They got personally involved in one out of
two cases and expected the lever to get personally involved in two out of three cases.
In contrast, when respondents had a very strong tie with the target, they tended to
choose a lever with no personal tie to the target (impersonal path) in only 22 per
cent of the cases (that is, a personalized path in 78 per cent of the cases), whereas the
lever had an impersonal tie to the target only in 29 per cent of the cases. The lever
had impersonal ties to the target that varied only within the interval of 36 per cent
and 29 per cent, whereas respondents had impersonal ties with the lever that varied
between 52 per cent and 22 per cent. If we assume that respondents knew whether or
not there was a relationship between the lever and the targetÐwhich is a reasonable
Table 7.7. Log-linear modelling of ties between respondents, targets, and levers
Models Degrees of
freedom
L2 Test R (%)
1. Baseline model
(RT) (RL) (LT) 54 393.37 p< 0.0001
2. (RTRL) (LT) 45 128.26 p< 0.0001 67.4
Test of (RTRL): (1)ÿ (2) 9 265.11 p< 0.0001
3. (RT) (RLLT) 45 377.43 p< 0.0001 4.1
Test of (RLLT): (1)ÿ (3) 9 15.94 p 0.0681
4. (RTLT) (RL) 45 353.55 p< 0.0001 13.1
Test of (RTLT): (1)ÿ (4) 9 39.82 p< 0.0001
5. (RTRL) (RLLT) (RTLT) 27 70.40 p< 0.0001 82.1
6. (RTRLLT) 0 0
Test of (RTRLLT): (5)ÿ (6) 27 70.40 p< 0.0001
Notes: RT represents the strength of the tie between respondent and the target; RL between respondent
and the lever; LT between the lever and the target. For the meaning of the expression `strength of tie', refer
to the text. L2 is the chi-square of the likelihood ratio representing the difference between the observed
values and the values estimated under the appropriate hypothesis. `R' is interpreted as the proportion of
the chi-square of the baseline model that is explained by ®tting a more complex model.
Source : Reprinted from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie, E. Lazega and M.-O. Lebeaux, `Capital social et
contrainte lateÂrale', 36: 773. Copyright 1995 with permission from Revue FrancËaise de Sociologie.
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assumption given the type of arguments provided to justify the choices of leversÐ
then respondents had a strategy of choices of levers that left less leeway to the lever in
the choice of whether or not to risk his or her relational capital for the common
good. Levers were chosen so as to get more personally involved in policing (com-
pared to the respondent), especially when the respondent had no personal tie to the
target. Levers were thus expected to be more indifferent to their own personal
interests in terms of managing their relational capital within the ®rm.
These results converge to suggest that much lateral control happened in niches and
that, within such niches, members spent both their own and the sanctioners' rela-
tional capital for protection of the common good. Indeed, this may explain the
frequencies of `unsafe' and `expensive' choices of levers (between 7 per cent and
9 per cent depending on the type of tie).11 Such strategies lost some of their riskiness
when they were deployed within niches, where members did not measure their efforts
in the same way. However, keeping costs of control low by choosing sanctioners who
were structurally close to the infractor left at least two problems connected to the
second-order free-rider issue unsolved: that of preferential treatment within niches,
and that of infractors outside the respondent's and the sanctioner's niche. Recall that
when respondents' choices of levers were analysed taking into account the link
between respondent and target, they appeared to be highly selective. Choosing a
friend as a lever (rather than a non-friend) was explained by the fact that the
respondent was a friend of the target. This selectivity shows that lateral control would
tend to create cliquelike formations of friends who chose one another to solve their
dif®culties in a `privatized' way. To go back to Table 7.5, partners tended to choose
members of their own relational capital (friends, co-workers, and advisers) to put
pressure on peers who were part of their relational capital. This selectivity could be
explained by the `economics' of relational capitalÐthat is, the wish to protect this
capital in the sense of not expending or investing it randomly, thus limiting the
potentially negative effects of exercising this type of lateral constraint.
But in addition, partners were not only reluctant to invest systematically their
own personal ties for the protection of the common good when the target was not
part of their own relational capital. As already mentioned, they also did not have
enough friends, co-workers, or advisers to cover the entire partnership. They were
thus willing or forced to make choices outside their personal network. Therefore I
argue that a few members operating as informal `whips', whom I call `multi-target
levers' (MTLs), or `protectors of the common good', were granted a speci®c form of
status in the social organization of individual and collective responsibility. They
were chosen to represent the interests of the ®rm and talk on its behalf to targets who
were not part of the respondent's niche or relational capital.
P R OT EC T OR S O F T H E C OM M O N G OO D:
S TA T US A N D L AT ER AL C ON TR O L
The delegation of responsibility to a few MTLs, which is shown here to be at the core
of this lateral control regime, makes sense from the perspective of individual
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partners' management of social resources, but also from the ®rm's perspective.
Partners indeed thought that MTLs would both reduce their own control costs and
increase the safety of the sanction. In the next section, I illustrate this perspective at
the individual level. In the subsequent sections, I look at who these MTLs were, the
social `territory' that each covered, and at the related question of who would exercise
control on themÐthat is, who would guard the guardians.
The strati®cation of lateral control
Respondents varied in the extent to which they perceived and expected a lateral
control structure that was clearly strati®ed. This can also be measured by another
Krackhardt (1994) index, called hierarchy score, which refers to the extent to which
a network allows cycles of in¯uence. This can be interpreted as an indication that
respondents believed that status mattered for leverage. Figure 7.4 shows Partner 18's
perception of the leverage structure. In this perception two main levers dominate:
Partner 20 and Partner 5, the managing partner at the time of the study (Of®ce I)
and his Of®ce II deputy. Each of them was expected to control more than ten
targets directly without being controlled by them in return. Notice that Partners
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Figure 7.4. Partner 18's expectations concerning leverage in the ®rm
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5 and 20 were chosen to control each other. This was explicit in Partner 18's
arguments, such as:
To handle Partner 6, I would send Partner 5. He is the most senior Of®ce II attorney. He
has worked with him for many years. He has respect for him, and he would do it
effectively. . . . To talk to Partner 11, I would send Partner 20, the managing partner. He
is in the same of®ce, less confrontational as somebody of Partner 1's seniority. And
he has a good temperament for dealing with these issues.
The status of Partner 5 and Partner 20 was recognized throughout the partnership,
which is more sharply illustrated by statements concerning dif®cult targets, such as
Partner 1 (recall Partner 13's exclamation, cited on p. 209, argument A) or Partner 6:
To talk to Partner 6, I'd send Partner 5. Partner 6 is a prima donna. He wouldn't listen to
anyone who is not a real peer, someone with as much seniority. I am not sure he actually
thinks he has a peer in this ®rm! (Partner 30)
In other cases, different heavyweight levers were chosen. Partner 32 chose
Partner 22 to control everyone else in a pure starlike structure (see Figure 7.5). High
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hierarchy scores often mean that MTLs were almost exclusively chosen. The reason
for such a belief in status may be the perceived safety of such paths of lateral control,
which was explicit in Partner 32's argument:
Partner 22 for everybody. He did it successfully once. There is the personal problem and
then the ®rm issue. You can't put blinders on either. As a managing partner you would
have to focus on the second issue. The institution comes ®rst. [Partner 22] is an ex-
marine, well-organized and ef®cient, able to get it done immediately. He would not let
his personal feelings in¯uence him. He would handle the task of putting the institution
®rst. He is very much respected by everyone in the ®rm. (Partner 32)
Partner 6 also chose Partner 2 as an almost universal lever:
To talk to all of them, I would ask Partner 2. I have a great deal of respect for him. He
would be able to handle the situation. When I don't chose Partner 2, it means that I think
that the two persons are more attuned to each other, and they understand what drives
the other well enough, so that it overrides my feeling for Partner 2 as the best
person. (Partner 6)
To summarize, partners differed in the extent to which they perceived and
expected a fragmented in¯uence world, in the extent to which they perceived a
strati®ed control mechanism (for instance, by choosing an MTL at the beginning of
the chain) and in the extent to which they thought of leverage as an individual or as a
collective effort. How did issues of cost and partners' conceptions of lateral control
combine with such differences?
The analyses at the individual level showed that members tended to perceive
the existence of a strati®ed control regime. To verify that costs of lateral control
were shifted to members with status, another series of independent variables
was used to look at the determinants of choices of levers at the individual level.
The effect of interest here is that of lever and target status on the choices of
levers. The analysis was again replicated across the thirty-six actors. It tested the
effect of each variable on each set of partner's choices. Variables representing var-
iations in status understood as the amount of social resources accumulated by
lever and target in each network were introduced by measurement of indegree
centrality scores in four networks. The value of this hypothesis could thus be
tested by including in the regression model the following effects (the numbers 22
to 29 identifying these effects here refer to the numbers identifying them in
Appendix G):
22. lever's indegree centrality score in advice network;
23. target's indegree centrality score in advice network;
24. lever's indegree centrality score in friendship network;
25. target's indegree centrality score in friendship network;
26. lever's indegree centrality score in co-workers' network;
27. target's indegree centrality score in co-workers' network;
28. lever's indegree centrality score in in¯uence network;
29. target's indegree centrality score in in¯uence network.
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Results, also displayed in Appendix G, show that, at the individual level, con-
ceptions of control did not vary strongly based on the amounts of members' rela-
tional capital and status in the ®rmÐthat is, on the position of the protagonists of
the control drama in the pecking order of the ®rm. One weak exception to this
statement is the levers' centrality score in the in¯uence network. Members to whom
partners tended to listen at partnership meetings when discussing ®rm management
issues were more likely than others to be chosen as main sanctioners and to incur
more costs of lateral control. Shifting these costs to them was seen as a legitimate
move, especially since many of them tended to have administrative responsibilities
in the ®rm. However, the lever's or the target's status as measured by their indegree
scores in the co-workers', advice, and friendship networks did not weigh heavily on
the choices of levers when examined at the individual level. Additional insights are
thus needed to understand what made someone apt to be a `protector of the
common good'.
Status and the concentration of leverage
At the structural level, there was also a centralization of lateral control in the hands
of a few partners with a speci®c form of status. The raw aggregated data show that,
for some targets, consensus as to who should be the lever was very strong. As already
mentioned, for example, Partner 5 was chosen thirty times to deal with Partner 18;
Partners 1 and 2 were chosen twenty-four times to deal with each other. For other
targets the regime was less clear as to who should be the appropriate lever: for
example, Partners 25 or 29, as targets, were not matched with `obvious' levers. The
ethnography of the ®rm shows that, in these cases as in many others, the absence of
high levels of consensus concerned targets whose status was atypical (for instance,
lateral12 partners, women partners), or dif®cult to handle (for instance, partners
married to one another, partners notorious for behaving like a prima donna).
Network analytic techniques show a pattern in these data. Measurements of
centrality of levers show that an informal hierarchy was a key feature of this
control regime. Overall, some partnersÐmostly senior onesÐwere expected to act
as levers much more often than others. Partners 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, and 26
were the most popular levers. The control network was thus strati®ed and less than a
third of the partners emerged as key players in the regime. Within this `elite' of
levers, additional distinctions were of interest. Some were `single-target levers',
others were MTLs. As an example of the ®rst type, Partners 8 and 21 were not very
popular levers, but locally specialized, and their role could be crucial; for example,
Partner 21 was the partner who was most often chosen to control Partner 20, the
most central and universal lever of all. Then several partners, such as Partners 1, 2, 4,
5, 9, 20, or 26 were boundary-spanning partners performing a role of MTL for many
(up to ten) targets.
It is important not only to identify MTLs, but also to show that they were chosen
in a discriminant wayÐthat is, to exercise control on a speci®c set of targets.
Figure 7.6 provides an example of MTLs' specialization in a speci®c `territory' of
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lateral control. SeniorityÐas will be con®rmed belowÐwas chosen as a criterion for
its particular importance as a dimension of formal structure. The ®gure is based on a
principal component analysis, which is necessary to represent respondents, levers,
and targets in the same space, and to stress the differences between the ways MTLs
were chosen (for a detailed description of the procedure used, see Appendix H). It
demonstrates that a few partners were chosen much more often than others as levers,
by all levels of seniority and to deal with targets of different seniority levels.
This ®gure stresses the contrasts between the ways in which important MTLs
(Partners 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, and 20) were chosen as levers.13 Proximity in this space
re¯ects the fact that they tended to be chosen together: for instance, Partners 2 and 4
are close to Partner 1, and were thus often chosen together by the same respondents
to deal with the same targets. The large distance between Partner 20 and Partner 5
represents the fact that they were rarely chosen simultaneously as levers to control
the same target. It was also rare that a respondent used simultaneously Partners 1
and 5. Respondents and targets were collapsed in groups (circles) according to three
levels of seniority. The proximity between a group and a lever in this space thus
indicates the existence of a culturally established and specialized pathway for the
¯ow of lateral control within the ®rm.
The ®gure shows that the main sanctioners (in diamonds), or `protectors of the
common good', were chosen in a very discriminating way by their partnersÐthat is,
they were chosen most often to exercise control on a speci®c set of infractors. For
example, Partner 20 was often chosen by senior partners to go and `talk to' medium-
seniority infractors. Partner 5 was often chosen by junior partners to go and talk to
junior infractors. In this ®gure, the three axes locate the main sanctioners in a way
that shows these contrasted specializations. Again, a great distance between sanc-
tioners (diamonds) means that they were rarely chosen together by the same
respondents to go and talk to the same infractors. Axis 1 expresses the contrast
between choosing Partner 20 and choosing Partner 5 as a sanctioner: these two
sanctioners are separated by a large distance in the picture, which means that they
were very rarely chosen together as sanctioners (that is, by the same respondents and
to control the same infractors). Axis 2 expresses the same kind of contrast, this time
between choosing Partner 1 and choosing Partner 5 as sanctioners. Finally, Axis 3
displays the contrast between choosing any one of the main sanctioners represented
in the picture versus all the other partners who were not chosen often enough to
qualify as a protector of the common good. When a group is close to a sanctioner in
that space, it means that respondents in this group chose this sanctioner very fre-
quently to go and talk to infractors in that same group. I interpret this result as an
indication that, according to the respondents, this important sanctioner was spe-
cialized in a speci®c category of infractors and thus had his or her territory of social
control.
Heavy and widely cited levers were thus specialized in a speci®c social `territory', a
particular category of target. For instance, Partners 1, 2, and 4 would be sent by most
respondents to control senior partners across the ®rm. They were chosen by all
partners to control senior partners (S J is to be read as `senior targets as indicated
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by junior respondents'; SM as `senior targets as indicated by medium-seniority
respondents', and so on). Thus, an important difference emerges from this analysis
between Partner 5, who was chosen by most respondents to control young partners
(mostly in Of®ce II), and all the other main levers. Another difference is between
all the main levers and Partner 20, who was a medium-seniority lever chosen to
pressure medium-seniority partners. Especially concerning Partner 20, the mana-
ging partner at the time of the study, this contrast seems very clear in terms of
internal politics. As seen above, he was presented as a default option by many respond-
ents. Choosing him was perceived as an `apolitical' strategy, one that could cut
across speciality and of®ce boundaries. In the next section, I look more closely at the
characteristics of the MTLs.
Uncontroversial partners avoiding con¯ict escalation
Additional data are particularly useful to establish the relationship between this
speci®c lateral control pattern and more obvious sources of power in the organi-
zation. As already suggested, there were two types of main levers. The ®rst type
was important in terms of administrative responsibilities and control of workforce.
This appears in Table 7.8, which shows that partners who were popular levers
were neither systematically central in the main sociometric networks (and therefore
informally powerful), nor systematically important in terms of revenue brought in
during the previous year.
Ordinary least-squares regression coef®cients describing the effect of indegree
centrality scores in the friendship, co-workers', and advice networks on outdegree
centrality in the control network are below signi®cance level. Overall, members'
performance as measured by amount of revenue brought into the ®rm did not
have a signi®cant effect on popularity as a lever. However, one can better predict
Table 7.8. Effect of partners' importance in the ®rm on the number of times they are
chosen as levers
Independent variables Parameter estimates Standardized estimates
Advice centrality 24.1 (15.3) 0.25
In¯uence centrality 49.9 (10.3) 0.69
Friendship centrality 3.0 (12.8) 0.02
Co-worker centrality ÿ36.6 (17.2) ÿ0.28
Business performance ÿ0.0 (0.0) ÿ0.00
Notes: N 35. Standard errors in parentheses. r 2 0.68. Indicators of partners' importance are indegree
centrality scores in the advice, in¯uence, friendship, and co-worker networks, as well as partners' business
performance. Previous year business performance is measured here by the dollars amount actually
brought into the ®rm by each partner at the end of the previous year.
Source: Reprinted from Organisation Studies, E. Lazega, `Enforcing Rules among Peers: A Lateral Control
Regime', 21: 206. Copyright 2000 with permission from Aldine-de Gruyter.
234 Pressuring Partners Back to Good Order
a member's popularity as a lever knowing his or her indegree centrality score
in the in¯uence network: being listened to by many partners on matters of
®rm management and policy was a relatively good predictor of being chosen often
to be sent as a lever, and thus of being an MTL. This con®rms the prevalent role
of minders as MTLs over that of many heavy client-getters and billers in the
®rm. Two explanations may account for the fact that MTLs were chosen among
partners who were minders and not necessarily powerful in terms of access to
important clients. First, the use of levers who did not control such key resources
was less threatening. These levers drew their authority from the fact that they
were senior but at the same time not perceived as controversial (for instance, not
involved in potentially cut-throat power struggles focusing on the bottom line),
could legitimately speak on behalf of the common interest, and thus could
prevent tensions from escalating, especially between partners of different prac-
tices and of®ces. Secondly, heavy billers or rainmakers could be perceived as
less likely to accept being used as levers, which could be unpleasant. This ana-
lysis suggests that the lateral control regime ful®lled its function in a way
compatible with Freidson's `rule of the collegium' (1975): partners' norm of
avoidance of open controversies. Indeed, what seemed to be shared by MTLs was
a ®rm-speci®c status that was different from status as described by, for example,
Bucher (1970) (based on professional recognition and reputation as the primary
dimension of power in a medical faculty) or by Nelson (1988) (based on control
of clients).
A second category included partners who did have high scores in key networks,
such as Partners 1 and 2, who had close relationships to lucrative clients, and were
important in terms of business and revenue brought in. However, they were also
autonomous, uncommitted to any clique, and therefore perceived as objective and
capable of negotiating on behalf of the ®rm. They were freer partners, who could be
chosen as levers because they were not locked in a constituency. Powerful actors
could be sought out in key networks by multiple constituencies (Burt 1982); they
tried to control the whole system. This type of MTL would have the power to
exercise pressure in many dyads in spite of internal divisions. This is exempli®ed
with Partner 1, who was the authority ®gure, the most senior person in the ®rm.
Recall that he `commands respect', was called by some `the Monarch', although not
perceived as potentially offensive to targets, and would bring some formality to a
meeting without creating an antagonistic situation.
By allowing partners to avoid con¯ict escalation and to reduce individual
enforcement costs, this lateral control regime becomes a credible component of the
collegial governance structure. It helped partners manage early monitoring and
sanctioning so as to solve the second-order free-riding problem and the threat that it
represented to collective action.
The concentration of leverage in the hands of a minority of specialized partners
raised the key issue of how this lateral control regime solved the classical problem
`Who is chosen to control the main controllers?' The next section uses measurement
of approximated structural equivalence to answer this question.
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Who guards the guardians?
A lateral control regime is an informal social mechanism, and thus fragile. Its very
existence was threatened by the fact that its main sanctioners, some of whom were
part of the oligarchy of the ®rm, could make themselves immune from control, thus
enforcing rules that they themselves would not be pressured to respect. It makes
sense to extend previous reasoning to the speci®c case of main sanctioners as
potential infractors and to look at how members asserted that they would keep
oligarchs in check. The classical question of who guards the guardians is thus
important here, and so is the structural solution provided by this social mechanism.
Speci®cally, in this section, I analyse the choices of levers used to in¯uence such
oligarchs. This helps in identifying a structure of lateral control that re¯ects two
types of ®rm protection strategy. In the ®rst, oligarchs were mainly divided into
several subgroups, which were then selected to control each other; theirs was not a
cohesive position of enforcers, but a fragmented one. In the second, some members
of the ®rm, with little status but personally close to some of the oligarchs, were also
used to monitor the latters' behaviour. Evidence of this upward `divide-and-rule'
strategy is provided by showing that such channels of lateral control, as derived from
individual partners' convergent expectations, re¯ect a speci®c network pattern. In
turn, this pattern shows that the lateral control regime also provided a structural
answer to the structural problem of guarding the guardians.
If partners with status and resources were more likely to be chosen as early and
specialized sanctioners in general, they were also more likely to be chosen as early
sanctioners specialized in each other. In effect, one can argue that only important
partners carried enough weight (controlled enough resources and attracted enough
deference) to impress other important partners, and that peers would choose seg-
ments of this elite to control each other in a circular way. This extension can be
facilitated by the fact that main sanctioners did tend to share a similar general role
with regard to the rest of the partnership. They could not be strictly structurally
equivalent (especially if they were specialized in different types of infractors), but
they could still be perceived to be closer to each other in the lateral control network
(and thus exercise in¯uence on each other) than to the rest of the partnership.14 This
provides the basis for the idea that partners chosen as main sanctioners were also
more likely than others to be chosen to control each other.
Measurement of approximated structural equivalence among partners is useful
to test this assertion, because it includes a description of how lateral control
would operate among the most central levers. Strong levels of structural equivalence
among partners in the control network created control positions. Figure 7.7 clusters
approximately structurally equivalent partners into such positions. This procedure
identi®es what can be called the `leverage structure' with six positions, the members
of each position, and the relations among positions. For a detailed description of the
procedure and the pattern emerging from the analysis, see Appendix I.
The overall pattern in the ¯ows of lateral control described by this ®gure is not
simply that of a strati®ed centre±periphery structure; it also shows what happened
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within the `elite' at the top. Several central positions, occupied by a few actors each,
were often chosen to control each other as well as many others. The oligarchy was
fragmented into different kinds. First, there were the partners with heavy admin-
istrative responsibilities, the mindersÐfor instance the managing partner, the
deputy managing partner, and partners sitting on committees such as the associate
committee, who were MTLs (mainly Position Five); minders had an important
responsibility, since they were chosen to control the highly central ®nders and
boundary-spanners in Position Four. Secondly, there were the senior MTLs who
were ®nders (Position Four); thirdly, the three top levers who were lost to the
`residual' category; fourthly, two partners with special status in Of®ce I (Position
Three); and, ®fthly, members of Position Six, Partners 8 and 21, single-target levers
mainly chosen to control MTLs 11 and 20. Thus the lateral control regime divided
the MTLs at the topÐpreventing this strati®cation from becoming too pyramidalÐ
and chose segments of this oligarchy to control each other in an approximately
circular way.
In summary, a few mostly senior partners and minders concentrated a great deal
of leverage in their hands, cut across formal boundaries, and were chosen to exercise
control on a fairly speci®c social `territory'. The lateral control regime protected
itself from the destructive effects of potential `immunity' of MTLs by solving the
Position One
Partners 34, 19, 15, 29, 16
36, 10, 27, 23, 22, 25, 17
Position Two
Partners 33, 28, 30, 18,
32, 31, 6, 7, 35, 14, 3 Position Four
Partners 1, 2
Position Five
Partners 13, 26, 24, 12
Position Six
Partners 8, 21
Residual partners: 4, 5, 20
Position Three
Partners 9, 11
Figure 7.7. Who guards the guardians?
Note: This ®gure represents the pattern of relationships between positions of approximately structurally
equivalent partners in the lateral control network. Boxes in grey indicate that members of these positions
were expected to control each other. Thick lines represent mutual control ties. Numbers in italic represent
partners who made a big difference in terms of revenue during the previous year. For details about the
procedure used to construct this ®gure, see Appendix I.
Source: Reprinted from Research in the Sociology of Organizations, E. Lazega, `Who Guards the Guardians?
Protecting a Lateral Control Mechanism from its own Oligarchs', 18: 279. Copyright 2001 with permis-
sion from Elsevier Science.
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problem of who guards the guardians in a speci®c way. It chose members of this elite
to control each other using a complex division of work among minders, ®nders,
structurally unique partners, and single-target levers.
L EV ER A G E S TY LE S: T H E I M P O R TA N C E O F S EN IO R I TY
F O R C O LL EC T I VE R E SP O NS I BI L IT Y
Finally, it is interesting to come back to a synthesis of members' different ways of
combining niches and status in their management of lateral control costs. Several
`leverage styles' (patterns of preoccupations of respondents when they made leverage
decisions) can be broadly distinguished from taking an overall view of results in
Appendix G.15 These styles tended to combine various ways of spreading and
shifting such costs, and characterized three levels of seniority. In effect, in partners'
conceptions of how lateral control would operate in their ®rm, the main differences
that could be relied upon to show the complementarity of niche seeking and status
competition in the lateral control mechanism were between senior, medium-
seniority, and junior partners. Seniority appears to be a key variable for actors' views
of unobtrusive protection of common resources among peers.
In these conceptions of leverage, senior partners tended to use resource depen-
dence and to be business oriented. They tended to concentrate rather than spread
the costs of control, and to shift them to a few safe and specialized levers or to
carefully selected and personally involved levers. They were relatively more sensitive
to the fact that the target saw the lever as a friend, and tended to use this resource
dependence. They cared less than others about similarities between lever and target,
especially in terms of seniority and speciality, and therefore about `smoothing'
devices. Since they actually did not all always know very well who the junior partners
were, they instead relied on more levers. This way of managing costs of control may
assume that senior partners tended to have more relational capital within the ®rm
than younger ones (which was not always con®rmed, since they tended to cite less
friends than others). Since they thought of themselves as more central in most
networks, they also thought that senior levers could afford to use their ties to `live up
to their status'. Senior partners believed in status and in the `muscle' theory of
relational capital: the more you use it, the more ef®cient it is. Note that, since most
MTLs were senior, this conception of control was also presumably self-serving and
dominant among the guardians of the guardians.
Medium-seniority partners, mostly in Of®ce I, tended to think as integrators of
the ®rmÐthat is, in terms of avoiding con¯ictsÐmore than others. They did use
resource dependencies, since they were sensitive to the fact that the target seeks
advice from the lever. But they would rather spread the costs of controlÐeven if this
meant using an `overkill' strategyÐand smooth the process by stressing, more than
others, niches and similarity in terms of of®ce, seniority, and speciality. They tended,
more than others, to choose as levers partners central in the in¯uence network, since
many of them were precisely very central in this network. This fact suggests that they
did not tend to shift the costs of control to others, but accepted investment of their
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own social resources (which was not scarcer than that of senior partners) for that
purpose. This does not mean that they relied less on MTLs than other partners, but
that they tended to combine their use with that of niche pathways.
Junior partners tended to be more hesitant in their choices of levers, and more
careful with their own scant relational capital. They were especially sensitive to
their own relationships to the lever and to the targetÐfor instance, to the fact that
they considered the target to be their friend. The `lever saw the target as a friend'
effect was often important to them, which means that they tended not to shift such
costs to levers unless the levers had a personal incentive to get involved. Most junior
partners were in Of®ce II, which meant a tendency to concentrate leverage in the
hands of a few MTLs and shift the costs of lateral control to them, rather than spread
the costs or invest their own relational capital for that purpose. In spite of many
differences in terms of commanding relational capital, they seemed to be closer in
their conception of management of costs of control to senior rather than to
medium-seniority partners.
This analysis also suggests that a combined theory of management of costs of
control expressed in terms of potential losses in relational capital, of resource
dependencies, and of symbolic recognition of identities and similarities, explains
why partners shared a common conception of how lateral control operates in their
own collegial organization. Niche seeking and status competition help peers use
various but identi®able forms of manipulation of relations among themselves to
create a social order in an informal, indirect, and relatively unobtrusive way.
TH E S OC I A L S TR U C TU R E O F
C OL LE C TI VE R ESP ON SI B IL I TY
To summarize, the ®rm stood to gain `quasi-voluntary compliance' with its rules
and agreements by reducing members' costs of intervening on behalf of the
common good. A lateral control regime was described that spread the control costs
among members, thus organizing collective responsibility. Partners had a strong
interest in motivating their deviant or malfunctioning partners and in preventing
damage to them because they depended on them for resources. Therefore, partners
were interested in sanctioning that was likely to take place and that was likely to
work. It is shown that it was more likely to take place if the cost of interaction was
lowered by easy access to the infractor and by the existence of personal ties between
sanctioner and infractor in social niches. In their choices of sanctioners, partners
relied on various commonalities of interests and identities among protagonists of
the control situation. It is also shown that it was likely to work if sanctioners
tended to be more senior than infractors and if they were powerful in uncon-
troversial ways. This means that the costs of enforcement, a serious problem
associated with collective provision of group solidarity in delicately calibrated
institutions (Hechter 1987), which plague every collegium (Freidson 1975), were
reduced for most partners and for the ®rm because they were shifted to members
with a speci®c form of status.
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A great deal of lateral control responsibility was informally concentrated in the
hands of a few `protectors of the common good', to whom the rest of the partnership
often delegated this task. However, the kind of status that these sanctioners had
suggests that they were also chosen so as to prevent the possible preferential treat-
ment for some infractors that was induced by close relationships with them. In
particular, in such an institutional context, these important sanctioners were less
controversial and more likely to live up to this form of status: they could speak on
behalf of the ®rm without triggering additional and escalating con¯icts, or being
suspected of representing speci®c coalitions, and without individually bene®ting
from exercising pressure on infractors. This lateral control regime could thus help
members ®nd an early solution to the so-called second-order free-rider problem in
formally egalitarian interdependent groupsÐthat is, the problem of who should
bear the costs of enforcing previous agreements. Because it offered a speci®c
organization of early enforcement of rules and decisions, it helped in ensuring that
cooperation remained possible. It can be said to be a credible component of the
governance structure in this type of ®rm.
Finally, this reconstitution of a pattern of lateral control using network analysis
required ®eld-related and methodological choices that de®ne three clear limitations
of the approach used in this chapter, both substantive and methodological. These
limitations prevent quick generalization from this study.
First, it should be noted that the lateral control regime described here would not
by itself prevent some partners from reaping free-loading gains. It was only one
informal mechanism helping partners choose sanctioners to compel each other, at
an early stage, to contribute the required efforts and resources before they decided to
switch to more formal disciplinary mechanisms (committees, votes, and so on). I do
not explore when exactly lateral control was needed (as opposed to more direct
control) (Wittek, 1999). I deal only partially with the second-order free-rider
problem, because I assume that partners had enough motivations and incentives
(other partners' convergent expectations created a strong constraint based on
resource dependencies; it was in their economic interest; in their social niche, they
had enough investments in relational capital to protect) to let themselves be used as
sanctioners. However, I did not, in addition to ethnographic evidence, have a chance
to observe the conditions under which this pressure on partners to be sanctioners
was actually ef®cient.
Secondly, the character of the management problem used as a tracer for the lateral
control regime means that the logic of how this problem was handled in this ®rm
may be speci®c to its socio-emotional, or expressive, characterÐas opposed to a
more instrumental, task-oriented problem. As a result, the lateral control regime in
this ®rm may not be completely investigated. For instance, partners could empathize
with social emotional problems and perhaps mobilize personal ties for leverage
purposes more easily than for more instrumental problems. One can hypothesize
that, if they had to deal with such instrumental issues, partners would systematically
choose sanctioners senior in advice giving so as to coach the infractor more closely.
They could hesitate less, presumably, to cross over to the other side in a polarized
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system, in terms of boundaries such as of®ce membership or the division of work.
Moreover, when dealing with issues such as professional mistakes of the kind that
Freidson (1975) calls `inexcusable mistakes', the in¯uence of certain dimensions of
the formal structure on the choices of sanctioners and on the ¯ow of lateral control
could become signi®cantly stronger: speciality could become even more salient,
whereas of®ce similarity and seniority superiority could lose some of their impor-
tance. Similarly, the control pattern building up around instrumental problems
could have more controversial rainmakers at the top, who might interfere much
more brutally with more politically charged strategies, such as speeding up formal
peer-review processes. The elite of sanctioners might then play a different roleÐfor
instance, guaranteeing the fairness of a peer-review committee. Such hypotheses
clearly need further investigation. The extent to which this lateral control regime
covered different types of infractions remains to be assessed in studies using dif-
ferent tasks as analysers.
In the next chapter, I look at the ways in which oligarchic processes stabilized the
rules of the games, just as they were contributing (see Chapter 6) to ®rm integration.
Management of potential tensions between different norms and policies is shown to
take place through politicization of exchanges in a way that is typical of collegial
organizationsÐthat is, in the negotiation of `precarious values' by members with
status. This helps combine a structural and institutional approach to collegial
organizations. In this case, the mechanism is not derived from the work process
itself, and re¯ects a relative autonomy of ®rm `political processes'.
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8Multi-Status Oligarchs and the
Negotiation of Precarious Values
This chapter shows that the form taken by status competition at SG&R stabilized its
regulatory process and reinforced the status quo, particularly in the debates about
compensation. Rules, and underlying norms and values, count for economic and
political actors not simply through moral virtue but through negotiation of terms of
exchanges. Renegotiating precarious values is the ultimate way for members to
politicize their exchanges. Because they are strategic, they couldÐin a collegial
contextÐbe arguing endlessly about changes in the rules of the game. But members
called multi-status oligarchs, with relatively loosely coupledÐor `inconsistent'Ð
forms of status, are shown to control the regulatory process. The source of their
in¯uence is both control of resources and legitimacy. Since any such change means
broken promises, they are in a better position than others to handle the effects of
these changes among their peers. They can legitimize them by sacri®cing resources
of their own for the collective good,1 thus reaching a position where they can ask for
similar sacri®ces from others as well. Taking this high road, however, may not be
ef®cient in itself (the losing party may object that `similar losses' are relative, and
may not be equally bearable by all), which is why multi-status oligarchs are also in a
position to force these changes by using their control of resource dependencies.
Both legitimacy and power go hand in hand in the management of social change
among peers.
As seen in previous chapters, several dimensions of status can be described in such
a ®rm: one derived from professional reputation, but also that of members con-
trolling access to important clients, and of those spending energy on administrative
matters (often overlapping with the `protector of the common good' status). Values
of ef®ciency, loyalty, respect of members' autonomy, and defence of the common
good could all be invoked ideally to guide collective action and exchanges at SG&R.
In this chapter, the role played by members cumulating such heterogeneous and
inconsistent forms of status is shown to be the key in the regulatory process as a
social mechanism. Inconsistency, or at least loose-connectedness, of the multiple
forms of status is functional. In effect, it allows oligarchs to lose resources along one
dimension, while still maintaining prominence and concentration of resources
along other dimensions. Correlations between forms of centrality in the ®rm, as well
as the existence of a Montesquieu structure (identi®ed in Chapter 6 as an integration
device), showed that these loosely coupled forms of status were present in the ®rm
(as in any small community or large society). Note that inconsistency does not mean
incompatibility. It means that oligarchs are in an uneasy position involving role
strain, another form of price to pay for those involved in status competition and
seeking to be primus inter pares.
P OL I CY IS SU ES AN D U ND ER L Y IN G VA L U E O R I EN TA T IO NS
Looking at the rede®nition of precarious values from a broadly conceived structural
perspective is done by following several aspects of debates on ®rm management
policies, and by exploring the structural constraints shaping these debates. As seen in
Chapter 2, SG&R had formal rules written in its partnership agreement and informal
rules that members learned when they were ®rst assimilated as associates, then as
partners. At some point, participation in collective action and regulatory activity
reached a discussion of such rules and underlying values, often presented as a dis-
cussion about professionalism and ®rm culture.
As also mentioned before, negotiating precarious values was a sophisticated way
for members to politicize their exchanges. For some, this meant trying to rede®ne
the rules of the game in a way that favoured their own interests more directly. For
example, it made sense for younger partners at SG&R to want to change the com-
pensation system. Instead of waiting (for a whole generation) for their turn to reap
the highest pro®ts, they wanted to introduce more merit-based criteria in the annual
sharing. However, to do this in a context of strong pressure towards consensus, they
needed to promote the `entrepreneurial' values that would legitimize such a change.
In order to renegotiate their participation in collective action, members have to
abide by the rules of regulatory deliberation. At this stage, a strategy based exclu-
sively on threats of leaving, for example, could be costly and insuf®cient in itself.
Preoccupations with values in regulatory deliberations were obvious in the
ideology of collegiality that permeated partners' discourse on the `culture' and
`uniqueness stories' of their ®rm. Discussion about collegiality and the quality of the
social atmosphere in which they practised was permanent among them. It was a
basic form of social self-monitoring and self-critique (Walzer 1965). For example,
Partner 19 discussed collegiality in mixing business and values:
We don't like puffy people who put on a lot of airs. No business-getters who don't
practise. Everyone does his own writing. Sometimes you'll even see Partner 1 in the
library, doing his own research. We all have strong lawyerly skills, write very well, speak
well, analyse problems well. It is an innovative and imaginative ®rm too. All the basic
ingredients. Very ethical ®rm too. We ®red two partners because of unethical behaviour.
And it required unanimous consent. Trustworthiness and honesty are essential. Intelli-
gence too. We have the reputation of a mixed group of people, with different religious
backgrounds and lifestyles, as opposed for instance to Henderson & Robinson across
the street, who are more homogeneously Yankee Protestants.
However, it was in debates about policy options that the negotiation of precarious
values was the most visible. SG&R's explicit or implicit policy choices re¯ected its
dominant sense of professionalism. Based on qualitative interviews, I ®rst look at
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some of the main issues discussed by the members of SG&R about ®rm policy.
Echoing Nelson (1988), who showed that policy choices do re¯ect values, especially
that of the elite in power, I connect these debates to the structural features of
the ®rm.
Seron (1992) contrasts several `value orientations' within legal services. In the case
that she studiesÐthat of the `new providers' such as legal services with prepaid
plansÐshe suggests that delivering legal services revolves around three relatively
different tasks and value orientations that do not all complement the traditional
professional model. These tasks are those of the manager, the entrepreneur, and the
professional. In their effort to ®nd the most appropriate organizational arrangement
for ensuring the completion of assignments, managers value supervision, account-
ing, ef®ciency, and predictability. Entrepreneurs value innovation, getting business,
social skills, networking and politicking, risk taking, and political commitment.
Professionals try to resist managerial standardization and entrepreneurial social
skills becoming more important than legal expertise per se. In the context studied
by Seron, they value control of the case, working in a small of®ce, private lawyer±
client relations, and working alone. In the context of a ®rm such as SG&R, the
emphasis is lower on the `working-alone' aspect. Seron also argues that managerial
and professional values share an anti-risk-taking orientation; managerial and entre-
preneurial values share an anti-substantive orientation; and professional and entre-
preneurial values share an anti-hierarchical orientation. This synthetic approach is
useful in the description of values described by members of this ®rm.
In the following pages I look at four such managerial policy issues as indicators of
ongoing debates or discussions of values in the ®rm. Signi®cant options existed
among managerial policies, which could more or less reshape the nature of the
practice. Four examples are considered: work¯ow, compensation, marketing, and
peer review.
Work¯ow
As seen before, the organization of work in the ®rm was based on a two-step
work¯ow: intake (mainly, who decides whether or not to take in a case, and based
on what criteria) and assignment (mainly, who will do the work) procedures could
be more or less formal and ¯exible. Flexibility, at least in the implementation of
one of the two steps, seemed to be imperative, because the work¯ow depended on the
nature of the practice, the source of work, and sometimes on the client's require-
ments. The extent of this ¯exibility was a matter of discussion at SG&R. Should
management be ¯exible on both procedures? Be ¯exible on one procedure only and
in¯exible on the otherÐfor instance, in¯exible on intake but ¯exible on assign-
ments? The procedures in place were ¯exible about both steps. A new matter had to
be approved by a lawyer with managerial responsibilities, especially in the ®elds that
were most crucial to ®rm's pro®ts, but many said that this was not automatic. The
way to staff a case was often negotiated by the initiator of the matter within the limits
de®ned by specialization.
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Some thought that real departments in the ®rm would impose more discipline
on their lawyers at different stages of the work¯ow. This would help the ®rm in using
its resources on work that was either even more interesting or even more pro®table
than other work that it got.
People walk down the hall and they'd see a litigator and say, `Hey I need some help.' It's
not so easy to educate your partners, but it's getting better. Someone should be
responsible for taking matters in, decide whether they are appropriate cases for us to
handleÐwe want to upgrade our practiceÐwhether we are going to get paid, and so
on. It's hard to be disciplined about those things, but someone should be responsible
to the rest of the partners to make this a more ef®cient and pro®table good operation
with good reputation. (Partner 32)
The ®rm was also preoccupied with situations that were not technical con¯icts
of interest, but that were not desirable in business terms. There were various reasons
to implement assignment policies, such as increasing the productivity of a ®rm
by using people and human capital more ef®ciently, or ensuring fairness of the
distribution of the workload.
The ®rm should not take on a litigation matter unless the managing partner signs off on
it. The managing partner should approve all new business that comes into the ®rm. You
have to have someone with a global view of what's going on. Just because we don't
have a con¯ict of interest does not mean it's something that is appropriate for us to
handle. Someone has to be aware of it. Some of our clients could get upset. For
example, a big case we know is going to happen. I said nobody should accept a case
involving this issue because we want to see whether we get contacted by one, two,
three, or four [sides] and we may want to make a decision based on that. But the way we
resolve that is to have the rule that every case comes to the managing partner. That may
happen some day. As you get bigger it's just hard to keep the information ¯ow. But
when I say I decide things, it's really kind of more consensus building and persuading,
more than it is that I issue a decision and people walk off shaking their heads; that's not
really the way it works. If somebody comes in and they have a client who wants to do
work with them, we won't, as long as the work is in the individual's ®eld, we generally
won't step in the way. But you've got to have the buck stop somewhere, and I am one of
the stops. (The managing partner at the time of the study)
Many partners, on the other hand, favoured a `free-for-all' approach (Maister
1993: 156). They said that work¯ow also depended upon where the work came from
and upon historically developed patterns. Therefore, they argued, bureaucratic
procedures should not be tightened:
An awful lot of the ®rm's practice, at least on the business side, relates to ongoing
clients with which we have had a relationship and for which we handle either all of their
work or a particular kind of their work on an ongoing basis. I think, to a certain extent,
that is less true of the litigation side, where there may be more of a one-time ¯avour to
it. . . . Patterns tend to develop. The client expects that when he's got a tax problem it's
going to go to that tax lawyer, and when he's got a real-estate problem it's going to go
that real-estate lawyer. That client will very quickly develop a pattern of going directly to
the person who has worked with him in the past. Some of our larger clients develop that
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subsidiary set of work¯ow pattern. There should always remain a partner who is more
involved with the direct hands-on client responsibility, who is ultimately responsible for
the client, and if there were a problem with the work that was being done at any other
level, that person would hear about it. . . . So it really just depends on the way the
patterns have developed historically. If ATC partners were to become too heavy-
handed in their interventions, I think you might have some clients rather upset about
what they might view as arbitrary decisions being made on who their lawyers will be. We
have to look at it from a ®rm perspective, of course, but we don't want to necessarily
interfere with the natural patterns. (Partner 26)
Thus, in spite of an overall trend towards more formally organized work¯ow,
there was a great deal of variance in the way partners understood how intake should
work and the amount of autonomy that members should have in the organization of
their practice. Clearly, managerial value orientations competed here with market
and professional value orientations.
Compensation
Compensation is a second example. In the organizational and broadly conceived
structural approach advocated here, members' rationality is assumed to be guided
®rst by the characteristics of the production processÐthat is, complex, non-routine,
and knowledge-intensive work. Analytically, constraints imposed by this process
shape subsequent decisions made by members about the terms of their production-
related investments, exchanges or sharing rules. In particular, fairness judgements
stressing equality or equity are contingent on the complexity of resource depend-
encies among members, itself a variable correlated to the type of work. At SG&R,
complexity with work was combined with procedural simplicity in the distribution
of rewards (equality among partners), a traditional solution that was being ques-
tioned by other models provided by the environment.
The distribution of income could follow many different patterns. There was
discussion at SG&R on changing the criteria for distributing economic rewards. The
growth of ®rms in previous decades (the 1970s and the 1980s) had worked to
the advantage of most senior members. They had reaped pro®ts from the efforts of
the growing number of lawyers in the ®rm who were their juniors in terms of years
and client responsibility. Many were strongly attached to the lockstep seniority
system, in which their share of pro®ts was slightly larger; it also avoided open
confrontations about intangible worth and tricky performance measurements:
I believe that compensation criteria should not change. People should do what they
have to do. Some adjustments to be made in individual cases where they don't carry
their weight. I deal with it on a negative basis. There should be a penalty system for
those not performing in one way or another, rather than a rewards inducement system
which would fracture the framework. (Partner 1)
Others took another stand:
On the compensation issue, I think that the criteria will change, but I wouldn't start out
there. If it changes, I would not endorse a drastic change, a slight one yes. This is a
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congenial, laid-back place, too congenial. But we have new challenges. Old ways of
doing business won't work in the 1990s. But changing a compensation system is not
that easy. It is like privatization in Russia. Before you do that, you need also greater
accessibility from partners on who are their clients, what they have done in the last year
to retain their clients, what new clients are they looking for, what billing will they do on a
monthly basis, and establish criteria for each partner to meet relative to ®rm adminis-
tration, to billing, etc. Inside and outside, people should have different goals to meet
and be accountable. Individual goals and more accountability to each other. Changing
the compensation system means increasing accountability. (Partner 4)
Some medium-seniority partners also favoured this system; they expected to
bene®t from it soon. Recall Partner 18, the main collector for that year (`Our system
costs me money. With a different system, I would have made more money. But not
enough more to make me go into a more competitive environment . . . '). Others
wanted to adopt a more entrepreneurial approach, to go with the general trend
towards compensation systems that weighed client responsibility more heavily. For
the ®rm to keep its `hotshots' and `client-getters', or to attract partners laterally, they
argued that the partnership agreement must move away from a purely seniority-
based system to a system that also pegged partnership shares to revenue produc-
tion.2 There were pressures towards taking into account merit, client responsibility,
and productivity. Younger partners especially pushed for taking into account both
seniority and merit. Some wanted changes by taking merit into consideration in
`marginal' ways, such as modest discretionary bonuses awarded for outstanding
work in a particular year; or the de®nition of an acceptable window of performance.
This was recognized by the managing partner: `Some younger people are unwilling
to wait, and they can threaten to go somewhere else.' They wanted a special com-
mittee that rewarded a mixture of contributions such as seniority, productivity,
generating business, and management responsibilities. Performance could be
measured against previously de®ned objectives. Partners would be penalized if
what they did last year did not correspond, within certain limits, to their individual
targets. Voicing more directly younger partners' position, Partner 30 also said:
Seniority lockstep: a dinosaur system. There are law ®rms where you eat what you kill.
Here we want to go less far. I inject myself a lot in policy issues. I have written memos to
Partner 20 [the managing partner at the time of the study] about issues of partners'
economic responsibilities, and means of inducing them. There is a great disparity
among partners. Coercion has not been tried, but I think that's the only thing which
would work. That's the real problem of collegiality to me. . . . Our managing partner
should be more aggressive. We don't have incentives for partners' performance. Out-
standing performances are grossly under-compensated. Partner 1 makes half as much
as Jackson [the most senior partner at the ®rm across the street, SG&R's main com-
petitor], but he is twice the lawyer Jackson is.
Many partners did not welcome the prospect of a ®nance committee allocating
each year a percentage of ®rm's pro®ts to each partner. They argued that, if the
percentage were to be adjusted up or down from year to year depending on per-
formance, merit would be evaluated in a way that was not very precisely known to
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the partners, and often challenged. Even in very sophisticated systems where com-
pensation was tied to individual marketing targets and plans, purely mathematical
formulas were rare, and committees had to rely on subjective judgements.
This debate had Rawlsian dimensions because members went to great lengths
to construct a rationale for equalizing incomes that was independent of concerns
about contribution and relative standing. This was done mainly through control of
status competition and long-term equalization of contributions (`You're hot one
year, you're down next year'). For a majority of lawyers interviewed in this ®rm, an
equality-based compensation weighted by seniority protected a cooperative envir-
onment. Introducing merit and equity criteria or a bonus system meant creating
incentives for grabbing clients or associates, compensation-bred competition among
lawyers. Despite the fact that clients were unequivocally clients of the ®rm, practic-
ally speaking the partners knew that the major clients were used to dealing with
certain people (their `primary lawyers'). Clearly, managerial value orientations again
con¯icted with entrepreneurial and professional ones.
Marketing
Marketing issues are a third example. As seen above, built-in pressures to grow in
size in medium-sized ®rms could become a threat by getting out of hand. To control
this possibility ®rms could try to `listen to the market', predict future needs, and
plan systematically how, and to what extent, they wanted to grow (Maister 1993).
However, several factors (the uncertainty in the economy, client behaviour, turn-
over) made this dif®cult. At the time of the study, SG&R partners were divided
between two attitudes. On the one hand, there was resistance to the pressure to
grow. Some did not want their ®rm to become larger. They believed that their size
allowed them to staff the most complex litigation or corporate transaction in the
region. The problem then became how to deal with associates when they felt that
their chances to become partners were based on economic criteria instead of pro-
fessional judgement applied to each individual's work. A brutal way of controlling
growth could threaten the ways in which the lawyers cooperated within the ®rm.
Other partners, subscribing to a more entrepreneurial approach to growth, wanted
their ®rm to expand, but in a centralized and controlled way. They thought that
leverage was not the key to success when growth is divorced from demand: there
must be a certain client base to support a larger ®rm.
Partners with each value orientation nevertheless agreed on hiring as little as
possible. Under such a policy, maintaining pro®ts could mainly be done by moving
more heavily into booming and lucrative specialities. Instead of hiring, the ®rm tried
to steer associates and partners into more pro®table areas of practice. But here again,
members disagreed on the extent to which the ®rm should reshape the nature of the
practice in terms of specialities. Those who pushed for a more systematic and
centralized analysis of the market also pushed for subsequent adjustments that
would require more ¯exibility from partners, more efforts on refocusing, new
decisions about where to put one's priorities in terms of existing personnel and the
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hiring process. This meant identifying strengths, weaknesses, speci®c areas in which
the ®rm wanted to grow, while acknowledging the effort and costs involved in
switching to a more lucrative specialization. For instance, as seen in Chapter 2, some
in the ®rm hesitated between dropping insurance defence work (based on con-
tingency fees) and developing expertise in the areas of international law, environ-
mental law, and bankruptcy law. This policy met with strong resistance. Partners
opposed to such changes favoured traditional forms of marketing and argued that
the ®rm was committed to remaining general practice and that it was in its long-
term interest to provide individual freedom to choose one's area of practice, even in
a context encouraging growth by specialization.
Marketing is a chicken and egg question. Part of it is looking at your skills and seeing
who out there could use your services. And the parallel way of doing it is looking for
clients out there by reading the business newspapers, by being involved in the com-
munity and knowing what's out there. And then see if you can tailor your lawyers and
your skills to meet their needs. You have to see that environmental law issues are
increasingly important in corporate transactions, in real-estate transactions, and see
whether your ®rm has people who are trained in that area so that then you can go and
say, `Hey folks have you ever thought of us as environmental lawyers.' You do that by
sending out brochures, you can do that by getting one client let you run one seminar or
that sort of thing. (Partner 6)
The issue of `tailoring oneself ' to new specialities could create serious con¯icts
in such a ®rm. Recall Former Partner No. 2 (see p. 204), who experienced a kind of
pressure by the ®rm that was similar to the pressure that would be exercised on
members of the ®rm who would be asked to switch specialities. In this case, though,
the pressure was on a partner not to switch.
Each position required an emphasis on a different type of marketing. Of®cially,
the ®rm thought about marketing in traditional terms. There was no formal
requirement from individual lawyers to participate in centralized marketing, only a
diffuse encouragement to get more involved in the community. There were no real
®nancial incentives offered to individual lawyers to go out and get new clients. The
philosophy was that a law ®rm makes itself different from other ®rms by the
reputation of its individual lawyers or groups of lawyers in speci®c specialities. They
differentiated themselves by being known as the best at something. At the time of
®eldwork, like all the other ®rms, SG&R worked on generating an image of the ®rm
as a young, dynamic, busy, high-visibility litigation ®rm.3 However, partners did
vary in the extent to which they wanted to systematize their marketing activities and
reorganize themselves with that purpose in mind. Most lawyers' thoughts about
marketing were informal and ad hoc, in terms of whether it was better to join clubs
or to give lectures and seminars and count on the reputation of giving the best-
quality service to the client.
We do not have the same incentives to do that as other ®rms do because of
the compensation system. But we have been trying to encourage people to do
more marketing that includes lots of different things, I mean participate more in bar
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association activities, put on seminars and other kinds of programmes. Take pro-
spective clients out to lunch, play golf, all of those things. But apart from trying to
keep our clients happy, by doing high-quality work, I personally have done almost none
of it. (Partner 13)
We don't have to be out doing marketing, we don't do a lot of marketing, we don't do a
good job at marketing ourselves, we don't wine and dine clients, we don't send them
boxes of cigars. I know other law ®rms would buy seats for the Yankee Stadium and give
them to the clients, we just haven't done that kind of stuff. I don't know whether that's
good or bad, but we just haven't done it. (Partner 6)
Others pushed for the creation of a more centralized infrastructure to support
individual lawyers' `bottom-up' marketing activities (a marketing director whose
job would be to help each professional develop a personal strategic plan, to get him
or her placed on boards and on committees where the publicity value was con-
siderable, and to plan ahead of time) and for `more guidance offered by the ®rm'
(Partner 29). Clearly, managerial and entrepreneurial value orientations con¯icted
here with traditional professional ones (for example autonomy).
Peer review
Finally, peer review is also an example of a policy issue that was on the discussion
agenda, especially under the pressure from malpractice insurers, and certainly one
of the most sensitive. Some feared that peer review might trigger dangerous per-
sonality attacks:
My partners are intelligent, straightforward, innovative and responsible. If they say that
they'll do it, they'll do it. There is a similar mold to that extent. But the fabric that holds it
together is delicate. Like an egg, it depends where the pressure comes from. The strain
is the strain of the work. But I think what could break it are personality attacks. There is
no mechanism for clearing the air for personality problems. People remember problems
of years ago. It is not like a family. That's a threat. It can take a lot of pressure on job
matters, not on personal things. That's visible in the fact that they don't bring up per-
sonal issues. They are too afraid to do that. Example: the quality of someone's work,
things which would be taken personally. Very few compliments are given here. It is a
lonely atmosphere. We rarely have partners telling other partners, `Hey you did a good
job.' It's traditional Yankee reluctance. Very few expressions of affection, but similarly
very few expressions of dislike. Very little emotional connection, even with your mentor.
As long as you are dealing with the usual con¯icts linked to legal problems, there is a
lot of stress and risk, but the ®rm holds best. It is very strong in a strict legal context.
If someone sued the ®rm, the lawyers would band together like one person. But if
one of us were to say: `Mr X, you are not working hard enough,' then it would break
the egg. (Partner 19)
Partners varied in the extent to which they thought that the ®rm should look
more closely at partners' quantitative and qualitative contribution. Some thought
that managerial and ®nancial controls (standard computer outputs distributed at
partnership meetings) constituted an ongoing and suf®ciently tight peer review; they
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would focus the debate on what could be considered an acceptable window of
quantitative performance. Methods for assessing partners' contributions were being
discussed. Recall that the ®rm already had the possibility of preventing a partner
from reaching the next level of compensation. This system was understood as a
substitute for the absence of built-in incentives for productivity in the compensation
system. Partners focusing the debate on this quantitative aspect of performance
usually opposed formal peer review about the quality of partners' work:
Judgement about the quality of work for other partners may happen through the
procedure of identifying the appropriate staf®ng on matters which often involve more
than one partner. So there are checks and balances that simply happen naturally
because on anything that is sophisticated or complex it would be rare that there was
only one person who was involved. Indirectly it is peer review. (Partner 13)
As seen in Chapter 4, many were sceptical about quality peer review. Some thought
that formal peer review of quality went against respect for one's partners. Some were
not so much afraid that their judgement would be called into question, as convinced
that a broad and formal system of peer review would be too expensive and dif®cult
to install (sometimes specialities were not even duplicated within the ®rm), exces-
sively time consuming (people were very busy), and not very revealing (substantive
dif®culties inherent to ex-post reviews of a case and to de®ning the quality of service
rendered). A formal peer review should be triggered only when a client complained.
Problems stemmed more from a partner who was not working hard enough, or
taking in undesirable business. As part of the cooperative spirit of the ®rm, informal
discussions among partners were frequent anyway, which constituted an informal
peer-review process by getting a second-opinion. Once formalized and separated
from the ongoing practice, a second opinion procedure (reviewing an opinion letter
before it goes out, for example) would become a perfunctory operation.
Other partners thought that, since there had never been a compensation process
with an aura of peer review, a periodic review mechanism would allow the ®rm
to assess each partner's performance against goalsÐfor example, every ®ve yearsÐ
and to provide constructive advice. This would include a look at a sample of each
partner's work product and billing ®gures, talks with people who worked with the
person within the ®rm, and talks with clients. They focused the debate on the
methodology: who should sit on a committee that would monitor the quality of
partners' work more formally. Management also underplayed the threatening
aspects of these reviews: they would be quite super®cial and useful only as a way to
tip the institution about partners who had personal problems. A partner in favour of
more peer review described how the review committee should work:
Nobody would be immune, we should be able to sit down with everyone and talk. We
should have a committee of primarily senior but uniformly highly respected partners,
because it's important that people think that this process is real and that it's not a lynch
mob. It would gather comments about each of the partners, almost like an associate
review, and then would sit down with the partner and talk about it. Hoping that it would
be a dialogue, not a monologue and that the partner will be able to talk about things
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that he or she is concerned about, where they hope their practice will be going in the
future. If it turns out that there's a consensus that the person is being overpaid, the
person shouldn't go to the next level of compensation. (Partner 30)
Again, managerial value orientations con¯icted here with professional ones.
P O LA R I Z A TI ON O F P O L IC Y
P R EF ER EN CE S A ND ST AT U S QU O
According to the questions on management policies presented in the questionnaire
(see Appendix A), the partnership was mixed with respect to the defence of values
that should orient its practice. With regard to work¯ow, 44 per cent of the partners
(sixteen out of thirty-six) thought that it should change: ®nders thought that it
should be less controlled; minders that it should be more controlled. Fifty-six
per cent favoured the more ¯exible status quo. To come back to Seron's classi®-
cation of value orientations, the majority here was more entrepreneurial than
managerial. With regard to compensation, 72 per cent of the partners favoured the
status quo. This re¯ected more managerial than entrepreneurial values. With regard
to organizing marketing at the individual level, 50 per cent of the partners thought
that everyone should become more entrepreneurial. With regard to peer review, 64
per cent of the partners refused a more formal system; the others favoured more peer
review, especially if the compensation criteria were not changed. Here the part-
nership remained more entrepreneurial. Figure 8.1 represents the polarization of the
partnership in terms of policy preferences.
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Figure 8.1. Polarization of policy preferences among partners
Note : Each number represents a partner. Partners close in this space have similar policy preferences.
This ®gure comes out of multidimensional scaling of a one-mode table representing partners'
similarities with regard to policy options. Subgroups displayed are identi®ed by hierarchical cluster
analysis.
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Figure 8.1 clusters members based on shared positions with regard to changes
in ®rm management policies. A ®rst split distinguishes two groups of partners.
Note mainly the distance separating the cluster of `radical conservative' partners
(defending the status quo) from that of combined and `radical reformers' (pushing
for a different partnership agreement) and other partners in favour of just `tinkering'
with the partnership agreement. The ®rst group (including Partners 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9,
10, 11, 16, and 36) represents the defence of the status quo. Its members were
mostly senior and conservative partners who did not want any change in ®rm
policies. The other group represents partners who favoured a change with regard
to at least one policy issue. Further splits in this second group display the exist-
ence of several subgroups representing different combinations of policy positions
and values. It shows that there were four core subgroups favouring substantial
changes: a ®rst subgroup includes Partners 4, 26, 28, and 31, who supported
changes in the four policy issues at hand; they could be called `radical reformers'.
The second subgroup included Partners 8, 23, 30, and 35: they supported changes in
three policies, with an emphasis on policies underlain by entrepreneurial values
(compensation, marketing, peer review). The third subgroup included Partners 20
and 22: they also supported changes in three policies, but with an emphasis on
policies underlain by managerial values (work¯ow, marketing, peer review). A
fourth subgroup included Partners 3, 14, and 17, who also supported changes in
policies underlain by managerial values (work¯ow, marketing). Other subgroups
were more inclined to support change along one policy issue only, usually for a
policy underlain by managerial values; they were closer to conservatives than shown
in the ®gure.
Each combination of policies/values made sense to its defenders. Senior partners
such as Partners 1, 2, and 5 had no incentive to change a system that bene®ted them
the most, in particular the lockstep seniority compensation system. A comment of
Partner 1 was typical of this approach, `Our compensation system is something that
we want to preserve because it eliminates a lot of back-stabbing . . . '. These partners
controlled access to many clients already and emphasizing individual marketing
activities would not introduce a change for them. They did not wish to depend on
in¯exible intake and assignment procedures, or face the problems raised by more
intrusive peer review, even as arbitrators. At the other end of the spectrum, Partners
4 and 26 championed changes in all ®rm policies. They represented more entre-
preneurial values of mostly junior partners who wanted their ®rm to follow the
trends followed by other ®rms in the USA. As mentioned above, younger partners in
particular tended to be more in favour of strong change: they were not prepared to
wait in an uncertain environment for their turn to reap the bene®ts of seniority.
Note that Partner 4's support for radical changes did not go against his own
immediate economic interests, but put him in an awkward position vis-aÁ-vis his
senior peers. His status provided younger partners with the legitimacy that they
needed to propose changes in the rules of the game in a socially acceptable way.
Slightly less pushy, but still in the avant-garde of change, was the managing partner,
who advocated combinations of policies that tried to promote change more
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discretely, while still preventing the emergence of con¯icts within the ®rm, mainly
by opposing changes in the equality-based compensation system.
In between the extremes, more moderate combinations represented attempts to
change the ®rm within the framework as it was. Partners 14 and 17 invoked changes
in work¯ow and marketing that required more individual mobilization and dis-
cipline without providing good citizens with more incentives than they already had.
Such medium-seniority partners were willing to wait for a few more years until their
share of the pie would become the biggest. Few, however, carried with them the two
orientations (managerial and entrepreneurial). Closer to conservatives, Partner 15
advocated a ®rm with a slightly more entrepreneurial touch; he considered that this
would be enough to secure its long-term survival and growth. Even more prudent,
Partner 13 was mainly concerned with changes in the enforcement of work¯ow
policy. Note also that, apart from the subgroup of members who wanted to change
the system entirely, partners tended not to think both that the compensation system
should be changed and that the work¯ow should be put under more surveillance
(more bureaucratized). Few were both more entrepreneurial and more managerial
at the same time.
During the year of ®eldwork, the partnership meetings discussed these changes
but opted for the status quo: no changes at all were introduced in the basic agree-
ment of the ®rm.4 Figure 8.1 con®rms the existence of different value systems, but
it does not create a link between structure and the negotiation of such precarious
values. In particular, it does not introduce status differences between interests and
values. Members are grouped based on their choices, their common way of thinking,
or common value system. But these discussions about professionalism could turn
into endless theological debates without a structure that helped them establish a
legitimate, though always questionable, set of policies. I turn to structural analysis to
show that this normative order was supported by speci®c types of relationships.
Even when participation in the regulatory process is formally equalized to mitigate
status competition among partners, democracy is always a form of polycracy.
Theories such as that of Waters tend to underestimate this structural and strategic
dimension of the negotiation of values, in particular its relationship to status
competition based on various forms of relational status, and to personalization of
power (Bourricaud 1964).
To combine a normative and structural approach to the collegial negotiation of
values, the interesting issue here is to look at what maintains the status quo in spite
of the fact that, as shown in Figure 8.1, there was much pressure towards change.
The argument above is that, in the uncertainty surrounding regulatory changes and
their consequences, it was not enough to say that partners with status decided on
matters of policy. I have argued that partners with multiple and locally inconsistent
(that is, not easily combined) forms of status had the strongest in¯uence on producing
stability or change. The task now is therefore to identify these multi-status oligarchs
and the kind of status inconsistency that made a difference in the policy decisions.
To do this, it is important to look more closely at where the regulatory debates took
place in this ®rm. I ®rst examine the functioning of the partnership meeting, the
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®rm's main decision-making and rati®cation body, especially at attention allocation
in this central committee of the whole. Then, I look at relationships in which more
informal discussions take placeÐthat is, friendship ties. This approach will identify
twenty-two partners who could be considered to be multi-status partners in this
®rm (out of thirty-six). When one looks more closely at their policy preferences, the
balance against changes becomes sixteen against six, which reduced the weight of
reformers considerably.
F OR M A L A ND IN F OR M AL R EG U L A TO R Y D EL IB ER AT I ON S
Following the discussion of values in partnership meetings would have been ideal.
But I did not have access to these meetings. Studying the transformation of indi-
vidual preferences into a common political will, and its subsequent formalization
into a ruleÐthrough negotiations, perhaps blackmail and bluffs, lateral pressures,
bullying tactics, persuasion and argumentation stylesÐwas beyond reach. Instead, I
collected interview descriptions about the dynamics of these meetings, as well as
sociometric data about attention allocation in them (who listened to whom, as
indicated in Appendix A). I use these data to look into structural constraints on
the negotiation of precarious values. These constraints came from relationships
that were key to regulatory work, not directly task related in the sense adopted in
Chapter 3. I can thus examine the ways in which debates tended to become restricted
to the voices of ®rm oligarchs, mainly through this attention allocation to opinion
leaders.
Centrality in each type of network provides a speci®c types of status. Together
with partners already known to be prominent in the ®rm, an oligarchy of partners is
identi®ed that was informally vested with representation of precarious values, along
with the resulting outcome of the negotiationÐthat is, oscillation leading to status
quo in the de®nition of ®rm policies.
The partnership meeting
The partnership meeting was the collegial organ par excellence, the `committee of
the whole', exclusively composed of partners, and the formal arena for regula-
tory deliberation. The con®dential character of its deliberations was part of
partners' code of deontology. This forum had a communication and information
function, but also a strong symbolic function. It stressed clearly the differences in
hierarchical status between partners and associates (who were not allowed in the
meetings). Its deliberations signalled whether the ®rm was integrated or not. Part-
nership meetings then also became places where values, norms, and attitudes were
reasserted and consensus about them re-expressed (Etzioni 1961). Very often, the
committee of the whole just rati®ed what had been decided elsewhere. Sometimes
it decided by itself. It represented the institutional order that was based on
equality and formal collegiality, on the one hand, and on equality and subordination
(of associates among themselves), on the other. According to several partners,
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decisions in the past had been reached by consensus, and people would defer to a
dissenting minority.
From 1971 to the late 1970s, there was an emphasis on collegiality and cohesiveness to
the point that I don't remember a decision made at the time which was not based on
consensus. Dissent never happened, because dissenting people would withdraw, or the
majority would defer to the minority. The foremost concern was not to disrupt the style
and the cohesion. Not a single issue was permitted to interfere with that. The ®rm at the
time had lots and lots of institutional clients, it was not under the kind of ®nancial stress
that began at the early 1980s, chasing clients, etc. There was an awful lot of socializing
outside the ®rm, partners and associates alike, at the end of the 1960s and beginning of
1970s. At least once a month the entire ®rm went out together. . . . Now the bottom line
is that formal votes are taken with more frequency. People don't defer any more to the
wishes of minorities. People are far less willing to do it. Even back in the early days in
terms of deference, there were people who were more important when they exposed a
view on an issue. People who did not have their status did not challenge their views. At
this stage, the lines between the important and less important partners are not as clearly
drawn, so that contributes. You have thirty-six people whose basic interest is try to earn
a livelihood and maximize their remuneration, which is, up to this point at least, based
on seniority. The process can be said to be collegial, in the sense that confrontations,
guided by a modicum of civility, can take place among people who know each other
well. (Partner 11)
An important characteristic of debates in partnership meetings, one that also
explains the in¯uence of members with status, was the time pressure.
Over time, you develop a political sense of how to be effective in a partnership meeting.
You focus on consensus raising, you don't want to have a fractious debate. Takes too
long. We would be there all night. (Partner 28)
Well attended meetings were thus perceived to be important monthly occasions,
whether to review ®rm ®gures or to scrutinize the managing partner's ideas, even for
routine matters, sometimes to decide what to say to help the associates tackle dif-
®cult and confusing issues. As already mentioned, information available to all
partners sorted out the ®rm's data by most important criteria: speciality, client,
billings, collecting, and so on. The extent to which this was also a truly deliberative
assembly, not simply a monitoring and rati®cation body, was dif®cult to evaluate.
Open confrontations could sometimes be avoided by creating subcommittees made
of a cross-section of the ®rm and members representing all the sides. But partners
acknowledged that debates were very rarely taken in such sub-committees, and that
corridors were not crammed with plotting members. The managing partner, who
controlled the agenda, was not backed by a whole team of administrative of®cials.
This committee of the whole was perceived to be ef®cient within the limited
expectations that partners had. Speeches were rarely pure theatre. Partners said that
they had little patience for high-blown vacuous set-piece contributions.
At partnership meetings, you speak only when you have something to say. The group is
tough if you are trumpeting the obvious. You may get laughed down and told to be
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quiet. Lawyers like to make fun of other people, draw a little bit of blood. The discussion
tends to be harsh. Say: `With all due respect' and then make fun, as long as it is not
direct personal attack. Never seen ad hominem happen in the partnership meeting. So,
by and large, people who speak have given it a thought and have a point to make. This
®rm has only one prima donna type: Partner X. Not a team player at all. We try to
accommodate him as best as we can. I got out of my way to ask for his advice and make
him feel good about things. But you cannot absorb more than two or three like that. He
stands up in partnership meetings and `I would not tolerate this' and `I would not
tolerate that'. . . . Most people here have big egos, but they are not prima donna types,
they don't take themselves too seriously. Bad feelings between people exist, but they
are fairly limited. If you do have con¯icts, they are likely to be solvable because most
people are of that type, capable of taking criticism even if they don't like it. Partner 14
[a lateral partner who came in from another ®rm] says that we don't generally take
ourselves quite seriously. We are not pompous lawyers who think of themselves as
important, central in the clients' life, at the centre of the universe. Not here. You won't
have large blow-ups over personalities alone. There is also a safety valve: if a partner
feels very strongly about something to the point of becoming emotional, upset, gen-
erally people will defer, back down, and be sensitive. There are negative votes, and
close votes. But there is an implicit rule: if you care enough to put yourself on the line,
if you stand out after a vote and say, `I am going to resign if . . . ', the ®rm will
accommodate you, as long as you don't do it too often, say, more than once every ®ve
years. (Partner 19)
Politics were said to take place across of®ce boundaries, and across age and
speciality divides. Professional and economic status games were many: partners
could ®nd it offensive that their performance be judged by others as low, or
inadequate. Fear of being penalized if you did not perform by others' standards was
not strong, but fears of irritation, of resentment among one's colleagues, and of
marginalization, still mattered according to the managing partner. Disagreement
was not perceived as undermining his authority. People disengaged from struggles
because it was unpleasant to be at odds with their partners.
At SG&R, claims to leadership by members of the oligarchy were subject to more
complex constraints, and their relationship to precarious values did not seem to be
as elusive as Nelson (1988) would suggest. In order to look at the connection
between such claims and the negotiation of precarious values in this context, I elicited
from partners an identi®cation of their opinion leaders among their peers. I was
allowed to ask each partner to whom he or she seriously listened in this bodyÐthat
is, to whom he or she paid particular attention when discussing policy issues. In
effect, as seen above, partners attending formal meetings were sometimes irritated by
their lengthiness, and might or might not take very seriously some of their colleagues
and their views. Power was personalized. Attention was focused and in¯uence was
structured. Among equals, there were some people whose views and expectations
one tried to ®nd out (especially what they expected from you); one often had to
second-guess them. This elite of partners most `listened to' (which, in the euphem-
istic vocabulary of these lawyers, means `in¯uential') in debates about policy issues
and professionalism was thus ultimately expected to maintain a certain continuity in
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the management of the ®rm. This can be shown by looking at the structure of
attention allocation in these meetings. One would expect that this form of status
would be strongly correlated to other forms, and that a partner whoÐat least at the
time of the discussionÐkept many lawyers busy had more in¯uence than others
(was more listened to) in partnership meetings. Others would hesitate to challenge
him or her.
All partners answered the same question about this topic (see Appendix A). Here
is an example of an answer:
I listen to what the most senior people have to say about that. The compensation is
based on seniority, and doesn't involve any merit assessment. From time to time that
issue is revisited. I view Partners 1 and 4 as two of the most signi®cant producers of new,
existing, and repeat business. They have been with the ®rm for so long, that they grew
up with the ®rm, they understand its ethic. (Partner 25)
These data help to combine this approach to ®rm discussion of precarious
values with more structural dimensions of the ®rm. Partners with both status
and active leadership claims can be identi®ed by looking at the members cited
most often as listened to (indegree centrality score of 20 or more) in these meetings.
They were, in order, Partner 20 (the managing partner), Partner 4 (who was to
become the next managing partner), Partner 1, Partner 26, and Partner 14, mostly
from Of®ce I.5 Note that this form of popularity favoured identi®cation of Of®ce
I partners as partners with leadership claims, since there had always been more
partners in that of®ce. Therefore special attention was paid to the position of
the most central Of®ce II partners in this structure, including Partner 14 and 5.
These six partners, who can be called oligarchs, could also be considered among the
most in¯uential in regulatory debates, in the sense that they framed the issues that
were discussed in the partnership meetings, and were listened to. As already seen
above, these in¯uential opinion leaders based their claim to leadership on different
forms of status, and the way in which they emphasized various policy orientations
and value systems was not random. As seen above, their voices carried and framed
the negotiation of precarious values in identi®able ways. To simplify, Partners 1 and
5 defended the status quo. Partners 4 and 26 challenged the status quo based on
more entrepreneurial values. The other oligarchs were looking for compromise by
challenging the status quo based on more moderate managerial principles. The
social mechanism by which the debate became restricted to the voices of ®rm oli-
garchs can be further explored by analysing in more detail this pattern of attention
allocation.
Attention allocation in partnership meetings
Structural constraints that weighed on the debates at SG&R partnership meet-
ings can be grasped by looking at the pattern of attention allocation in these
meetings. This helps to get a better sense of what went on in the negotiation of
precarious values. The density table presented in Appendix J shows that this dense
network6 can be represented with four positions of approximately structurally
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equivalent partners. Figure 8.2 visualizes the way in which the positions were related
to one another.
This centralized and deceptively simple pattern shows the existence of an oli-
garchy of leaders in Position One carrying ®rm-wide values and representing
different forms of status. This structure signals the high concentration of partners'
attention on what these speci®c oligarchs had to say. Notice for example Position
Two partners, an unorganized set of Of®ce I and II members who listened to the
oligarchy of minders, but unreciprocated. One particular feature of this pattern
suggests that, in this partnership, discussion of values also took place informally in
more personalized relationships, based on more exogenous identity criteria. Also
central in this structure are Position Four minders and their friends. Note that this
segmentation of the partnership no longer re¯ected the niche system, because
specialities did not count that much, but overall seniority and of®ce membership
did, as well as gender. Women partners (two of whom minders), for example,
made a separate position. Recall Figure 6.1 showing that strong ties cutting across
speciality lines were friendship ties, understood as sources of role distance and a
de®nition of the situation. Recall also p2 models (Chapter 3), showing that more
exogenousÐthat is, informalÐidentity criteria counted as a basis for selection of
friends. This suggests that the close connection between in¯uence and friendship
had both inclusive and exclusive effects. This could mean that informal and more
personalized discussions of precarious values also contributed to shape policy and
explain, for example, Partner 17's presence in Position One, among the oligarchs.
But it could also mean that women partners would have been part of Position
Four if they had been listened to by Position One multistatus oligarchsÐfor
example if they had had strong friendship ties with them (Ibarra 1992).
Position Four
Office I minders
and their friends
Position One
Office I
multistatus 
oligarchs
Position Two 
Unorganized
partners
Position Three
Women partners
and minders
Figure 8.2. Attention allocation in partnership meetings
Note: This ®gure represents the pattern of relationships
between positions of approximately structurally equivalent
partners in the `listening-at-the-partnership-meeting' network.
Thick lines represent mutual ties. For a detailed description of
positions and their members, see Appendix J.
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Formal debates in partnership meetings provided only a partial view of the
process of regulatory deliberation. In effect, partnership meetings were a forum for
members to assert their positions and count their votes. But other, more informal
and personalized, contexts also witnessed discussion of precarious values and policy
issues. Such contexts can be identi®ed by looking at the friendship network among
partners.
Friendship and informal discussion of values
Why was there a need for informal discussion of values? Why should this discussion
take place outside the formal organization? Talking about the managing partner,
Partner 19 said that he `knows how to court the partnership ahead of time', meaning
that much of the consensus building was done outside the of®cial forum of the
partnership meeting. A distance must be constructed to rede®ne individual interests
and to evaluate day-to-day operations and ®rm policies. As emphasized by
Bourricaud, there is a `decentring' process in any form of democracy. In collegial
contexts, friendship ties helped create, by de®nition, such a decentring.7
Recall the terms in which partners talked about friendship in Chapter 3. In task-
oriented brainstorming and its characteristic status competition, role-distance ties
had an important function: they helped mitigate the potentially negative effects of
the use of hierarchical authority in a professional context, such as open con-
frontations. In that respect, they did not just represent chit-chat among members;
they helped stabilize the deliberation by maintaining a social fabric, especially
among senior advisers, that was vital evenÐperhaps especiallyÐin a very pressuring
®rm. In this section, I argue that role-distance ties also helped members achieve this
result by providing an informal forum to discuss regulatory changes and to ®ne-tune
precarious values. This implies that members very central in the friendship network
may also be considered members of the regulatory oligarchy.
This is not a digression about collegial `altruism'. Recall the importance of
unconditional friends as an insurance policy against expulsion from SG&R. In
addition, friendship ties were consistent with the three aspects of collective action
among peers discussed in Chapter 1. First, there was the fact that the labour contract,
particularly the lockstep compensation system, worked best when partners had a
long duration in mind, actually the perspective of a lifetime loyalty to the ®rm.
Secondly, partners who succeeded in this forum were often partners who had the
patience for building consensus, for discussing issues with one partner after another
months in advance, working things out slowly, avoiding treading on toes unneces-
sarily, emphasizing what held people together and not what divided them.8 This
worked also because of physical and social proximity during non-working hours
(such as athletic facilities). The reference group of members of this kind of ®rm
was much more heavily composed of co-workers than was the case for a typical
American worker (Frank 1985). Recall again Former Partner No. 2 saying that he felt
socially isolated now that he was no longer a partner at SG&R. Thirdly, there was the
personalization of power among peers.
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For the purpose of policy-oriented deliberation about precarious values, only
friendship ties among partners are of direct interest here. Associates at SG&R were
almost never consulted about policy. Density was relatively high (0.21, compared
with overall density in the friendship network (0.12); or with density in the
friendship network among associates only (0.15)). The partners cited most often as
friends by other partners (indegree centrality score of 15 times or more) were
Partners 26, 17, 27, 9, and 4. All were also from Of®ce I. Note the absence of
Partners 13 and 24, who were very central in the friendship network for the whole
®rm because they were cited very often by associates. This, for example, adds
credibility to the inclusion of Partner 17 into the small circle of opinion leaders
(`a compromise man' who played an important role in connecting the blocks of
partners represented in Figure 3.1, and so ensuring the generalized nature of
exchanges).9 Through informal ties, he brought together members with different
forms of status and carrying different values.
In sum, in this ®rm, the `listening' and the friendship ties affected the debate
between value orientations. Figure 8.1 con®rmed the existence of different value
systems, but created only a minimal link between structure and the negotiation of
such precarious values by showing that a majority of partners stood for some
changesÐwhile no changes occurred for ®ve years after ®eldwork. But it did not
introduce status differences that could mediate between interests and values.
Members were grouped based on their choices, their common way of thinking, or
common value system. But these discussions about professionalism could become
endless without a status structure that helped them establish a legitimate, though
always questionable, set of policies.
Few members belonged to the multistatus oligarchy that was particularly involved
and exposed in policy deliberations. They were Partners 1, 4, 5, 14, 17, 20, and 26.
What characterized their social pro®le was that they all cumulated at least three
forms of `importance'. Partner 1 was a top money-maker, adviser, reliable co-
worker, and multi-target lever. Partner 4 was a top money-maker, co-worker, and
very central friend. Partner 5 was a top performer, multi-target lever, and an active
minder. Partner 14 was a top co-worker, adviser and minder. Partners 17 and 26
were top co-workers, advisers, and friends. Partner 20 was the ultimate minder,
multi-target lever, and adviser.10 In the next section, I look at which speci®c forms of
status existed among partners only and at how these multi-status oligarchs were
successful at preserving the status quo in a situation where most partners did want at
least some changes.
TH E O LI G A R C H S F R A M IN G DEL I B ER A T IO N ON
P R E C A R IO U S VA L UE S
The fact that regulatory deliberation is dominated by important members is not
suf®cient in itself to account for the social mechanism of negotiation of precarious
values. In effect, issues of status consistency must be brought in.11 As suggested by
Frank (1985), the price of status is high when members interact intensively. In the
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context of SG&R, cumulating several forms of status was therefore even more dif-
®cult. Very speci®c correlations between measurements of importance were needed
to build a status system that drove the negotiation of precarious values (sinceÐas
theorized aboveÐmulti-status members could muster extra-legitimacy by showing
that they `sacri®ced' resources when siding with speci®cÐand costly to someÐ
policy options). Table 8.1 identi®es three basic kinds of status in this ®rm. It looks at
the correlations between all the dimensions of importance in this partnership, thus
providing an additional view of the structural context in which the debate on
precarious values took place.
Table 8.1 con®rms that, overall, partners at this ®rm tended to be allocated across
the three familiar different forms of status (which overlapped only exceptionally
in the six members of the oligarchy identi®ed above). First, members in¯uential in
policy discussions in partnership meetings tended also to be cited as important
professional advisers and important protectors of the common good, and were
considered by many to be friends. These were minders. Secondly, membersÐ
including young and entrepreneurial partnersÐconsidered important to others as
strong co-workers in the production process tended also to be sought out often as
professional advisers, but did not put in many billable hours. These were often
rainmakers or ®nders who were in a position to distribute large amounts of work to
others. Finally, there were solo operators who happened to bill and collect indivi-
dually enormous amounts during that year, but tended to be prima donnas, espe-
cially not protectors of the common good (signi®cant negative correlation). Part of
this overall picture echoes the interdependence of elites and balance of powers aÁ la
Montesquieu. Policy remained a matter discussed by all, but seriously framed by
of®cials in charge (minders) and by ®nders who were also rainmakers. This
approach identi®es a switch in the representation of constituencies based on
exclusion of partners without multiple forms of status. In spite of the `one-person-
one-vote' rule and of constituency support, they did not have their ticket into the
actual circle of in¯uential decision-makers.
Table 8.1. Correlations between dimensions of status among partners
Indicators of status Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Fees collected * *
2. Time input (hours) 1,380 328 0.51 Ð
3. Centrality (in¯uence) 3.26 1.12 0.15 ÿ0.22 Ð
4. Centrality (advice) 3.20 0.87 0.26 ÿ0.16 0.58 Ð
5. Centrality (friendship) 2.62 0.75 ÿ0.09 ÿ0.13 0.41 0.28 Ð
6. Centrality (co-workers) 3.09 0.65 0.06 ÿ0.00 0.16 0.58 0.17 Ð
7. Centrality (leverage) 22.40 16.70 0.15 ÿ0.31 0.77 0.51 0.37 0.04
Notes: N 36 partners. SD: standard deviation. Correlation table for measurements of partners'
`importance' in the ®rm as indicated by their respective centrality in ®rm social networks and by their
economic performance. * means that the information may not be disclosed.
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ST A TU S IN C ON SI ST EN C Y A ND S TA T U S QU O: S TI F L ED
EN T R EP R ENE U R IA L VA L UE S
Having identi®ed these endogenous forms of status in the organization, it is possible
to re-identify the oligarchs, their policy choices, and their effect on the deliberations.
Once attention to status inconsistency is introduced in the identi®cation of multi-
status oligarchs, their circle can be enlarged as follows. Among the multi-status
partners, some combined three different and inconsistent forms of status: Partners
1, 14, 15, 17, and 27 opposed important changes; Partners 4, 26, and 30 favoured
them. Among bi-status partners, Partners 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, and 24
opposed them, whereas Partners 28, 31, and 34 favoured them. Using this infor-
mation, Table 8.2 presents a different view of the relationship between structure and
culture as understood hereÐthat is, forms of status and values underlying policy
preferences in the ®rm. Each form of status is separately, then jointly, correlated to
these preferences.
Minder, ®nder, and collector are each a form of status identi®ed in Table 8.1.
Minder status is measured by centrality in the advice, discussion about management
policy issues, friendship, and lateral control networks. Finder status is measured
by centrality in the strong co-workers' and advice networks. Collector status is
measured as rank in two types of economic performance measurements: number of
hours worked and amount of fees collected by each partner during the year of
®eldwork. In Table 8.2 each status variable was derived from counting the number
of consistent dimensions of status that were accumulated by each partner. This was
done by ranking each partner along the compatible centrality scores. Regardless of
issues of status consistency, a partner central in all these networks, plus hard
working for lucrative clients, could accumulate seven forms of `importance' in the
®rm (mean is 2.9, standard deviation is 1.8). Within each consistent form of status,
cut-off points were chosen based on large drops in the values between two partners
or based on reputation (that is, ethnographic knowledge of the way in which
partners themselves perceived each other's prominence).
Table 8.2. Correlations between having one or several forms of inconsistent dimensions of status
and preferences with regard to changes in management policies
Suggested policy
change concerning:
Multi-status
oligarchs
Minder
status
Finder
status
Collector
status
1 2 3
1. Work¯ow 0.36 0.16 0.40 0.08 Ð
2. Compensation 0.02 ÿ0.22 0.21 0.02 0.07 Ð
3. Marketing 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.37 Ð
4. Peer review 0.13 0.04 0.25 ÿ0.07 0.38 0.57 0.40
Notes : N 36 partners. In this table, multi-status oligarchs are partners accumulating two or three
inconsistent forms of status, for example `minder and ®nder', or `minder and collector', or `®nder and
collector'.
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This look at the effect of the structural context on the debate on precarious
values con®rms that indeed policy remained a matter discussed by all, but ser-
iously shaped by multi-status oligarchs identi®ed above as in¯uential in policy
deliberations. They tended to accumulate forms of status that, overall, remained
inconsistent in this ®rm. Members shaping the debate on precarious values were
partners who bridged particularly the ®rst and second categories of status. Note
again that members with only the third type of status, that derived from bringing
in much more than their share of the revenue (big individual collectors), were
not much listened to. Hence the absence of Partner 18, the big collector who
ranked third on the performance scale in terms of dollars brought in that year (and
®rst the next year); he did not have high centrality scores in any of the ®rm's
networks.
Looking jointly at Figure 8.1 and at Table 8.1, it becomes clear that the social
mechanism by which the debate became restricted to the voices of these speci®c ®rm
oligarchs had the expected effect on the ®rm's policies. It helped to maintain the
status quo, not to promote change. Recall that Partners 1 and 5 defended the status
quo, particularly with regard to compensation. Partners 4 and 26 challenged the
status quo based on more entrepreneurial values. The other oligarchs were looking
for compromise by challenging the status quo based on more moderate managerial
principles. Thus the main voices in these discussions did not represent together the
whole spectrum of forms of status. Exceptions such as Partner 1 belonged at the
same time to all categories, and were very conservative. Partner 4 was lobbying for
changes, but his status was more that of the ®rst and third type. Partner 26 covered
almost all three types, but he was not a multi-target lever, which meant not a
con®rmed minder; he was closer to Partner 4's pro®le than to Partner 1's. Thus
managerial conservatism was backed by minders. Entrepreneurial values tended to
be backed by ®nders.
This form of status inconsistency (for oligarchs)Ðalready detected in Chapter 6
(®nders in a RED set are not minders)Ðhelped maintain the status quo. It meant an
awkward position for multi-status oligarchsÐanother price to pay for status. But its
main effect was to prevent challengers from becoming minders and minders from
mustering alone enough legitimacy to challenge ef®ciently the rules of the game.
Work¯ow, compensation, marketing, and peer-review policies were therefore
challenged, but not strongly enough. The ®rst remained ¯exible, the second
remained committed to the lockstep system, the third remained a matter of indi-
vidual goodwill, and the fourth remained entirely informal. The partners who were
listened to in the deliberations were in the majority the partners who wanted the
status quo, except Partners 4 and 26. Thanks to the latter, the values and policy
options carried by younger partners had to be considered legitimate and put on the
agenda, and the compensation system was obviously in danger. But, given the
connection between the speci®c forms of status inconsistency found in this ®rm,
chances of new values to win more legitimacy and be adopted as priorities for that
year were low. Under this form of status consistency and structural arrangement,
conservative minders win out. Five out of seven opinion leaders stood for small
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changes, if any. The sharing of pro®ts arrangementÐthe most important rule of the
gameÐwas not dangerously questioned by the elite of that year.
Structural constraints on the discussion of precarious values are established. They
derive their strength from the mechanism of maintenance of status heterogeneity
described in Chapter 6. Most partners at SG&R did not feel left out of the decision-
making process. But key partners emerged as important to regulatory deliberation.
Members with two or three inconsistent forms of status had a stronger normative
function; they were expected to de®ne the terms under which exchanges took place,
the `rules of the game'. In particular, minders tended to defend equal distribution of
income for all partners (weighted by seniorityÐthat is, loyalty to the ®rm), strict
rules with regard to the grey areas of multiple representation (political con¯icts of
interest), or the introduction of a more formal peer-review process. Finders tended
to push for more merit-based compensation criteria and a more risk-taking attitude
to multiple representation (for example, by seeking client waivers as often as pos-
sible), and to oppose a more formal peer-review process (as inevitably political).
Finally, it is useful to provide an example of how multi-status oligarchs `sacri®ced'
resources for the common good. The only `constituencies' that expressed clear
preferences between these policies were senior and junior partners. As a con-
stituency, senior partners favoured the status quo for three policies (work¯ow,
compensation, and peer review; their client base being established already, they did
not need to oppose individual marketing efforts that would not be carried out at
their own expense). As a constituency, junior partners tended to favour the changes.
No other characteristic of partners has such a systematic effect on policy choices as
seniority does.12
Looking only at such constituencies as the end of the story misses an important
point. Recall that in this ®rm partners' values did not entirely mirror their narrow
economic interests. Some multi-status oligarchs who represented constituencies
stood up for the values that promoted their immediate and personal advantage, but
some did not. Partner 1 defended the status quo; according to many, he would
certainly have fared better under a different compensation regime. Partner 4, who
had approximately the same interests, defended entrepreneurial values. Partner 33
favoured a single managerial change (more individual work devoted to marketing)
that would not have increased his revenue from what he received under the com-
pensation regime as it was. Thus the logic of values was not entirely consistent with
the logic of short-term economic interests.
TH E S TR U C TU R A L BA S IS O F N OR M AT I VE O R DE R
To summarize, in this partnership, multi-status members, who cumulated several
loosely coupled forms of status, were in a position to arbitrate in the negotiation of
precarious values. It was only those oligarchs who were senior, productive,
respected, and active in management (that is, with uneasily combined forms of
status) who could hope to muster enough credibility (both resources and legiti-
macy) to impress their colleagues in the deliberation about new rules. Uni-status
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members (for example, a highly productive partner who championed one single
valueÐsay, `merit' in the distribution of compensation) were not in¯uential among
their peers in debates about policy. Thus, the form taken by status competition at
SG&R stabilized its regulatory process and tended to reinforce the status quoÐto
sti¯e entrepreneurial values, stressing more managerial and professional ones. The
notions of precarious values, status inconsistency, and multi-status oligarchs are
thus useful for combining legitimacy and resources dependencies in the explanation
of organizational change (or lack thereof). They bring together institutional and
broadly conceived structural approaches to the regulatory deliberations.
Thus, data analysis found evidence for speci®c structural constraints on nego-
tiation of precarious values. It provides an exploratory analysis of the structural basis
of normative orders. This procedural approach to the regulatory debate in this
collegial organization explains how the rules of the game were maintained or
changed. The debate on precarious values took place in a context that was struc-
turally well de®ned, and among members who were allowed to personalize a form of
status at the time of the deliberation. The structural mechanism kept in check the
discussion of values among peers by allowing some, and not others, to participate in
a credible way in the debate. This supports the idea that the relationships between
interests, values, and policies are not direct and straightforward among peers. A
social mechanism characterizing the regulatory deliberation introduces complex
status games that weigh on their policy decisions. In particular, any organization
authorizes certain forms of status heterogeneity that help maintain an ongoing
debate about professionalism.13
266 Precarious Values
Conclusion
The purpose of this book was to develop a broadly conceived structural approach
that can account for collective action among peers confronted by complex,
knowledge-intensive tasks, in both its formal and informal dimensions. I have
attempted to show that this approach improves on previous understanding of this
form of cooperation, the `collegial phenomenon'. I did so by arguing that members
organize their work as niche-building entrepreneurs valuing a form of work-related
bounded solidarity, and as status competitors participating in regulatory activities.
Such characteristics help expose three generic social mechanisms that allow collegial
organizations to operate and to solve typical problems of collective action and
collective responsibility among rival partners, or interdependent entrepreneurs.
These mechanisms sometimes make use of particularistic ties for the bene®t of such
organizations' informal self-governance. They include a generalized exchange
system, a lateral control regime, and a process of renegotiation of precarious values
among multi-status oligarchs.
Beyond the issue of durable cooperation among peers, this approach is of interest
to more general sociological theory because it shows that such mechanisms can be
understood only when rational choice and strategic analysis are combined with
structural analysis. It also gives a new purpose to studies of `embeddedness' in
economic sociology. A multilevel structural analysis, one that recognizes that the
micro±macro link is above all a political and politicized issue, can thus be brought
back into theories of solidarity, control, and regulation in the organizational society.
T H E S C O P E O F T H E C O L L E G I A L F O R M
The collegial form and its characteristic social mechanisms remain idealtypical.
Generalization of mechanisms observed systematically in a law partnership remains
hypothetical. Here, I have assumed that all collegial organizations will have the
problems of production, exchange, control, and regulation described above.
Whether different types of collegial organizations will have different types of solu-
tion to these problems is still a matter for veri®cation.
Two variables suggest a path to follow for generalization. First, the nature of
complex specialized knowledge, identi®ed, for example, by the objectives of
peers' common activity, or by the measurability of the product, can vary widely.
Usually, the specialized knowledge of a task force of surgeons can be veri®ed more
quickly than that of a religious or even judiciary council. Therefore, forms of status
competition should vary with the type of knowledge-intensive activity. Secondly,
resources exchanged by peers during the production process, and with them the type
of niche that is built and the type of status for which members compete, can vary
too: for example, controlling access to clients may provide more status to lawyers
than to medical doctors when there is less shortage of clients for the latter. Exchange
and control mechanisms may also vary as a consequence. The nature of knowledge
and the types of resources involved must have an important effect on the solutions
found by these organizations to their common problems. In addition, the rela-
tionships between members of the oligarchy of ®rms can be much more volatile than
that observed at SG&R. In these domains, much remains to be done.
One example of direction for future research is the enforcement of contracts and
the protection of cooperative institutions through lateral control, and organizations'
ability to induce their members to honour their obligations. First, given that this
case study is unique, I am not in a position to generalize these exact results to other
organizations based on the ®ndings reported. Although the lateral control regime
described here was consistent with speci®c formal characteristics of adhocracies,
other similar organizations might not be able to help their members deal with the
second-order free-rider problem by mobilizing sanctioners with enough incentives
and/or legitimacy to reduce costs of control suf®ciently. It remains to be seen
whether or not this pattern has relevance for other types of collegial organizations.
In professional business partnershipsÐfor instance, in medicine, engineering,
accounting, and universitiesÐone could also ®nd a reluctance to pull rank and use
formal procedures, as well as similar incentives and similar `protectors of the
common good'. Other law ®rms with different partnership agreements have dif-
ferent and often harsher ways of sanctioning partners who do not comply with the
norms. But one can hypothesize that, as long as such organizations can be char-
acterized by formal equality and interdependence among professionals, such a lat-
eral control regime will always emerge to help with early monitoring and
sanctioning, thus performing a function essential to collective action.
Secondly, given that the lateral control described here takes into account key
dimensions of formal structure, it remains to be seen to what extent such a pattern
changes in more bureaucratized professional ®rms (Morrill 1995; Wallace 1995;
Wittek 1999) as well as in pyramidal environments (that is, among non-professionals),
especially in bureaucracies with reduced numbers of hierarchical levels, or in `inner
circles' (Useem 1986) examined at the level of groups of large ®rms. For instance,
because power relations in collegial ®rms are often both denied and limited by the
ideology of collegiality, more bureaucratized ®rms may not have to rely on lateral
controlasmuchasthe®rmexaminedhere. Insuch®rms, the lateralcontrolpatternmay
allocate the costs of monitoring and sanctioning in a different way (for instance, to
formal department heads, in which case it loses its `lateral' dimension). Further
research should determine under what conditions these ®ndings on lateral control are
relevant in other, especially larger and more bureaucratic organizations preoccupied
with altering tall structures, increasing the professionalization of the workforce, and
setting up autonomous, empowered, and knowledge-intensive work groups or teams
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(Hodson et al. 1993). This dimension of collective action may be important for
explaining success or failure of experiences in organizational democracy (Dahl 1985;
Hechter 1987; Rothschild and Whitt 1986; Sainsaulieu et al. 1983; Swidler 1979).
Since they stem from more general collective action problems, the generic
social mechanisms identi®ed by a broadly conceived structural approach make
sense even in knowledge-intensive organizations that do not bene®t from the sup-
port of organized professions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the fact that
this analysis was carried out on data collected in a relatively traditional corporate
law ®rm does not mean, in my view, that such social mechanisms are waning. They
may take different forms in local of®ces of global ®rms, but their existence is a
necessary consequence of cooperation in knowledge-intensive work. Development
of knowledge-intensive ®rms through multinational expansion does not invalidate
the study of social mechanisms at the local level. Local establishments that are
allowed to self-regulate must also witness such mechanisms, perhaps in different
ways that remain to be researched, and that are imposed by the speci®c bureaucratic
constraints of the global level. Rather, further work could use this structural
approach to explain variations in these mechanisms, as well as provide answers to
more practical questions, such as why professional services ®rms fall apart or what
happens when they merge.
Finally, the issue of collegiality as an idealtype is not limited to a speci®cally
collegial organizational form. In Waters's view, as in that of many others, `pure'
collegial organizations can develop only in the most limited conditions, where scale
and functional complexity are relatively low. But sociologists such as Sciulli (1986)
or Baylis (1989) argue that collegiality has come to represent a value capable of
creating restraints on instrumental action and the arbitrary exercise of collective
powers in society at largeÐthat is, in all deliberative bodies typically comprised of
heterogeneous actors and competing (that is, non-consensual) groups. Their rea-
soning opens up the collegial phenomenon not only to organizations other than
professional ones, but also to cooperation among all kinds of interdependent
entrepreneurs, such as individualistic craftsmen or subcontractors trying to coor-
dinate their work and set up structures of collective responsibility for their economic
survival. Collegiality serves both to deny an authority system and to limit its
strength. This helps maintain high levels of commitment and cohesiveness in any
potentially volatile organization where power has this quality of `now you see it, now
you don't'. Formal equality and collegiality come mainly from complexity of
tasks to be performed and from the willingness to share risks. The more people are
needed to crack a complex and non-standard problem in an economy of quality
(White, forthcoming), the more collegial the organization becomes. Research
focusing on the extent to which social mechanisms associated with collegial organ-
izations (such as partnerships) can be extended to collegial pockets within large
bureaucraciesÐespecially those shortening and weakening hierarchical channels to
do knowledge-intensive workÐseems particularly promising. In the situation of
decentralization of large organizations, and generalization of project forms of
management, power also has a collegial component, and it is much stronger than is
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usually acknowledged. As soon as experts cooperate, some collegial mechanisms,
sometimes based on particularistic ties, may be triggered.
This comparative perspective also raises the issue of the existence of the same
social mechanisms in organizations where incentives are designed differently. In
this book, the nature of the task to perform in common is considered a much
more powerful determinant of the shape of social mechanisms than the criterion
used to provide incentives to members. The complexity and knowledge-intensive
nature of the task is the most important factor distinguishing collegial organizations
from more bureaucratic ones. But are the mechanisms examined here limited to
situations of equality, much less frequent than organizations where various forms
of equity are the norm? There are reasons to doubt it. First, SG&R is not an egali-
tarian organization: an approximation of formal equality exists among partners
only, with all the feelings of relative deprivation that come attached nevertheless,
and that heavily in¯uence interactions. Equality is mainly procedural. Secondly,
equity criteria are not rigidly and directly coupled with speci®c types of interaction
among actors (Kellerhals et al. 1988), and therefore with the form taken by generic
social mechanisms. Distinguishing structures simply by equality or equity is too
situational an approach, not structural and organizational enough. A longitudinal
study of SG&R could have provided insights into this question. A rigorously con-
ducted comparison between social mechanisms in organizations using different
incentive schemes would be useful structural research on conceptions of justice and
collective action.
In addition, it remains to be seen to what extent such mechanisms can exist
only where risk of economic failure provides the energy to kick and sustain themÐ
which is not the case, for example, in many public-sector organizations. When
this threat is less obvious, interdependence may not be as strong, and the result
may be a notorious indifference to collective or mutual accountability, and hence
a switch towards more bureaucratized forms of collective action. This would entail
a reassessment of the extent to which they are signi®cantly in¯uenced by their
environment.
Parts of this approach thus require further thoughts and research into the collegial
form, its generic mechanisms, and its variable scope at any time in history. Col-
lecting evidence for such hypotheses in various types of organizations should prove
to be a productive area of research. In addition, this approach shows that the
collegial form raises social problems that challenge both the sociology of organ-
izations and the sociology of the professions.
H OL D IN G ONE 'S O W N I N TH E C OM P A NY O F P E ER S
This form of organization offers its members many ways to carve a place for
themselves in the group. They compete for a great variety of forms of status, which is
socially integrativeÐas long as they are focused on work. However, in spite of what
more idealistic approaches to cooperation would assert (Desroche 1976; Meister
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1972), it is at the same time a socially very constraining environment (Barker 1993).
The social discipline and forms of collective responsibility underlying collective
action among peers are important components of knowledge-intensive work and of
¯at organizations. But they are also very demanding. Particularistic ties matter for
governance of organizations in a systematic way when a balance between niche
seeking and status competition is maintained so as to help generic social mechan-
isms. Such a balance is dif®cult to achieve. Knowledge-intensive collective actors
are not suited to kinder gentler coordination. They are generally organizations in
which rival partners or interdependent entrepreneurs need to become even more
strategic (in areas of their lives that were left outside the standard work relationships
in more typical bureaucracies), and then ®nd niches where strategic and opportu-
nistic behaviour can be suspended.
The issues of multidimensionality of status and status competition, in particular,
change the relationship between the individual and the group in collegial settings,
when compared to more monocratic and bureaucratic ones. Status is not only based
on seniority and money; it has a particularly strong dimension of prestige, of
symbolic recognition of a member's contribution, and of ongoing critical judge-
ments about members' quality. To de®ne their place in the group, members need to
invest in a form of status, cultivate status competition and learn how to mitigate it,
and defend a conception of `professionalism'. Whether or not they try to become a
primus inter pares in some way (economic, managerial, professional), they always
need to get involved in the complex task-oriented exchange system of the ®rm. This
is a much more stressful form of organizational assimilation than in many
bureaucratic organizations, one that requires adjustments to highly complex and
personalized mechanisms for solidarity and control.
Partnerships or their functional equivalent bring together partners with great
incentives to run their business well and invest in the group. It is less easy for such
members to stay away from the risks of participation. Withdrawal from the group is
less likely than in bureaucratic organizations, even if collegial and participationist
utopias have their limits. The existence of social niches means that one must learn to
personalize (embed) and depersonalize (disembed) work relationships and business
transactions. This may amount to increased exploitation, as in the case of associates,
if they can be dropped before reaping the return on suchÐoften ambiguous and
demandingÐrelational investments. It becomes increasingly dif®cult to externalize
social costs in such organizations. Often, there are not many persons outside the
organization (such as family or friends) ready to incur such costs when they reach a
certain level. More research is thus needed on how actors can hold their own in such
a context of intense personalization and depersonalization of work relationships for
exchange, control, and regulation.
A broadly conceived structural approach assumes that members have to
become political players in order to hold their own and defend their interests in
such collegial organizations. Since professional practitioners in knowledge-
intensive organizations are often formally equal, they have to allow each other to
speak on behalf of the collective and recognize each other's regulatory interests. This
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implies that informal authority of members with status is based not only on control
of all sorts of resources (important clients, workforce, day-to-day operations,
technical competence, experience), but also on their capacity to manipulate rela-
tionships to create consensus, on their ®rm-speci®c strategic culture. By this I mean
a political know-how allowing them to be players in a power game de-emphasizing
unilateral impositions of strength and encouraging learning and mutual prescrip-
tion in negotiations. This requires a capacity to share with others a certain code of
collegial relations and an ideology of collegiality (Frischkopf 1973)Ðthat is, a cer-
tain conception of professionalism. For example, the mix of an adversarial and
pushy professional culture, on the one hand, and of personalized and unobtrusive
lateral control, on the other hand, are not always easy to combine for partners in
a corporate law ®rm. This also requires rhetorical manipulation of an ideology
of collegiality in debates about professionalism, especially when members with
market power try to pressure others for consensus around their own conception of
professionalism.
Forwarding one's own interests while at the same time contributing to the pro-
tection of common resources, and to the maintenance of long-term institutional
arrangements, is a dif®cult task. Seen from the outside of collegial organizations,
strategies for handling potentially negative effects of status competitionÐsuch as
preventing task forces from being too stable, relying on mitigating friendship ties,
plotting peer-driven `police' intervention on behalf of collective interestsÐmay
seem unrealistic or paradoxical. From within, they must be learned and shrewdly
used. Similarly, understanding interdependencies is the key to establishing a partial
order at the structural level through manipulations of relationships and subsequent
social mechanisms. For example, niche members' `bounded solidarity' picks up
their structural equivalence and makes it indispensable for ®rm-level solidarity.
Although niche-building/seeking members are entitled to participate in regulatory
activity, to speak up in partnership meetings, and to claim their share of status, they
also have to subscribe to priorities among many common goals, learn how to
exchange in highly multiplex and personalized situations, and do all this in ways
considered acceptable and legitimate by their peers. In other words, cooperating
peers have to be willing and able to play politicsÐthe complexity of which is only
sketched in this book.
In sum, a combined neo-Weberian and structural approach clearly raises
and disentangles key questions with regard to collective action among peers in
modern societies. But one of the main questions raised by this approach is that of
the willingness of individuals to invest so much in their professional lives. This
points to the problem of a new relationship to work in a knowledge-intensive,
organizational society characterized by `¯exible' labour markets and multilateral
relationships between all sorts of `stakeholders'. I argue that failure to take into
account the social mechanisms that help rival peers design structural solutions to
problems of collective action would mean failure of economic sociology to under-
stand how an increasing number of individuals defend their interests in this
organizational society.
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T H E ET H IC A L P R OB L EM OF CO NF L I CT S O F I NT ER E ST S
Finally, the issue of polycracy and collegiality has serious regulatory implications
too, ones that should also be of closer interest to the sociology of the professions and
economic sociology. In other words, the social discipline and mechanisms at work
here raise questions about the capacity of professions to respect their ethical com-
mitments and to regulate themselves in the business world. In Waters's view, this
organizational form helped professions in maintaining their closure and forms of
monopoly. Because professions practise and struggle for jurisdiction and rights in a
society that is much more organizational than usually acknowledged by the
sociology of the professions (Abbott 1988; Perrow 1991), collegial self-governance
and collective responsibility often con¯ict with professional rules of ethics on behalf
of the profession's economic privileges. Ethical commitments are a key area on
which a broadly conceived structural approach to collegial organizations, particu-
larly professional services ®rms, can shed some light.1 A speci®c example is the
treatment of con¯icts of interests.
In corporate law ®rms, and in professional and knowledge-intensive organiza-
tions in general, this issue re¯ects the limits of professional self-regulation in the
business world. The problem of con¯icts of interest is a classic ethical preoccupa-
tion for all the professions, especially for lawyers, whose adversarial business often
involves choices between suing or not suing client A (one of their own clients), or
one of client A's subsidiaries, on behalf of client B. In this situation, the lawyer
risks being disloyal to one of the parties, and to favour the interests of the more
lucrative one.
The profession has traditionally tried to deal with this problem by formulating
codes of ethics that are meant to protect con®dentiality and secrecy in the rela-
tionship between the professional and the client. However, pressure to disregard or
change these codes comes from the growth of ®rms employing professionals and
semi-professionals (law ®rms, hospitals, advertising agencies, ®nancial institutions);
from the fact that ®rms imposing collective responsibility and liability expand and
take on an increasingly broad range of businesses; from the fact that clients spread
their business around; from the changing characteristics of modern career paths and
the mobility and ¯exibility of members; from the fact that many ®rms are multi-city;
from the complexity of many ®nancial transactions; and from the likelihood of
cross-ownership, the acceptance of partial payment with stock, and cross-selling
(Dezalay 1992). All this contributes to the intensi®cation of this problem and
increases the ethical dif®culty of multiple representation.2 As most of the lawyers I
interviewed admitted, con¯icts of interest were everywhere, large law ®rms ran into
themselves all the time; butÐto my knowledgeÐreliable ®gures are not available on
this issue.
What kind of insight does a structural approach provide on such ethical issues? It
is important to remember that con¯icts are imputed throughout the ®rm (the legal
entity being the ®rm, and, if a lawyer who is a partner in the ®rm is disquali®ed by
the court for a con¯ict, the whole ®rm is disquali®ed). Large law ®rms deal with
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con¯icts of interests arising with former and with current clients by using one of
three organizational solutions. First, they can screen clients when opening a ®le,
using computerized `adversity checks'. Practically, before opening a ®le, a lawyer can
check for con¯icts by looking at whether other parties to the new matter are former
clients. Secondly, they can raise formal `Chinese walls' between members of the ®rm
representing the con¯icting clients. Thirdly, deliberation in ethics committees can
lead to the self-disquali®cation of the ®rmÐthat is, to the giving-up of repre-
sentation of one of the two parties to another ®rm. This may entail heavy sunk costs,
especially when the con¯icts are hard to uncover (Hazard 1987).
Given what we know about the ways in which work is taken in and allocated in
such ®rms (see Chapters 2 and 6), it is unlikely that the ®rst solution functions as a
credible organizational device. Examination of the control of work¯ow showed that
intake procedures were not respected by many rainmakers. Lawyers in general do
not like to turn work away. Since responsibility is collective throughout the ®rm, a
conscientious lawyer would have to conduct these checks for all former clients of
every lawyer in the ®rm. One would have to do this usually before opening a ®leÐ
that is, before the full scope of the new matter is known, often without really
knowing the precise information to look for. When a ®rm has dozens (if not
hundreds or thousands) of lawyers in three, ®ve, ten of®ces, this becomes next to
impossible. That more or less forces the ®rms to overlook many con¯icts that they
conveniently call `theoretical'.
Another solution is to disclose the potential matter con¯ict, because clients are
often willing to waive con¯ict issues in many areas of practice, or when there is a
risk that the ®rm representing the other side has special and sensitive inside
knowledge about these clients' company. One incentive for the client to waive the
con¯ict is the knowledge that the ®rm guarantees to set up a Chinese wall (a `safe-
harbor' exclusion from the abstinence requirement for multi-service ®rms) between
the lawyers who represent the potentially con¯icting sides. For instance, when a
lawyer leaves a ®rm for another ®rm, the ®rm's con¯icts do not travel with him or
her if he or she is screened from participation in the particular matter giving rise to
the con¯ict within his or her new ®rm. Given what we know about social niches and
the ways in which bounded solidarity is established in collegial organizations, it
becomes dif®cult to believe in members' respect for these Chinese walls: for
example, heavy reliance on others' advice, intellectual challenges, unbounded status
auctions and reliance on partners outside the case for mitigation of status compe-
tition, use of cases for the training of associates. Porosity of internal boundaries is
also an issue: for example, at SG&R, the ties that would cut across Chinese
walls between specialities were the friendship ties, which are the least visible ones
and the least subject to any form of control.
Finally, a third solution is to self-disqualify. But this means that one of two
partners has to give up his or her client. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some of
the biggest ®ghts that people told me about in these ®rms were precisely about
lawyers who had to give up a client to another lawyer, or just let the client go
after it appeared that there might be a visible con¯ict that could not be handled.
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Professional services ®rms such as corporate law ®rms are often furnished with thick
carpets in luxurious buildings, creating a deceptively quiet atmosphere, an
impression of `being in control', where people try to avoid such open ®ghts.
Especially when compensation systems weigh merit, client responsibility, and pro-
ductivity more heavily than other factors, status competition among partners within
the same ®rm incites them to use the organization for their personal bene®t more
than for the interests of the collective, including its ethical reputation. Therefore
there is an incentive to avoid discussing a potential con¯ict and disclosing it to the
client, or to disclose it in such a way that it does not seem threatening.3
All these organizational features of collegial organizations strongly question, in
my opinion, the ef®ciency of the `solutions' offered by large ®rms to the problem of
con¯icts of interests. Being more ethical thus necessarily sets a limit to the growth of
the ®rms. This is why, for example, large law ®rms have long tried to rede®ne and
loosen the rules of ethics in such a way that appearance of con¯ict in the eye of the
most cynical observer will not be enough to disqualify a lawyer. Medium-sized and
large ®rms seem to accept a form of business competition that escapes the control of
the profession, until they are able to rede®ne the ethical rules of the profession itself
(Nelson 1988; Nelson et al. 1992).
Using con¯icts of interests as an analyser, it becomes obvious that collegial
organizations and their social discipline often contradict traditional ethical rules of
the profession, ones that were thoughtÐparadoxicallyÐto ®nd in collegiality a
guarantee of professionalism. Such an issue belongs to the more general re¯ection
on social control of organizational life (Reiss 1984, 1988), on the balance between
external and self-regulation of all sorts of knowledge-intensive and professional
services ®rms. When it reaches the level of a fully-¯edged organizational form,
collegial self-regulation, in many ways, con¯icts with professional self-regulation.
Such issues are raised by the study of the collegial form and deserve further research
in economic sociology and the sociology of the professions, which have to adapt
their approaches to the fact that professions practise and struggle for jurisdiction
and rights in an organizational society.
In spite of the dif®culties raised by durable cooperation among rival peers,
knowledge of such mechanisms can help members of collegial settings, whether
recognized professionals or not. Many social mechanisms are not beyond the
control of interdependent entrepreneurs involved in unstandardized decision-
making or production. This knowledge can help manage and lower the costs of
many moments of workplace democracy that they can achieve. There should also be
much to learn from extending this broadly conceived structural approach to any
formally democratic system, action, and regulatory change. In my view, this kind of
knowledge would generally contribute to more democracy and accountability in the
organizational society.
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Appendix A. Fieldwork and Questionnaire
This structural study is exploratory and inductive, although systematic; it is both qualitative
and quantitative. It combines a qualitative approach such as that of Glaser and Strauss (1968)
and Crozier (1963), and a more formalized approach using network analysis. Data collection
was based on qualitative interviews with several open-ended questions, on sociometric
questionnaires ®lled out in my presence, and on systematic documents provided by the
administration of the ®rm (such as performance data for the year before and after ®eldwork,
or the partnership agreement). However, in spite of this relative openness compared to other
law ®rms, access was limited. I did not see ®rm's ®les or attend a partnership meeting.
The data were collected between October 1989 and June 1991. Research was carried out in
two stages. During the ®rst stage, I interviewed forty lawyers with managerial responsibilities
(managing partners, members of committees, heads of departments), administrators and
business of®cers in six of the largest law ®rms (between 60 and 250 lawyers) in a north-eastern
US state. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, at Yale Law School, helped by supporting the project and
making the ®rst phone call. A senior partner of one of the six ®rms, Spencer, Grace & Robbins,
agreed to be interviewed, and then to introduce me to other partners in his ®rm. The
managing partner of SG&R then introduced me to managing partners in other ®rms. The ®rst
stage of the project snowballed its way through. These interviews were about the formal
structure of the ®rms and their respective organizational policies. This exploratory ®eldwork
provided a clear picture of how they dealt with the changes in the US market for legal services
and in the US legal profession in the early 1990s. It also focused on their attempts to ®nd new
organizational forms better suited to this environment, mainly in order to control the
partner±associate spirale and increase their ¯exibility for the development of new practice
areas. In addition, I conducted interviews in New York ®rms for comparative purposes.
The research proposal sent out to these ®rms for the ®rst stage stressed that the study was
concerned with the management of law ®rms, that it focused on issues such as the structure of
the ®rm, its policies concerning specialization, compensation, recruitment and admission to
partnership, growth, division of labour, personal working styles, and relationships between
colleagues (for instance, exchanges of expertise). It offered insights into the organization of
the ®rm that could assist evaluation of future strategy. It presented the study as relying on
in-depth interviews that would cover the areas mentioned above. It also mentioned further
developments of this project, which could include collecting quantitative data and statistical
analysis. Con®dentiality was guaranteed by the fact that I was concerned with organizational
and managerial issues, not with speci®c cases and substantive areas of law. It was agreed that
participation in this project would not threaten any privileged relation with clients. Individual
interviews with members of the ®rm would not be made available to other persons in the ®rm.
The name of the ®rm, the names of its clients (if they happened to be mentioned), would be
kept strictly con®dential.
The second stage of ®eldwork, the network study at SG&R, took place in January and
February 1991, with tests conducted on name generators and the vignette a few months
earlier. This was negotiated with the ®rm as a study of its level of collegiality. The ®rm
provided an of®ce and authorized me to contact all its attorneys to seek an appointment. The
managing partner sent a memo to all the members of the ®rm, supporting the project. To take
me in meant a strong political commitment from him. All agreed to be interviewed. It was also
agreed upon that an interview would not last more than forty-®ve minutes. Many partners,
however, opened their door for longer discussions. In addition to Geoffrey Hazard's support,
advice from Kenneth Mann and Stanley Wheeler at Yale Law School, from Miguel Centeno
and Albert Reiss at Yale Sociology, from Ursula Cassani at Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and
from Bill Felstiner at the American Bar Foundation in Chicago, was also very helpful in
handling this negotiation so as not to be considered a threat or a waste of time. Interviews
with former partners and associates were also helpful in the interpretation of results.
A report on the informal mechanisms of ®rm integration was sent to the ®rm in April 1991.
Later discussions with the managing partner showed that the ®rm was interested, at the time,
in the fact that, in the ®rm as a whole, horizontal, vertical, and spatial differentiation impeded
integration, while both strong and weak ties integrated the ®rm across formal boundaries
created by this differentiation. Integration was secured differently, by different types of
relationships, all compoundedÐat the timeÐunder the name of `collegial relationships', in
different corners of the structure. Years later, as a former managing partner, he was interested
enough in the idea of this book to discuss the ®ndings and to provide more information that
the ®rm was not prepared to share at the time of ®eldwork, such as a copy of the partnership
agreement and ®rm accounts measuring individual members' economic performance for the
years of ®eldwork. He read the drafts of the papers written based on this study and provided
helpful criticism and suggestions, as well as con®rmation of the validity of the results.
The questionnaire used for systematic data collection included sociometric name gen-
erators used to reconstitute co-workers, whole-picture, advice, friendship, and in¯uence
networks. All interviewees were presented with a list of all the members (attorneys) of their
®rm. Interviewees were asked to annotate the lists of names based on the following questions.
Co-workers' network : `Because most ®rms like yours are also organized very informally, it is
dif®cult to get a clear idea of how the members really work together. Think back over the
past year, consider all the lawyers in your ®rm. Would you go through this list and check
the names of those whom you have worked with. (By `` worked with'' I mean that you have
spent time together on at least one case, that you have been assigned to the same case, that
they read or used your work product or that you have read or used their work product; this
includes professional work done within the ®rm like Bar association work, administration,
etc.)'
Whole-picture network : `Now look at your list of all the members that you just checked as a
strong co-worker. When you work on a case, you have or make up your own picture of the
case, think about how to handle it, and about what is going on in it. My question is the
following: when you work on a case with each of these persons, do you usually feel that you
share the whole picture of the case with him or her? If yes, why? If not, why not? (For each
justi®cation, make sure that the answer contains an indication about why sharing or not
sharing is legitimate.)'
Basic advice network : `Think back over the past year, consider all the lawyers in your ®rm.
To whom did you go for basic professional advice? For instance, you want to make sure that
you are handling a case right, making a proper decision, and you want to consult someone
whose professional opinions are in general of great value to you. By advice I do not mean
simply technical advice.'
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Friendship network : `Would you go through this list, and check the names of those you
socialize with outside work. You know their family, they know yours, for instance. I do not
mean all the people you are simply on a friendly level with, or people you happen to meet at
®rm functions.'
[For partners only] In¯uence (or `listening') network : `Would you go through this list of your
partners, and check the names of those you consider as in¯uential for important decisions
made in the ®rm, on matters of ®rm policy; this could include partners you pay special
attention to when they speak up at partnership meetings, for instance.'
[For partners only] Lateral control scenario : `Here is the list of all the partners in the ®rm. I
would like you to imagine that you are the managing partner. You notice that X is having
personal problems. It could be anything, from alcohol to depression, or divorce. But it has
repercussions on his or her performance. As a managing partner, it is your job to do
something about it. You are looking for colleagues of his or hers among the other partners
of the ®rm to intercede on a discreet and con®dential basis, to go and talk to him or her, see
what's going on, what the ®rm can do to help, and give unsolicited advice. You don't want
to do this yourself because you want to keep it informal, and your position would be in the
way. My question is: who are the persons among all the other partners whom you would ask
to approach X, and why would you delegate this task to them? What if this person were Y,
or Z, etc.?'
The questionnaire ended with a question on management policies : `What is your position with
regard to each of the four policy issues being discussed today in your ®rm: work¯ow,
marketing, compensation, peer review? Should the ®rm change its policies?'
In-depth interviews on the ®rm, its history, and the meaning of collegiality were conducted
with partners particularly interested in the project and quoted more often than others in
the text.
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Appendix B. Density Tables for Figure 3.1 across the
Co-Workers', Advice, and Friendship Networks of all
the Lawyers in the Firm
All density tables below were constructed with Structure 4.1 software (Burt 1991). For more
details about this type of analysis, see Burt (1982, 1991). Such tables are themselves matrices,
and could be analysed as such. The tradition, however, is to call them tables, because they are
the ®nal product of a procedure designed, in part, to represent a complex network (or several
stacked networks) in a simpli®ed way.
Table B1. Density table for the co-workers' network in Figure 3.1
Position Position
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Residual
One 0.317 0.249 0.107 0.123 0.405 0.128 0.112 0.148 0.325 0.102
Two 0.259 0.517 0.175 0.277 0.125 0.382 0.020 0.353 0.086 0.306
Three 0.174 0.257 0.522 0.150 0.131 0.311 0.458 0.165 0.100 0.340
Four 0.246 0.389 0.178 0.293 0.113 0.146 0.140 0.161 0.129 0.213
Five 0.448 0.194 0.108 0.087 0.349 0.128 0.110 0.159 0.299 0.083
Six 0.161 0.447 0.253 0.194 0.110 0.704 0.075 0.305 0.100 0.315
Seven 0.226 0.164 0.489 0.095 0.275 0.184 0.741 0.085 0.215 0.241
Eight 0.169 0.558 0.126 0.072 0.151 0.281 0.041 0.120 0.082 0.323
Nine 0.423 0.156 0.123 0.070 0.457 0.104 0.154 0.146 0.275 0.098
Residual 0.210 0.405 0.349 0.108 0.113 0.216 0.142 0.263 0.132 0.223
Table B2. Density table for the advice network in Figure 3.1
Position Position
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Residual
One 0.551 0.529 0.318 0.068 0.350 0.215 0.070 0.146 0.048 0.266
Two 0.433 0.623 0.359 0.136 0.215 0.339 0.061 0.176 0.040 0.348
Three 0.314 0.410 0.554 0.070 0.152 0.296 0.197 0.140 0.027 0.335
Four 0.406 0.560 0.480 0.281 0.164 0.256 0.162 0.109 0.033 0.273
Five 0.589 0.323 0.228 0.059 0.601 0.210 0.059 0.182 0.142 0.234
Six 0.245 0.501 0.371 0.123 0.193 0.654 0.106 0.290 0.030 0.404
Seven 0.318 0.187 0.505 0.021 0.378 0.212 0.563 0.073 0.106 0.254
Eight 0.344 0.502 0.309 0.186 0.268 0.481 0.063 0.198 0.076 0.305
Nine 0.453 0.210 0.162 0.031 0.531 0.096 0.159 0.255 0.438 0.135
Residual 0.357 0.491 0.448 0.132 0.241 0.474 0.164 0.237 0.037 0.269
Table B1 shows the density table for the co-workers' network, where cell i, j is the average
relation from someone occupying Position I to someone in Position J. The average relation
between any two people in the network was 0.237. Representation of this table uses this value
as a cut-off point.
Table B2 shows the density table for the advice network, where cell i, j is the average relation
from someone occupying position I to someone in position J. The average relation between
any two people in the network was 0.300. Representation of this table uses this value as a cut-
off point.
Table B3 shows the density table for the friendship network, where cell i, j is the average
relation from someone occupying Position I to someone in Position J. The average relation
between any two people in the network was 0.289. Representation of this table uses this value
as a cut-off point.
Table B3. Density table for the friendship network in Figure 3.1
Position Position
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Residual
One 0.610 0.551 0.243 0.015 0.516 0.156 0.104 0.225 0.069 0.202
Two 0.589 0.629 0.296 0.088 0.419 0.199 0.128 0.185 0.066 0.234
Three 0.277 0.312 0.456 0.020 0.189 0.229 0.426 0.125 0.090 0.193
Four 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Five 0.449 0.261 0.112 0.005 0.629 0.294 0.226 0.444 0.268 0.203
Six 0.284 0.302 0.170 0.005 0.573 0.540 0.241 0.604 0.330 0.356
Seven 0.245 0.200 0.527 0.006 0.377 0.290 0.571 0.232 0.238 0.246
Eight 0.253 0.152 0.126 0.005 0.620 0.546 0.340 0.613 0.543 0.245
Nine 0.250 0.109 0.110 0.003 0.503 0.326 0.256 0.461 0.556 0.163
Residual 0.367 0.351 0.284 0.005 0.359 0.371 0.365 0.353 0.220 0.159
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Appendix C. De®nition of Variables Presented
in Table 3.3
The similarity variables used in Table 3.3 are (in increasing re®nement): similarity in status,
taking value 1 if both actors in the dyad were partners or if they were both associates; partner
similarity, 1 if they were both partners; seniority 1 similarity, 1 if they were both partners with
seniority 1; seniority 2 similarity, 1 if they were both partners with seniority 2; associate
similarity, 1 if they were both associates with the same level of seniority. The ®rst constructed
and most general asymmetric variable is superiority, which takes value 1 if the relation is
directed from i to j and i has a lower level of seniority than j; it takes valueÿ1 if the relation is
directed from j to i and i has a lower level of seniority than j. A similar de®nition is given to
partner superiority, where i and j both have to be partners, for associate superiority where i
and j both have to be associates, and for `partner±associate superiority', where i is associate
and j is partner. It is important to realize that not all of these covariates can be used at the same
time, because of dependency between them. For instance, when only status is used to dis-
tinguish formal positions of partners, then status similarity or partner similarity and super-
iority or `partner±associate superiority' can be used for modelling the density parameter.
A forward selection procedure was used to reach the best model presented in Table 3.3. It
carefully inspects all possible effects taken individually. After selecting the most signi®cant
explanatory variables for the four parameters, the model is estimated again with these vari-
ables. Variables that are no longer signi®cant in the joint model are removed. For all models,
the variance components and the `general' density parameter  and reciprocity parameter 
are part of the model. In these networks, few sender or receiver or extra-reciprocity effects are
signi®cant; the variance parameters for sender effects and receiver effects, as well as the
`constant' term for extra reciprocity, do not change much in the empty and ®nal models. For
example, for the advice network, adding explanatory variables for the density parameter has
reduced the `constant' term for density, , thus accounting for a good part of the differences
among attorneys in this network. The covariance between sender and receiver parameters
shows a certain amount of negative correlation: the tendency to select advisers is negatively
related to the tendency for being sought out as an adviser. For a detailed description of the
model selection procedure, see Lazega and Van Duijn (1997).
Appendix D. Professional Authority and the
Distribution of the Authority to Know
This is a detailed presentation of Figure 4.1. Table D1 constructed with Structure 4.1 (Burt
1991) shows the density table for the advice network, where cell i, j is the average relation from
someone occupying Position I to someone in Position J. The average relation between any two
people in the network was 0.302. Representation of this table uses this value as a cut-off point.
The positions de®ned based on the analysis of this single network are not the same as the
positions de®ned based on the three networks stacked together in Figure 3.1 and Appendix B.
Examining the paths followed by actors speci®cally to get access to a single resource, such as
advice, helps identify additional, usually more subtle aspects of the structure of the ®rm. All
Of®ce I and Of®ce III senior partners, including the managing partner and two more junior
partners, of all specialities, occupied Position One (Partners 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17,
20, 29, and 34). They exchanged advice among themselves and sought advice from partners
from Positions Two, Three, and Six, mixing all specialities and of®ces, as well as from Of®ce I
associates of Positions Five and Eleven. Note that they did not directly seek out Of®ce II
litigation partners, or Of®ce II litigation associates with little experience or seniority. How-
ever, their advice was sought out by the members of the positions they sought out (Two,
Three, Five, Six, and Eleven), and also by members of Positions Four (Of®ce II litigation
partners) and Ten (atypical associates from all of®ces). This con®rms an asymmetry between
Of®ce I and Of®ce II partners within the same speciality. This asymmetry was probably caused
by a status competition between the main litigators of these of®ces, by the critical massÐin
terms of the number of litigatorsÐreached by Of®ce I, but also perhaps by what Of®ce II
attorneys felt to be a certain `arrogance' of its members. This is suggested by their prominence
scores (Burt 1991). More than half of the most prominent partners in the ®rm (in the advice
Table D1. Density table for the advice network in Figure 4.1
Position Position
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Ten Eleven Residual
One 0.597 0.327 0.469 0.265 0.346 0.511 0.092 0.000 0.046 0.092 0.319 0.267
Two 0.447 0.436 0.571 0.466 0.238 0.317 0.067 0.000 0.134 0.162 0.272 0.285
Three 0.408 0.489 0.693 0.610 0.243 0.316 0.054 0.000 0.143 0.123 0.215 0.357
Four 0.415 0.320 0.628 0.658 0.252 0.479 0.098 0.000 0.167 0.067 0.169 0.431
Five 0.454 0.173 0.228 0.331 0.340 0.725 0.289 0.000 0.045 0.036 0.279 0.305
Six 0.493 0.210 0.256 0.301 0.545 0.711 0.185 0.000 0.065 0.040 0.270 0.283
Seven 0.298 0.163 0.169 0.259 0.465 0.649 0.425 0.000 0.119 0.029 0.204 0.312
Eight 0.201 0.104 0.158 0.152 0.409 0.478 0.633 0.674 0.087 0.165 0.262 0.213
Nine 0.165 0.247 0.452 0.778 0.313 0.340 0.272 0.000 0.674 0.040 0.051 0.348
Ten 0.520 0.420 0.484 0.361 0.294 0.408 0.080 0.000 0.100 0.089 0.292 0.330
Eleven 0.522 0.384 0.383 0.216 0.438 0.453 0.108 0.000 0.044 0.094 0.433 0.248
Residual 0.412 0.293 0.478 0.488 0.279 0.402 0.067 0.000 0.088 0.100 0.138 0.289
network) belonged to this position. Therefore I call it the `hard core' of the ®rm. Its members
were more often sought out and listened to than others.
Position Two clusters `atypical' (non-lucrative speciality and lateral recruitment, for
example) mainly corporate partners and associates from both of®ces (3, 7, 19, 25, 45, 46, 50,
and 60). This does not mean that their advice was not sought out. On the contrary, they
exchanged advice among themselves and sought out partners from Positions One, Three,
Four, and Six, mixing specialities and of®ces. They did not seek out any associate in the ®rm,
thus playing more status games than members of Position One. Their advice was sought out
by partners from Positions One, Three, and Four, but not Six, as well as by atypical associates
from both the largest of®ces (Positions Ten and Eleven). It is interesting to remember that
lateral associates had to rely almost exclusively on their competence to become partner, and
that they might consequently have a more instrumental attitude in exchanges of advice. They
had less time than other associates to make themselves known by partners, and could take
advantage of these exchanges to meet them more systematically. They were also members of
both of®ces, and constituted an unexpected bridge between them. They almost never sought
out associates from other positions, but were sought out by the latter (especially from
Positions Ten and Eleven). Atypical partners and associates thus tended to exchange ideas
more often with one another than with more typical colleagues. This particular circuit in the
advice ¯ows may explain why Position Two cut systematically across speciality and of®ce
boundaries. I call it the position of `atypical' attorneys.
Position Three clustered exclusively Of®ce II corporate partners (14, 28, 32, and 35), who
exchanged advice among themselves and sought out partners from all the other positions
(One, Two, Four, and Six), but almost never associates. This is perhaps due to the fact that
there were few corporate associates in Of®ce II, and that direct access to Of®ce I corporate
associates was a delicate matter, unless through Of®ce I partners, which introduced a strong
dependence. Their advice was sought out by partners from Positions One, Two, and Four (but
not Position Six), as well as by associates from Positions Nine, Ten, and ElevenÐthat is,
atypical associates from all of®ces and Of®ce II litigation associates. Note that Of®ce I cor-
porate associates did not seek out these Of®ce II partners of the same speciality. I call this
position the position of the Of®ce II corporate partners.
The fourth position was composed exclusively of Of®ce II litigation partners (5, 18, 30, and
31), who exchanged advice among themselves and sought out partners from all the other
positions (Position One, Two, Three, and Six) but again very rarely from associates. Their
advice was sought out in return by the members of Positions Two, Three, and Six, but not
One, the Of®ce I `hard-core' litigators. One ®nds here again the status and prestige compe-
tition, the critical mass and independence of Of®ce I, the perception of arrogance described
above. Of®ce II litigation associates (Position Nine) sought them out as well as the Of®ce I
litigation associates of Position Five (who played a broker role between litigation partners and
associates in the whole ®rm) and Position Ten. Associates from Positions Seven, Eight, and
Eleven did not have direct access to these Position Four partners, from whom they were
separated by status and of®ce boundaries. I call this position that of Of®ce II litigation
partners.
The ®fth position was exclusively composed of women litigators in Of®ce I (27, 38, 39, and
43): the most senior woman partner in the ®rm and the three most senior women associates in
the ®rm. They exchanged advice among themselves and sought advice from partners in
Positions One, Four, and Six, mainly the most prominent partners in the advice network,
Of®ce I and Of®ce II litigation partners. They were very close to the most prominent position
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in the network and focused exclusively on advice relationships with other litigators; they did
not seek out other associates, corporate partners, or the atypical partners described above.
They did, however, exchange ideas with Of®ce II litigation partners (Position Four), which
may have been a sign of independence or distance from Position One partners. Their advice
was, however, sought out by members of six positions (One, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, and
Eleven). They centralized many requests and even Of®ce I partners (corporate as well as
litigation partners) asked for their advice, as did all the litigation associates in the ®rm. Notice
that even Of®ce II litigation associates (Position Nine) sought them out for advice, which
could have allowed them not to bypass their own Of®ce II litigation partners and take less risk
with their reputation there (they did not have to go for advice to their own direct and local
`bosses'). This position was also clearly a bridge between prominent Position One partners
and ®rm litigation associates who did not have access to them directly (for instance, Positions
Seven and Eight). Finally, members of this Position Five had very few advice relationships
with the atypical lawyers in the ®rm and with the corporate side of the ®rm. They were a pure
product of Of®ce I, its training and promotion system. I call this position that of the women
litigation coordinators.
Position Six was made up of the partners most active in ®rm administrative committees
(managing partners and deputy managing partners excepted), that of the minders, as well as
two of the most senior male associates in the ®rm (13, 21, 24, 26, 40, and 41). All were
litigators from Of®ce I. They exchanged advice among themselves and sought out Position
One partners and Position Five associates, thus con®ning themselves within their own of®ce.
All were among the most prominent lawyers in the ®rm, and their position was the most
central in the whole pattern. Their advice was sought out by the members of all the other
positions. They were the most `universal' and reachable advisers in the ®rm: they were sought
out by lawyers regardless of status, of®ce, or speciality. Note that, although it was very much
populated by Of®ce I persons, this position was different from Position One precisely because
of its high reachability and homogeneity (it was exclusively composed of litigators). I call this
position that of the universal advisers.
Position Seven was exclusively made up of Of®ce I medium-seniority (three or four years
with the ®rm) male litigation associates whom other associates called `the boys' (49, 52, 54, 55,
56, 57, 62, 65, and 68). They exchanged advice among themselves and sought out Position
Five associates and Position Six partners, all litigators. Note that they did not have direct
access to Position One partners, despite being also pure products of Of®ce I. Thus, in terms of
exchange of ideas and advice, they were relatively isolated from the rest of the ®rm. They were
themselves sought out only by more junior associates (Position Eight). I call this position that
of `the boys'.
The most junior associates in the ®rm (66, 67, 69, and 71), recruited six months before the
interviews, all Of®ce I litigators, also had a Position of their own, Position Eight. They
exchanged advice among themselves and sought out Position Five, Six, and Seven members,
mostly more senior associates and the `universal' advisers (who were partly in charge of
associates). They did not dare to bother other partners and stuck to senior associates of their
own of®ce and speciality. Nobody sought them out in the advice network. This relative
isolation was a classic charateristic of ®rst-year associates in law ®rms. I call them the
`beginners'.
A ninth position was composed excusively of Of®ce II litigation medium-seniority (three or
four years with the ®rm) associates (51, 58, and 59). They exchanged advice among themselves
and sought out litigation and corporate partners in Of®ce II (Positions Three and Four), as
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well as the coordinators and universal advisers in Of®ce I (Positions Five and Six). It is
obvious that associates in Of®ce II had more direct access to partners in their of®ce than their
peers in Of®ce I did. This may have been due to the smaller size of Of®ce II and to its speci®c
relational climate. Like the majority of Of®ce I associates, though, they could not have direct
access to partners of the other of®ce, and had to use intermediaries. Seeking them out directly
would have been perceived as deliberate bypassing of (and lack of trust in) partners in their
own of®ce. Nobody sought out their advice. I call this position that of Of®ce II litigation
associates.
Position Ten was composed of relatively marginal associates in the ®rm (44, 47, 61, and
70)Ðthat is, the corporate laterals or members of the small Of®ce III (at the time of the
®eldwork). They did not exchange advice among themselves and sought out directly partners
from Positions One, Two, Three, Four, and Six, who did not reciprocate. Just like the
members of Position Two, they contributed in blurring internal speciality and of®ce
boundaries. No one sought them out for advice. I call them the `peripheral associates'.
Finally, Position Eleven was composed of Of®ce I corporate associates (42, 48, 53, and 64),
also relatively atypical in the ®rm (one lateral, one `permanent associate', and so on). They
exchanged advice among themselves and sought out members of Positions One, Two, Three,
Five, and Six. The main difference between these associates and the others of similar pro®le
(such as Position Ten associates, for instance) was that partners from Position One, one of
the most prominent in the ®rm, sought out their advice. I call this position that of Of®ce I
`atypical' corporate associates.
A `residual' category included seven members (6, 22, 23, 33, 36, 37, and 63) whose rela-
tional pro®le in this advice network was very different from that of any other member in
the ®rm.
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Appendix E. Presentation of Multirelational
p* Models
Models within the multivariate p* class are probability models for multirelational networks
(Pattison and Wasserman 1999; Wasserman and Pattison, forthcoming). In their most
general form, p* models express the probability of an overall multirelational network
structure in terms of parameters associated with particular network substructures. A sub-
structure is considered here as a speci®c hypothetical con®guration of network ties linking a
small set of network membersÐfor instance, a pair of lawyers joined by mutual co-work ties
or a trio of lawyers, two of whom were linked by mutual advice ties and a third linked
by friendship to one of these two. The substructures appearing in the model are determined
by the independence assumptions that one makes: speci®cally, the substructures are
de®ned by sets of possible ties, each pair of which is assumed to be conditionally dependent,
given the remaining ties. (The number of possible ties in a particular substructure is termed
the level of the substructure.) Pattison and Wasserman (1999) have argued that the mul-
tivariate Markov assumption permits one to examine many of the forms of interdependence
among ties that have been proposed in the network analysis literature. These forms are
associated with notions of role set, exchange, path dependence, structural position, and
actor effects. The multivariate Markov assumption speci®es that two possible network
ties are conditionally independent, given all remaining ties, unless the pair of possible ties
has a lawyer in common. The consequence of this assumption is that multiplex ties and
multiplex dyadic and triadic con®gurations are all potentially critical in modelling the
overall network structure. In the case of a multirelational Markov assumption, the model
for the network is expressed in relation to substructures of a multivariate triad, or of a
multivariate star of order nÿ 1 (for a network of n nodes; see Pattison and Wasserman,
1999). Analyses of the role of higher-order stars of order three or more (that is, of sub-
structures comprising three or more ties directed to or from a member of the ®rm) are not
reported here, since preliminary investigations suggested that higher-order stars play a
much less substantial role than the multivariate triadic con®gurations on which this analysis
focuses here.
In order to describe the exchange system of the ®rm, analyses based on the p* class of
models are presented in two stages. In the ®rst stage, a reduced univariate Markov random
graph model (Wasserman and Pattison 1996) is identi®ed (see Table 3.4) for each of the three
network relations (co-work, advice, friendship). These models analyse the network dis-
tribution of each kind of resource in the ®rm in terms of local dyadic and triadic char-
acteristics. In the second stage, a multivariate p* model (see Table 5.1) is derived for the three
network relations simultaneously. This model is based on the multivariate Markov
assumption and allows interdependencies among the three types of relations to be evaluated at
the level of ties, dyads, and triads.
If a substructure has a large positive parameter in a p* model, then the presence of the
substructure enhances the likelihood of the overall network. All models presented here are
homogeneous in the sense of assuming that a relational substructure of a given form (a pair
of reciprocal friendship ties, or some particular triadic structure) has a constant effect on
the likelihood of the overall network structure and is not dependent on attributes of the
participating nodes. As a result, the models have a single parameter corresponding to each
possible substructure.
Parameters are estimated in all cases using pseudolikelihood estimation (Pattison and
Wasserman 1999; Strauss and Ikeda 1990). The approximate standard errors that accompany
the pseudolikelihood estimates are given only for guidance as to likely order of magnitude;
all comparisons among models are based on two indices of model ®tÐnamely ÿ2 times the
log of the maximized pseudolikelihood, and the mean absolute residual for each possible
network.
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Appendix F. A Montesquieu Structure: Spotting RED
(`Ready-for-Easy-Defection') Subsets
This is a density table for Figure 6.2 and a description of positions of approximately struc-
turally equivalent members in the strong co-workers' network. Table F1 shows the density
table for the co-workers' network: cell i, j is the average relation from someone occupying
Position I to someone in Position J. The average relation between any two people in the
network was 0.237. Representation of this table uses this value as a cut-off point. Figure 6.2
represents the best (i.e. `cleanest') split into positions approximating structural equivalence
between members in this network.
Position One included six partners and three associates, all Of®ce II litigators. Average
amounts collected per partner ranked second when compared to that of other positions (®rst
being that of Position Ten), average indegree centrality was 16 and 15 for partners in the
co-workers' and advice networks respectively (which was high for Of®ce II members). Among
them, Partners 5 and 18 were among the top performers in the ®rm, and Partner 32Ðwho
represented the ATC in Of®ce IIÐamong the most central partners in the co-workers' net-
work. They worked together closely, forming a more or less permanent team. They also
worked with Position Two members (same of®ce, different speciality), with Position Eight
(high status partners, same speciality, different of®ce) and Position Nine (senior associates,
same speciality, different of®ce). Through Positions Eight and Nine, they could get accessÐ
when additional manpower was needed on large and urgent casesÐto Position Three
members, a pool of more junior litigation associates in the other of®ce. Associates 51, 58, and
59 could be considered to be clients of Position One partners, especially 5 and 18. In this
network, they also bene®ted from their proximity with Partner 32.
Table F1. Density table for Figure 6.2
Position Position
One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight Nine Ten Residual
One 0.715 0.397 0.130 0.124 0.060 0.162 0.214 0.259 0.369 0.203 0.231
Two 0.368 0.647 0.057 0.380 0.131 0.071 0.392 0.187 0.108 0.304 0.340
Three 0.092 0.088 0.420 0.174 0.095 0.418 0.144 0.582 0.344 0.178 0.209
Four 0.081 0.234 0.154 0.639 0.418 0.116 0.325 0.281 0.182 0.556 0.228
Five 0.067 0.149 0.108 0.636 0.291 0.089 0.184 0.279 0.199 0.374 0.217
Six 0.131 0.086 0.368 0.210 0.128 0.313 0.149 0.460 0.456 0.277 0.233
Seven 0.133 0.286 0.127 0.583 0.164 0.129 0.643 0.126 0.100 0.526 0.157
Eight 0.176 0.093 0.471 0.276 0.140 0.315 0.134 0.232 0.492 0.253 0.179
Nine 0.235 0.052 0.285 0.214 0.138 0.406 0.108 0.522 0.122 0.183 0.231
Ten 0.100 0.147 0.136 0.477 0.224 0.183 0.563 0.331 0.041 0.204 0.256
Residual 0.232 0.229 0.113 0.210 0.161 0.099 0.116 0.338 0.231 0.231 0.278
Position Two included ®ve partners and two associates, all Of®ce II corporate lawyers,
among which were Partner 14, a top performer, and Partner 28, a very central partner in the
network. Average amounts collected per partner ranked fourth when compared to that of
other positions; average indegree centrality was 16 and 14 for partners in the co-workers' and
advice networks respectively (which was high for Of®ce II members). Members worked
together, as well as with Position One litigators (same of®ce, different speciality), with
Positions Four and Ten (high-status partners, same speciality, different of®ce), and with
Position Seven (a set of highly competent lateral associates, same speciality, different of®ce).
Through Position Four and Seven, Position Two could get accessÐwhen neededÐto the
Position Five pool of more junior corporate associates in the other of®ce. Associates 50 and 63
could be considered to be clients of this position partners, especially 14 and 28.
Position Three included one partner (Partner 21, a top performer) and eight associates, all
Of®ce I litigators. This was a less cohesive position, in which members worked with one
another less than members of the previous positions. They constituted a pool of manpower
working mainly for Positions Six and EightÐi.e. Of®ce I litigation partners and their Position
Nine brokers (senior associates in the same of®ce). Position Three members show that the
patronage system was a two-tiered system; they were clients of clients who did not (yet)
belong to close-knit stable teams.
Position Four included six Of®ce I corporate partners, among which Partners 12, 17, and 19
were top performers, and Partners 16, 17, 19, 29, and 34 were highly central. Average amounts
collected per partner ranked third when compared to that of other positions; average indegree
centrality was 24 and 20 in the co-workers' and advice networks respectively. They distributed
work to Position Five associates (same of®ce, same speciality), and to their senior and lateral
associates of Position Seven (same of®ce, same speciality). They worked with Position Eight
partners (same of®ce, different speciality) and with Position Ten partners (same of®ce, same
speciality). This position was highly cohesive and concentrated much power, but did not seem
to have its own clientele. Positions Five's and Position Seven's associates were shared with
other partners, especially from Positions Eight and Ten. They did not consider Position Two
members (same speciality, different of®ce) as strong co-workers: there were more people in
Of®ce I, and thus more different specialities represented, and they did not feel that they
needed to strengthen the Of®ce II corporate group.
Position Five included mainly corporate associates in Of®ce I and Of®ce III, mixed with
associates working mainly with Of®ce I Positions Four and Ten (same of®ce, same speciality
partners) and with Position Eight (same of®ce, different speciality partners). Partner 2, a top
performer, was also a member of this position. This was mainly another manpower pool in
which it was dif®cult to distinguish close clientelistic ties with speci®c partners. In particular,
senior corporate associates of Position Seven, mostly laterals, did not operate as brokers
between these associates and the partners; in addition, just as Position Three associates, they
did not work much for Of®ce II corporate partners.
Position Six included closely tied Of®ce I litigation partners (among which were Partner 1,
a top performer and the lawyer with most prestige in the ®rm, two other partners working
with him, and Associate 52, a very central broker between Partner 1 or Partner 23 and other
associates)Ðanother stable team in the ®rm. Average amounts collected per partner ranked
®fth when compared to that of other positions; average indegree centrality was 12 and 16 in
the co-workers' and advice networks respectively. Partners in this position controlled large
clients and provided their own associates, as well as Position Eight partners and Position
Three associates, with work. They used Position Nine senior associates to collaborate with
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corporate partners in their own of®ce (Position Ten), but not with Position Four. This stable
team subcontracted a lot of work, but not to Of®ce II litigators, with whom they did not feel
much solidarity.
Position Seven included senior corporate associates in the ®rm, almost all laterals, among
whom was Associate 45, one of the most central attorneys in the ®rm. They were not part of a
stable team, nor did they seem to be clients of speci®c partners. They were more senior than
most Position Five associates, and had a speci®c structural position in that they worked with/
for the three positions of corporate partners in the ®rm (Positions Two, Four, and Ten),
without exception: they were hired based on their indispensable specialities. Because they had
not `grown up' in the ®rm, they seemed to have more autonomy in their choices of colla-
borators, depending less on one or two speci®c patrons. Their relationship with the other
lawyers in the ®rm was more impersonal and functional.
Position Eight included Of®ce I partners, mainly litigators, who had in common that they
were closer to most associates in the ®rm, because they belonged to the associate committee
on the litigation side (one of their duties being to match associates, partners, and new ®les).
They included two top performers, Partners 13 and 26, and four among the most central
lawyers in the ®rm, Partners 13, 22, 24, and 26. Average amounts collected per partner ranked
sixth (i.e. last) when compared to that of other partner positions; average indegree centrality
was 24 and 26 in the co-workers' and advice networks respectively. They worked with many
positions, although more with litigators in Of®ce I, Positions Three and Six (same speciality,
same of®ce), and corporate lawyers in Of®ce I (Positions Four and Ten) than with those in
Of®ce II, and they used Position Nine's senior associates. They were recognized as repre-
sentatives of the good citizens in the ®rm, in charge of the welfare system for associates, and
did not seem to groom their own clients.
Position Nine members included senior litigation associates in Of®ce I. As with Position
Seven's senior corporate associates, they worked very little together. But they were very central
intermediaries between partners and more junior associates in this network. One of them,
Associate 38, reached one of the highest scores in that respect. They redistributed work mainly
among Position Three associates, worked directly with Positions Six and Eight partners, and
controlled a considerable part of partners' access to manpower, particularly in Of®ce II, where
they depended less on partners for their promotion to partnership than in their own of®ce
(Of®ce I), where partners were twice as many. They therefore had to maintain a fragile balance
between several `constituencies' (with regard to the forthcoming partnership vote).
The last position, Position Ten, included three senior corporate partners in Of®ce I, among
whom was Partner 4, both a top performer and one of the highest centrality scores in this
network. Average amounts collected per partner ranked ®rst when compared to that of other
positions of partners; average indegree centrality was 20 and 11 in the co-workers' and advice
networks respectively. They did not work together, but collaborated with members of Posi-
tions Two, Four, Five, Seven, and Eight. Contributing to their position as a powerhouse
within the ®rm, and to the explanation of why they had a position of their own, was the fact
that they also represented a structural bridge between corporate and litigation lawyers.
A `residual' category included seven partners, including the managing partner of the ®rm,
and one associate. Three of the partners, Partners 7, 8, and 15, were among the top perfor-
mers, and two, Partners 15 and 30, were among the highest centrality scores. Some worked
mostly alone, whereas others were highly active in the work distribution process.
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Appendix G. Overall Distribution of the Signi®cant
Effects on Each Respondent's Choices of Levers
Analysed Separately in Chapter 7
Partners Effects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
8 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
12 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
13 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
17 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
18 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
20 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
22 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
24 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
26 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
29 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
35 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Notes: This table lists the thirty-six partners and summarizes the results of the three rounds of regressions
presented in Chapter 7, testing the effect of variables 1±9, then 10±21, and ®nally 22±29, on the choices of levers by
each of these individual partners. Thus, for example, for Partner 1 (®rst row of this table), only two variables seem
to have had an effect of his choices of levers: effects 19 and 20; that is, the fact that he saw the target as a friend and
the fact that he saw the target as a co-worker.
1 signi®cant at least at p< 0.01; else 0. To identify each effect, refer to Chapter 7. Only such strongly
signi®cant effects were taken into consideration for inclusion in this table and for interpretation.
Source: Reprinted from Quality and Quantity, E. Lazega and D. Krackhardt, `Spreading and Shifting Costs of
Lateral Control in a Law Partnership: A Structural Analysis at the Individual Level', 34: 169. Copyright 2000 with
permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Appendix H. Specialization of the Main Levers:
Procedure Followed to Construct Figure 7.6
Figure 7.6 is the result of principal component analysis. This method is a type of factor
analysis that is similar to correspondence analysis. It differs from correspondence analysis,
among other features, in that it does not use any weighting in the analysis of the raw target by
lever matrix that is used as data input. The absence of weighting strengthens the effect of
numerically important columns in the extraction of factors. Thanks to this particular sensi-
tivity, this method is especially well adapted to this data-set, because it is precisely the position
of the main levers (i.e. those selected most often as indicated in the columns of this matrix)
that must be identi®ed and located in a three-dimensional space. In addition, correspondence
analysis was not used because it is too sensitive to little cohesive groups of levers and targets,
whereas a principal component analysis on the positive deviations from the independence
matrix offers more massive overall effects.
The ®gure contains two kinds of objects: important sanctioners (represented by a diamond)
and groups of respondents and infractors (represented by a circle) collapsed together based on
their respective level of seniority. The ®gure shows that the main sanctioners (in diamonds),
or `protectors of the common good', were expected in a discriminating and specialized way by
their partnersÐthat is, they were expected most often to exercise control on a speci®c set of
infractors. For example, Partner 20 was often chosen by senior partners to `talk to' medium-
seniority infractors. Partner 5 was often chosen by junior partners to `talk to' junior partners.
In this ®gure, the three axes help locate the main sanctioners in a way that shows these
contrasted specializations by creating a great distance between sanctioners who were rarely
chosen together. When a group is close to a sanctioner in that space, it means that respondents
in this group chose this sanctioner very often to go and `talk to' infractors in that same group.
This means that, according to the respondents, this important sanctioner was `specialized' in a
speci®c category of infractors and thus had his or her `territory' of social control.
This ®gure is the result of a two-step procedure. First, the 36 individual matrices (called
`slices' by Krackhardt) were stacked vertically to create a single 1,296 36 matrix. Levers are
the variables, because the choices by respondents were choices of levers. The difference
between the observed frequencies and the frequencies expected under the model of `inde-
pendence' in each cell of the table was computed. The larger the positive deviation, the
stronger the link between the target and the lever. Only large positive deviations above a
speci®c cut-off, which indicate a very central lever, were retained for graphic representation.
This residuals matrix was used, in the second step, to represent the distances between the main
levers in a multidimensional space.
To represent respondents, targets, and levers in the same space, nine rows of supplementary
observations were added to the contingency table. They are represented as points in the joint
row and column space, but they are not used while determining the locations of the active row
and column points of the contingency table. This means that supplementary observations
were ignored in the computation of eigenvectors. The values in the nine supplementary rows
were computed as follows. Respondents and targets were sorted by three levels of seniority:
junior, medium, senior. They were assigned to each category based on their place on the
letterhead paper and a `natural' threshold provided by the fact that they were considered
within the ®rm to be different `generations' of lawyers. Nine categories were thus created:
senior respondent/senior target, senior respondent/medium target, and so on, up to junior
respondent/junior target. The number of choices of each lever were summed for each of these
nine categoriesÐthat is, each time a lever was chosen by a respondent of that category to be
sent to deal with a target of that category. The values for each category and lever were then
added to the table as supplementary observations.
Values in the new 45 36 table were normalized to avoid having groups with a large
number of choices brought arti®cially closer to the centre of the ®gure. Scores on the three
axes were thus computed for rows (targets) and columns (levers) as well as for respondents
and targets collapsed into nine groups, as displayed in the ®gure. For these groups, the points
projected on the map are the mean values for all the members of each group. For more precise
technical indications about this approach, see Lazega and Vari (1992).
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Appendix I. Who Guards the Guardians? Procedure
Used to Build Figure 7.7
This method uses Euclidean distance as a detector of approximated structural equivalence
between partners in the aggregated control network. The matrix aggregating the 36 individual
levers by target matrices was used as input to Structure 4.1. Data were treated as direct
measures of relations. Equivalence hypotheses were formulated using a hierarchical cluster
analysis of the distances between actors' positions based on the Ward error sum of squares
method. These hypotheses were tested (to con®rm that a set of actors are approximately
equivalent) using reliability coef®cients based on correlations between distances to an indi-
vidual with the mean distances to the other actors in the set. Once the positions were de®ned,
the ties between them were determined by building the density table shown in Table I1, where
the cell i, j is the average relation from someone occupying Position I to someone in Position J.
The average relation between any two people in the network was 23.515. Representation of
this table uses this value as a cut-off point.
Position One included Of®ce I partners with low indegree centrality scores. Position Two
clustered Of®ce II partners also with low scores; it was the only position in which Of®ce II
partners were found. Neither position controlled any other position or themselves. Positions
Three, Four, and Five were composed of Of®ce I partners with high scores. Together they
controlled Position One. Position Six was composed of two Of®ce I partners; it ful®lled an
interesting function: its partners with low centrality scores in the control network guarded
partners with high centrality scores. Finally, three partners were not assigned to any position
and made a `residual' category. Two among the most central actors belonged to this category.
Partner 5 was lost to the residuals by Position Two, mainly because he was often chosen by
Position Two members to control one another. Partner 20 was lost by Position Five because
he was more universal, and particularly often chosen to control Of®ce II targets. Partner 4 was
lost by Position Four because he was chosen to cover additional and speci®c targets (Partners
9, 15, and 29). Position Four was composed of the two most senior partners of the ®rm. Along
with Partner 20, they were givenÐby Of®ce I partnersÐexclusive lateral responsibility for
Position Two (Of®ce II) partners. This position was important, because its members were
Table I1. Density table for the lateral control network provided by Structure 4.1
Position Position
One Two Three Four Five Six Residual
One 14.8 7.9 4.1 4.1 7.5 5.9 5.7
Two 2.8 22.5 0.0 5.9 1.4 0.5 10.0
Three 34.7 9.1 230.0 15.0 37.5 167.5 75.0
Four 55.0 54.1 50.0 240.0 68.8 67.5 108.8
Five 41.0 17.0 25.0 23.8 97.5 36.3 32.5
Six 19.7 8.6 85.0 15.0 42.5 20.0 35.0
Residual 51.5 80.2 41.3 80.0 44.4 27.5 48.3
chosen to cut across of®ce boundaries and because it controlled all the other positions without
exception. It was watched only by Position Five and Partner 20. In turn, Position Five was
controlled by Positions Three, Four, and Six. Note that Positions Three and Five were almost
similar in their role; they differed only to the extent that Position Five was chosen to control
Position Four, and Position Three was not. Leverage was thus highly concentrated in the
hands of the members of three Positions (Three, Four, and Five) and the members of the
residual category. It is also important to note that these three positions were chosen to control
each other.
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Appendix J. Partners' In¯uence Network: Density
Table for Figure 8.2
Table J1 shows the density table for the `listening-at-the-partnership-meeting' network (or
in¯uence network): cell i, j is the average relation from someone occupying Position I to
someone in Position J. The average relation between any two people in the network was 0.290.
Representation of this table uses this value as a cut-off point.
The ®rst and most central position included ®ve among the six oligarchs identi®ed in the
text as the most central (in terms of indegree) in this networkÐi.e. as claiming leadership and
framing the debates on policy issues and precarious values (Partners 4, 26, 20, 1, and 14), plus
Partner 17, whose presence is explained by his rich informal ties to the oligarchs. All, except
14, were from Of®ce I. The density within the position was high; its members listened to one
another. Members of this position said that they listened to members of Position Four, in
which all members were from Of®ce I also; and they were cited by members of the three other
positions. Thus, they tended not to reciprocate citations by Of®ce II members. The fourth
position included eight members (Partners 11, 9, 21, 13, 8, 12, 24, and 22), also all from Of®ce
I. These partners included some of the most active in terms of administrative work, especially
for the management of associates (9, 13, and 24) and their friends. The density within the
position was also high, although less than in Position One, and its members listened to one
another. They also listened to members of Positions One and Three. Their pro®le differs from
that of Position One precisely because they tended to listen to Position Three members, who
included the three women partners, two of them minders, and the most junior partner. They
tended to be cited by members of the positions they citedÐOne and ThreeÐbut not to
reciprocate citations by Of®ce II members. The second position included a mix of Of®ce II
and Of®ce I partners (Partners 33, 19, 7, 31, 10, 35, 25, 32, 16, 6, and 23), who listened to
Positions One and Four members and were the only position to which no other position
listened (not even its members among themselves). Some of the latter tended to be considered
as eccentric; they were also less interested in management and policy issues. Position Three
members were the three women partners in the ®rm, plus the most junior partner, who had
been recently elected. Members of this position listened to members of Positions One and
Four, as well as to each other. Figure 8.1 shows that they did not carry exactly the same
policy options; three of them backed very moderate changes. They would have been part of
Table J1. Density table for Figure 8.2
Position Position
One Two Three Four Residual
One 0.649 0.099 0.201 0.425 0.349
Two 0.502 0.077 0.207 0.297 0.346
Three 0.617 0.101 0.366 0.377 0.262
Four 0.541 0.072 0.315 0.481 0.260
Residual 0.414 0.120 0.121 0.223 0.326
Position Four if they had been taken more seriously by Position One leaders. The `residual'
category included Partners 2, 3, 5, 15, 18, 28, and 30. These partners included some highly
prominent ®gures in the ®rm, such as Partners 2 and 5, but also one of the least listened to
(Partner 18, who was also among the highest billers/collectors in the ®rm). Partners 2 and 5
were lost to the `residual' category by Position One: raw data show that the reason for this was
that they were mainly listened to by partners in their own of®ce, not by partners in the other
of®ce, which is what characterized Position One. This is con®rmed by their relatively low
centrality scores.
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Notes
Introduction
1. For a review and criticism of this abundant literature on professionals in bureaucracy,
see e.g. Davies (1983).
2. See e.g. work by Aharoni (1997); Bosk (1979); Bourrier (1999); Bucher (1970); Crane
(1972); Eccles and Crane (1988); Freidson (1975); Freidson and Rhea (1963); Friedberg
and Musselin (1989); Frischkopf (1973); Hechter (1987); Heinz and Laumann (1982);
Ibarra (1992); Karpik (1995); Kuty (1998); Latour and Woolgar (1988); Laumann and
Heinz (1977); McCann (1993); Nelson (1988); Ostrom (1990); Parsons and Platt (1973);
Sainsaulieu et al. (1983); Sutton and Hargadon (1996); Swidler (1979); Tilley (1981).
3. Remaining at this formal level makes it too easy to dismiss this organizational form as a
vague form of `associational professionalism' (Abbott 1988).
4. They can also be said to be part of a broadly conceived `corporate social capital' (Leenders
and Gabbay 1999), a very general concept encompassing, as in Coleman (1990), any social
mechanism characterizing and helping a corporate actor solve problems raised by
members' cooperation.
5. Competition and con¯ict for resources and high level of political activity have long been
recognized as characteristic of professional organizations (Bucher and Stelling 1969;
Montagna 1968).
6. This notion is borrowed from Portes (1994).
7. In the approach outlined here, however, I do not focus on measuring the relative con-
tribution of such social ties (and their structure) to maximization of individual perform-
ance in competitive arenas (Burt 1992). I am instead largely concerned with how members
manage their social resources in order to ful®l their commitment to a partnership
agreement.
8. This stresses the regulatory and consciously normative dimension of culture, one that is
still connected to resource dependencies, as distinguished from the `autonomous inner
logic' and more unconsciously constraining nature of culture (Emirbayer and Goodwin
1994; Mohr and Duquenne 1997). The fact that early and narrow structural approaches to
action were promoted in the 1960s and 1970s against the idea of action oriented by
socialization, norms, and values should not prevent sociologists from combining these
approaches (Hirsch 1997; Kunda 1993; Selznick 1996).
9. This echoes ideas in unorthodox economics, for which conventions are rules that never
determine behaviour mechanically, because they have to be interpreted and applied
(Favereau 1998). Politicization is thus brought back into economic behaviour, because
actors have to have an idea of the collective associated with the correct functioning of the
rulesÐi.e. in which they want to coordinate with others.
10. An abundant literature of interest to my purpose is available on corporate law ®rms
(Brock et al. 1999; Dezalay 1992; Flood, 1987; Galanter and Palay 1991; Gallouj 1992;
Gilson and Mnookin 1985; Hazard and Rhode 1988; Heinz and Laumann 1982;
Karpik 1995; Maister 1993; Mann 1985; Nelson 1988; Smigel 1969; Starbuck 1993;
Wallace 1995; and many others).
11. Privileges that may have something to do with the fact that lawyers, in the USA, have long
been the `shock troops of capitalism' (Sellers 1991).
12. Starbuck relies on sociological literature showing that knowledge-intensive ®rms
downplay formal structures, and try to achieve coordination through social norms and
reward systems instead of hierarchical controls (Nelson 1988). He acknowledges work
such as that of Bucher and Stelling (1969), suggesting that organizations dominated by
professionals had a number of special characteristics, including professionals building
their own roles rather than ®tting into pre-set roles, spontaneous internal differentiation
based on work interests, competition and con¯ict for resources, and high levels of
political activity. He rightly points out that famous consultants such as David Maister
(1993) offer an idealized model of knowledge-intensive ®rms, the model of the `one-®rm
®rm'. But he himself does the same by overemphasizing the importance of organizational
culture in the operation of such ®rms.
Chapter 1
1. The nature of partnerships is de®ned by law. Tests are prescribed for determining whether
a partnership exists, and what is partnership property. They deal with issues of agency and
with the nature of the relations of partners to persons dealing with the partnership. With
regard to complexity, Rowley and Rowley (1960: 15) argue that `there is no other relation
known to law which, in its nature, is so complicated as is partnership. A natural person is
an entity, and may sue or be sued; may receive, hold, and dispose of, real or personal
property. A corporation, or arti®cial person is in the same position, being endowed with a
personality by an act which creates it. The question of the entity of a partnership has been
repeatedly raised, and answered in different ways. Is the partnership a unit, having
a distinctive personality, a self, or is it merely a convenient mode of expressing the
association, and the consequent rights and liabilities of the persons so associated
therein? . . . The ordinary mercantile conception of a partnership and the legal conception
are largely at variance. For all practical business dealings, the merchant regards a part-
nership or ®rm as an entity, up to the time when he must go to court to enforce a liability
against it. Creditors charge the ®rm on their accounts and the books of the partnership
are kept as if it had a separate existence.'
2. In fact, this opposition simpli®es Weber's approach, whose typology of bureaucracies is
neglected in favour of explorations of the monocratic version. This unfairness to Weber
characterizes much of what has passed into the received wisdom of organizational studies.
3. This is a clear simpli®cation, because there are other reasons for complying in such
organizations, such as losing resources and personal support, as well as commitment to
the general value standards of the organization (which Waters attributes to polycratic
forms other than the collegialÐi.e. mass or direct democracy).
4. Following the socio-technical tradition of the 1950s, these interdependencies can be
functionalÐi.e. related to a formal division of workÐor structuralÐi.e. related to more
informal circulation of all sorts of resources through social relationships. In that
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respect, structural analysis is compatible with what Crozier (1963; Crozier and Friedberg
1977) calls `strategic' analysis. Indeed, the former presupposes the latter (Lazega 1994a,
1996, 1997; Lazega and Mounier, forthcoming). This is particularly the case because
structural analysis offers sophisticated measurements of resource interdependencies,
status, and power that are basic concepts of the French school of organizational
analysis.
5. This de®nition of a niche is different from that offered by White (forthcoming), which
relies on a theory of monopolistic competition. As will be shown in this chapter, it is
de®ned in network analytical terms as a position that is also a clique. Note that the
expression `niche building' may be slightly misleading, since niches are not built ex nihilo,
but under pre-existing structural constraints. Thus a dynamic perspective should make a
Durkheimian approach to such behaviour (more system oriented) compatible with that
of Weber (more actor oriented) thanks to a Simmelian form of manipulation of ties
(Blau 1964).
6. In economics, barter is a slow, expensive, and highly restrictive way to do business. The
barter economy is inef®cient compared to the cash economy. Barter transactions are
opaque and approximative. However, in social life, barter is much more widespread than
is usually acknowledged (Blau 1964). It is used much more often than cash for many types
of exchanges. In effect, pricing many goods or resources is next to impossible for actors
involved in transactions connected to production and collective action. This is especially
the case for knowledge. Barter's opaque, non explicit, and approximative characters are
quite useful to exchange partners. Barter is indeed much more restrictive and it falls under
a logic of membership, a symbolic logic of boundary management; it is much more
demanding in terms of solidarity with one's reference groupÐi.e. others minimally
considered to be `one's own people'. Basically, it is identity criteria and particularistic
discrimination that drive the barter economyÐi.e. principles that are the opposite of
those defended by theoreticians of the market mechanism, in which people are supposed
to be anonymous and unrelated.
7. On the relationship between identity, appropriateness judgements, and behaviour, see
Lazega (1992a).
8. This means that exchanges are preceded (analytically speaking) by qualifying rounds.
Actors have to show that they qualify as partners for exchanges of resources. The quali-
®cation is mainly negotiated based on attributes, values, and past experience. Before
qualifying, actors are not yet in business; they are not allowed to barter many resources
with the long term in mind. They can be involved only in spot transactions using a
currency that opens up exchanges to many others, increasing costs. When exchanges are
multiplex, however, there is no general equivalent or currency. Identities are connected to
terms of the exchanges de®ned in the political process.
9. For additional insights into cooperation as politicized versus routine transfers or
exchanges of various kinds of resources, see Bearman (1997); Breiger and Ennis (1997);
Cook (1987, 1990); Ekeh (1977); Galaskiewicz and Marsden (1978); Gouldner (1960);
Han and Breiger (1998); Lazega and Pattison (1999, 2001); Lin (1982, 1995); Levi-Strauss
(1949); Raub and Weesie (1990).
10. As shown by Festinger (1954), the comparisons that matter for people are the compari-
sons with others most like themselves. Combinations of criteria (similarities in terms of
of®ce membership, speciality, hierarchical status, etc.) push members to compare
themselves to same niche people.
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11. These are exogenous identities that are particularistic within the ®rmÐi.e. once members
are part of the ®rm. I do not mean, for instance, that school attended is an `ascribed'
characteristic such as gender.
12. Again, a fundamental aspect of the notion of power is related to the ways in which
members politicize their exchanges. In effect, if actors contribute to the construction of
the structure that constrains them, some are more active in this structuration than others.
In that respect, Friedberg (1993) de®nes power as the capacity to structure interaction
contexts to one's own advantage. From a structural perspectiveÐi.e. centred on transfers
and exchanges of resourcesÐthis expression has two complementary meanings. `Having
power over someone else' consists, ®rst, in controlling access to resources needed by this
person; and, secondly, in de®ning the terms of exchange with this person and among
members of the organization (Reynaud 1989).
13. Contributions by network analysts to the study of `becoming a player' in organizational
politics and social control are useful to mention here. First, becoming a player in the
organizational power game requires a trained capacity to perceive who the key players in
the system are (i.e. people who can help in getting things done, in getting people to agree,
or in getting ahead), what the relationships between them are, what the coalitions and
allegiances are, and who the trustworthy people to make deals with are. Analytically,
Krackhardt's work (1990, 1992) on perceptions of relations, particularly on three-
dimensional data (`perception cubes'), shows that perception of the structure varies
according to one's position in it, and that power is also exercised in spite of (or based
upon) existing `blind spots' in members' perception of the structure. Secondly, to be a
player in the power game also requires a trained capacity to use interdependence
among others. Burt's work (1982, 1992) on manipulation of relations, particularly on co-
optation as a defence mechanism, describes members' manipulations of relations in terms
of network `surgery': withdrawal (cutting ties) and expansion (adding new ties to one's
network). In this perspective, a strategic player tries to decrease his dependence upon a
constraining party (e.g. a powerful supplier of resources) by gaining some leverage over
the constrainer (`embedding' the constraining party) and creating a tie over which there is
more control. Such co-optation manúuvres can also be indirect (Gargiulo 1993; Lazega
and Vari 1992).
14. This argument can also be derived from Heimer (1992).
15. As suggested by Frank (1985), the price of status is high when members interact inten-
sively. This is explained by the assumption that members in a densely connected organ-
ization are uniquely isolated from status comparisons with people other than their
co-workers. From an individual's perspective, this may also be why an oligarchy of
powerful members emerges among peers in the ®rst place. In collegial organizations
where networks are relatively dense, many may not be able or prepared to pay such a high
price in exchange for status.
16. Blau (1964), for example, thinks that minders cease to compete for superior status and
win social acceptance in the group in exchange for the contribution they make to group
solidarity. Here, minders are seen as status competitors, just as others are.
17. See Blau (1964) and Fernandez (1991) about the relationship between leadership and
`respect'.
18. See Eccles and Crane (1988) for a slightly comparable situation.
19. Frischkopf (1973), well before network analysis, had the idea that collegial restraint was at
the origin of collegiality as a relational code among peers.
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20. Some exchanges in law partnerships tend to create status equality, as opposed to others
that create status differentiation, in particular advice relationships such as that studied by
Blau (1964) and Homans (1961), which operate as a mechanism of differentiation of
status and status allocation.
21. It should be mentioned that this type of temporary task-force structure, in which partners
keep their autonomy in their negotiation of means and ends, makes it dif®cult for a centre
to identify and appropriate real or potential productivity gains. Therefore, governance of
these task forces, when work is not de®ned as a standard process in the Taylorian way,
also means that work is evaluated based on other standardsÐmore local, subjective
(in partners' minds), or relational ones.
22. For a summary of research on the relationship between social networks and performance,
see Flap et al. (1998).
23. Indeed, in knowledge-intensive ®rms, this commitment is even more dif®cult to measure:
the measurement itself is always a politicized issue (Friedberg 1993; Meyer 1994).
24. This is partly at odds with Burt's general statement (1992) about association between low
constraint and high performance, and more consistent with Coleman's ideas (1990) on
the bene®ts of closure and embeddedness of ties. Burt's measurement of constraint,
however, remains useful regardless (Lazega 1999a).
25. This often depends on subtle ways in which members with status in¯uence the salience of
some categories in debates about professionalism. Perrow (1986) and many others call
this premiss setting. This is consistent with sociological theory, assuming that people are
interdependent in terms of affecting each other's categorizations in any given action
situation. The in¯uential people in a group are not only those who can sanction and
monitor behaviour, but those who can provide information about the relevant stereo-
types and categories characterizing a social group (Bourdieu 1980; Lindenberg 1997).
26. This is possible by a relational mechanism that I have called elsewhere `epistemic align-
ment' or `co-orientation' (Lazega 1992a), which is based on the interactive dimension of
members' `appropriateness judgements'. Quality control is thus more generally related to
epistemic dimensions of collective action.
27. `A small penalty may be suf®cient to remind the infractor of the importance of com-
pliance. Everyone might be in a similar situation in the future and would want some
understanding at that time. Everyone will hear about the incident, and the violator's
reputation for reliability will depend on complying with the rules in the future' (Ostrom
1990: 97).
28. `Multiple ties and multiple bases of power provide a stable context for the exertion of
in¯uence on a variety of attitudes and behaviors' (Marsden and Friedkin 1993: 131).
29. In this terminology, a lever or a sanctioner ful®ls a function similar to that of a broker,
especially of a `coordinator' (as de®ned by Fernandez and Gould 1994), who remains
within the organization and establishes a link between two other members. Analytically,
however, members themselves can be considered to be the `third parties' constraining
levers to intervene on behalf of the organization. Such constraints come from the con-
vergent expectations of these members.
30. See e.g. Charles Bosk (1979), who, following Freidson's work (Friedson 1975;
Freidson and Rhea 1963), characterizes such collegial settings by their `atrophy of cor-
porate self-control' and `hypertrophy of professional self-control' by individual members.
The existence of this regime is consistent with Bosk's criticism of organizational studies
over-celebrating individual conscience as a source of control in professional services
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organizations. A structural approach, while not ignoring the reasons for pointing at the
existence of this `atrophy' also shows that there is among peers at least one informal
corporate mechanism for early monitoring and sanctioning. This approach is also con-
sistent with Tannenbaum's theory of control (1968) as a non-zero-sum game. According
to Tannenbaum, if one creates a situation where there is solidarity, then everyone has the
feeling that they control more than before. In collegial settings, this also means that a
partner accepts giving up some control to selected others so that they can be controlled in
return. One can thus hopefully focus actors and avoid the dispersion of their actions.
This, however, is only part of what happens in collegial settings, because lateral control
also tends to concentrate in the hands of a few, who are often forced to accept such a
costly shift.
31. By using the word consensus, I do not mean that conformity is obtained by a calm and
formal agreement following a politely conducted discussion. Conformity is the result of
ongoing negotiation, sometimes including threats and arguments in which this agree-
ment is not necessarily a formal consent but the result of various processes of in¯uence
and convergence of expectations. As Bourricaud (1961) puts it, in¯uence includes all the
means that members use in their art of having the last word with rival partners who may
one day have more status than they. See also, about this issue, network analysts such as
Breiger (1990) and White (1992), or social psychologists such as Asch (1951), French and
Raven (1959), and Raven (1965).
32. Again, this stresses the regulatory and consciously normative dimension of culture.
33. Parsons (1968; Parsons and Shils, 1951) and other theoreticians (Dingwall 1999; Hughes
1958) have discussed the preservation of precarious values in the larger society by the
professions; Selznick pushes the connection between status and values further. This again
goes back to the Weberian theme of plurality of legitimacies, or value `polytheism'.
34. Political participation in general has long been a central process for the study of the
interplay of structure and culture. For example, at the macro-sociological level, political
scientists such as Putnam (1993), following a well-established Tocquevillian and socio-
logical tradition, argue that dense social networks sustain ef®cient civic norms. But such
studies remain very vague in their structural approach; in particular, they fail to specify
how such a political participation takes placeÐi.e. through which social mechanisms
sustaining these norms. Here, I argue that this tradition can be enriched by a broadly
conceived structural approach to regulatory processes in collective actors. This means
taking into account systematically resource dependencies (Crozier 1963; Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978) between actors involved in the regulatory process.
35. Feelings about relative status often govern our decisions about rules (Festinger 1954).
Therefore it makes sense to argue that discussions about precarious values are shaped by
status heterogeneity in the oligarchy of the organization.
36. Although I do not share some of their assumptions in the study of in¯uence, my
understanding of the use of network analysis for the study of this issue is in many ways
similar to that of pioneering work by Laumann and Pappi (1976), Laumann et al. (1977),
Marsden (1981), Marsden and Laumann (1977).
37. In the study of social movements, authors such as McAdam and Paulsen (1993) focus
on how social networks matter for processes such as recruitment, mobilization, and
collective identity formation. Such approaches to collective action often stress the
importance of achieving social cohesion and of concentrating power in the hands of a
leadership, or an avant-garde. In my view, however, these studies of political participation
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do not suf®ciently take into account the diversity of forms of status, and issues of status
consistency, in order to explain the mechanism of emergence of speci®c norms as
priorities for a given collective actor.
38. Such a mutual prescription may also be a condition of collective learning (Hatchuel
1995).
Chapter 2
1. With available paralegal and administrative personnel, associates are often able to transfer
the `dirty work' down the hierarchical ladder, thus maintaining a `collegial' character in
their interactions with partners more easily than in other types of professional ®rms.
2. I did not observe SG&R attorneys carrying out speci®c tasks from the beginning to the
end of a case, mainly because I was not allowed to meet the clients.
3. Putting together transactions means transforming a unilaterally conceived agreement
into a consensual one. `The document's ®nal form is as much a result of the interaction
between the two senior lawyers . . . on either side of the transaction as it is a quest for the
most pro®table and ef®cient form' (Flood 1987: 237).
4. About litigators' `agonistic' professional culture, see Starbuck (1992).
5. Several types of partner contributions were recognized at SG&R. For example, Partner 3
was not expected to practise law intensively, but ratherÐas a former CEO of a large
insurance companyÐto transfer to the ®rm some of his network of contacts and
knowledge of people with clout. Others were involved in large-scale arbitrage.
6. Sometimes they are assigned work which they consider useless. Knowing when and how
to correct a partner in a meeting is dangerous for your career and requires tact (if not the
associate could be blamed). Fresh associates establish reputations quickly concerning
their skills and personalities.
7. Nelson (1988: 91±2) de®nes traditional management as characterized by `(1) ad hoc
and reactive policy-making, with little long-range planning; (2) direct administration
by leading lawyers, aided only by a part-time managing partner, with no regular moni-
toring of internal performance measures or ®nancial information; and (3) informally
de®ned and shifting work groups'. Bureaucratic management is de®ned as `(1) a spe-
cialized policy-making group that actively engages in strategic planning; (2) a developed
administrative component consisting of a managing partner and a mechanism for col-
lecting and analyzing data on the ®nancial performance of individual lawyers and work
groups; and (3) well-de®ned work groups (usually taking the form of departments) with
recognized heads who supervise the group and report to the central policy-making
group'.
8. Advertising was authorized in the legal profession by a 1977 Supreme Court decision.
9. Despite the weak economy, pro®ts were generally said to be going up, but pro®t rates as a
percentage of gross revenue were said to be stagnating (®rm-wide, independent of which
specialities were considered to be more pro®table than others).
10. Partners could not sell or transfer their partnership interest.
11. This agreement could be amended by at least 80% of all partners. For some provisions
requiring a speci®c percentage vote of partners other than a majority, it could be amended
only by all the partners. Matters not provided for in the agreement were governed by law
(Uniform Partnership Act).
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12. Discourse about collegiality does not always re¯ect rigid positions. Partner 15 left the ®rm
a few years later for a larger and wealthier competitor.
13. Rawls (1971) constructs a rationale for equalizing incomes that is independent of con-
cerns about relative standing. He believes such concerns are not even rational, let alone
morally legitimate. See also Frank (1985: 113).
14. The story of former Partner No. 2 who wanted to switch specialities away from a lucrative
one is presented in Chapter 7.
15. `Partner 1 was an interesting exception in the ®rm, because most of the senior guys except
Partner 1 were state patricians with lots of money, married to lots of money, lived a very
grand country life, big estates, horses, that kind of thing. Partner 1 was from a working-
class family, had gone to Yale College and Yale Law School. It was clear to me from the
beginning that he was a truly superb lawyer. He was a big help to me when I was hired
there' (No 1 former partner).
16. In this book, this expression refers to the hours worked and collected by the lawyer him or
herself; it does not include amounts collected indirectly through work distributed to other
partners and associates.
17. `Partner 4 was the ®rst person who had not gone to Yale. He was from Harvard. Always
extremely well organized, very energetic, very good ®sherman. They immediately made
him a member of some ®shing club' (No 1 former partner).
Chapter 3
1. Recall that a multiplex relation is a polyvalent one, in which more than one resource is
transferred or exchanged. For members, this polyvalence created new ways for access to
resources. A substructure is de®ned as a con®guration of ties linking a small set of
network membersÐe.g. a pair of lawyers joined by mutual co-work ties, or a triplet of
lawyers two of whom are linked by mutual advice ties and a third is linked by friendship
to one of these two.
2. The description of the multiplex exchange system at work in the ®rm can only be partial,
since it was carried out based on three types of resources only. There were more than three
types. However, these resources were central to the production system and to individual
`survival' in this type of ®rm. I assume that knowledge of an exchange system based on
them is suf®cient to understand many of the processes at work in this ®rm.
3. I do not have hard information on who worked with whom in this ®rm, but I do have
information on who relied on whom for strong cooperation for the previous year (for
more details, see Lazega 2000b).
4. For Goffman (1961), individuals achieve role distance on their own. Surgeons joke and
hum during surgery. Here I assume that role distance has a strong relational dimension:
members need others to achieve it.
5. Structural equivalence refers to a procedure that represents patterns in complex
social networks data in simpli®ed form to reveal subsets of actors who are similarly
embedded in these networks of relations, and to describe relationships between these
subsets (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 347±93; Degenne and ForseÂ 1994). Two actors are
structurally equivalent if they have identical ties to and from all other actors in the
network. Since actors in a real social network are almost never structurally equivalent, the
analysis uses a measure of the degree to which pairs or subsets of actors approach
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structural equivalence. Analyses described in this book are carried out by available net-
work analysis software, particularly Structure 4 (Burt 1991) and Ucinet 4 (Borgatti 1991).
6. Overall densities of the co-workers', advisers', and friends' networks were respectively
0.22, 0.18, and 0.12. For associates among themselves, these densities dropped to 0.13 and
0.16 for the ®rst two networks, and increased to 0.15 for the friendship network.
7. Measurements used here are indegree centrality scores. Indegree centrality represents a
measurement of the extent to which members are `popular' in these networks and
therefore accumulate resources circulating in them (Freeman 1979). As summarized by
Wasserman and Faust (1994: 169±219), centrality measures identify the `most important'
actors in a social network. Since de®nitions of importance vary considerably, and a variety
of measures has been developed to locate the most central members in a network. I use
here one of such measures, called degree centrality, which highlights the difference
between the most and the least `active' members. In the network observed, high indegree
centrality scores re¯ect the most `popular' members. Network analysts have tried various
methodologies to look at the extent to which centrality is an operationalization of
powerÐi.e. the extent to which actors can convert a central position (where they bene®t
from a high concentration of resources and from competitive advantages) into power
(Burt 1982; Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky et al. 1988; Marsden 1982; Mizruchi 1994).
Indegree centrality was chosen (as opposed to other types of measurements of centrality)
because it can be considered to be an index of status. For an evaluation of the robustness
of this index for measuring status and power in organizations, see Brass (1984) and Brass
and Burkhardt (1992).
8. This may be due to the fact that members of the ®rm did not think of a managing
partner's administrative tasks as `real' legal work.
9. The proportion of dyadic Blau compounds that characterized a member's relational
pro®le decreased as one went down the seniority level; this shows that junior partners
either needed more advice or tended to be less `arrogant' than more senior ones (who did
not seek out advice from their advisees). Composition of typical members' pattern of
multiplex relationships in this context would be too long to describe here. A summary is
presented in Lazega (1999a).
10. In these pages, saying that members of a niche did not rely on each other for a certain type
of resource will be considered equivalent to saying that the transfers and exchanges of this
resource were not very intense, at least not intense enough to reach the thresholds de®ned
for the density tables presented in Appendix B. Thus a niche characterized by such a weak
solidarity was a fragile one.
11. To use Burt's expression (1982) for members whose relational pro®le is so different from
that of others in the networks examined that they are clustered in a common category of
members without structurally equivalent colleagues.
12. As mentioned at the beginning of chapter 3, recognizing this distinction more generally,
LeÂvi-Strauss (1949) separates two forms of exchange: direct or restricted exchange
(dyadic) and indirect or generalized exchange (structural). However, as seen in the
Introduction and in Chapter 1, the micro±macro link is always a matter of politicsÐof
how actors politicize exchanges, control, and especially regulation, for which they
support representativesÐnot a technical issue. Reaching the macro-level and a classi-
®cation of members based on the description of relational substructures at the dyadic or
higher-order level, where the focus is on ties, cannot be done mechanically, as Blau
(1964) sometimes thinks. Although the two approaches are complementary, they use
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two different units of analysis. Network analysts have often been trained (largely by
block-modelling) to think about network structure in terms of identifying (differ-
entiated) social positions (and the relations between them). In this approach, it is the
way in which individual nodes in the network are distinguished by patterns of incoming
and outgoing ties that is examined. This is a helpful approach, because the interest can
focus on how individual outcomes of various sorts differ accross network members. The
models ®tted below have a different focus, asking what homogeneous local processes
might be responsible for the overall structure. They posit local structural constraints (or
dependencies) and are explicit in assuming that, once the analysis has taken account of
these local structural tendencies, the overall structure is put together `independently'
from these piecesÐi.e. there is no global structure beyond the local structural tendencies.
This is not to say that global structure cannot be described in block-model-like termsÐ
only that what global structure there is can be explained in terms of local constraints. The
models can be seen as akin in theoretical form (but not necessarily substance) to both
balance theory and the strong±weak ties argument. Both of the latter accounts are
attempts to posit local structural constraints (e.g. tendency for friends of friends to be
friends; or strong tie associates of a person to be at least weakly tied) that explain global
structural tendencies (a bipartition of the network into friendship cliques in the one case,
the global disconnectedness of strong tie networks in the other). This approach is much
more tie-based than the block-modelling one and provides a different (and com-
plementary) lens through which to examine network structure. In this section, ties will
be the focus, and differences between nodes described indirectly, through their parti-
cipation in different ties. Of course, it would be useful to take more systematic advantage
of the complementarity of the two approaches by lining them up, side by side, but this
goes beyond what was needed for the purpose of this chapter (and what is easily done in
network analysis).
13. This does not mean that solidarity of another kind did not exist among members sharing
this type of characteristic, as will be shown below.
14. `You scatter when you begin to practise as partners. The bond of friendship may be cut by
different practices and lack of opportunity to mix with these people: different ¯oors,
different buildings, different specialities' (Partner 24).
15. This is not to say that inter-of®ce ties and cross-speciality ties did not exist. As will also be
shown below, friendships spanning boundaries were less frequent than the others, but still
important.
16. I am grateful to Marijtje van Duijn, University of Groningen, for help and advice in the
data analysis based on the p2 model. For detailed description of this methodology,
especially for the model selection procedure, see Van Duijn and Snijders (1995) and
Lazega and Van Duijn (1997).
17. Since the goal of the study is explanation rather than simple description, statistical modelling
is relevant even though we have the whole population. The residual terms in the statistical
models represent unexplained effects. On model-based and design-based inference, and on
non-included in¯uences as a basis for probability models, see Snijders and Bosker (1999).
18. Limiting the analysis of these effects to the dyadic level is not suf®cient for a fully-¯edged
description of niches. But, given the heavy weight of dyadic effects detected above in
this speci®c exchange system (when compared to triadic and higher order substructures),
this limited analysis is suf®cient to identify broad niche-building constraints under
which this exchange system operates.
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19. Choices among partners only and among associates only are examined in subsequent
chapters.
20. The negative and signi®cant interaction effect between status and speciality similarity
shows that these effects are not independent of each other, and that there is a trade-off
between them: each absorbs some of the effect of the other. In the p2 models, there is no
need for an independent interpretation of interaction effects, which qualify the separate
main effects.
21. Another `moderator' is the value of : it is quite high, which means that much
reciprocity still remains to be explained, but with other effects than those chosen in the
model.
22. Partners who created temporary task forces were not allowed to transform them into
more permanent ones (see Chapter 6). They could cultivate their autonomy vis-aÁ-vis their
organization, but only up to a point. They were not allowed to withdraw in a permanent
team that could start functioning independently of ®rm rules, policies, and system.
23. Mobilizing similarities in terms of several attributes could thus be perceived to be a
useful mitigating device by advice-seekers of any rank. Other mechanisms that will
not be quanti®ed here (and will therefore be included in the `random' part of the
model) operated as well. For instance, with much sought-out and selective advisers,
personalized access and multiplex ties could help advice-seekers in stretching advice as
much as possible before it became collaboration. But multiplex ties did not exist among
all the members of the organization, particularly beyond a certain size. Recall that, in
this ®rm, as in many others, the advice network was less dense than the co-workers'
network.
24. Note, for example, that women were not chosen as friends more than men, which con-
tradicts a general idea that, in organizations, role distance or emotional support is pro-
vided more by women than by men.
25. Status thus had an effect on members, choices of friends. However, in Of®ce I, associates
also tend to choose litigation partners as friends (probably because Partners 13, 24, and
26, all litigators and in charge of the associates committee, were in Of®ce I), much more
than Of®ce II associates chose Of®ce II partners as friends. This was probably why the lay-
offs of associates, at the end of 1990, came as more of a shock to Of®ce I associates than to
Of®ce II associates. To Of®ce I associates, they shed a new light on their friendship ties
with partners and on the congenial ambiance in their of®ce. Parameters show that status
differences and of®ce membership, but not speciality, did tend to affect socializing with
partners.
26. Additional signi®cant effects are rare, but can be strong. They are not interpreted here,
since they do not add much to (nor do they contradict) my argument about the creation
of niches.
27. Without longitudinal data, it is impossible to show how they emerge from a complex
process of self-organizationÐ that is, from mutual adjustments between colleagues who
behave according to their short- and long-term interests, gradually leading to these stable
patterns of behaviour in the organization.
28. I am grateful to Philippa Pattison, University of Melbourne, for running the p* models
presented in this book and for helping in the data analysis based on them. A more detailed
description of this analysis, including model selection procedures and tables reporting the
®t statistics for the univariate p* models, is available in Lazega and Pattison (1999). In all
p* tables below, the negative parameters for each type of tie signify that a tie between two
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actors was less likely than no tie (and the relative magnitudes of the parameters con®rm,
for example, that work ties were the most frequent and friendship ties were the least
frequent). Here, too, effects control for one another.
29. In fact, in a separate analysis of symmetric co-work ties, there was additional evidence of a
generalized exchange structure. Speci®cally, the parameter corresponding to a 4-cycle of
co-work ties adds substantially to the ®t of a model permitting cyclic and joint dyadic
exchange, and all three of these parameters are positive. This analysis, together with the
one reported in the text, con®rms that co-work ties possess a richly overlaid generalized
exchange structure.
30. The fact that the Level 6 (and 5) substructures add nothing to the ®t of the model indicate
that the tendency for 3-cycles to occur is not an artefact of the tendency for higher-order
substructures containing them to occur. The 3-cycle parameter estimate is robust across
models containing more complex substructures. Some of its occurrences are as con-
stituents of higher-order structures, but only to an extent predicted by the parameters for
their other lower-order constituents. Models show a positive tendency for 4-cycles in the
network of reciprocated work ties to be fairly compelling with respect to the existence of
generalized exchange.
31. Some, however, ended up enjoying the status of permanent associate, with less pressure,
weekends, and vacations. This attitude weakened incentives attached to status competi-
tion and was not openly encouraged, but increasingly accepted when the associate was
strongly specialized.
32. Robins et al. p* models (2000) bring in attributes for substructures beyond the dyadic
level.
33. Although I tried, I did not get information on what had gone on in the politics of
promotion to partnership for the previous and subsequent years. This would have ¯eshed
out this complex structural position. Partners avoided the issue. There were also not
enough (for statistical analysis) cases of associates becoming partners at SG&R in the few
years following ®eldwork. All of those promoted had strong ties with selected partners
who had acted as their champion. Few laterals made it to partnership: they may have
lacked the rock-solid support from several sponsors enjoyed by other proteÂgeÂs. Retro-
spectively, an associate who was passed over told me that, at the end of the day, he still did
not know on what basis the decision about him was made. The usual discourse heard in
most law ®rms includes analytical ability, detailed knowledge of two areas of law
important to ®rm clients, the ability to organize work with younger associates, the ability
to generate new business from ongoing clients or from new clients, good judgement, and
hard work. But serious candidates such as Associate 41, a Yale graduate, close friend to
many Of®ce I partners, member of Position Five in Figure 3.1, who participated in big
cases and avoided burn-out, did not make it. Cross-your-®ngers candidates such as
Associate 37, with an atypical career, did; and found themselves well accepted within the
®rm. Promotion was often as unpredictable as any committee decision, subject to
eleventh-hour revisions in a labyrinthine process. Meeting all the tests under broad
de®nitions of economic and professional merit did not mean that one would be pro-
moted. Of course, it was hard for associates not to take their omission personally, feeling
that a judgement had been made on them alone on the basis of merit. There still had to be
a strong need for new partners, and that need was decided by the partnership meeting.
An able specialist in a booming area had a better chance of making it than an able
specialist in a depressed area, even if both had the same commitment and relational skills,
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not just technical abilities. The only certainty was that the decision, once made, was also
made to appear democratic.
Chapter 4
1. This distinction is not simply cosmetic. The idea of distributed knowledge rests upon a
different conception of actors' cognitive work. It is driven by what I call `appropriateness
judgements' (Lazega 1992a), which involve structural ingredients such as status and
authority, two concepts entirely absent from cognitive psychologists' (and sometimes
even cognitive sociologists'!) work. In my view, transforming individual knowledge into
social and shared knowledge raises issues familiar to economists interested in the pro-
duction of collective goods. This can be dealt with only by bringing in a different
behavioural theory, one that takes into account the existence and competition between
various kinds of status and legitimate authority.
2. There were exceptions, of course. For example, in the case of Partner 8, the temptation
was strong to do everything by himself, not to seek cooperation with others.
3. Partners were especially well positioned to play on resource dependencies to get associ-
ates' commitment to their labour contract (which was not necessarily in the latters'
narrow and short-term self-interest).
4. For Burt (1992), network constraint measures `social capital' as a form of network
structure. Speci®cally, constraint is a function of network size, density, and hierarchy
(that measures the extent to which relations are directly or indirectly concentrated in a
single contact). A contact in which relations are concentrated is a `knot' in the network,
making it dif®cult for negotiations to proceed independently in separate relationships.
Constrained networks leave little opportunity for individual initiative, little chance to
withdraw from dif®cult relationships. Dif®cult relations persist because they
are interlocked with cooperative relations. The higher the constraint, the fewer oppor-
tunities for alternatives offered by one's contacts or contacts' contacts, and the lower the
performance.
5. As in Burt's approach (1992), the pattern of relationships in itself constitutes part of
members' individual `social capital'. Here I mainly analyse economic performance under-
stood as the amount of fees brought into the ®rm at the end of the year. Such amounts
depended minimally on the amounts of time worked and on hourly rates. Thus, the more
members worked, the more they performed in that sense. Following Coleman (1990), my
point is that extracting work from them was easier in a constrained network of work ties.
Analysing the determinants of other types of individual performance, such as promotion to
partnership, could presumably yield different results and an opposite sign to the associa-
tionÐwhich would be more in line with Burt's results. About this issue, see also Gabbay
(1997) and Lazega (2000d).
6. For example, a partner could take an associate with him or her to meet the client. The
associate would sit in at the meeting, listening and saying nothing, and the partner would
charge the associate's presence time to the client. This is not productivity in the usual
sense of the term, and the clients might or might not accept that this time be billed to
them.
7. Partners were careful about how their bills were worded. This affected how it was treated
by the clients in their books: it could make a difference for tax purposes (whether they put
it up as an asset, or as an expense to write off against income that year).
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8. However, causal links are dif®cult to identify with non-longitudinal data; it is impossible
to know here whether members were low performers because they established different
types of relationships with their colleagues, or whether they established these relation-
ships to try to mitigate the effects of their low performance and carve out a different place
for themselves in the group.
9. There were exceptions, of course: Partner 12, for example, had more than ten ties
including unreciprocated (by the other party) friendship ties. Seeking role distance from
many people nevertheless characterized associates' pro®les much more.
10. For some associates, such a combination becomes a handicap. At SG&R, for associates
only, centrality in terms of friendship affected collection negatively. This means that
associates who were very active socially, and provided on average more moral support to
others, played a role that was not recognized by ®rm accounts. Obviously the link between
the two phenomena is very indirect and remains to be explained, but it is nevertheless
statistically strong. The more central associates were in terms of their number of
co-workers (i.e. the more colleagues they worked with), the more hours they billed. The
only associates who signi®cantly collected more hours were those who were also central in
the co-workers network, (they tended to be senior associates). On average for associates,
seniority was the best predictor of performance in terms of hours collected, but seniority
and centrality as a co-worker were the best predictors of performance in terms of hours
billed.
11. This is not to say that this system, which made the partnership agreement enforceable,
disciplined all the members equally. Some paid a higher price to be part of it. For example,
as will be shown later in this chapter, some associates were put in a better position to try
to build their competitive advantage (in the race to partnership) in the use of these
embedded ties.
12. The issue of `unforgiveable mistakes' will not be dealt with here. Still, Goffman-like
gossip or stories, such as the following, did circulate within the ®rm: `There is really a
distinction between the people who were there from older generations, or because their
father was the president of a big utility company, often very decent human beings but
sometimes not very smart. One often used to make terrible mistakes; he was not a very
good trial lawyer. I realized that at the time, so I would frequently save his ass; I always
pushed our clients to settle their case rather than let him screw their case in court' (No 1
former partner).
13. See Burt (1992) and Flap (1999) for the general idea that, in many ways, returns on
human capital depend on members' relational capital.
14. This is possible through `epistemic alignment' or `co-orientation' (Lazega 1992a), which
is based on the interactive dimension of members' `appropriateness judgements'. Quality
control is thus more generally related to epistemic dimensions of collective action.
15. Firms recognized that protecting their knowledge was next to impossible, which is why
members were encouraged to publish it and use it to be recognized as specialists, in a mix
of academic and marketing approach.
16. General density of the advice network was 0.18. Answers varied considerably in quanti-
tative terms. At the two extremes, we have one partner who said that he did not need nor
ask anyone for advice, and another partner who declared that he had sought advice from
thirty other colleagues.
17. As seen in the univariate p* models of Table 3.4, the local organization of advice rela-
tions shows that the advice network did have positive parameters for transitivity and
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reciprocity, but the latter were weaker than for other types of tie, mainly because of status
competition. As con®rmed by Robins et al. (2000), 3-cycles were unlikely. Parameters
for 2-in-stars (see 14 in Figure 3.2), 2-out-stars (see 12 in Figure 3.2), and transi-
tive triads are positive (as well as the parameter for reciprocated ties) and the parameter
for advice ties of length 2 is negative. The contribution of the advice out-star con®g-
uration is to suggest the tendency for an individual to have sought advice from multiple,
unrelated others, while the contribution of the advice in-star parameter is to suggest the
likelihood that an individual received requests for advice from several unrelated individ-
uals. It is interesting that the parameter for paths of advice ties of length 2 is negative,
while the parameter for transitive triads is positive, and it is tempting to hypothesize that
paths of advice ties created the potential for new advice ties. Certainly, the collection of
important substructures of advice ties is consistent with a relation that exhibits tendencies
both to clustering (referring to what Blau (1964) calls `partnerships of mutual con-
sultation for less competent members') and to hierarchy, but with an emphasis on
hierarchical arrangement.
18. Some interpreted this as a form of professional `arrogance' or complacency. However,
recall that this law of seniority also limited their pool of available advisers.
19. For a more detailed analysis of this structure, see Lazega (1995a).
20. As shown in Chapter 5, substructures in which advice and friendship were bartered
were very likely. Recall as well that dimensions of formal structure had an in¯uence
on choice of advisers, and, therefore, indirectly provided some members with more
or better resources to deal with strong or diffuse competition (such as access to
authoritative advice). For associates, striking a fragile balance between cooperation and
competition by playing with the (unspoken) rules paid off for some, but not for others
(Lazega 1995a).
Chapter 5
1. This term refers to Merton's observation (1957) on status segregation as a mechanism for
managing role strain.
2. Corporate lawyers sometimes compared themselves with the highly-compensated
corporate executives for whom they worked, but more systematically, and realistically,
with other lawyers.
3. This process is similar to the `subtle give-and-take' identi®ed and analysed by Charles
Bosk's classic Forgive and Remember (1979: 143) between senior and junior surgeons (in the
work of senior members developing the socialization of junior members into the profes-
sion). On the one hand, senior members encouraged subordinates to question the grounds
of their (the seniors') actions; yet, on the other hand, senior members also tried to limit
that questioning so that it would not impair the quick judgements necessary in surgery.
This similarity holds, even though ritualized self-criticism seems much more limited in
corporate law ®rms than in surgery wards. Surgeons are socialized into the heroic ideal
of grace under pressure (Bosk 1979: 144). Lawyers live in a much more adversarial
environment, which both simpli®es and complicates the issue of status competition.
4. Note again, for example, that a single unidirectional work tie was very unlikely to come
up on its own in this ®rm. Work ties were mostly embedded in more complex and social
substructures.
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5. Despite the disjunction of these effects, at the dyadic level, aggregating for all members,
after sorting all existing ties between i and j, the most frequent type of tie was the Blau tie
(282 occurrences, 5.6% of the total number of possible ties).
6. There may be other plausible interpretations of the relationships between advice and
friendship. For instance, one could hypothesize different types of advice relationsÐthose
that re¯ected status differences, and those that were forged through friendship. But the
latter option underestimates the pressure of business on members' exchanges of advice. In
addition, time-dependent data are especially important for addressing these kinds of
issues, since the dynamics of tie generation are critical.
Chapter 6
1. Detection of `cliques' under strong components in Structure 4.1 (Burt 1991).
2. Cooperation could be imposed, and work was often done, with undesired co-workers:
associates and partners had to work with ®rm colleagues as opposed to lawyers from
outside the ®rm, and often with other partners and associates who would not have been
®rst on their list of reliable co-workers. Reluctant cooperation was especially frequent for
associates. Firm policies con¯icted in particular with lawyers' own personal preferences
when they put together a task force to work on a ®le.
3. I do not have all the detailed information that I would have liked to have to describe how
the ATC worked on a daily basis.
4. For example, there wereÐat the time of the studyÐfew senior associates coming from Ivy
League law schools, partly because they were fast-track people and had been moved up as
partners already, perhaps to avoid feelings of `relative deprivation'.
5. For both generalized exchange situations, sources of exploitation were less easily detectable
than in dyadic situations: `Exploitation therein will contribute to social disruption less
easily' (Ekeh 1976: 213).
6. Choices of co-workers created a network of strong work ties. The density of this
co-workers' network was higher than that of the advice and friendship networks. Recall
that overall densities of these networks were respectively 0.22, 0.18, and 0.12. In the co-
workers' network, 88% of all possible direct and indirect relations were possible in two
steps. The cost of having interaction, or access to cooperation, with most people (except
with one isolate) was low in general. Approximation of structural equivalence for this
speci®c network also uses Euclidean distances (Burt 1982, 1991).
7. The of®ce boundary will not be the centre of attention here: the two of®ces were not large
enough to survive individually as a general practice ®rm, which was why they had merged
eight years previously.
8. This de®nition does not include a small `boutique' (very specialized ®rm) that could not
survive on its own but that could be bought out by another ®rm. Given the size of most
®rms in the region, this case could be assimilated to a more or less individual defection,
which is not the topic of this chapter.
9. As in previous chapters, performance is measured by dollars brought in during 1990, the
year before ®eldwork, and centrality scores are indegree measures in the co-workers'
network. Top performers are lawyers who ranked between ®rst and ®fteenth in the ®rst
measure, and central lawyers are those who received more than twenty citations in the
second measure.
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10. Associates, the grinders, were represented in Figure 6.2 by Position Three on the litigation
side and Position Five on the corporate side. These were two pools of associates for whom
it was dif®cult to distinguish individual clientelistic ties with speci®c partners. I also
included here a position of lateral senior associates on the corporate side (Position
Seven), who worked with all the corporate partners in the ®rm.
11. Members who were not assignable to any position (the `residual category' in Burt's
language) were not, by de®nition, in a position to create a RED set. I therefore ignored
them for this argument. That does not mean that they did not have a role in the inte-
gration of the ®rm, but that this role was stronger in the ®rst integration process described
in this chapter, than in the second.
Chapter 7
1. The importance of this in¯uence cannot be underestimated. Very generally, persuasion
and in¯uence are essential among peers. Bourricaud (1961, 1964) notes the ambiguity of
collegial regimes towards the use of force. If no one is strong enough to impose his or her
point of view, the only chance of pushing through one's own preferences is to dilute them,
to trim what is too personal and too direct in them, and to create a coalition of members
who pursue in this issue their own advantages and interests.
2. The lateral control regime can be seen as supported by a wider micro-political culture
(Lazega 1992b; Pfeffer 1992; Van Maanen and Barley 1984). As will be shown below,
senior partners could also be chosen as sanctioners, because they had more traditional
legitimacy to intervene on behalf of the common good. It is, therefore, dif®cult to dis-
entangle partners' convergent expectations in their selections of sanctioners from a
`lateral control culture', understood as a set of learned choices that enabled well-socialized
partners in a stable organization to match sanctioners and infractors in a way consistent
with the `rule of the collegium'. Such learned ways would make the choice of sanctioners
more compatible with face-saving unobtrusiveness (choices of sanctioners might have to
signal to infractors that the ®rm was not going out of its way to remind them of their
obligations), would stress a norm of avoidance of con¯ict escalation, and could also be
explained by factors attributed to the subjective make-up of actors. Although the con-
tribution of this chapter is limited to a broadly conceived structural account of choices of
sanctioners and its underlying symbolic and strategic logic, some of this material is also
consistent with a more cultural account.
3. In this terminology, a lever ful®ls a function similar to that of a broker, especially of
a `coordinator' (as de®ned by Fernandez and Gould 1994). However, reducing leverage in
a lateral control regime to a simple form of brokerage ignores the common-good
dimension of this process.
4. Another example: `After I had been in the ®rm for three years, Mr Spencer called me and
told me this: `` I am telling you this a year before I would normally tell you. We are going
to offer you a partnership a year from now. The reason I am telling you now is that you've
been a very close friend of X's. We need help, because there is a real problem with his
work.'' I forget the details of the conversation, but they wanted insight. What did I know
that might help them deal with someone who had all the talent in the world, but was
obviously not doing ®rst-class work. They didn't want their relationship with X to be a
failure. Because of his [elite] social background, they probably cared more than they
would have cared about just anybody' (No 1 former partner).
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5. This vignette confronted partners with expressive problems that had repercussions on
productivity. For example, alcoholism was a problem in the ®rm, as well as in the pro-
fession. Partner 13: `In the New York Times today, an American Bar Association survey
gives a statistic I can't believe. 13% of lawyers normally have six drinks a day. Alcoholism
due to increasing pressure of the practice of law as a bottom-line oriented practice, and to
loss of collegiality within ®rms. Collegiality disappears among lawyers generally, not only
within the ®rm. Now the lawyers who are older than 50 say, `` I am looking forward to
getting out of this, it is not as much fun as it used to be.'' ' Partners did not agree to discuss
more instrumental, work-related, `deviant' behaviour. Nevertheless, I assume that this
data-set supplemented by thorough organizational analysis, qualitative interviews, and
information on partners' individual performance, is suf®cient to address the topic of this
chapter in a systematic, although limited way.
6. On the conditions under which vignettes can be used to elicit judgements or choices, and
the criteria underlying them, see e.g. Rossi (1979). In this situation, the question was
based on a reality that was the same for all the respondents, andÐgiven the rotation
ruleÐit left them where they were actually very likely to be. However, it would probably
not have been appropriate in a larger and more bureaucratic law ®rm, where the position
of managing partner would carry with it more power and a different status, and where
individual performance would not be made as visible to all partners as it was at SG&R
(Friedkin 1983).
7. I am grateful to David Krackhardt, Marie-Odile Lebeaux, and SteÂphane Vari for help and
advice at various stages in the complex statistical analyses of this three-way data. For
measurement of each partner's propensity to select a solution with regard to such options,
see Lazega and Krackhardt (2000), where Krackhardt's three different indexes (1994) are
used: the extent to which members fragmented their control environment (connectivity
scores), perceived a hierarchy in it (hierarchy scores), and perceived control to be a task-
force effort (graph ef®ciency scores).
8. In the following calculations, the single Of®ce III partner was counted as an Of®ce I
partner. Of®ce III had been set up two years before the study took place, and its members
were all originally from Of®ce I.
9. Analyses creating a typology of leverage strategies cross-tabulating cost (expensive or
cheap in relational termsÐi.e. using one's own personal ties for lateral control) and safety
(safe or unsafe from the ®rm's perspectiveÐi.e. using a multi-target lever or not) in
choices of levers reach the same misleading conclusion (with cheap and safe choices
representing between 42% and 67% of all choices of levers, depending on the type of tie).
This mistake can be avoided by weighting such ®gures at least by the general density of the
observed sociometric network.
10. Again, to avoid a misleading interpretation of Table 7.6, it is useful to know whether or
not, in the absolute, respondents and levers had the opportunity to choose personalized
paths more or less than they actually did. To proceed with this comparison, distributions
of frequencies of impersonal, uniplex, duplex, and triplex ties were reconstituted in the
population of partners by examining all the possible paths between any two individuals.
To perform this `frameshift', this distribution was weighted differently for each segment
of the in¯uence path (number of paths used by each respondent for the relations between
respondent and lever; number of times each partner was chosen as a lever for the rela-
tionship between lever and target). For a comparison between observed and weighted
(or `baseline') frequencies, see Lazega and Lebeaux (1995). This con®rms the tendency of
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respondents to `spend' the relational capital of the levers more than their own. It was a
deliberate strategy of respondents who managed to choose well-connected levers
(although one does not know if they would have actually let themselves be used). This
framing also con®rms that respondents chose most often impersonal in¯uence paths,
where there was no privileged relationship between the protagonists.
11. See note 9 for de®nition of safe/unsafe and expensive/cheap in this situation.
12. `Lateral' partners are partners who were never associates in the ®rm. Instead of coming up
through the ranks, they had been hired directly as partners, mostly away from another
®rm.
13. Only the most central levers were included in Figure 7.6, which explains, for example, the
absence of members on the negative side of axis 3.
14. For the relationship between this relaxation of a restrictive de®nition of structural
equivalence and in¯uence processes, see Marsden and Friedkin (1993). The latter,
however, do not reason in terms of costs of control.
15. A quick look at Appendix G shows that results tend to re-emphasize differences in of®ce
membership (Of®ce II partners spread the cost of control less than Of®ce I partners, and
tended to shift these costs to specialized MTLs more than Of®ce I levers), and differences
in friendship indegree centrality (popular partners in the friendship network also tended
to spread less and to shift to specialized, carefully selected levers more than less popular
respondents). Targets' dependencies on levers for resources tended to be important
additional criteria in partners' choices of levers, as were similarities between lever and
target in terms of of®ce location and in terms of level of seniority: the latter criteria were
used by partners who tried to `smooth' the lateral control process by allocating the control
costs to targets close to the levers geographically and in terms of experience (but not
speciality), while still counting on the levers' use of the target's dependence on such
resources.
Chapter 8
1. `Bestowing benefactions', as Blau (1964) calls it, adding that `risk is an essential element of
responsibility'.
2. Note that switching to a merit-based system would not immediately deprive senior
partners of their larger share. The client base changes only gradually, and more senior
lawyers were still likely to have greater client responsibility than younger lawyers. In
the ®rm's age-graded pyramid, older lawyers would still control most of the clients and
pro®ts.
3. But it was dif®cult for large law ®rms to differentiate themselves from other large law
®rms in the region: `You know, we all offer the same services; we offer the same turn-
around time; we offer equal or better con®dence, equal or better substantive coverageÐ
all you can do is simply say, give us a shot and we'll show you what we can do' (A member
of the marketing committee).
4. Changes were to be introduced four years later in 1995 under conditions that were not
observed systematically.
5. There are no isolates, but there were ten partners to whom almost no one listened.
6. The density of this network (0.33) was high compared to that of other networks observed
among the partners.
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7. By mobilizing more exogenous identities, the discussion of precarious values shows that
the privatization of the ®rm was an illusion. Members needed and used an `outside' to
create the norms and expectations that helped them think long term. They found that
kind of resource in their niche as well as outside it.
8. Fights to impose legitimacy or take it away from each other (Gibson 1999; Vilkas 1996)
are not visible in this research.
9. Partner 17 was the partner who would draft the language of a new partnership agreement
that was to be institutionalized four years after this study. In this new agreement, merit
criteria were introduced in the compensation system and a bonus pool created to reward
this merit. Partner 26, who was the `ringleader' in the changes, was receiving, in 1999, by
far the highest percentage of the bonus pool, `and he seems to deserve it', said the other
partners.
10. While all partners were entitled to speak on behalf of the interests of the ®rm as a whole,
members of the oligarchy at the top of the ®rm could be there only because they also
spoke on behalf of a constituency and voiced values supported by this constituency. It was
not enough to concentrate social or economic resources to be able to participate in¯u-
entially in the negotiation of precarious values. Partners 1 and 5 represented senior
partners; Partners 4 and 26 represented junior partners; Partners 17 and 20 represented
more medium-seniority partners.
11. Simply looking at the correlation between the number of kinds of centrality character-
izing each partner with his or her choices of policy provides few, if not misleading, results
concerning the relationship between structure and culture (Lazega 2000c). Ethnographic
observations did show that some multi-status oligarchs tended to be conservative. When
all forms of centrality were con¯ated without consideration to issues of status consistency
between various dimensions, the effects of these dimensions could cancel each other out
in undetected ways. This misleading character meant that the analysis had to bring in the
notion of compatibility between various dimensions of status.
12. Taken separately, variables re¯ecting the possible existence of other constituencies, such
as speciality and of®ce membership, do not have an effect on policy choices.
13. This, among other things, means that indirect in¯uence of the professional model still has
a structural effect on such ®rms. Whether such in¯uence is strong enough to guarantee
ethical conduct is another matter, which I have discussed elsewhere (Lazega 1994b; see
also Flood 1993; Hamermesh 1986; Hazard 1987; Powell 1985).
Conclusion
1. In general, an organizational approach has been shown to help understanding trust
violations, such as breaking clients' con®dence (Reichman 1989; Reiss 1984, 1988; Sha-
piro 1986; Weisburd et al. 1991; Vaughan 1983, 1998).
2. For more detailed references to the literature about this issue, see Lazega (1994b).
3. It is dif®cult to study the `decision to disclose', but there are many incentives not to
discloseÐjust like for the `decision to prosecute' by inspectors enforcing external regu-
lation (Hawkins and Thomas 1984).
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